HOYT OLIVER PONDER v. JULIE SANTANGELO PONDER (2026)

In this community property dispute, Hoyt Ponder appeals the trial court judgment partitioning the community of acquets and gains previously existing between him and Julie Ponder. For the following reasons, we amend the judgment and, as amended, affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Hoyt and Julie were married on October 14, 2007. On September 21, 2018, Hoyt filed a petition for divorce and ancillary matters, including a request for termination of the community from the date of filing the petition and exclusive use and occupancy of the former matrimonial domicile, or in the alternative, fair market rental value for Julie's use of the home, retroactive to the date of demand. Julie also filed a petition for divorce and other incidental relief, including a request for termination of the community and exclusive use and occupancy of the former matrimonial domicile. On April 1, 2019, a judgment of divorce was signed, as well as a judgment addressing several matters incidental to the divorce. The rulings relevant to this appeal include: the termination of the community of acquets and gains between the parties retroactive to September 21, 2018; the award of exclusive use and occupancy of the former matrimonial domicile to Julie with the requirement that if she vacates the residence, Hoyt shall be provided notice within fifteen days of her moving from the matrimonial domicile; the requirement that Julie is responsible for normal and ordinary maintenance of the home during her occupancy; and the reservation of both parties rights to seek reimbursement claims associated with the former matrimonial domicile, as well as a determination of fair market rental value.

On October 15, 2021, Julie filed a petition for partition of the community property and, thereafter, both parties filed detailed descriptive lists as well as a joint detailed descriptive list. The matter came before the trial court for a three-day trial to partition the community property on January 14, 15, and 16, 2025. At the conclusion of the hearing, the parties were ordered to file post-trial briefs, and the matter was taken under advisement. On June 23, 2025, the trial court issued reasons for judgment and signed a judgment in conformance with its written reasons, which resulted in Hoyt owing Julie $162,084.87.¹ Hoyt appeals this judgment, assigning error to several rulings made by the trial court.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The trial court's allocation or assigning of assets and liabilities in the partition of community property is reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard. Abreo v. Abreo, 2021-0528 (La. App. 1st Cir. 12/22/21), 2021 WL 6069448, *3. In community property partitions, the trial court is granted much discretion in valuing and allocating assets and liabilities and is required to consider the source and nature of each asset or liability, the financial situation of each spouse, and any other relevant circumstances. See La. R.S. 9:2801(A)(4)(c) et seq.; Berthelot v. Berthelot, 2017-1055 (La. App. 1st Cir. 7/18/18), 254 So. 3d 800, 808. Given this great discretion, the trial court is not required to accept, at face value, a spouse's valuation of assets. Berthelot, 254 So. 3d at 816.

A trial court's factual findings and credibility determinations made in the course of valuing and allocating assets and liabilities in the partition of community property may not be set aside absent manifest error. Cosman v. Cosman, 2022-0694 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1/10/23), 360 So. 3d 892, 896, writ denied, 2023-00299 (La. 5/2/23), 359 So.3d 1272.

I. Julie's Reimbursement Claim for 1/212 the Cost of Building on the Lowery Rd. Property

The trial court granted Julie's reimbursement claim in the amount of $108,000.00 for one-half of the estimated cost to build a structure on the Lowery Rd. property. It is undisputed that the Lowery Rd. property is Hoyt's separate property, and at least in part during the marriage, what the parties sometimes referred to as a barndominium (a residence) was built on the property. Louisiana Civil Code article 2366 provides in pertinent part that, “[b]uildings, other constructions permanently attached to the ground, and plantings made on the separate property of a spouse with community property belong to the owner of the ground. The other spouse is entitled to reimbursement for one-half of the amount or value that the community property had at the time it was used.” Thus, the proper measure of Julie's reimbursement claim under La. Civ. Code art. 2366 is based on the value the community property had at the time it was used. There was limited testimony about when and what was built on the Lowery Rd. property. Julie testified that she had no information on the Lowery Rd. property costs, and she was deferring to her expert, Mr. Alfred Blossman. Using the sales comparison approach, Mr. Blossman appraised the total value of the Lowery Rd. property at $320,000.00, allocated a value of $104,000.00 for the land, which was the separate property of Hoyt, and gave a final value of the structure on the land to be $216,000.00. Mr. Blossman testified that because construction costs are so high, the cost approach would have resulted in a higher value for the structure. Additionally, Mr. Blossman's appraisal, was introduced into evidence, and revealed a higher value for the cost approach than the sales comparison approach he used.²

When asked when he started the building, Hoyt testified, “[P]robably in ’15 we did some improvements, put a roof on the property.” He said it never started as a house; it was more like a bam he just started building on his own and adding to it; and that there were several different phases of construction. He testified that there was already water, power, and sewer, and “I just kind of added a lean-to and kind of added a little bit more, and added a little bit more.” When asked what money was used in constructing the structure, Hoyt testified, “I guess it was my money.” In the trial court awarding Julie's reimbursement claim in the amount of $108,000.00 for one-half of the estimated cost to build a structure on the Lowery Rd. property, it clearly determined that community property was used during the marriage to construct the structure on Hoyt's separate property. Considering Hoyt's somewhat evasive testimony about when and how the construction occurred, and Mr. Blossman's testimony that his appraised value would be less than the cost approach, it was within the trial court's discretion to grant Julie's reimbursement claim in the amount of $108,000.00 for the value of the community property that was used to construct the structure on the Lowery Rd. property.

II. Julie and Hoyt's Reimbursement Claims for Fair Market Rental Value for Exclusive Use of the Former Matrimonial Domicile

The trial court granted Hoyt's reimbursement claim for the fair market rental value during Julie's exclusive use of the former matrimonial domicile in the amount of $26,400.00. The trial court also granted Julie's reimbursement claim for Hoyt's “in fact” exclusive use of the former matrimonial domicile in the amount of $90,200.00 under La. R.S. 9:374(D).³ Hoyt contended that the trial court erred in awarding his reimbursement for only twelve months and argued that his reimbursement claim should be from September 21, 2018, the date he filed for divorce, until February 24, 2023, the date he purchased the home, a total of fifty-two months. In the April 1, 2019 judgment, Julie was awarded exclusive use and occupancy of the former matrimonial domicile and was ordered that, in the event she vacates the residence, Hoyt shall be provided notice within fifteen days of her moving from the matrimonial domicile. The judgment also reserved both parties’ rights to seek reimbursement claims associated with the former matrimonial domicile, as well as a determination of fair market rental value. Hoyt contends that Julie was awarded court ordered exclusive use of the home, and she never gave him the notice as ordered in the judgment that she was moving from the home, so her court ordered exclusive use continued until he purchased the home.

It is undisputed that on October 31, 2019, Julie vacated the marital home and did not return. She testified that she gave Hoyt notice she was vacating the home through their attorneys. She also testified that after she left the home, Hoyt changed the locks and put the electricity in his name. Hoyt testified that Julie never informed him she was leaving, and that he only changed the locks on two doors because his handyman had to break into the home to address running water coming from the home that his neighbor informed him about. However, in an earlier deposition, Hoyt stated that he changed the locks because of items missing from the home and did not mention the water issue.

Hoyt also testified that he never resided in the home from when he left the home in 2018 until he purchased the home in 2023. The parties gave conflicting testimony regarding whether Hoyt used the home and property for horse roping events after Julie vacated the home. Our review of the testimony reveals that it is within the trial court's discretion, which was based heavily on credibility, to award Hoyt's reimbursement claim for the twelve months that Julie resided in the home, until October 31, 2019, and Julie's reimbursement claim for forty months from November 1, 2019, until Hoyt purchased the home on February 24, 2023.

However, we note that during the hearing, Julie's attorney stipulated that Hoyt's expert would testify to $1850.00, per month for the fair market rental value of the former matrimonial domicile.⁴ Julie did not present evidence of the fair market rental value, and $1,850.00 was the only evidence of the rental value for the marital home. Additionally, a reimbursement for fair market rental value of the family home is one-half the fair market rental value for one party's exclusive use and occupancy of the home. See La. Civ. Code arts. 2369.1 and 2369.2; Averill v. Averill, 2018-0299 (La. App. 1st Cir. 9/21/18), 393 So.3d 351, 353; Stockton v. Stockton, 2023-0145 (La. App. 1st Cir. 10/18/23), 377 So.3d 282, 290. Herein, both parties’ claims for rental reimbursement were not reduced by one-half. Accordingly, we amend the trial court's reimbursement claims for rental value for the exclusive use of the family home as follows: Julie's reimbursement is reduced from $90,200.00 to $37,000.00 (1/2(40 x $1,850)), and Hoyt's reimbursement is reduced from $26,400.00 to $11,100.00. (1/2(12 x $1,850)).

III. Valuation of the Ponder & Dorian, LLC Assets and Obligations

The trial court awarded several lots in Three Rivers Island subdivision on the Diversion Canal to Hoyt at the value of $265,000.00. The trial court also determined that there was zero community debt associated with the lots. The lots are owned by Ponder & Dorian LLC (“the LLC”), an LLC in which Hoyt has 50% interest. The LLC was formed to purchase land in Three Rivers Island subdivision to be developed. There was extensive testimony presented regarding the valuation of the lots as well as whether there were any debts remaining. It is undisputed that shortly after purchasing the lots, Hoyt's father, Charles Ponder Sr., loaned Hoyt money for improvements on the property including infrastructure, cabins, and electricity. Thereafter, three promissory notes were executed including one on March 10, 2009, and two on March 21, 2009. The promissory notes did not include a date when payment was due. Approximately nine years later, in August 2018, seventeen of the lots were donated to Hoyt's brother, Charles Ponder Jr.

Hoyt testified that the LLC donated the property to his brother to satisfy the debt he owed to his father because his father was getting older and did not want any more property in his name. Julie's attorney pointed out to Hoyt that in 2018 the LLC had the same $467,182.00 value as it did in 2017 despite the donation of seventeen lots to Charles Jr., and Hoyt responded that it was a tax error. Hoyt testified that it was “just a coincidence” that the property was donated to his brother three weeks prior to him filing for divorce. When Charles Sr. was asked why there was no due date on the three March 2009 promissory notes, he answered, “I didn't expect to have to collect from those.”

Each party provided an expert to appraise the Three Rivers lots that were owned by the LLC. Ricky Juban, Hoyt's expert, did not include the lots donated to Charles Jr. and appraised twenty-six lots, and after a marketability discount, gave a total value of $110,000.00 for the lots. Julie's expert, Mr. Blossman, included the seventeen lots donated to Charles Jr. in his appraisal, and after a marketability discount valued the lots at $431,200.00.⁵

In its reasons for judgment, the trial court stated that it found many of Hoyt's answers to questions about the transfer of the property to his brother to be evasive and less than credible. The trial court also noted that it found Charles Sr.’s testimony that he did not expect to get repaid from Hoyt and his rejection of the transfer of properties to him was “very telling.” In determining the value of the Three Rivers lots, the trial court included the seventeen lots donated to Charles Jr. and did not consider the promissory notes to Charles Sr. as a debt of the LLC. Also, the trial court chose to use the value provided by Mr. Blossman rather than Mr. Juban. The trial court's decision was clearly based heavily on credibility determinations. Furthermore, in deciding to accept the opinion of one expert and reject the opinion of another, a trial court can virtually never be manifestly erroneous. Fox v. Fox, 97-1914 (La. App. 1st Cir. 11/6/98), 727 So.2d 514, 516, writ denied, 99-0265 (La. 3/19/99), 740 So.2d 119. Therefore, we find no manifest error in the trial court's decision to include the lots donated to Charles Jr., in finding that the LLC did not have any debt, and in accepting the value of the lots provided by Mr. Blossman.

However, we note the undisputed testimony of Mr. Blossman revealed that he was asked to provide an appraisal for fifty-seven lots, and some of the lots had been sold and should not have been included in the appraisal. Mr. Blossman corrected his appraisal during his testimony and determined that the total value of the lots owned by the LLC after a marketability discount was $428,000.00, and 1/212 the value of the lots for Hoyt's 50% ownership in the LLC should total $214,000.00 rather than the $265,000.00 awarded by the court. In accordance with Mr. Blossman's testimony, we reduce the value given to the Three Rivers Island lots owned by LLC from $265,000.00 to $214,000.00.

IV. Hoyt's Reimbursement Claim for Julie's Mismanagement of Community Property

The trial court denied Hoyt's reimbursement claim for Julie's alleged breach of her duty to preserve community property based on damages to the former matrimonial domicile. In so doing, the trial court found Hoyt purchased the home in “as is” condition, and any claims associated with the repairs to the home were waived by Hoyt in negotiating the purchase price of the home from Julie when he executed the closing document associated with the sale of the home. We find no manifest error in this ruling by the trial court.

CONCLUSION

As a result of the reduction in the value of the net assets awarded to Hoyt based on the value of the Three Rivers Subdivision lot by $51,000.00 ($265,000.00- $214,000.00); Julie's reimbursement claim for fair market rental value being reduced from $90,200.00 to $3 7,000.00; and Hoyt's reimbursement claim for fair market rental value being reduced from $26,400.00 to $11,100.00, the total owed to Julie from Hoyt is reduced from $162,084.87 to $98,684.87.⁶ Accordingly, we amend the judgment to reflect the amount Hoyt owes to Julie to be $98,684.87, and as amended, affirm. Costs of the appeal are assessed one-half each to Hoyt Ponder and Julie Ponder.

AMENDED, AND AS AMENDED, AFFIRMED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The reasons for judgment discussed the extensive assets, liabilities, and reimbursement claims listed in the parties’ joint detailed descriptive list. Our discussion is limited to the issues raised by Hoyt on appeal.

2.   Mr. Blossman's sales comparison approach value was $320,000.00, and his cost approach value was $327,504.00.

3.   Louisiana Revised Statute 9:374 was amended in 2022 and again in 2024. Herein, we apply the version in effect at the time of the trial of the community property partition. See Kyles v. Kyles, 2025-526 (La. App. 1st Cir. 01/09/26), __ So.3d __, 2026 WL 123278; Stockton v. Stockton, 2023-0145 (La. App. 1st Cir. 10/18/23), 377 So.3d 282, 290.

4.   It appears that the trial court used $2,200.00 per month as the fair market rental value. There was no evidence in the record to support this amount.

5.   Initially, Mr. Blossman's appraisal valued the property at $530,000.00, but during his testimony, he acknowledged that he included some lots that were not owned by the LLC.

6.   $162,084.87 – [(1/2 x $51,000) + (($90,200 – $37,000) – ($26,400 – $11,100))] = $98,684.87

HESTER, J.