STATE v. MOLIERE (2026)

James Moliere (hereinafter “Defendant”) appeals his convictions and sentences for second degree murder and obstruction of justice. After consideration of the record before this Court, and the applicable law, we affirm Defendant's second degree murder and obstruction of justice convictions; affirm Defendant's sentence for second degree murder; and remand the matter to the district court for removal of the prohibition against parole, probation or suspension of sentence on Defendant's obstruction of justice sentence.

Facts and Procedural History

In the early morning hours of January 1, 2023, Defendant and Clark Bowdry (hereinafter “Mr. Bowdry”) were at Gold Room Nola, a club located in the 1600 Block of Clio Street in New Orleans, Louisiana. Mr. Bowdry arrived at the club after text exchanges between he and his former girlfriend, Alexia Howard (hereinafter “Ms. Howard”), who was at the club with her cousin Kayla Simmons (hereinafter “Ms. Simmons). After exiting the club, the women were approached by Mr. Bowdry, who initiated a verbal confrontation with Ms. Simmons. Ms. Howard began recording the confrontation on her cellular phone. Defendant observed the confrontation and approached Mr. Bowdry with a rifle. The two men engaged in a physical altercation after Mr. Bowdry knocked the rifle out of Defendant's hand. Thereafter, a bouncer from the club intervened and broke up the altercation. Defendant then shot Mr. Bowdry five times. Defendant fled the scene and Mr. Bowdry was later pronounced dead.

On April 27, 2023, an Orleans Parish grand jury indicted Defendant for the second degree murder of Mr. Bowdry, a violation of La. R.S. 14:30.1 and one count of obstruction of justice, a violation of La. R.S. 14:130.1. At trial the jury heard testimony from multiple witnesses, including the officer who first responded to the scene; the investigating officer; Ms. Howard; Ms. Simmons; and the forensic pathologist who performed Mr. Bowdry's autopsy.¹ Following the State's presentation of the witnesses’ testimony, the State rested and Defendant did not call any witnesses.

After a four-day jury trial, the jury unanimously found Defendant guilty of second degree murder and obstruction of justice. Following trial, and under newly retained counsel, Defendant moved for a post-verdict judgment of acquittal, or alternatively, a new trial. On September 5, 2025, the district court denied Defendant's motions and he waived sentencing delays. The district court imposed a sentence of life imprisonment for the second degree murder conviction and forty years at hard labor for the obstruction of justice conviction. The district court ordered each sentence to be served concurrently without the benefit of probation, parole or suspension of sentence. This appeal followed.

Discussion

Defendant raises the following assignments of error:

Counseled Assignments of Error:  2

1. When a defendant asserts self-defense or defense of others, the burden is on the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he did not act in self-defense or defense of others. The State failed to do so in this case;

2. The State is required to prove that the defendant had the specific intent to distort the results of a criminal proceeding in order to convict for obstruction of justice. The State must also negate every reasonable hypothesis of innocence to uphold the conviction based upon wholly circumstantial evidence. The State failed in both regards;

Pro Se Assignments of Error:3

1. Insufficient evidence to support the convictions for second degree murder and obstruction of justice;

2. Trial counsel did not allow defendant to testify;

3. The State failed to disclose exculpatory material;

4. The State engaged in misconduct;

5. The district court failed to instruct the jury on “justifiable homicide;”

6. The district court failed to observe the mandatory delay between the denial of his motion for new trial and sentencing.

For ease of discussion, we will address each assignment of error under its relevant topic.

Sufficiency of the Evidence (Counseled Assignment of Error One and Two; Pro Se Assignment of Error One)

Sufficiency of the Evidence

It is well settled that when sufficiency of the evidence and one or more trial errors are raised on appeal, this Court should first determine the sufficiency of the evidence. State v. Groves, 2020-0450, p. 21 (La.App. 4 Cir. 6/10/21), 323 So.3d 957, 971 (quoting State v. Hearold, 603 So.2d 731, 734 (La. 1992). We review sufficiency of the evidence first because “if there is not sufficient evidence to support a conviction, an accused is not entitled to a new trial; rather, an accused is entitled to an acquittal. If an accused is entitled to an acquittal, this prevents the need for a retrial.” Id. (citation omitted).

This Court has previously set forth the applicable standard of review for sufficiency of the evidence:

In evaluating whether evidence is constitutionally sufficient to support a conviction, an appellate court must determine whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); State v. Green, 588 So.2d 757 (La.App. 4 Cir.1991). However, the reviewing court may not disregard this duty simply because the record contains evidence that tends to support each fact necessary to constitute the crime. State v. Mussall, 523 So.2d 1305 (La. 1988). The reviewing court must consider the record as a whole since that is what a rational trier of fact would do. If rational triers of fact could disagree as to the interpretation of the evidence, the rational trier's view of all the evidence most favorable to the prosecution must be adopted. The fact finder's discretion will be impinged upon only to the extent necessary to guarantee the fundamental protection of due process of law. Mussall; Green; supra. “[A] reviewing court is not called upon to decide whether it believes the witnesses or whether the conviction is contrary to the weight of the evidence.” State v. Smith, 600 So.2d 1319 (La. 1992) at 1324.

State v. Huckabay, 2000-1082, p. 32 (La.App. 4 Cir. 2/6/02), 809 So.2d 1093, 1111.

Pursuant to Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979), this Court must determine that the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, “was sufficient to convince a rational trier of fact that all of the elements of the crime had been proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Neal, 2000-0674, p. 9 (La. 6/29/01), 796 So.2d 649, 657 (citations omitted). The elements must be proven such that every reasonable hypothesis of innocence is excluded. La. R.S. 15:438. The statutory test of La. R.S. 15:438 “works with the Jackson constitutional sufficiency test to evaluate whether all the evidence, direct and circumstantial, is sufficient to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt to a rational jury.” Id. “When circumstantial evidence forms the basis of the conviction, such evidence must consist of proof of collateral facts and circumstances from which the existence of the main fact may be inferred according to reason and common experience.” State v. Brown, 2012-0626, p. 8 (La.App. 4 Cir. 4/10/13), 115 So.3d 564, 571 (citation omitted). “[A] reviewing court is not called upon to decide whether it believes the witnesses or whether the conviction is contrary to the weight of the evidence.” Huckabay, 2000-1082, p. 32, 809 So.2d at 1111 (quoting State v. Smith, 600 So.2d 1319, 1324 (La. 1992)). As an appellate court, we must review the record as a whole just as the trier of fact would do. State v. Wilson, 2022-0346, p. 4 (La.App. 4 Cir. 12/9/22), 353 So.3d 389, 393 (citation omitted). With these principles in mind, we analyze whether the State presented sufficient evidence to convict Defendant of second degree murder and obstruction of justice.

Second Degree Murder

The State charged Defendant with second degree murder pursuant to La. R.S. 14:30.1 and the jury unanimously found him guilty as charged. Second degree murder is defined as “the killing of a human being․when the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm․ .” La. R.S. 14:30.1(A)(1). “Specific criminal intent is a state of mind, and, as such, need not be proven as fact but may be inferred from the circumstances and the actions of the accused.” State v. Scott, 2009-0138, p. 8 (La.App. 4 Cir. 11/18/09), 26 So.3d 283, 289 (citation omitted). Defendant contends the State did not present sufficient evidence to support his conviction of second degree murder. While Defendant does not dispute that he shot Mr. Bowdry, he asserts that he did so in defense of Ms. Howard and Ms. Simmons and in self-defense due to the physical altercation between he and Mr. Bowdry.

La. R.S. 14:20(A)(1) provides that a homicide is justified “[w]hen committed in self-defense by one who reasonably believes that he is in imminent danger of losing his life or receiving great bodily harm and that the killing is necessary to save himself from that danger.” While the belief of imminent danger and the necessity to kill must both be reasonable, “the justification defense may not apply to a defendant who acts as the aggressor and provokes the situation.” State v. Wright, 2024-0349, p. 7 (La.App. 4 Cir. 3/19/25), 418 So.3d 63, 69. La R.S. 14:22 provides: “It is justifiable to use force or violence or to kill in the defense of another person when it is reasonably apparent that the person attacked could have justifiably used such means himself, and when it is reasonably believed that such intervention is necessary to protect the other person.” Once a defendant raises the issue of self-defense, the State has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not act in self-defense. La. C.Cr.P. art. 390(A).

Police obtained and viewed several surveillance videos from both inside and outside of the club. Additionally, Detective Maurice Stewart (hereinafter “Detective Stewart”), the lead investigator, was able to obtain video footage from Ms. Howard's cellular phone, which provided a clear view of the altercation between Mr. Bowdry and Defendant. It is undisputed that Mr. Bowdry was aggressive towards Ms. Simmons and Ms. Howard when he approached the women. Ms. Simmons testified that once she and Ms. Howard left the club, Mr. Bowdry approached her and “was fussing in [her] face.” She explained that she did not fear for her life or seek assistance from anyone. Although Ms. Simmons indicated she was not afraid of Mr. Bowdry, she admitted that a bystander could have concluded that Mr. Bowdry was trying to harm her. The video, which was shown to the jury, shows Defendant retrieving a rifle from his vehicle and approaching Mr. Bowdry, who then walked away from the women. Mr. Bowdry knocked the rifle out of Defendant's hand, and a physical altercation ensued between the two men. They fought until a bouncer from the club separated Mr. Bowdry and Defendant. As both men stood up, Defendant opened fire with the handgun and shot Mr. Bowdry five times. Dr. Erin O'Sullivan (hereinafter “Dr. O'Sullivan”) performed the autopsy and testified that while she could not determine what order Mr. Bowdry's wounds were sustained, four of the wounds were on the right side of his abdomen or on the side or back of his right arm, the side nearest Defendant. The fifth wound was to the top of Mr. Bowdry's head and appeared to have traveled in a downward path, slightly front to back. Dr. O'Sullivan also noted that there was no firearm residue found on Mr. Bowdry, which indicates that he was not in close proximity to the firearm when he was shot.

Although Defendant asserts a claim of self-defense and defense of others, the video footage of the incident does not support his claim. The video footage shows Mr. Bowdry retreating once the bouncer broke up the altercation. Further, Mr. Bowdry was taller than Defendant and the bullet that struck Mr. Bowdry's head entered at the top of the head and traveled in a downward path. The position of the remaining gunshot wounds to Mr. Bowdry's torso and arm were from the side, not in front of the victim, supporting a finding that Mr. Bowdry was not advancing toward Defendant at the time of the shooting. Defendant's defense of other's argument centers on his belief that Mr. Bowdry was about to harm Ms. Howard and Ms. Simmons. However, at the point of the altercation, Mr. Bowdry had retreated from both women. We find, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the jury had sufficient evidence to conclude that Defendant did not act in self-defense or defense of others when he shot Mr. Bowdry. We find no merit to Defendant's claim.

Obstruction of Justice

Defendant argues that insufficient evidence exists to convict him of obstruction of justice because leaving the scene of the crime, with the weapon, fails to demonstrate a specific intent to distort the results of the investigation. La. R.S. 14:130.1 defines obstruction of justice, as:

A. The crime of obstruction of justice is any of the following acts when committed with the knowledge that such act has, reasonably may, or will affect an actual or potential present, past, or future criminal proceeding as described in this Section:

(1) Tampering with evidence with the specific intent of distorting the results of any criminal investigation or proceeding which may reasonably prove relevant to a criminal investigation or proceeding. Tampering with evidence shall include the intentional alteration, movement, removal, or addition of any object or substance either:

(a) At the location of any incident which the perpetrator knows or has good reason to believe will be the subject of any investigation by state, local, or United States law enforcement officers; or

(b) At the location of storage, transfer, or place of review of any such evidence.

La. R.S. 14:130.1(A)(1)(a-b). “Specific intent [to commit obstruction of justice] need not be proven as fact but may be inferred from the circumstances of the transaction and the actions of defendant.” State v. Harvey, 2021-0730, p. 10 (La.App. 4 Cir. 5/25/22), 345 So.3d 1043, 1050.

Defendant maintains that leaving the scene of the crime with the weapon is insufficient to show a specific intent to distort a criminal investigation. Therefore, leaving the scene of the crime with the weapon cannot support a conviction for obstruction of justice. We find this argument unpersuasive. The jury considered the totality of Defendant's actions after leaving the crime scene. Defendant's vehicle, including the license plate, can be seen on the surveillance footage. The police also collected 9mm. caliber cartridge cases from the scene of the incident. Detective Stewart testified that during the investigation, Defendant's vehicle was located at his brother's house and had been registered under a different license plate. The police also located a rifle matching the one seen on surveillance video, a 9mm. handgun and other firearms. The firearm identification expert testified that the 9mm. caliber cartridge cases found at the scene of the incident were fired from the 9mm. handgun located at Defendant's brother's house. Based on the totality of the circumstances, it is reasonable to infer that Defendant left the scene of the incident, with the firearm that he knew would be the subject of a criminal investigation. Further, Defendant changed the license plate on his vehicle, essentially making it more difficult for law enforcement to locate the vehicle identified on surveillance footage. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, specifically, the undisputed fact that Defendant fled the scene with the firearm, placed the weapons at his brother's house and changed the license plate on his vehicle, a rational trier of fact could conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Defendant obstructed justice by tampering with evidence. See State v. Powell, 2015-0218, p. 11 (La. App. 4 Cir. 10/28/15), 179 So.3d 721, 728 (removal of a weapon from the scene of the shooting is sufficient to support an obstruction of justice conviction). We find no merit to Defendant's claim.

Based on the foregoing, and viewing the evidence presented by the State, in a light most favorable to the prosecution, we find the trier of fact was presented with sufficient evidence to determine that Defendant committed the crimes of second degree murder and obstruction of justice. See State v. Toby, 2023-00722, p. 3 (La. 10/25/24), 395 So.3d 831, 833, reh'g denied, 2023-00722 (La. 12/12/24), 397 So.3d 424 (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979)) (internal citation omitted) (“Appellate review for constitutional sufficiency of evidence is limited by the due process standard of Jackson v. Virginia. Under that standard, ‘the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ”).

Remaining Pro Se Assignments of Error: Constitutional Right to Testify; Prosecutorial Misconduct; Jury Instruction; and Twenty-Four Hour Sentencing Delay 4

Constitutional Right To Testify

Defendant argues that his constitutional right to testify was violated by his trial counsel because he was not allowed to testify, although he asserted his desire to do so. A defendant has a constitutional right to testify in his own defense. La. Const. Article I, Section 16. To determine whether a defendant's right to testify was violated or waived by his silence, our Supreme Court has adopted two criteria: (1) the district court should inquire into a defendant's right to testify and assume by not testifying, a defendant has knowingly and voluntarily waived his right; and (2) a defendant can only rebut this presumption by demonstrating that his attorney caused him to forego his right to testify by alleging specific credible facts that he was legally forbidden to testify. State v. Hampton, 2000-0522, pp. 14-15 (La. 3/22/02), 818 So.2d 720, 729-30.⁵

At the hearing on Defendant's motion for post-verdict judgment of acquittal, Defendant testified that he was not advised of his constitutional right to testify and he therefore, did not waive that right. Defendant's three trial attorneys testified that Defendant expressed his desire to testify but was advised against it as a trial strategy. Although Defendant asserts that he did not waive his right to testify, the district court noted that it observed Defendant's interactions during trial and did not witness conduct demonstrating his desire to testify. The district court inquired into Defendant's right to testify and found that he failed to demonstrate that he was legally forbidden to do so. We find no merit to Defendant's claim.

Prosecutorial Misconduct

Defendant argues that the State participated in “prosecutorial misconduct” during the trial. He maintains that the following actions constitute prosecutorial misconduct on the part of the State: (1) excluding testimony of Mr. Bowdry's prior criminal history; (2) arguing that Defendant did not have authority to act in defense of others once he left the club's property on the night of the incident; and (3) introduction of the extent of his legally owned firearms, not just the two firearms involved in the incident.

As to Mr. Bowdry's prior criminal history, the district court ruled that the victim's prior criminal history would be excluded unless the defense could prove that Defendant had actual knowledge of the incidents involving the victim's prior criminal history. There was no error in the district court's ruling and we find no merit to Defendant's claim. See State v. Williams, 2019-00490, p. 6 (La. 4/3/20), 340 So.3d 761, 765 (“[U]nder La. C.E. art. 404(B)(1), evidence of [a] prior bad act ‘is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith.’ Furthermore, there is no indication that defendant had any knowledge of the victim's prior arrest․, as might bear upon his state of mind as to the victim's dangerous character.”) (citations omitted). Secondly, as to Defendant's “law enforcement authority” at the club, a review of the transcript indicates that the State did not address the extent of the “authority” that Defendant would have as a security guard. The transcript reveals that the State argued that Mr. Bowdry was not obligated to submit to Defendant's directives in rebuttal to Defendant's argument that he had authority over Mr. Bowdry when Defendant approached him. We find no merit to Defendant's claim.

Lastly, the State introduced Defendant's firearms that were found at his brother's house when the police executed the search warrant. The two firearms involved in the incident were in a duffle bag that also contained Defendant's other legally owned firearms. The State did not attempt to associate the other firearms found in the duffle bag with the firearms used by the Defendant and involved in the incident. See State v. Manieri, 378 So.2d 931 (La. 1979) (finding that the erroneous introduction of knives did not prejudice the defendant because there was no attempt to associate the knives introduced with the knife used by the defendant.). Further, even if the other firearms were improperly admitted, it is subject to a harmless error analysis. State v. Session, 2021-0118, p. 6 (La.App. 4 Cir. 12/14/21), 332 So.3d 729, 737 (citation omitted). For an error to be harmless, it must be shown that the guilty verdict actually rendered at trial was unattributable to the error. State v. Trung Le, 2017-0164, p. 20 (La.App. 4 Cir. 4/11/18), 243 So.3d 637, 657-58. As previously noted, the State presented sufficient evidence to support the jury's finding of guilt and any prejudicial impact on the jury by viewing all of the firearms found, which were legally owned by Defendant, is negligible. We find no merit to Defendant's claims.

Jury Instruction

Defendant contends it was error that the jury was not charged regarding justifiable homicide. While the trial transcript does not contain the jury charges, it does contain the court reporter's note that “there were no objections by either side to the jury charges.” Thus, if a contemporaneous objection is not made, any possible error is not reserved on appeal. La. C.Cr.P. art. 841(A) (“An irregularity or error cannot be availed of after verdict unless it was objected to at the time of occurrence.”); See State v. Brown, 2016-0998, p. 69 (La. 1/28/22), 347 So.3d 745, 800. We find no merit to Defendant's claim.

Twenty-four Hour Sentencing Delay

Defendant argues the district court erred by failing to observe the twenty-four-hour sentencing delay as mandated by La. C.Cr.P. art 873. When a defendant is convicted of a felony and “a motion for new trial․is filed, sentence shall not be imposed until at least twenty-four hours after the motion is overruled.” La. C.Cr.P. art. 873. However, a sentence may be imposed immediately after the denial of a motion for new trial if “the defendant expressly waives a delay․.” Id. Counsel for Defendant waived the statutory sentencing delay at the hearing on Defendant's motion for post-judgment verdict of acquittal, or alternatively new trial. Since counsel for Defendant expressly waived the delays set forth in La. C.Cr.P. art. 873, the trial court did not err in immediately sentencing Defendant after the denial of his motion. We find no merit to Defendant's claim.

Errors Patent Review

In accordance with La. C.Cr.P. art. 920, this Court reviews all criminal appeals for errors patent on the face of the record. An error patent is one “that is discoverable by a mere inspection of the pleadings and proceedings and without inspection of the evidence.” La. C.Cr.P. art. 920(2). A review of the record reveals two errors patent.

The first error patent concerns the polling of the jury with respect to the guilty verdict on the second degree murder charge. The trial transcript reflects that only eleven jurors were questioned as to their verdict on the second degree murder charge. By contrast, the trial transcript reflects that twelve jurors were questioned regarding the obstruction of justice charge. Nonetheless, the district court stated “I have counted [and] there are twelve [jurors] for each verdict.” Further, Defendant did not object to any error in the verdicts. The record therefore supports the conclusion that twelve jurors voted to convict Defendant of second degree murder and no action is warranted by this Court.

The second error patent concerns the sentence for Defendant's obstruction of justice conviction. The district court imposed the sentence on the obstruction of justice conviction without benefit of parole, probation or suspension of sentence. La. R.S. 14:130.1(B)(1) provides that when the obstruction of justice involves an offense for which a life sentence may be imposed, “the offender shall be fined not more than one hundred thousand dollars, imprisoned for not more than forty years at hard labor, or both.” There is no provision that the sentence be served without benefit of parole, probation or suspension of sentence. Accordingly, the sentence imposed by the district court on the obstruction of justice conviction is illegal. The matter is therefore remanded to the district court with an instruction to amend the sentence on the obstruction of justice conviction and delete any reference to the prohibition against parole, probation or suspension of sentence. The district court shall furnish the Louisiana Department of Corrections with a commitment order reflecting the amended sentence. See State v. Randall, 2010-1027, p. 4 (La.App. 4 Cir. 6/22/11), 69 So.3d 683, 685.

Decree

After a thorough review of the record, we affirm Defendant's second degree murder and obstruction of justice convictions; affirm Defendant's sentence for second degree murder; and remand the matter to the district court for removal of the prohibition against parole, probation or suspension of sentence on Defendant's obstruction of justice sentence.

CONVICTIONS AFFIRMED; SECOND DEGREE MURDER SENTENCE AFFIRMED; REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS

FOOTNOTES

1.   Mr. Bowdry's mother, Rheesa LeBoyd, also testified at trial.

2.   At the time of the lodging of the appeal, Defendant was represented by Louisiana Appeals and Writ Service who filed an appellant brief on his behalf raising two assignments of error. Defendant later retained private counsel and Louisiana Appeals and Writ Service withdrew from his case. Defendant's private counsel filed a reply brief on his behalf, raising two additional assignments of error. We decline to consider the assignments of error raised in Defendant's reply brief. See State v. Edwards, 2013-0665, pp. 2-3 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1/22/14), 133 So.3d 132, 134 (citing Uniform Rules, Courts of Appeal, Rule 2-12.6) (“[A] rebuttal brief is limited to responding to matters raised by the appellee's brief.”).

3.   Defendant filed several pro se documents in this Court asserting various “errors” which occurred during the trial.

5.   Defendant's appellate counsel frames the issue of his constitutional right to testify as an ineffective assistance of counsel claim in the reply brief. Insomuch as Defendant is raising an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, that claim is better reserved for an application for post-conviction relief. See State v. Turner, 2025-00209 (La. 3/6/26), 429 So.3d 179 (wherein the Louisiana Supreme Court found that if a claim of a violation of the right to testify is raised in an application for post-conviction relief, it should be considered under the ineffective assistance of counsel review pursuant to Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984)).

Judge Tiffany Gautier Chase