PEDERSEN v. HOWARD (2026)

This underlying litigation results from a fee sharing dispute between attorneys, Relator Jonathan C. Pedersen and Respondent D. Douglas Howard, Jr. Relator seeks review of the district court's March 4, 2026 judgment which denied Relator's Motion to Dissolve Writ of Sequestration, or, Alternatively, Allow Security in Lieu of Cash and Increase Bond for Writ of Sequestration (“motion to dissolve”). For the reasons that follow, we grant Relator's writ application, reverse the judgment, lift the stay, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Relator began work with Respondent as a licensed attorney in 2009. He received a salary as a contract attorney until 2018. Over the years, Relator worked on some personal matters for Respondent and the parties shared fees generated from some contingency fee contracts. The parties’ professional relationship terminated in February 2025.

The fee dispute at issue herein involves the settlement of a case captioned Endurance American Company v. Cheyenne Partners, LLC, et al (“Endurance”). The case settled in July 2023, and Relator's attorney's fees totaled $2,257,160.87. Relator filed a Petition for Declaratory Judgment seeking a declaration that Respondent was not entitled to any portion of the Endurance fee, averring in part, that he developed the case from his own client base; worked the case alone; and paid costs out of his separate accounts.

In reply, Respondent filed a Verified Reconventional Demand, Answer, and Affirmative Defenses, claiming the parties had a joint venture agreement which entitled him to a portion of revenues generated by Relator. Thereafter, Respondent filed a Motion for Issuance of Writ of Sequestration (“sequestration motion”) to sequester two-thirds of the attorney's fees from the Endurance settlement pursuant to the joint venture agreement. Relator opposed the motion, contesting the existence of a joint venture agreement. The trial court granted Respondent's sequestration motion; ordered Relator to deposit $1,504,773.91 into the registry of the court; and ordered Respondent to post security of ten percent of the sequestered funds.

Before the deadline to deposit the funds, Relator filed a motion to dissolve. The trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing on January 7, 2026, and February 9, 2026 (collectively, the “evidentiary hearing”). At the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied the motion to dissolve; however, sua sponte, reduced the writ of sequestration order from two-thirds of the attorney's fees at issue—$1,504,773.91—to one-half of the fees—$1,128,580.44.

Relator timely filed the present writ application.¹

DISCUSSION

Assignments of Error

Relator raises the following assignments of error:

1. The trial court erred by failing to dissolve the writ of sequestration when Respondent did not prove that a joint venture agreement existed which entitled Respondent to two-thirds of all fees prior to December 12, 2022.

2. The trial court erred by failing to dissolve the writ of sequestration when Respondent failed to prove a joint venture agreement existed which specifically entitled Respondent to two-thirds of the fees generated from the Endurance settlement.

Standard of Review

Where factual determinations have been made, established jurisprudence provides that “a court of appeal may not set aside a trial court's or a jury's finding of fact in the absence of ‘manifest error’ or unless it is ‘clearly wrong.’ ” St. Bernard Port, Harbor & Terminal Dist. v. Violet Dock Port, Inc., L.L.C., 2017-0434, p.12 (La. 1/30/18), 239 So.3d 243, 252 (quoting Rosell v. ESCO, 549 So.2d 840, 844 (La. 1989)).

Writ of Sequestration

In Louisiana, a writ of sequestration permits the seizure of property by a party who claims an interest in the property to prevent its disposal by another party so as to preserve the property during the pendency of a judicial proceeding. See Succession of Barrios, 2017-0560, p. 15 (La. App. 4 Cir. 4/6/18), 243 So.3d 122, 132. A writ of sequestration “shall issue only when the nature of the claim and the amount thereof ․ and the grounds relied upon for the issuance of the writ clearly appear from specific facts shown by the petition verified by, or the separate affidavit of, the petitioner․” La. C.C.P. art. 3501. However, La. C.C.P. art. 3506 provides, in part, that “[t]he defendant by contradictory motion, may obtain a dissolution of a writ of attachment or of sequestration, unless the plaintiff proves the grounds upon which the writ was issued.” Hence, “the burden of proof shifts to the plaintiff to establish the facts constituting grounds for the issuance of the writ.” Yorkwood Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Thomas, 379 So.2d 798, 799 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1980). This means the party who obtained the writ of sequestration is put to its burden of proof for a second time in court through a contradictory hearing. Hargett v. Hargett, 1998-1470, p. 6 (La. App. 3 Cir. 3/31/99), 732 So.2d 666, 669. As a writ of sequestration is an extremely harsh remedy, issuance and maintaining the writ requires strict and literal compliance with all formalities. See Hancock Bank v. Alexander, 256 La. 643, 237 So.2d 669, 672 (1970); see also Yorkwood, 379 So.2d at 799.

Evidentiary Hearing

Respondent's entitlement to a writ of sequestration rests on his claim that a joint venture agreement between the parties required Relator to pay him two-thirds of any fees generated by the Endurance settlement. In our review of the evidence and testimony offered at the evidentiary hearing, we find Respondent did not meet his burden of proof to factually establish the existence of a joint venture agreement, in general, or a fee sharing agreement specific to the Endurance settlement sufficient to deny Relator's motion to dissolve.

At the hearing herein, evidence of disbursement checks and witness testimony established the parties utilized some form of a fee sharing arrangement on numerous cases. Some disbursements showed Respondent received a two-thirds fee; in other matters, Respondent received a one-third fee; and in some cases, no fees were shared. Notwithstanding, Respondent did not conclusively establish that a formal, written joint venture agreement existed between the parties. Respondent acknowledged he met with Relator to sign a written joint venture agreement. However, Respondent admitted and Relator testified that no written document established a joint venture agreement or a fixed percentage of fees to be split between the parties. Additionally, in an unrelated lawsuit, Respondent and Relator indicated they had no fee sharing agreement except on a case-by-case basis.²

Respondent's testimony also acknowledged Relator's claim that after Respondent stopped paying Relator a salary, their arrangement was “you eat what you kill.” Relator contended this arrangement applied to the Endurance case. Relator attested that he brought in the case because the client was a relative. Respondent verified that he did no substantive work on the case and that Relator had paid all the costs. Moreover, Respondent submitted no objective, documentary evidence of an express agreement with Relator which entitled Respondent to two-thirds of the attorney fee award from the Endurance matter.

Based on the above-referenced findings from the evidentiary hearing, Respondent did not meet his “second” burden of proof obligation at the evidentiary hearing to prove specific facts; and consequently, Respondent did not strictly and literally comply with the formalities of La. C.C.P. art. 3501 to maintain the writ of sequestration. See Yorkwood, 379 So.2d at 799. Therefore, the trial court abused its discretion in denying Relator's motion to dissolve.

Further, we note the trial court also erred in denying the motion to dissolve by its decision to reduce the amount of attorney's fees subject to sequestration. The Supreme Court has determined that,

․ dealing as they [La. C.C.P. arts. 3501 and 3571] do with an extremely harsh remedy which is only extended where the formalities of the law have been strictly and literally complied with—will not permit an amendment once the defendant has moved to dissolve a conservatory writ.

Hancock Bank, 237 So.2d at 672; see also Sunbelt Innovative Plastics, L.L.C. v. Velvet Pines Developers, L.L.C., unpub., 2024-0178, (La. App. 1 Cir. 4/4/24), 2024 WL 1460465, at *1(Welch, J., concurring, “the trial court erred in allowing plaintiff ․ to amend its writ of sequestration to cure a deficiency with the amount to be seized after defendant filed a motion to dissolve the writ of sequestration”, citing Hancock Bank, 237 So.2d at 672). Therefore, in finding that the amount to be sequestered should be reduced from $1,504,733.01—the two-thirds amount initially claimed by Respondent in his motion for a writ of sequestration—to $1,128,580.44, the trial court implicitly allowed Respondent to amend the motion to sequester after Relator had filed his motion to dissolve. As referenced, such an amendment contravenes Hancock Bank, supra.

Remand

Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Art. 3506 also provides that “[i]f the writ of attachment or of sequestration is dissolved, the action shall then proceed as if no writ had been issued.” Accordingly, as the granting of Relator's motion to dissolve does not decide the merits of the underlying litigation, this matter is remanded to the trial court to proceed as if the writ of sequestration had not been issued.

DECREE

Based on the foregoing reasons, we grant Relator's writ application, reverse the judgment, lift the stay, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

WRIT GRANTED; JUDGMENT REVERSED; STAY LIFTED; AND REMANDED

FOOTNOTES

1.   Relator also requested a stay of the writ of sequestration order in his writ application which was granted by this Court. See Pedersen v. Howard, 2026-C-0150 (La. App. 4 Cir. 3/5/26).

2.   Respondent acknowledged that in a suit brought by his step-siblings captioned Conroy v. Howard, Reed & Pederson, Civil District Court, Docket Number: 2019-09363, Respondent's Answer included the statement that ‘[t]here is no sharing of any fees or costs except on a case-by case basis, and then only by specific agreement in connection with a specific case.”

Judge Sandra Cabrina Jenkins

LOBRANO, J., CONCURS IN THE RESULT CHASE, J., CONCURS IN THE RESULT