STATE v. DABNEY (2026)

Defendant, Alvin Dabney, appeals his convictions and sentencing for two (2) counts of indecent behavior with a juvenile under the age of thirteen (13) and one (1) count of aggravated crime against nature involving his daughter. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the convictions and corresponding sentences.

Procedural Background

Defendant was charged by a Grand Jury indictment with two (2) counts of first-degree rape of his biological daughter, N.D., under La. R.S. 14:42, and one (1) count of aggravated crime against nature under La. R.S. 14:89.1. After entering not guilty pleas to all charges, trial began on June 10, 2024.

During voir dire, defense counsel moved to strike a prospective juror for cause, which the trial court denied.

After a four-day trial, the jury returned unanimous responsive verdicts of guilty of indecent behavior with a juvenile under the age of thirteen (13) as to counts one (1) and two (2), and guilty as charged as to count three (3), aggravated crime against nature. On August 30, 2024, Defendant was sentenced to twenty-five (25) years imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence as to counts one (1) and two (2), and thirty (30) years imprisonment at hard labor with at least twenty-five (25) to be served without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence as to count three (3). Both sentences were ordered to run concurrently. Defendant timely appealed.

Factual Background

Defendant is the biological father of N.D. Defendant was incarcerated when N.D. was born and his first encounter with N.D. was after he was released from prison. N.D. was four (4) years old at that time. According to N. D.’s mother Cornelia Bridges, defendant became more involved in N.D.’s life when she reached the age of eleven (11). Ms. Bridges testified that she wanted N.D. to have a relationship with her biological father and testified that she would bring N.D. to the Defendant's residence to visit (initially, Defendant resided at his mother's home and later at his girlfriend's home) and spend weekends.

Mrs. Bridges noticed a change in N.D.’s demeanor around the age of eleven (11) or twelve (12). Also, during that period, N.D. expressed that she no longer wanted to stay with Defendant on weekends. Mrs. Bridges testified that she would encourage N.D.’s visit, as Defendant would threaten to withhold financial support (i.e. purchasing clothes and shoes) if N.D. was not allowed to stay with him. Mrs. Bridges also testified that N.D. would cry and become angry when she was told she would be staying with Defendant on the weekend.

Mrs. Bridges’ husband, Durrell Johnson, has been a part of N.D.’s life since she was five (5) months old. He testified that he also noticed a change in N.D.’s demeanor when she reached the age of eleven (11) or twelve (12), which he initially attributed to N.D. entering her teenage years. He testified that at that time N.D. became very reserved and stopped participating in activities she had previously enjoyed.

N.D. testified that she and her mother both wanted her to develop a relationship with her biological father. She testified that her mother would drop her off at Defendant's residence to spend weekends. She further testified that beginning when she was eleven (11), Defendant penetrated her vagina with his penis on multiple occasions while he lay beside her in bed during these weekend visits. N.D. also described a time when Defendant, Mrs. Bridges, and she spent a night together at a hotel, at which time Defendant sexually assaulted her.

N.D. explained the time she first disclosed these incidents to her mother, stating “I just remember her asking me if somebody had touched me and I told her yes and she started naming people and I told her that it was my daddy AJ (Defendant)”. Defendant testified on his own behalf and denied all allegations that were made against him. Defendant claimed that Mrs. Bridges was being vindictive because he had begun a new relationship. He testified that he suspected Mr. Johnson was the person who sexually molested N.D.

ERRORS PATENT

A review of the record reveals no errors patent.

DISCUSSION

Assignment of Error Number 1 – Insufficiency of Evidence

Defendant asserts that the state failed to present sufficient evidence to sustain his conviction.

Appellate courts review insufficiency of evidence claims under the standard set forth in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781 (1979). The Jackson court opined that all evidence, both direct and circumstantial, when viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, must be sufficient to prove each element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. The Jackson court further explained that:

․the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. This familiar standard gives full play to the responsibility of the trier of fact to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts. Once a defendant has been found guilty of the crime charged, the factfinder's role as weigher of the evidence is preserved through a legal conclusion that upon judicial review all of the evidence is to be considered in the light most favorable to the prosecution.

Id., 443 U.S. at 319, 99 S.Ct. at 2789 (citation omitted). “Under the Jackson standard, the rational credibility determinations of the trier of fact are not to be second guessed by a reviewing court.” State v. Williams, 2011-0414, p. 18 (La. App. 4 Cir. 2/29/12), 85 So. 3d 759, 771. Moreover, “[t]he testimony of a single witness, if believed by the trier of fact, is sufficient to support a conviction.” State v. Wells, 2010-1338, p. 5 (La. App. 4 Cir. 3/30/11), 64 So. 3d 303, 306 (citation omitted).

Here, Defendant was found guilty of two (2) counts of indecent behavior with a juvenile under the age of thirteen (13) and one (1) count of aggravated crime against nature.

Indecent behavior with juveniles is the commission of any of the following acts with the intention of arousing or gratifying the sexual desires of either person:

(1) Any lewd or lascivious act upon the person or in the presence of any child under the age of seventeen, where there is an age difference of greater than two years between the two persons. Lack of knowledge of the child's age shall not be a defense.

(2) The transmission, delivery or utterance of any textual, visual, written, or oral communication depicting lewd or lascivious conduct, text, words, or images to any person reasonably believed to be under the age of seventeen and reasonably believed to be at least two years younger than the offender. It shall not be a defense that the person who actually receives the transmission is not under the age of seventeen.

(3) The grooming of a child under the age of seventeen, where the offender is at least four years older than the child. Completion or attempt to complete such act is not necessary to constitute grooming. Lack of knowledge of the child's age shall not be a defense.

La. R.S. 14:81.

At the time of the offense, a conviction for aggravated crime against nature required proof beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant committed a sexual battery by touching N.D.’s vagina under or over her clothing; that N.D. was under the age of thirteen (13); that Defendant was over the age of seventeen; and that Defendant knew he was N.D.’s father. See La. R.S. 14:89 and 14.89.1.

Here, N.D. testified that the Defendant, starting from the time she was eleven (11) years old, penetrated her vagina with his penis on multiple occasions. N.D.’s testimony, alone, sufficiently established the elements of both offenses. See, e.g., State v. Rives, 407 So.2d 1195, 1197 (La. 1981) (the testimony of the victim was sufficient to establish sexual intercourse despite the absence of scientific evidence); State v. Summers, 2010-0341, p. 7 (La. App. 4 Cir. 12/1/10), 52 So.3d 951, 955 (citation omitted) (“The testimony of the victim alone is sufficient to establish the elements of the offense.”). Moreover, it is undisputed Defendant knew he was N.D.’s biological father long before these incidents occurred. We find this assignment of error to be without merit.

Assignment of Error Number 2 – Juror Challenge

Defendant also asserts that the trial court erred in denying his “for-cause” challenge of Juror Twenty-Two.

For-cause challenges are sustained when “[t]he juror is not impartial, whatever the cause of his partiality[,]” or when “[t]he juror will not accept the law as given to him by the court.” See La. C.Cr.P. art. 797. The Louisiana Supreme Court has explained that “[a] trial judge is vested with broad discretion in ruling on challenges for cause, and h[er] ruling will be reversed only when a review of the entire voir dire reveals the judge abused h[er] discretion.” State v. Robertson, 630 So. 2d 1278, 1281 (La. 1994) (citation omitted). “Reversible error is demonstrated and prejudice is presumed in cases in which a defense challenge for cause was erroneously denied and the defendant ultimately exhausted his peremptory challenges.” State v. Landrieu, 2018-0964, p. 18 (La. App. 4 Cir. 6/12/19) 274 So.3d 661, 674 (citation omitted).

Defendant exercised all twelve (12) of peremptory challenges prior to challenging Juror Twenty-Two “for-cause”. Defendant predicated his challenge on Juror Twenty-Two's responses, including statements such as “I think it would be really hard for me, especially if the kid was up there [on the stand], considering I work with kids every day and I see the trauma. I have known kids that this has happened to and I think that that would make it very difficult for me.” When asked if she could set aside her personal experience and judge the case based on the evidence, Juror Twenty-Two stated “I would like to think that I could try but I also know that I am a really emotional person. So[,] I think that it would be hard for me to set my own emotions aside.” Juror Twenty-Two also explained that she would give more credibility to a child's testimony and that she “would definitely have more sympathy towards children.” The trial court denied Defendant's ensuing challenge.

Both this Court and the Supreme Court have repeatedly held that an equivocal response does not amount to a refusal to remain impartial or accept the law, and a trial court's denial of a cause challenge does not constitute an abuse of discretion under those circumstances.

Clearly, La. C.Cr.P. art. 797(2) does not require that a prospective juror state with absolute certainty that he/she cannot be impartial in order to be removed for cause. However, in the absence of such a statement, the trial court's denial of a challenge for cause will not be reversed if, on review of the entire voir dire examination, the prospective juror demonstrates a willingness and ability to decide the case impartially according to the law and evidence.

State v. Dotson, 2016-0473, p. 17 (La. 10/18/17), 234 So.3d 34, 45.

Although Juror Twenty-Two's voir dire responses may appear equivocal, none of the answers indicated she could not remain impartial or accept the law. As such, we find that the trial court's denial of Defendant's “for-cause” challenge did not constitute an abuse of discretion, and Defendant's second assignment of error is without merit.

Assignment of Error Number 3 – Exclusion of Texts/Screenshots

Defendant asserts the trial court erred by excluding screenshots of text messages that would “prove the charges were false and he was being set up.”

“A trial court has great discretion in determining whether a sufficient foundation has been laid for the introduction of evidence.” State v. Ashford, 03-1691, p. 14 (La. App. 4 Cir. 6/16/04), 878 So.2d 798, 806 (citing State v. Lewis, 97-2854, p. 31 (La. App. 4 Cir. 5/19/99), 736 So.2d 1004, 1022). Additionally,

Authentication of evidence is required in order for evidence to be admissible at trial. La. C.E. art. 901 states that “authentication” is a “condition precedent to admissibility” that is “satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims.” La. C.E. art. 901(B) provides an illustrative, though not exhaustive, list of examples of authentication or identification that conforms with the requirements of the article. Generally, the standard applied by state and federal courts alike with respect to the authentication of a document is whether there is sufficient evidence from which a reasonable juror could find the proposed evidence is what the proponent claims it to be. State v. Lee, 01–2082, p. 9 (La. App. 4 Cir. 8/21/02), 826 So.2d 616, 624 (“[I]t is a fundamental law of evidence that an article or substance which is introduced as demonstrative evidence, or to which a witness is asked to testify, must be sufficiently identified as the one involved in the occurrence in question.” (quoting State v. Hotoph, 99–243 (La. App. 5 Cir. 11/10/99), 750 So.2d 1036, 1045)); U.S. v. Gagliardi, 506 F.3d 140, 151 (2d Cir. 2007); Sublet v. State, 442 Md. 632, 113 A.3d 695 (2015).

Id.

Here, Defendant sought to introduce screenshots of text messages purportedly between himself, Mrs. Bridges, and N.D. Neither Mrs. Bridges nor N.D. testified that the screenshots were what Defendant claimed they were. Rather, Mrs. Bridges and N.D. testified they had never viewed the messages and they did not know who composed them. Accordingly, Defendant failed to present sufficient evidence to authenticate the screenshots and the trial court did not abuse its discretion by excluding same.¹

Appellant's Pro Se Assignments of Error

Defendant's pro se assignments of error are also without merit. Defendant first contends that the state failed to provide him notice of an amended indictment. However, the record reflects no such amendment was ever made to the original indictment. Next, Defendant alleges his counsel was ineffective. It is firmly entrenched that claims for ineffective assistance of counsel should be addressed in post-conviction proceedings. See State v. Watson, 2000-1580, p. 4 (La. 5/14/02), 817 So. 2d 81, 84 (citation omitted) (“generally, the preference for addressing claims of ineffective assistance of counsel is a post-conviction proceeding in the trial court, not on appeal; the rationale behind such procedure is that a full evidentiary hearing may be conducted to explore the issue”). Defendant also claims that both Mrs. Bridges and N.D. committed perjury; however, he failed to present any evidence of untruthfulness. Finally, Defendant argues that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of abuse that occurred in Jefferson Parish. The record reflects that Defendant failed to make a contemporaneous objection to such evidence, but rather himself introduced the Jefferson Parish Detective's interview of him, which reflected evidence of other abuse.

Accordingly, we find that Appellant's pro se assignments of error are without merit.

CONCLUSION

Based upon the foregoing reasons, we affirm Defendant's convictions for two (2) counts of indecent behavior with a juvenile under the age of thirteen (13) and one (1) count of aggravated crime against nature involving his daughter and the corresponding sentences.

CONVICTIONS AFFIRMED SENTENCES AFFIRMED

FOOTNOTES

1.   It should be noted that Defendant sought expedited review of this same issue and this Court denied writs. See State v. Dabney, 2024-0353 (La. App. 4 Cir. 6/13/24). Defendant did not seek review of this Court's ruling denying writs.

Judge Daniel L. Dysart