REINE v. CLEMENT (2026)

In this child custody case, the trial court signed a judgment granting the father shared physical custody of the children with the mother, his former spouse. In the same judgment, the trial court designated the mother as the domiciliary parent but imposed restrictions upon her authority. On appeal, the father challenges the trial court's domiciliary parent designation as beyond the scope of the pleadings before the court. The mother answered the appeal, challenging the limitations imposed upon her as domiciliary parent and also challenging the award of shared physical custody. After review, we amend the judgment to remove the improper restrictions on the domiciliary parent and, as amended, affirm the judgment.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Garrett Kyle Reine and Megan Holliday Clement were married from June 2013 to March 2018. Together, they had two daughters -- one born in 2012 and another born in 2014 (the children). When Mr. Reine and Ms. Clement divorced, they entered a series of stipulated judgments regarding the children's custody in the matter entitled Megan Holliday Reine v. Garrett Kyle Reine, No. 121,533, Division B, 23rd Judicial District Court, Ascension Parish.

On March 29, 2018, the parties entered into a stipulated judgment whereby Mr. Reine had physical custody every other weekend and on his two days off during the week. Ms. Clement was designated as the domiciliary parent but Mr. Reine had the right to act as the domiciliary parent during his custodial time with the children. In August 2018, the parties implemented a 2-2-3 custodial schedule.¹ The parties entered a new stipulated judgment in July 2019 whereby Mr. Reine had physical custody of the children every other weekend and overnight on Tuesdays. The parties also agreed to split the costs of the children's extracurricular activities, extraordinary medical expenses, and school expenses.

After the July 2019 stipulated judgment was rendered, both parties moved outside of Ascension Parish and re-married. Ms. Clement moved to Ethel, Louisiana, and she has had two children with her current spouse. Mr. Reine moved to Central, Louisiana, where he lives with his current spouse and the children from his previous marriage. The children, who have both been diagnosed with dyslexia, previously attended a school in the Zachary Community School System. However, in the Fall of 2022, the mother enrolled them at the Silliman Institute in Clinton. Ms. Clement accepted a job teaching at the Silliman Institute the following year.

On November 9, 2022, Mr. Reine filed a petition in East Baton Rouge Parish seeking to modify the current custody award to obtain fifty-fifty shared physical custody with Ms. Clement. The petition also sought an order directing the parties to alternate holidays; an order to enroll the children in his employer-provided health insurance policy; and objecting to Ms. Clement's enrollment of the children at the Silliman Institute. In support of the modification, Mr. Reine averred that both he and Ms. Clement had moved away from Ascension Parish and that he wanted to foster a closer relationship with the children. Mr. Reine additionally averred that Ms. Clement refuses to alternate holidays with him and that she has made derogatory statements to him and about him in the children's presence.

Ms. Clement filed an answer and reconventional demand denying Mr. Reine's allegations and asking the court to maintain the existing joint custody agreement. Ms. Clement also filed a rule to modify child support, averring that Mr. Reine had a new job earning more money and had not been paying his proportionate share of non-covered medical expenses.

On December 19, 2022, the trial court signed a judgment determining physical custody of the minor children during the Christmas holidays, while the other issues raised in Mr. Reine's petition to modify were continued to a later date. The judgment also memorialized the parties’ agreement to make executory the stipulated judgments they previously entered into in Ascension Parish. In August 2023, the parties entered into a stipulated judgment agreeing to appoint Alan Taylor, Ph.D., to provide a custody recommendation.

Trial on the remaining issues raised by Mr. Reine's petition and Ms. Clement's rule to modify child support commenced on April 17, 2024, and continued on May 6, 2024. At trial, documents were introduced into evidence and the court heard testimony from multiple witnesses, including Mr. Reine, Ms. Clement, and Dr. Alan Taylor, the custody evaluator agreed to by the parties.

Mr. Reine testified at trial that he is a process operator at BASF in Geismar, Louisiana. He works a 2-2-3 schedule with 12-hour shifts that rotate days and nights. His wife is a registered nurse who works straight nights. Mr. Reine testified that if the court implemented an alternating weekly shared custody schedule that started on his current custody weekend, he would only have to work two shifts during the week he has custody of the children. When he has custody of the children, both he and his wife handle the children's bedtime routine and help the children with their homework. Mr. Reine indicated that he and Ms. Clement agreed to share physical custody on an alternating weekly basis the previous summer, which worked well in his opinion. He believed the same schedule would work well during the school year.

Ms. Clement testified that since she began teaching at the Silliman Institute, she works Mondays through Fridays from 8:00 A.M. to 3:30 P.M. She and the children ride to and from school together, and they have a 10 to 15 minute commute. Ms. Clement testified that when she and Mr. Reine visited the Silliman Institute before enrolling the children there, the headmaster informed them that the school had a special program for dyslexic students. After the children enrolled, they found out the program was no longer offered. Regardless, Ms. Clement testified that the children are doing “great” at the school. As far as extracurricular activities, Ms. Clement testified that her older daughter participates in basketball and competitive cheerleading. Her younger daughter barrel races horses, competing in the sport two to three weekends a month.

Ms. Clement opposes changing to a fifty-fifty shared physical custody arrangement because she believes Mr. Reine's house in Central is too far away from the children's school in Clinton. Also, she believes the children have a particular need for consistency in their routine due to their respective anxiety and ADHD diagnoses. She thinks it would be better for the children if they had the same parent getting them to and from school each day. Ms. Clement also expressed concern as to Mr. Reine's work schedule. Ms. Clement believed that, under a weekly shared custody arrangement, there would be days when Mr. Reine is getting the children ready for school, other days when his wife is getting the children ready for school, and still other days when neither Mr. Reine nor his wife is available to help them get ready.

Dr. Taylor, the court-appointed clinical psychologist, testified that this was “one of the most benign, normal, struggles to get through the custody evaluation and move forward that I've encountered[.]” According to Dr. Taylor:

It's the most normal situation and the people involved [are] the most capable, caring, have already done a great job. The kids are fine. ․ So, there is nobody involved in this that I would label as pathological ․, as not having the right motives, or is not doing the best they can.

Dr. Taylor also testified that both step-parents are excellent.

However, Dr. Taylor did not recommend a change to fifty-fifty shared physical custody. He believed that until the girls were sophomores in high school, “the presence of the mother is more important.” Dr. Taylor testified this opinion was based upon a developmental point of view that considered the age of the girls. Dr. Taylor instead recommended additional counseling for the parties -- a therapist to help the children and Mr. Reine build their relationship and a parenting coordinator to assist the parties with their communication. In support of his counseling recommendation, Dr. Taylor testified that the children were “emotionally struggling with the amount of animosity, the parents not getting along with one another.” When the court pointed to Dr. Taylor's earlier testimony suggesting that this was a normal, benign case, Dr. Taylor clarified that he was not saying there should not be fifty-fifty custody in this case. Instead, he recommended the appointment of “someone to promote it and help develop it ․, rather than just arbitrarily [doing] it now.”

After the hearing, the trial court granted Mr. Reine's request to modify the custody arrangement. On July 9, 2024, the trial court signed the judgment in accordance with the earlier ruling, awarding joint legal custody with shared physical custody to be exercised on alternating week-long periods, commencing on Fridays. The trial court also designated Ms. Clement as the domiciliary parent “for health and education issues,” but restricted her authority by ordering the children to undergo a professional evaluation to determine their educational needs. The trial court also ordered Mr. Reine to give Ms. Clement a copy of his work schedule; Mr. Reine to give Ms. Clement a right of first refusal with respect to any unexpected shifts he must cover before placing the children in another's care; and ordered that the children continue individual counseling. The court awarded retroactive child support in the amount of $2,685.25 and ordered Mr. Reine to pay $664.90 per month in child support beginning May 15, 2024. Mr. Reine appealed the trial court's judgment and Ms. Clement answered the appeal.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

On appeal, Mr. Reine assigns error to the trial court's designation of Ms. Clement as the domiciliary parent on grounds the issue was not raised by the pleadings before the court. In her answer, Ms. Clement assigns error to: (1) the restrictions placed on her as domiciliary parent; (2) the determination of physical custody and ancillary relief awarded; and (3) the determination of child support, including retroactive child support and expense sharing. However, Ms. Clement only challenges the child support determination in the event this Court reverses the shared physical custody determination.

APPLICABLE LAW

The Louisiana Supreme Court in Hodges v. Hodges, 2015-0585 (La. 11/23/15), 181 So.3d 700, 702, discussed the law that governs joint custody decrees like the one at issue in this case:

In a proceeding for divorce or thereafter, the court shall award custody of a child in accordance with the best interest of the child. La. C.C. art. 131. The best interest of the child is the sole criterion to be met in making a custody award, as the trial court sits as a sort of fiduciary on behalf of the child and must pursue actively that course of conduct which will be of the greatest benefit to the child. ․

If the parents agree who is to have custody, the court shall award custody in accordance with their agreement unless the best interest of the child requires a different award. La. C.C. art. 132. In the absence of an agreement, or if the agreement is not in the best interest of the child, the court shall award custody to the parents jointly; however, if custody in one parent is shown by clear and convincing evidence to serve the best interest of the child, the court shall award custody to that parent. ․Id.

As provided in La. C.C. art. 134, all relevant factors in determining the best interest of the child must be considered by the court. ․ However, once that decision is reached, La. R.S. 9:335 ․ governs a court's determination of the details of the custody arrangement.

Each child custody case must be viewed in light of its own particular set of facts and circumstances, with the paramount consideration being the child's best interest. Weicks v. Stromberg, 2023-1004 (La. App. 1 Cir. 3/22/24), 388 So.3d 398, 402. The trial court is in the best position to ascertain the child's best interest given each unique set of circumstances. Accordingly, a trial court's custody determination is entitled to great weight and will not be reversed on appeal unless an abuse of discretion is clearly shown. See Yepez v. Yepez, 2021-0477 (La. App. 1 Cir. 12/22/21), 340 So.3d 36, 41.

Domiciliary Parent Designation

Mr. Reine's Assignment of Error and Ms. Clement's Assignment of Error No. 1

On appeal, Mr. Reine contends the trial court lacked jurisdiction to modify the domiciliary parent designation. In support, Mr. Reine contends that neither party requested a modification of the domiciliary parent designation in the pleadings; neither party consented to trying the modification of the designation; and neither party orally moved to amend their pleadings during trial to assert an action to modify the designation. Rather, Mr. Reine contends that all evidence introduced at trial and considered by the trial court pertained to modifying the allocation of physical custody between the parties.

Ms. Clement argues in response that the trial court properly designated a domiciliary parent because the court rendered a decree of joint custody. In support, Ms. Clement points to La. R.S. 9:335(B)(1), which directs that “[i]n a decree of joint custody[,] the court shall designate a domiciliary parent except when there is an implementation order to the contrary or for other good cause shown.” Ms. Clement contends that once the parties asked the court to evaluate custody and issue a considered decree of joint custody, the trial court was obliged to follow La. R.S. 9:335’s dictates regarding the appointment of a domiciliary parent. Ms. Clement thus contends the trial court's appointment of a domiciliary parent was correct. We agree.

The issue of custody was before the trial court by virtue of Mr. Reine's petition to modify custody. When Mr. Reine filed his petition to modify custody, the parties were put on notice that the issue of custody was going to be before the court. See Stewart v. Desoto, 2024-0289 (La. App. 1 Cir. 9/26/24), 2024 WL 4297822, *5. After the trial concluded, the court rendered a judgment decreeing joint legal custody.

When joint custody is decreed and in the absence of good cause shown, a joint custody implementation order “shall allocate the time periods during which each parent shall have physical custody of the child” and “shall allocate the legal authority and responsibility of the parents.” Hodges, 181 So.3d at 709, quoting La. R.S. 9:335(A)(1), (2)(a), and (3). The Legislature thus envisioned the order as a means of allocating physical and legal custody. See Hodges, 181 So.3d at 709. The statute then directs that the court “shall” designate a domiciliary parent except when there is an implementation order to the contrary or for other good cause shown. La. R.S. 9:335(B)(1).

Here, the trial court had authority to designate a domiciliary parent because it decreed joint legal custody. This Court has considered, and rejected, similar attempts to limit a trial court's authority to render a valid judgment under La. R.S. 9:355. See Stewart, 2024 WL 4297822, *5 (on a rule to modify physical custody, this Court found the trial court acted within its discretion by allocating decision-making authority to the parties); Griffith v. Lary, 2011-0512 (La. App. 1 Cir. 9/20/11), 2011 WL 4375321, *2 (where the father filed a petition seeking to become the domiciliary parent, this Court found no due process violation in the trial court's judgment designating the mother as the domiciliary parent). Recognizing the trial court's authority to fashion a joint custody implementation order that fulfills the requirements of La. R.S. 9:335 comports with the court's paramount consideration -- that is, creating a custody arrangement that is in the child's best interest. See Gorio v. Gorio, 2025-0353 (La. App. 1 Cir. 9/19/25), 2025 WL 2738706, *5.

We also reject Mr. Reine's contention that physical custody was the only issue before the court. Legal custody is the right or authority of parents to make decisions concerning the child's upbringing. Evans v. Lungrin, 97-0541 (La. 2/6/98), 708 So.2d 731, 737. Mr. Reine filed a petition to modify custody “and for other relief,” which included his “objection to choice of school by domiciliary parent.” Mr. Reine's petition requested, among other things, an order directing the children to return to the Zachary Community School District; alternatively, allowing him to enroll the children in the Central Community School District; or alternatively, ordering the enrollment of one daughter in additional disability-specific therapy if the children remained at the Silliman Institute. By seeking relief relating to the children's education, Mr. Reine's petition requested relief that implicates matters of legal custody and specifically challenged the domiciliary parent's decision concerning same. Mr. Reine thus placed the issue of legal custody before the court. For this additional reason, we find that the trial court did not err by designating a domiciliary parent in the judgment.

Next, we consider Ms. Clement's contention that the trial court placed improper limits upon her authority as the domiciliary parent. The trial court designated Ms. Clement as the domiciliary parent for health and education issues, except that:

once the minor children have completed the third grade at the Silliman Institute, the parties shall have the minor children evaluated by a qualified professional to determine what the minor children's educational needs are and whether the Silliman Institute satisfies the children's educational needs. After the evaluation, the parties shall confer to determine what school the minor children should attend beginning with the 2024-2025 academic year.

The trial court limited Ms. Clement's authority with respect to educational decisions by requiring the children to undergo an evaluation to determine their educational needs and to determine whether the Silliman Institute satisfies their educational needs.² There was no specific finding that the domiciliary parent's decision to enroll the children in the Silliman Institute was not in their best interest or that Mr. Reine's selection of a school in Zachary or Central was a better choice.

The authority of a domiciliary parent is set forth in La. R.S. 9:335(B)(3). Under that statutory provision, the domiciliary parent shall have the authority to make all decisions affecting the child unless an implementation order provides otherwise. La. R.S. 9:335(B)(3). All major decisions made by the domiciliary parent are presumed to be in the child's best interest. See id. The Louisiana Supreme Court has rendered several recent opinions that clarify the parameters of the domiciliary parent designation.

In Hodges, the Louisiana Supreme Court held that La R.S. 9:335 precludes the designation of “co-domiciliary parents” in a joint custody arrangement. Rather, the Supreme Court stated that the plain language of La. R.S. 9:355(B)(3) manifests the legislature's intent to establish a custodial system in which a child has no more than one domiciliary parent. Hodges, 181 So.3d at 706. More recently, the Louisiana Supreme Court considered the propriety of a judgment that designated the father as the children's domiciliary parent but also provided that the children must remain enrolled at their school in the Central Community School System so long as the mother maintained her residence there. Thibodeaux v. Thibodeaux, 2025-00972 (La. 8/6/25), 415 So.3d 932, 933 (per curiam). The Thibodeaux Court found that the judgment improperly infringed on the father's authority as domiciliary parent. In reaching its decision, the Louisiana Supreme Court rejected the mother's contention that the school provision nevertheless constituted a valid implementation order, pointing out that the judgment failed to specify any legal authority or responsibility of the mother with respect to school choice.³ Id., at 933.

Here, we conclude the trial court's judgment violates La. R.S. 9:335(B)(3) by placing unwarranted restrictions on Ms. Clement's authority as the domiciliary parent. Problematically, the judgment unilaterally orders the children to undergo a professional evaluation. As in Thibodeaux, this order improperly infringes upon Ms. Clement's authority as domiciliary parent under La. R.S. 9:335(B)(3). See Thibodeaux, 415 So.3d 932, at 932-933. Also, as in Thibodeaux, this order cannot constitute a valid implementation order because it does not allocate any legal authority or responsibility of the father. Id. Accordingly, we reverse that portion of the judgment that improperly imposes restrictions on the designated domiciliary parent.

Shared Physical Custody

Ms. Clement's Assignment of Error No. 2

Ms. Clement next challenges the portion of the judgment that increased Mr. Reine's custody by awarding the parties fifty-fifty shared physical custody of the children. Where, as here, the original custody decree is a stipulated judgment, the party seeking modification must prove that (1) there has been a material change of circumstances since the original custody decree was entered, and (2) the proposed modification is in the best interest of the child. Evans, 708 So.2d at 738. In a proceeding in which joint custody is decreed, physical custody of the children should be shared equally “[t]o the extent it is feasible and in the best interest of the child[.]” La. R.S. 9:335(A)(2)(b). See also Stephens v. Stephens, 2002-0402 (La. App. 1 Cir. 6/21/02), 822 So.2d 770, 776.

In this case, Mr. Reine bore the burden of proving a material change of circumstances affecting the children's welfare and that the change to fifty-fifty shared physical custody was in the children's best interest. See Yepez, 340 So.3d at 42. Mr. Reine also bore the burden of proving that fifty-fifty shared custody was feasible. See Stephens, 822 So.2d at 777. In her answer to the appeal, Ms. Clement contends Mr. Reine did not satisfy his burden of proving that the modification was feasible or in the children's best interest.

The trial court found that the proposed custody modification was in the children's best interest based upon its consideration of the best interest factors set forth in La. C.C. art. 134.⁴ Those factors are non-exclusive, and the determinations as to the weight to be given each factor is left to the discretion of the trial court. La. C.C. art. 134, 1993 Revision Comments- comment (b). Regarding Factor 2, the court pointed out that both parents show love and affection for the children and they both have strong blended family structures, with spouses and grandparents on both sides who are available to help transport the children to their various activities and school events.⁵ Regarding Factor 3, the court pointed to Mr. Reine's testimony that he attends church with his wife and children.⁶

The trial court weighed Factor 4 heavily.⁷ Under this factor, which considers the ability of the parents to provide for the material and medical needs of the children, the court found that both parents are employed and share the cost of their children's extracurricular activities. The trial court noted that Mr. Reine and Mr. Clement (Ms. Clement's current spouse) pay for health insurance for the children through their respective employers’ policies. Mr. Reine and Ms. Clement bring the children to their weekly counseling sessions. However, the court noted that Ms. Clement was more proactive when it came to handling the children's medical needs. The court pointed out that neither party scheduled a follow-up evaluation of the children's educational and health accommodations before trial. The court also acknowledged testimony that Mr. Reine's work schedule has caused him to be late or request exchange modifications but nevertheless found no dispute that he was a “highly active father in the children's lives and their․ many activities.”

Regarding the children's school under Factor 10, the court expressed concern about the children's enrollment at the Silliman Institute.⁸ The court pointed to evidence the children need supplemental educational assistance, which they previously received while attending school in the Zachary Community School System, but which the Silliman Institute did not provide until students reached the third grade. Regarding the distance between the parties’ residences under Factor 13, the trial court found this was not an issue because the parties’ custody exchanges do not take place at their residences.⁹ The trial court also found that when Mr. Reine took voluntary overtime at work, the children were not in his custody the majority of the time.

Regarding Dr. Taylor's testimony as the custody evaluator by stipulation of the parties, the court found that his testimony was contradictory. According to the court, Dr. Taylor testified that the children were “emotionally struggling with the amount of animosity,” and that “the family is dysfunctional,” after previously testifying that this case presented a benign and normal case. The court also found that Dr. Taylor's custody recommendations may have hinged upon the gender and age of the children. The court thus determined that it would only consider Dr. Taylor's positive statements “as the truest appreciation of the family and adhere to the recommendation in part as to maintaining the individual therapy for the minor children, and nothing more.” The court then rendered its decision awarding shared physical custody, finding that “[e]ven at their young ages, if [the children] can be highly involved in activities that change and weekly health appointments with heavy family support, this custody arrangement can be addressed.”

The issue before us is whether the trial court abused its great discretion by awarding shared physical custody to the parents and rejecting Dr. Taylor's expert opinion recommending against shared physical custody. See Yepez, 340 So.3d at 43. It is well-settled that an appellate court cannot set aside a trial court's findings of fact in the absence of manifest error or unless those findings are clearly wrong. Weicks, 388 So.3d at 403. The manifest error standard demands great deference to factual findings that are based on credibility determinations. Id. Also, the trial court is not bound by the testimony of an expert; an expert's testimony is to be weighed the same as any other evidence. Fountain v. Fountain, 93-2176 (La. App. 1 Cir. 10/7/94), 644 So.2d 733, 738.

In support of its decision to disregard Dr. Taylor's custody recommendation, the trial court pointed to apparent contradictions in his testimony. While we are unable to verify all of the contradictions cited by the trial court (i.e., we did not see any testimony by Dr. Taylor that the family was dysfunctional), we agree that Dr. Taylor's testimony about the family seemed contradictory. Dr. Taylor initially testified about how “benign” and “normal” this family's struggles were, but he later testified that the children were emotionally struggling with the amount of animosity between their parents. We also agree that Dr. Taylor's recommendation against shared physical custody relied more heavily upon the children's gender and developmental expectations, with less consideration of the information he obtained from his interviews with the family members. Furthermore, Dr. Taylor acknowledged in his testimony at trial that he was not saying there should not be fifty-fifty custody in this case. Under these circumstances, we find no error in the trial court's decision not to adopt Dr. Taylor's custody recommendation.

Moreover, we find the evidence supports the trial court's determination that a modification to award fifty-fifty physical custody is in the children's best interest. The evidence also demonstrates that shared physical custody is feasible. When the matter was tried, the children were 9 and 11 years old. The parties successfully implemented weekly shared physical custody the summer before trial. According to Mr. Reine's testimony, it takes him approximately 35 to 40 minutes to drive from his house to the children's school at the Silliman Institute. Mr. Reine also explained how his job will have a minimal impact upon his time with the children under a weekly shared custody arrangement. The evidence demonstrated that Mr. Reine's spouse actively assists with the children's care, helping them with their homework and bedtime routines. When Mr. Reine was late picking up the children or requested a change in the custody exchanges, the evidence indicated that it was due to work or traffic he encountered commuting from his work in Geismar. While Ms. Clement expressed concern about the impact the weekly changes in custody would have on the children, the trial court reasonably determined that the children's busy extracurricular activity schedule suggested they could successfully adjust to the weekly shared physical custody arrangement.

Contrary to Ms. Clement's contention that there is “absolutely no evidence in the record” to show that fifty-fifty custody is in the children's best interest and “nothing the trial court could have relied on” to establish that it is feasible, our review of the evidence demonstrates otherwise. We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's custody determination. See Yepez, 340 So.3d at 41. This assignment of error by Ms. Clement lacks merit.¹⁰

Because we find the trial court did not abuse its discretion with respect to the physical custody determination, but we find the domiciliary parent restrictions violated La. R.S. 9:335(B)(3), we amend the judgment to remove any restrictions on the designated domiciliary parent and affirm, as amended.

CONCLUSION

We amend the portion of the trial court's July 9, 2024 judgment that placed improper restrictions on the designated domiciliary parent as discussed herein. We affirm the judgment, as amended. We assess costs of this appeal equally, one-half to Garrett Kyle Reine and one-half to Megan Holliday Clement.

JUDGMENT AMENDED; AFFIRMED AS AMENDED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The record does not include a document memorializing this agreement. Information about the agreement instead came from the parties’ testimony at trial. Under a typical 2-2-3 custodial schedule, parents alternate custody each week, with the children spending Monday and Tuesday with one parent, Wednesday and Thursday with the other parent, and then Friday, Saturday, and Sunday with the first parent. See Hansbrough v. Hansbrough, 2010-0846 (La. App. 1 Cir. 9/24/10), 2010 WL 3724735, *1 n. 1.

2.   We acknowledge that the judgment refers to the 2024-2025 school year, which has already passed. However, we do not consider the issue moot because the judgment is not clearly limited to the 2024-2025 school year, and may be interpreted as requiring the parties to confer at the beginning of every school year.

3.   Recently, the Louisiana Supreme Court reversed a trial court judgment in another matter that involved school choice. Robert v. Robert, 2025-00957 (La. 8/5/25), 415 So.3d 931 (per curiam). In Robert, the parents entered a stipulated judgment consistent with La. R.S. 9:335(B)(3) insofar as it treated an arbitrator's decision on school choice as if it were made by a domiciliary parent and placed the aggrieved party in the position of a non-domiciliary parent for purposes of judicially challenging the arbitrator's decision. Id., at 932. After the arbitrator selected a school for the child, which was the school preferred by the mother, the father sought judicial review. After a hearing, the trial court ordered the child to attend the school preferred by the father. On the mother's writ application, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court, finding it improperly substituted its judgment in place of the arbitrator's decision, without applying La. R.S. 9:335(B)(3)’s presumption that the arbitrator's choice was in the best interest of the child (per the stipulated judgment).

4.   The trial court determined that the parents’ moves and the change of schools by the children constituted material changes.

5.   Factor 2 of La. C.C. art. 134(A) considers the love, affection, and other emotional ties between each party and the child.

6.   Factor 3 of La. C.C. art. 134(A) considers the capacity and disposition of each party to give the child love, affection, and spiritual guidance and to continue the education and rearing of the child.

7.   Factor 4 of La. C.C. art. 134(A) considers the capacity and disposition of each party to provide the child with food, clothing, medical care, and other material needs.

8.   Factor 10 of La. C.C. art. 134(A) considers the home, school, and community history of the child.

9.   Factor 13 of La. C.C. art. 134(A) considers the distance between the respective residences of the parties.

10.   We pretermit consideration of Ms. Clement's third assignment of error pertaining to the determination of child support because Ms. Clement only urged this assignment in the event this Court reversed the shared physical custody determination. The issue is moot as we are not reversing the shared physical custody determination.

GREENE, J.

McClendon, C.J. concurs in the result.