JASON DUREL v. ACADIAN EAR NOSE THROAT FACIAL PLASTIC SURGERY APMC (2022)

In brief summary, Dr. Durel sued AENT seeking to recover his shares in AENT's medical practice. AENT reconvened, alleging that Dr. Durel violated the non-compete terms of his physician employment contract. AENT sought to enjoin and restrain Dr. Durel from practicing his specialty in Lafayette Parish for the length of that contract. AENT further sought damages and attorney fees for breach of that contract. The trial court signed a temporary restraining order (TRO) against Dr. Durel pending a hearing on AENT's request for a preliminary injunction.

Dr. Durel alleged in response to AENT's request for TRO and preliminary injunction that AENT waived enforcement of its non-compete agreement. The parties presented factual testimony surrounding the waiver issue at a hearing set purely within the context of the incidental summary proceeding related to the TRO and preliminary injunction. There was no trial on the merits in an ordinary proceeding.

After a four (4) day hearing on the relief sought in the summary proceeding, the trial judge denied AENT's motion for preliminary injunction.

The resulting interlocutory judgment stated:

Two matters in this case were heard by the court May 7 and May 10 through 13, 2021: Plaintiff's Motion to Dissolve Temporary Restraining Order and Defendant's Motion for Preliminary Injunction. After considering the evidence presented and arguments of counsel:

IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion to Dissolve Temporary Restraining Order is GRANTED.

IT IS ALSO ORDERED that Defendant's Motion for Preliminary Injunction is DENIED.

It was, and is, the only judgment on appeal.

On original appeal, we found that the two-year period for injunctive relief against physicians under employment contracts such as the one at issue in this case had expired while the appeal was pending. La.R.S. 23:921. We therefore dismissed the appeal as moot. Again, the only judgment on appeal was the judgment granting Dr. Durel's motion to dissolve the TRO and denying AENT's request for a preliminary injunction.

By a 3-2 vote, this court granted AENT's motion for rehearing, received additional briefing, and heard additional oral arguments. On rehearing, the majority maintains the original holding that the request for preliminary injunction is moot based solely on our holding that the time period during which such an injunction may be issued has expired. See Durel v. Acadian Ear, Nose, Throat & Facial Plastic Surgery, APMC, 21-433 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/25/22) (2022 WL 1664339).

The lead opinion on rehearing, however, goes further and addresses the trial court's underlying factual determination that AENT had waived its right to enforce the preliminary injunction. The majority does so upon a determination that if the trial court's factual findings regarding waiver are not reversed by this appeal, the findings will become law of the case, and AENT will be unable to demand damages for violations of the non-compete and non-solicitation provisions of the employment contract. I disagree and respectfully dissent from the majority's determination, and instead point out that the law of the case doctrine has no place in the matter before the court.

First, the issue with which the majority is concerned is a factual finding of waiver made by the trial court at a summary proceeding on the preliminary injunction issue only and is only part of the trial court's oral reasons for ruling. It forms no part of the actual judgment of the trial court judgment quoted infra. Courts, however, review judgments, not reasons for judgment. See Bellard v. American Cent. Ins. Co., 07-1335 (La. 4/18/08), 980 So.2d 654. Oral or written reasons for ruling form no part of the judgment. Boquet v. Boquet, 18-798 (La.App. 3 Cir. 4/10/19), 269 So.3d 895, writ denied, 19-0673 (La. 6/17/19), 274 So.3d 1261. Rather, reasons for judgment are “ ‘merely an explication of the Trial Court's determinations.’ ” Id. at 899 (quoting State in the Interest of Mason, 356 So.2d 530 (La.App. 1 Cir. 1977)). Here, the judgment itself has been rendered moot. It follows that all underlying factual findings attendant to that judgment in this summary proceeding are no longer viable as those findings were related to the trial court's findings of waiver by AENT and thus issued for different reasons.

We now have issued reasons finding that the period during which a physician's employment agreement can be enforced (two years) has now expired and that is why the preliminary injunction has expired by operation of law and is now moot. See La.R.S. 23:921. More importantly, however, is the fact that the “judgment” under review is interlocutory in nature as it only pertains to the preliminary injunction sought by AENT. See, e.g., Dunbar v. Howard, 21-1171 (La.App. 1 Cir. 8/16/22) (2022 WL 3569488) (A judgment on a preliminary injunction is an appealable, interlocutory judgment).

Our supreme court has clearly explained that the law of the case doctrine “does not apply in the context of a trial court ruling on interlocutory issues[.]” Land v. Vidrine, 10-1342 (La. 3/15/11), 62 So.3d 36. See also Meadows v. Adams, 18-1544, p. 10 (La.App. 1 Cir. 11/9/20), 316 So.3d 5, 7 (“The law of the case doctrine does not apply to trial court rulings on interlocutory issues.”); Zanella's Wax Bar, LLC v. Trudy's Wax Bar, LLC, 19-0043 (La.App. 1 Cir. 11/7/19), 291 So.3d 693, writ denied, 19-01931 (La. 1/28/20), 291 So.3d 1052; Guidry v. USAgencies, 16-0562 (La.App. 1 Cir. 2/16/17), 213 So.3d 406, writ denied, 17-0601 (La. 5/26/17), 221 So.3d 81.

More pointedly, the doctrine is even inapplicable to the trial court's judgment on the preliminary injunction. See Monlezun v. Lyon Interests, Inc., 11-576 (La.App. 3 Cir. 11/2/11), 76 So.3d 628 (finding the law of the case doctrine inapplicable to a trial court's issuance of a preliminary injunction upon its observation that the ruling was an interlocutory order issued in a summary proceeding incidental to the main demand for permanent injunctive relief). Moreover, and as previously mentioned, the trial court's preliminary injunction issue is now moot as the period during which such an injunction can apply has now expired under La.R.S. 23:921 as explained in our original opinion. See Durel, 21-433.

Rather, the only matter before the court now is the limited, interlocutory judgment, quoted infra., which the majority has recognized is now moot. Accordingly, as stated in our original opinion, I find it appropriate to remand for further proceedings on the parties’ remaining demands.

CONERY, Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part.