LOPEZ v. ACUREN INSPECTION INC ABC (2026)

This matter arises from an alleged hit-and-run automobile accident. Appellant, Robin Lopez (“Ms. Lopez”), appeals the district court's May 20, 2025 judgment, which granted summary judgment in favor of defendants, Acuren Inspection, Inc. (“Acuren”) and Zurich American Insurance Company (“Zurich”) (collectively, “defendants”), dismissing all of Ms. Lopez's claims with prejudice. For the reasons that follow, we reverse the district court's May 20, 2025 judgment, and remand the matter for further proceedings.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Ms. Lopez was involved in a hit-and-run automobile accident on January 22, 2022. A petition for damages was filed on January 19, 2023, naming as defendants Acuren and its liability insurer, Zurich. Ms. Lopez alleged that she and her two minor children were injured when her vehicle was struck by a truck bearing the name “Acuren”, truck number 2402 and a Texas license plate, which was driven by Pharo Martinez (“Mr. Martinez”). Ms. Lopez further alleged that at the time of the accident Mr. Martinez was in the course and scope of his employment with Acuren. Ms. Lopez also alleged that Acuren's the liability insurer had a policy that covered Mr. Martinez on the date of the accident. On June 29, 2023, defendants filed an answer.

Below is a timeline of relevant post-filing activity:

• November 6, 2023 – Acuren propounded interrogatories and requests for production to Ms. Lopez.

• March 5, 2024 – Acuren propounded requests for admission to Ms. Lopez.

• June 6, 2024 – Ms. Lopez served responses to interrogatories and requests for production.

• December 20, 2024 – Acuren filed a motion for summary judgment.

• January 7, 2025 – Ms. Lopez requested dates for a corporate deposition under La. C.C.P. art. 1442 and circulated a draft notice.

• January 23, 2025 – Ms. Lopez served a finalized 1442 Notice of deposition.

• January 28, 2025 – Acuren's corporate representative deposition was conducted.

• January 29, 2025 – Ms. Lopez moved for a continuance and opposed the motion for summary judgment.

• February 13, 2025 – A hearing was held on Ms. Lopez's motion to continue and reset the summary judgment hearing and the district court granted a thirty-day continuance.

• February 14, 2025 – Ms. Lopez requested a second 1442 corporate deposition, which the defendants denied.

• February 18, 2025 – Ms. Lopez filed a motion to set expedited telephone/zoom status conference to clarify the district court's grant of her motion to continue the defendants’ motion for summary judgment to allow additional discovery.

• February 19, 2025 – Acuren filed an opposition to Ms. Lopez's motion to set expedited telephone/zoom status conference and moved to quash second 1442 deposition.

• May 6, 2025 – Telephone status conference held.

• May 8, 2025 – The district court held a hearing on Ms. Lopez's request for clarification of the motion to continue and on the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The district court denied Ms. Lopez's request for second corporate deposition and granted Acuren's motion for summary judgment.

On May 20, 2025, the trial court signed the judgment which granted the motion for summary judgment in favor of defendants and dismissed Ms. Lopez's claims with prejudice. Ms. Lopez filed a motion for devolutive appeal on July 2, 2025. This appeal follows.

DISCUSSION

Ms. Lopez assigns one error for review, which is that the trial court erred in granting defendants’ motion for summary judgment without allowing adequate discovery and denying her motion to continue.¹

Motion for Summary Judgment

An appellate court reviews the granting of a motion for summary judgment de novo, using the same criteria as a trial court. Kazan v. Red Lion Hotels Corp., 2021-01820, p. 2 (La. 6/29/22), 346 So.3d 267, 269. La. C.C.P. article 966(A)(3) provides that “[a]fter an opportunity for adequate discovery, a motion for summary judgment shall be granted if the motion, memorandum, and supporting documents show that there is no genuine issue as to material fact and that the mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”

The burden of proof rests with the mover to demonstrate entitlement to judgment. The “adverse party [must] produce factual support sufficient to establish the existence of a genuine issue of material fact or that the mover is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” La. C.C.P. art. 966(D)(1).

“The granting of summary judgment is contingent upon the pleadings, depositions, answers to discovery, admissions on file and affidavits demonstrating that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Majoue v. Fish, 2023-0549, p. 5 (La. App. 4 Cir. 3/8/24), 385 So.3d 321, 325 (internal citation omitted). Genuine issues are ones in which reasonable factfinders could disagree. Id. “[I]f reasonable persons could only reach one conclusion, there is no need for trial on that issue, and summary judgment is appropriate.” Id. “A fact is material when its existence or nonexistence may be essential to the plaintiff's cause of action under the applicable theory of recovery; a fact is material if it potentially insures or precludes recovery, affects a litigant's ultimate success, or determines the outcome of the legal dispute.” Id.

Applicable Theory of Recovery

“Every act whatever of man that causes damage to another obliges him by whose fault it happened to repair it.” La. C.C. art. 2315 (A). Under the duty/risk analysis, a plaintiff must prove all of the following five elements:

1. The defendant had a duty to conform his conduct to a specific standard (the duty element);

2. The defendant's conduct failed to conform to the appropriate standard (the breach element);

3. The defendant's substandard conduct was a cause-in-fact of the plaintiff's injuries (the cause-in-fact element);

4. The defendant's substandard conduct was a legal cause of the plaintiff's injuries (the scope of duty element); and

5. Proof of actual damages (the damages element).

Farrell v. Circle K Stores, Inc., 2022-00849, p. 5 (La. 3/17/23), 359 So.3d 467, 471-72 (quoting Malta v. Hiller Corp., 2021-0209, p. 11 (La. 10/10/21), 333 So.3d 384-395).

Defendants’ Support for Summary Judgment

In support of the motion for summary judgment, the defendants attached Ms. Lopez's petition for damages, the first set of requests for admission to Ms. Lopez, Ms. Lopez's answers to first set of interrogatories, and affidavits of Mark Evans, Nicholas Jolivette, Amanda Sanders, John Sellers, and Ron Noble.

Mark Evans attested that he is an employee of Acuren and the custodian of records and incent reporting system. Mr. Evan further attested that Acuren owned a truck identified as vehicle number 2402, and there are no reports or evidence that the truck was involved in a motor vehicle accident on or around January 22, 2022.

Nicolas Jolivette, an employee of Acuren, attested that Acuren's fleet records were devoid of any evidence of the truck requiring special or unordinary maintenance or repairs on or about January 22, 2022. Mr. Jolivette provided that there was no record of Mr. Maritnez having been employed by Acuren, but the records revealed that the truck was operated by John Sellers. Additionally, Amanda Sanders, an employee of Acuren and custodian of records, attested that the company has no personnel records or employment history of Mr. Martinez. Ms. Sanders provided that Mr. Martinez was never an agent, representative, or consultant of Acuren.

John Sellers attested that on or about January 22, 2022, he was employed by Acuren and drove the truck on or about January 22, 2022 and was not involved in a motor vehicle collision on that date. Mr. Sellers provided that he does not know any person named Pharo Martinez.

Ron Noble, an employee of Acuren, attested that he was a passenger in the truck on or about January 22, 2022, and it was not involved in a motor vehicle collision. Mr. Noble also attested that he does not know any person named Pharo Martinez, and the truck was not operated by said person.

Ms. Lopez's Opposition

In response the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, Ms. Lopez filed a motion to continue and an opposition. Ms. Lopez asserted that a motion for summary judgment is premature because adequate discovery has not been conducted. Moreover, Ms. Lopez attached her and her child, London William's affidavits, as well as the deposition of Mark Evans.

Ms. Lopez attested that she was driving when a vehicle struck her in the rear and subsequently left the scene. Ms. Lopez and London Williams identified the vehicle as a white Ford truck, Texas license plate, the name “Acuren” on it and truck number 2402.

In light of Ms. Lopez's assertion that adequate discovery was not completed, we turn to the issue of whether the trial court erred in denying the motion to continue.

Motion to Continue/Additional Discovery

“A trial judge has wide discretion in determining whether a motion for continuance should be granted; thus, the standard of review in such cases is abuse of discretion.” Doe v. Lewis, 2020-0320, p. 3 (La. App. 4 Cir. 12/30/20), 312 So.3d 1165, 1169 (citing Jordan v. Cmty. Care Hosp., 2019-0039, 2019-0040, pp. 22-23 (La. App. 4 Cir. 7/24/19), 276 So.3d 564, 582).

La. C.C.P. art. 1601 provides that “[a] continuance may be granted in any case if there is good ground therefore.” La. C.C.P. art. 1602 sets forth, in pertinent part that “[a] continuance shall be granted if at the time a case is to be tried, the party applying for the continuance shows that he has been unable, with the exercise of due diligence, to obtain evidence material to his case.”

In interpreting Articles 1601 and 1602, this Court in Doe v. Lewis, considered that trial was scheduled for January 21, 2020 and the plaintiff filed a written motion to continue trial on January 7, 2020, asserting that an out-of-state material witness could not be served or contacted, and another witness who was served, would be out of town the day of trial. The Court found that the plaintiff had ample time from the first and second trial settings to secure her witnesses. The Court provided that the district court postponed the start time of trial to help accommodate the plaintiff's witnesses and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to continue trial. Doe, 2020-0320, pp. 3-5, 312 So.3d at 1170.

Additionally, in Coastal Fire Protection, L.L.C. v. Custom Drywall & Painting, L.L.C., this Court considered whether the trial court erred in denying a motion to continue. The Court noted that the motion for summary judgment was scheduled for October 11, 2025, and the defendant filed its motion to continue on October 7, 2024, on the grounds that counsel needed additional time to gain familiarity with the case. 2025-0081, p. 10 (La. App. 4 Cir. 9/16/25), 421 So.3d 267, 273-74.

In finding no abuse of discretion, this Court explained:

The trial court provided that [plaintiff's] motion for summary judgment was refiled on August 16, 2024 and was served to [defendant] on August 29, 2024, however, a motion to continue was requested after the deadline for filing the opposition to the motion for summary judgment. The trial court further provided that even if it granted [defendant] a continuance, it would not be allowed to file an opposition to the motion for summary judgment due to the strict constraints of Article 966.

Id. at p. 11, 421 So.3d at 274.

In Scott v. City of New Orleans By and Through New Orleans Aviation Bd., this Court examined whether the trial court erred in denying plaintiff's motion to continue to conduct additional discovery and in granting summary judgment in favor of defendants. 2025-0513, p. 4 (La. App. 4 Cir. 2/18/26), ––– So.3d ––––, 2026 WL 456887. The Scott court noted that “[o]rdinarily a motion for summary judgment may be granted only ‘[a]fter an opportunity for adequate discovery.’ ” Id. at p. 12, ––– So.3d –––– (quoting Succession of Hickman, 2022-0730, p. 7 (La. App. 4 Cir. 3/15/23), 359 So.3d 584, 590). The Court provided:

“When discovery is alleged to be incomplete, a trial court has the discretion either to hear the summary judgment motion or to grant a continuance to allow further discovery.” Id. (quoting Roadrunner Transp. Sys. v. Brown, [20] 17-0040, p. 11 (La. App. 4 Cir. 5/10/17), 219 So.3d 1265, 1272). “In this procedural context, a trial court's choice to hear a motion for summary judgment or to grant a continuance is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard.” Id., (quoting Roadrunner, [20]17-0040, p. 11, 219 So.3d at 1272-73). “Although the language of [Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure] article 966 does not grant a party the absolute right to delay a decision on a motion for summary judgment until all discovery is complete, the law does require that the parties be given a fair opportunity to present their case.” Id. at p. 8, 359 So.3d at 591 (quoting Francois, [20]20-0440, p. 5, 314 So.3d at 897) (alteration in original). “Unless [a] plaintiff shows a probable injustice[,] a suit should not be delayed pending discovery when it appears at an early stage that there is no genuine issue of fact.” Id.

Scott at p. 12, ––– So.3d ––––.

This Court utilizes a four-part test to analyze whether there has been insufficient time to conduct adequate discovery: (1) whether the party is ready to go to trial, (2) whether the party indicated what additional discovery was needed, (3) whether the party took any steps to conduct additional discovery during the period between filing the motion and the hearing on it, and (4) whether the discovery issue was raised in the trial court before the entry of the summary judgment. Id. (quoting Succession of Hickman, p. 8, 359 So.3d at 591).

The Scott court noted that it did not appear from the record that a trial date had been set, making it likely that the defendant was also not prepared to go to trial. Additionally, the Court noted that in the motion to continue, counsel indicated what discovery was necessary and although it was unclear from the record when written discovery was propounded by the plaintiff, during the period between the filing of the motion for summary judgment and the hearing, the plaintiff engaged in inspection of the premises at issue. Lastly, the Scott court noted that the plaintiff moved for a continuance a few weeks prior to the hearing on the motion for summary judgment and also raised the issue in her opposition to the motion for summary judgment. In light of these factors, the Court reversed the grant of summary judgment and remanded it for additional time to conduct discovery. Id. at pp.13-13, ––– So.3d ––––.

In this instant matter, the defendants moved for summary judgment on December 20, 2024. On January 23, 2025, Ms. Lopez served a notice of corporate deposition of Acuren, and the deposition was conducted on January 28, 2025. On January 29, 2025, Ms. Lopez moved for a continuance and opposed the motion for summary judgment.

At the February 13, 2025, hearing on the motion to continue, counsel for Ms. Lopez explained that he discovered that the representative deposed for the corporate deposition did not have full knowledge of events and additional discovery was needed. The district court granted the motion to continue. Thereafter, Ms. Lopez requested a second corporate deposition of Acuren. Although a continuance was granted to Ms. Lopez for additional discovery, the defendant's objected to the second request for a corporate deposition. Thereafter, Ms. Lopez filed a motion to set an expedited status conference. A telephone status conference was held on May 6, 2025 and the hearing on the defendants’ motion for summary judgment was held on May 8, 2025.

The May 9, 2025 hearing transcript reveals that the district court refused to allow Ms. Lopez to conduct another corporate deposition of Acuren. The record does not show a deadline for discovery or a trial date schedule. It is undisputed that Ms. Lopez maintained that additional discovery was necessary and, during the period between the filing of the motion for summary judgment on December 20, 2024, and the hearing on May 8, 2025, sought to conduct corporate depositions. Additionally, Ms. Lopez raised the discovery issue in her opposition to the motion for summary judgment and the request for a status conference.

CONCLUSION

Considering these factors collectively, we conclude that Ms. Lopez should be afforded additional time to complete discovery and depose another representative of Acuren. See Succession of Hickman, 2022-0730, p. 7, 359 So.3d at 590.

For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the district court's May 20, 2025 judgment, and remand the matter for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS

FOOTNOTES

1.   While Ms. Lopez asserts that her motion to continue was denied, the record reflects it was granted. However, the district court subsequently denied Ms. Lopez the opportunity to conduct an additional corporate deposition.

JUDGE SANDRA CABRINA JENKINS