AUTOMOTIVE EXPERTS LLC v. JOE JOHNSON INC JOE JOHNSON CHEVROLET (2017)

This case comes before this Court on appeal of the district court's April 20, 2017 judgment granting plaintiff, Automotive Expert, LLC's, motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of breach of contract. On August 18, 2017, Plaintiff filed a “Motion to Dismiss appeal for Lack of Jurisdiction.” Defendant filed an opposition thereto on August 28, 2017.

Plaintiff's motion to dismiss argues that the judgment in question is not a final judgment because it was not designated a final, immediately appealable judgment as required by La.C.C.P. art. 1915(B)(1). Defendant argues the judgment is indeed final pursuant to La.C.C.P. art. 1915(A)(5), as the issue of liability has been decided and only questions regarding damages remain. Alternatively, Defendant suggests this Court has discretion to certify the judgment as final or appealable, or to convert the appeal into a writ application.

The relevant provision, La.C.C.P. art. 1915 provides, in pertinent part, as follows:

A. A final judgment may be rendered and signed by the court, even though it may not grant the successful party or parties all of the relief prayed for, or may not adjudicate all of the issues in the case, when the court:

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(3) Grants a motion for summary judgment, as provided by Articles 966 through 969, but not including a summary judgment granted pursuant to Article 966(E).

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(5) Signs a judgment on the issue of liability when that issue has been tried separately by the court, or when, in a jury trial, the issue of liability has been tried before a jury and the issue of damages is to be tried before a different jury.

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B.(1) When a court renders a partial judgment or partial summary judgment or sustains an exception in part, as to one or more but less than all of the claims, demands, issues, or theories against a party, whether in an original demand, reconventional demand, cross-claim, third-party claim, or intervention, the judgment shall not constitute a final judgment unless it is designated as a final judgment by the court after an express determination that there is no just reason for delay.

(2) In the absence of such a determination and designation, any such order or decision shall not constitute a final judgment for the purpose of an immediate appeal and may be revised at any time prior to rendition of the judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties.

There is no dispute that the judgment in question lacks the necessary designation as a “final judgment by the court after an express determination that there is no just reason for delay.”

This Court addressed a similar scenario in Diecidue v. Tittle, 2012-0903, pp. 4-5 (La.App. 4 Cir. 8/14/13), 122 So.3d 1143, 1145–46, which reasoned and held as follows:

Here, the motion for partial summary judgment was granted as to the liability of [defendant] for legal malpractice pursuant to Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 966(E), leaving only the issue of damages to be tried. Therefore, by virtue of the literal language of Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 1915(A)(3), the judgment is not immediately appealable in the absence of a designation of finality pursuant to art. 1915(B). In Crescent City Physicians, Inc. v. Desse, 2004–1280 (La.10/1/04), 883 So.2d 963, the Louisiana Supreme Court reversed this court and dismissed the appeal of a partial summary judgment on the issue of liability. In his concurrence, Chief Justice Calogero noted that La. C.C.P. art. 1915(A)(5) “is not applicable in this case because the issue of liability was not tried separately by the court.․' Instead, the trial court granted a partial summary judgment on the liability issue pursuant to ․ art. 966(E).” Id. (Calogero, C.J., concurring).

Accordingly, we find that absent a designation of finality pursuant to Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure 1915(B), the partial summary judgment rendered by the trial court on the issue of liability is not appealable. Because we lack jurisdiction, we dismiss the instant appeal.

Based on the foregoing, we likewise find that this Court lacks jurisdiction, and we dismiss the instant appeal without prejudice.

APPEAL DISMISSED

Judge Regina Bartholomew-Woods

JENKINS, J., CONCURS IN THE RESULT