STATE v. HARRIS (2026)

The defendant, Mekaill D. Harris (“Defendant”), appeals his convictions and sentences for second degree murder and attempted second degree murder. After consideration of the record before this Court and the applicable law, we affirm Defendant's convictions and sentences.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

This case arises from a shooting incident that occurred on June 28, 2021, at 4105 Jumonville Street in New Orleans, Louisiana, resulting in the death of Tommy Butler (“Mr. Butler”) and gunshot injuries to Raynard Enclarde (“Mr. Enclarde”). Surveillance footage from a nearby retail store captured the events leading up to, during, and immediately after the shooting. The footage showed a dark blue Dodge Caliber (“Caliber”), with “TOW” displayed on the windshield, repeatedly driving past 4105 Jumonville Street before the shooting. During that period, a small red sedan, driven by Mr. Enclarde, pulled into the driveway of the residence, and Mr. Butler moved towards the street from the driveway.

The Caliber approached the residence on its final pass with the rear driver's-side passenger door opened. An individual, later identified as Defendant, wearing a red hoodie and blue latex gloves while armed with a handgun, exited from the rear driver's-side passenger seat and ran up the driveway while firing. At the same time, a second shooter exited from the front passenger seat, aimed over the roof of the Caliber, and fired toward the driveway. A third shooter then exited from the rear passenger area armed with a Draco-style rifle and fired from near the end of the driveway. The second shooter subsequently moved from the Caliber toward the driveway and continued firing down the driveway. The shooters then proceeded farther down the driveway. The red sedan backed out of the driveway and left the area while one of the shooters continued firing in its direction.

During the shooting, Defendant was struck by gunfire and was momentarily stationary, face down, in a patch of grass near the end of the driveway. After the red sedan departed, two of the shooters dragged Defendant back to the Caliber and placed him in the rear seat. Then, the shooters reentered the Caliber and fled the scene.

Mr. Butler was found dead at the scene. Mr. Enclarde sustained multiple gunshot wounds and arrived at University Medical Center (“UMC”) in critical condition. Defendant also arrived at UMC with a gunshot wound. Surveillance footage from the hospital showed Defendant being dropped off by the same Caliber depicted in the Jumonville Street surveillance footage.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On December 9, 2021, Defendant was charged by grand jury indictment with one count of obstruction of justice, a violation of La. R.S. 14:130.1; one count of second degree murder, a violation of La. R.S. 14:30.1; and one count of attempted second degree murder, a violation of La. R.S. 14(27)30.1. On February 2, 2022, Defendant pled not guilty to all charges at his arraignment. The State later filed a notice to invoke the firearm sentencing enhancement under La. C.Cr.P. art. 893.3.

The jury trial commenced with jury selection on July 8, 2024. At trial several individuals testified, including: Dr. Samantha Huber (“Dr. Huber”), Detective Mary Lou Agustin (“Detective Agustin”), Kenneth Leary (“Mr. Leary”), Zachary Shawhan (“Mr. Shawhan”), and the Defendant. Dr. Huber, the chief pathologist in the Orleans Parish Coroner's Office, performed the autopsy on Mr. Butler. Dr. Huber testified that Mr. Butler sustained eight gunshot wounds and that the cause of death was multiple gunshot wounds. She explained that three of the wounds were fatal and that she recovered one bullet from the base of Mr. Butler's neck and bullet fragments from one of his arms.

The lead homicide detective assigned to the matter, Detective Agustin, testified that she responded to the shooting scene at 4105 Jumonville Street. When she arrived, officers from the New Orleans Police Department's Third District were already present. Detective Agustin explained that she directed officers to obtain surveillance footage from a nearby retail store and instructed crime scene technicians to photograph the scene and collect shell casings and other physical evidence.

Detective Agustin testified that, at the scene, she observed two firearms near Mr. Butler's body. One firearm was located underneath Mr. Butler's hand, and another was nearby on the sidewalk. She also observed numerous casings and blood at the scene. According to Detective Agustin, the firearm located on the sidewalk was a .40 caliber handgun, while the firearm located under Mr. Butler's hand was a jammed 9mm handgun.

Further, Detective Agustin explained that her investigation led her to the Caliber seen in the surveillance footage. She testified that the Caliber was later found abandoned in the 2700 block of Cherry Street. Pursuant to a search warrant, officers processed the vehicle. Detective Agustin indicated that the rear driver's-side interior was covered in blood and that officers recovered a blue surgical glove from inside the vehicle. Also, she noted that the glove matched the description of the glove Defendant wore during the shooting.

The State presented firearms evidence through Mr. Leary, a criminalist assigned to the NOPD firearms examination unit and accepted as an expert in firearms and ballistics identification. Mr. Leary testified that the physical evidence established that at least two .40 caliber firearms and one 7.62x39 mm firearm were used during the shooting. He determined that nine of the recovered .40 caliber casings were fired from the handgun recovered at the scene. He further explained that none of the casings or projectiles recovered from the scene had been fired from the 9mm handgun found under Mr. Butler's hand. According to Mr. Leary, the rifle depicted in the surveillance footage was likely the source of the 7.62x39 mm casings recovered from the scene.

Additionally, the State introduced DNA evidence through the testimony of Mr. Shawhan. Mr. Shawhan, a DNA analyst with the Louisiana State Police Crime Lab, testified that blood recovered from the patch of grass where Defendant was seen lying after the shooting was consistent with Defendant's DNA profile. He further testified that blood recovered from the blue surgical glove and from the interior of the Caliber was also consistent with Defendant's DNA profile.

Defendant testified in his own defense. He denied intending to kill Mr. Butler and claimed that Mr. Butler pulled a firearm first, causing Defendant to fire in self-defense.

Trial concluded on July 10, 2024, with the jury finding Defendant guilty as charged of second degree murder and attempted second degree murder, while acquitting him of obstruction of justice. Additionally, the jury found that Defendant discharged a firearm during the attempted second degree murder, resulting in bodily injury.

On September 24, 2024, Defendant filed a motion for new trial, which the district court denied on September 26, 2024. After Defendant waived delays, the district court sentenced him to life imprisonment for second degree murder and forty years for attempted second degree murder, inclusive of the firearm enhancement, with the sentences to run concurrently. This timely appeal followed.

ERRORS PATENT

In accordance with La. C.Cr.P. art. 920, all appeals are reviewed for errors patent on the face of the record. Our review reveals no errors patent.

DISCUSSION

On appeal, Defendant assigns two errors for this Court's review: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for second degree murder because the State failed to disprove self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt; and (2) the district court erred in instructing the jury on attempted second degree murder by including intent to inflict great bodily harm within the charge. Because a sufficiency claim implicates Defendant's constitutional protection against double jeopardy, we address that assignment first.

Assignment of Error No. 1: Sufficiency of the Evidence / Self-Defense

As his first assignment of error, Defendant asserts that the evidence was insufficient to support his second degree murder conviction because Mr. Butler was armed and Defendant fired only in self-defense. Defendant emphasizes the jammed 9mm handgun found under Mr. Butler's hand and his own testimony that he believed Mr. Butler posed an imminent threat.

Pursuant to Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979), this Court must determine that the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, “was sufficient to convince a rational trier of fact that all the elements of the crime had been proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Neal, 2000-0674, p. 9 (La. 6/29/01), 796 So.2d 649, 657 (citations omitted). The statutory test of La. R.S. 15:438 “works with the Jackson constitutional sufficiency test to evaluate whether all the evidence, direct and circumstantial, is sufficient to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt to a rational jury.” Id. (citing State v. Rosiere, 488 So.2d 965, 968 (La. 1986)).

This Court has previously set forth the applicable standard of review for sufficiency of the evidence:

In evaluating whether evidence is constitutionally sufficient to support a conviction, an appellate court must determine whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); State v. Green, 588 So.2d 757 (La. App. 4 Cir.1991). However, the reviewing court may not disregard this duty simply because the record contains evidence that tends to support each fact necessary to constitute the crime. State v. Mussall, 523 So.2d 1305 (La. 1988). The reviewing court must consider the record as a whole since that is what a rational trier of fact would do. If rational triers of fact could disagree as to the interpretation of the evidence, the rational trier's view of all the evidence most favorable to the prosecution must be adopted. The fact finder's discretion will be impinged upon only to the extent necessary to guarantee the fundamental protection of due process of law. Mussall; Green; supra. “[A] reviewing court is not called upon to decide whether it believes the witnesses or whether the conviction is contrary to the weight of the evidence.” State v. Smith, 600 So.2d 1319 (La. 1992) at 1324.

State v. Huckabay, 2000-1082, p. 32 (La. App. 4 Cir. 2/6/02), 809 So.2d 1093, 1111.

The State charged Defendant with the second degree murder of Mr. Butler. La. R.S. 14:30.1(A)(1) defines second degree murder as the “killing of a human being․when the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm.” La. R.S. 14:10(1) defines specific criminal intent as “that state of mind which exists when the circumstances indicate that the offender actively desired the prescribed criminal consequences to follow his act or failure to act.” “Specific intent may be inferred from the circumstances surrounding the offense and the conduct of the defendant.” State v. Bishop, 2001-2548, p. 4 (La. 1/14/03), 835 So.2d 434, 437 (citing La. R.S. 14:10(1); State v. Butler, 322 So.2d 189 (La.1975); and State v. Martin, 1992-0811 (La. App. 5 Cir. 5/31/94), 638 So.2d 411). Defendant argues that there is insufficient evidence for his conviction of second degree murder because the State failed to prove that the shooting was not the result of self-defense. Defendant argues that he acted in self-defense when he shot Mr. Butler; thus, his actions were legally justified.

A homicide is justifiable “[w]hen committed in self-defense by one who reasonably believes that he is in imminent danger of losing his life or receiving great bodily harm and that the killing is necessary to save himself from that danger.” La. R.S. 14:20(A)(1). “In a homicide case in which the defendant asserts he acted in self-defense, the State has the burden of establishing beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not act in self-defense.” State v. Kirk, 2011-1218, pp. 6-7 (La. App. 4 Cir. 8/8/12), 98 So.3d 934, 939-40 (citing State v. Taylor, 2003-1834, p. 7 (La. 5/25/04), 875 So.2d 58, 63). A defendant who is the aggressor or who brings on the difficulty cannot claim self-defense unless he withdraws in good faith and in a manner that his adversary knows or should know that he desires to withdraw and discontinue the conflict. La. R.S. 14:21.

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, we find that the State presented sufficient evidence from which a rational trier of fact could conclude that Defendant did not act in self-defense. The surveillance footage provided compelling evidence that the shooting was not defensive in nature, but rather deliberate and coordinated. The footage showed a dark blue Caliber driving past 4105 Jumonville Street several times before the shooting. On the vehicle's final pass, Defendant exited from the rear driver's-side passenger seat with a firearm drawn and immediately ran up the driveway while firing in the direction of Mr. Butler and Mr. Enclarde. At the same time, two other armed individuals exited the vehicle and joined in the gunfire. This evidence permitted the jury to reasonably find that Defendant was the aggressor and that the shooting constituted an offensive attack rather than an act of self-defense.

The forensic evidence further undermined Defendant's claim of self-defense. Although a jammed 9mm handgun was recovered beneath Mr. Butler's hand, Mr. Leary testified that none of the casings or projectiles recovered from the scene had been fired from that weapon. Instead, the evidence established that two .40 caliber firearms and a rifle were used during the shooting. Thus, the jury could reasonably infer that the 9mm handgun recovered beneath Mr. Butler's hand had not been fired during the incident.

Moreover, the jury was free to reject Defendant's testimony that he acted in self-defense. “A trier of fact's determination as to the credibility of a witness is a question of fact entitled to great weight, and its determination will not be disturbed unless it is clearly contrary to the evidence.” State v. Wells, 2010-1338, p. 5 (La. App. 4 Cir. 3/30/11), 64 So.3d 303, 306 (citation omitted). Here, the jury evidently credited the surveillance footage and forensic evidence over Defendant's account of the shooting. On this record, that credibility determination was not clearly contrary to the evidence.

Accordingly, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, we find that a rational trier of fact could have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant had the specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm upon Mr. Butler, and that the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant did not act in self-defense. This assignment of error lacks merit.

Assignment of Error No. 2: Jury Instruction on Attempted Second Degree Murder

In his second assignment of error, Defendant asserts that the district court erred in instructing the jury on attempted second degree murder because the instruction referenced the statutory definition of second degree murder, which includes the “specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm.” Defendant contends that this language improperly invited the jury to convict him of attempted second degree murder upon finding only that he specifically intended to inflict great bodily harm.

Louisiana law is clear that, although the completed offense of second degree murder may be committed when the offender has the specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm, attempted second degree murder requires proof of the specific intent to kill. Butler, 322 So.2d at 192; State v. Hongo, 96-2060, p. 2 (La. 12/2/97), 706 So.2d 419, 420. Specific intent to inflict great bodily harm, standing alone, is insufficient to support a conviction for attempted second degree murder. Hongo, 1996-2060, pp. 2-3, 706 So.2d at 420. To the extent the district court's instruction incorporated the statutory definition of second degree murder and thereby referenced the “specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm,” the instruction was erroneous as applied to the attempted second degree murder charge. Attempted second degree murder required the State to prove that Defendant had the specific intent to kill Mr. Enclarde, not merely an intent to inflict great bodily harm.

Defendant did not object to the attempted second degree murder instruction before the jury retired, nor did he otherwise bring the alleged defect to the district court's attention at a time when the court could have reasonably cured the issue by clarifying that attempted second degree murder requires the specific intent to kill. Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure Article 801(C) provides, in pertinent part, that “[a] party may not assign as error the giving or failure to give a jury charge or any portion thereof unless an objection thereto is made before the jury retires or within such time as the court may reasonably cure the alleged error.” Likewise, La. C.Cr.P. art. 841(A) provides that “[a]n irregularity or error cannot be availed of after verdict unless it was objected to at the time of occurrence.” “The contemporaneous objection rule has two purposes: (1) to put the trial judge on notice of the alleged irregularity so that he may cure the problem and (2) to prevent a defendant from gambling for a favorable verdict and then resorting to appeal on errors that might easily have been corrected by objection.” State v. Thomas, 427 So.2d 428, 433 (La. 1982) (citations omitted).

Generally, absent a contemporaneous objection, a defendant may not challenge an allegedly erroneous jury instruction for the first time on appeal. However, the rule is subject to a narrow exception “where the error is the very definition of the crime of which the defendant was in fact convicted, and where the record bears full and sufficient proof of the error which no posterior hearing could augment.” State v. Holmes, 620 So.2d 436, 438 (La. App. 3rd Cir. 6/9/1993) (citing State v. Williamson, 389 So.2d 1328 (La.1980)).

In State v. Williamson, the Louisiana Supreme Court considered an erroneous attempted first degree murder instruction despite the lack of a contemporaneous objection. However, Williamson arose in an unusual procedural and legal posture. The attempted murder law had recently changed, and the jury charge created substantial confusion as to the elements of the responsive verdict of attempted second degree murder. Williamson, 389 So.2d at 1329-30. The Court found it apparent from the record that the jury may have applied an erroneous definition of the offense. Id., 389 So.2d at 1331. Thus, Williamson represents a narrow exception where the record itself demonstrated a serious likelihood that the jury convicted under a legally incorrect theory.

Two years after Williamson, the Louisiana Supreme Court, in State v. Belgard, refused to consider an alleged error in the jury charge where the defendant failed to object contemporaneously. 410 So.2d 720 (La. 1982). The Court, without discussing Williamson, stated, “[d]efendant assigns as error the trial court's jury instruction on the definition of attempted second degree murder. However, defendant did not object to this instruction at trial, and it is not reviewable on appeal.” Id., 410 So.2d at 727 (citations omitted).

Thereafter, in State v. Wallace, this Court “note[d] that the Louisiana Supreme Court has cautioned courts in its application of Williamson.” 2013-0149, p. 17 (La. App. 4 Cir. 6/25/14), 143 So.3d 1275, 1284. “In State v. Thomas, 427 So.2d 428, 435 (La. 1982), the Supreme Court noted that Williamson should not be interpreted as permitting appellate review of every constitutional violation alleged and erroneous jury instruction claimed on first appeal without a contemporaneous objection.” Id. In Wallace, this Court addressed a jury instruction that erroneously allowed conviction for aggravated rape based on an incorrect legal theory. Similar to Williamson, the aggravated rape law changed between the time of the offense and the time of trial. Id. at p. 13, 143 So.3d at 1282. This Court concluded that “a substantial probability that jurors may have convicted [Mr. Wallace] under an incorrect definition of the crime justifies setting aside a conviction on due process grounds even in the absence of a contemporaneous objection.” Id. at pp. 16-17, 143 So.3d at 1284.

We are not persuaded that Wallace mandates reversal under the circumstances presented here. Unlike in Wallace, in this case, there were no statutory revisions nor is it apparent from the record that the jury mistakenly applied the law. The evidence and arguments did not present multiple legally distinct routes by which the jury could have convicted Defendant of attempted second degree murder. The State's theory required a finding that Defendant participated in an armed ambush with the intent to kill. Defendant's theory was that he acted in self-defense and lacked criminal culpability. The jury's guilty verdict necessarily reflects its rejection of Defendant's self-defense account and its acceptance of the State's evidence that Defendant intentionally opened fire on Mr. Enclarde as part of a coordinated attack.

On this record, there is no reasonable likelihood of jury confusion. The evidence of specific intent to kill was direct and overwhelming. The surveillance footage showed the Caliber driving past 4105 Jumonville Street several times before the shooting. On the vehicle's final pass, Defendant exited from the rear driver's side passenger seat with a firearm drawn and immediately ran up the driveway while firing toward Mr. Butler and Mr. Enclarde. Two other armed individuals simultaneously emerged from the vehicle and joined in the gunfire. The red sedan driven by Mr. Enclarde then backed out of the driveway while one of the shooters continued firing toward it. One victim died, and Mr. Enclarde sustained multiple gunshot wounds.

The record does not support a realistic middle-ground theory that Defendant intended only to inflict great bodily harm upon Mr. Enclarde. Further, Defendant has not pointed this Court to any specific evidence, testimony, or proceedings that transforms an instructional error into denial of due process. Due to Defendant's failure to contemporaneously object to the trial court's jury instruction and inapplicability of the contemporaneous objection exception to the matter herein, this issue is not reviewable on appeal.

Nevertheless, even assuming arguendo that the jury charge was erroneous and the contemporaneous objection exception applies, any error was harmless because the verdict was surely unattributable to the challenged language. “[H]armless-error analysis applies to instructional errors so long as the error at issue does not categorically ‘ “vitiat[e] all the jury's findings.” ’ ”Wallace, 2013-0149, p. 11, 143 So.3d at 1281 (citation omitted). “The burden of proving harmless error rests with the party benefitting from the error.” Id. (citation omitted). In the matter herein, the State has the burden of showing that the jury's verdict was unattributable to the erroneous instruction and that Defendant's substantial rights are not affected. See Id. at pp. 11-12, 143 So.3d at 1281.

The applicability of the harmless error analysis is reinforced by State v. Hongo. In Hongo, the Louisiana Supreme Court recognized that attempted second degree murder requires the specific intent to kill, but held that an erroneous instruction referencing intent to inflict great bodily harm did not require reversal where the record did not support a finding that the defendant intended only to inflict great bodily harm. Hongo, 1996-2060, pp. 3-4, 706 So.2d at 421-22. The Court observed that, “given only the two versions that were presented, no reasonable jury could have concluded that defendant had the intent to only inflict great bodily harm.”. Id. at p. 6, 706 So.2d at 422.

This case is analogous to Hongo. Defendant's theory was not that he intended only to wound Mr. Enclarde. Rather, he denied criminal culpability and asserted self-defense. The State's evidence, by contrast, showed that Defendant and his accomplices repeatedly passed the residence, approached on the final pass with Defendant's door open, exited armed, and immediately fired toward the victims. The jury was therefore presented with competing theories of intentional attempted killing versus justification, not a viable theory of intent only to inflict great bodily harm.

Considering the jury instructions as a whole, the evidence presented, and the competing theories advanced at trial, there is no reasonable likelihood that the jury convicted Defendant of attempted second degree murder based solely upon a finding that he intended to only inflict great bodily harm. Accordingly, this assignment of error lacks merit.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendant's convictions and sentences for second degree murder and attempted second degree murder are affirmed.

AFFIRMED

Judge Nakisha Ervin-Knott