TYLER STEWART v. CAJUN INDUSTRIES LLC AND AMERICAN CONTRACTORS INSURANCE GROUP (2026)

An employer appeals an Office of Workers’ Compensation (“OWC”) judgment awarding workers’ compensation benefits to an employee and rejecting the employer's contention that the employee had forfeited his right to such benefits under LSA-R.S. 23:1208.1 by untruthfully answering medical questions on a pre-employment questionnaire. For the reasons that follow, we reverse.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In 2018, Tyler Stewart was involved in a motor vehicle accident that resulted in back pain. Mr. Stewart sought treatment with Dr. Kevin McCarthy for his back pain. During his treatment, Dr. McCarthy ordered an MRI, which reflected that Mr. Stewart had, among other things, facet effusions, disc bulges, and disc herniations. Dr. McCarthy performed a facet joint injection on Mr. Stewart on May 29, 2018, and subsequently released him from care on June 12, 2018.

Mr. Stewart was hired by Cajun Industries, LLC (“Cajun”) in 2023. Prior to his employment, Mr. Stewart completed a medical history questionnaire on May 23, 2023. The questionnaire included the following:

Disease and Other Employment Medical Conditions you currently have or have ever had. For all conditions that you [have,] check yes, write a brief explanation on the Explanation Page. [Please check the appropriate box next to each. Every illness/injury requires a Yes (Y) or No (N) answer.]

Pertinent hereto, Mr. Stewart checked “No” to the question asking if he had a “Ruptured or Herniated Disc.” The form also included an acknowledgment that “Failure to answer truthfully and/or correctly to any of the questions on this form may result in a forfeiture of any and all workers[’] compensation benefits under La. R.S. 23:1208.1”

Mr. Stewart was in the course and scope of his employment with Cajun on August 3, 2023, when he lost his balance and twisted his back, resulting in injury. On September 14, 2023, Mr. Stewart filed a Disputed Claim for Compensation seeking wage benefits, medical treatment, attorney's fees, and penalties. In response, Cajun and its workers’ compensation insurance carrier, American Contractors Insurance Group, (hereinafter collectively “Cajun”) filed an answer denying Mr. Stewart's claim, asserting therein that Mr. Stewart forfeited his rights to workers’ compensation benefits by failing to disclose his preexisting disc herniations on the May 23, 2023 pre-employment medical questionnaire.

The case proceeded to trial before the OWC on June 20, 2024. Following trial, the OWC took the matter under advisement. In its written reasons, the OWC found that Mr. Stewart did not violate LSA-R.S. 23:1208.1 because he “presented credible testimony that he did not know he had a herniated disc and no one ever told ․ him he did.” Further, the OWC found that Cajun had not established “prejudice.” Accordingly, the OWC signed a judgment on July 11, 2024, finding that Mr. Stewart was entitled to workers’ compensation benefits.

Cajun has appealed the OWC's judgment. In its first two assignments of error, Cajun asserts the OWC committed legal error in applying an improper legal standard with respect to Cajun's burden of proving two of the requisite three elements of its LSA-R.S. 23:1208.1 claim—an untruthful statement and prejudice. In its third assignment of error, Cajun asserts the OWC committed legal error in finding Mr. Stewart did not violate LSA-R.S. 23:1208.1 based on the facts and evidence presented at trial.

SHOW CAUSE ORDER

The OWC signed an initial judgment on July 11, 2024, that awarded workers’ compensation indemnity benefits to Mr. Stewart, but did not quantify the amount of the benefits. Following the issuance of a Show Cause Order from this court noting that the “judgment lacks specificity regarding the monetary amount of indemnity benefits awarded as required by La-C.C.P. art. 1918(A),” the OWC signed an amended judgment on July 25, 2025, that corrected the deficiencies noted in the Show Cause Order.¹ Accordingly, we maintain the appeal.

LAW

The Louisiana Workers’ Compensation Act contains an anti-fraud provision, LSA-R.S. 23:1208.1,² that applies to employment-related questioning of an employee or prospective employee by an employer concerning a prior injury, when there is no pending workers’ compensation claim. Ambeau v. Cajun Constructors, Inc., 2002-2503 (La.App. 1 Cir. 9/26/03), 855 So.2d 964, 967, writ denied, 2003-3029 (La. 1/30/04), 865 So.2d 81. The statute results in forfeiture of workers’ compensation benefits when: (1) the claimant made an untruthful statement concerning a prior injury in response to such an inquiry, (2) the untruthful statements are directly related to the medical condition for which the claimant is seeking employment benefits or to the employer's ability to receive reimbursement from the second injury fund, and (3) the employer has provided contemporaneous notice to the claimant that untruthful statements made in response to the inquiry may result in forfeiture of workers’ compensation benefits. See Id. Summarized, the three components for establishing a violation of LSA-R.S. 23:1208.1 are: untruthfulness, prejudice, and notice. Lavalais v. Gilchrist Constr. Co., LLC, 14- 785 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/4/15), 158 So.3d 195, 201.

Forfeiture is a harsh remedy and must be strictly construed. Wise v. J.E. Merit Constructors, Inc., 97-0684 (La. 1/21/98), 707 So.2d 1214, 1218. An employer has the burden of proving each element within LSA-R.S. 23:1208.1. Id. The failure to prove one of the elements is fatal to an employer's avoidance of liability. Id.

To assist employers in meeting their statutory burdens, LSA-R.S. 23:1208.1 permits the employer to obtain information from the employee or applicant concerning preexisting conditions. Id. The answers provided by the employee allow the employer to discern if he has hired (or will hire) a worker with a permanent partial disability for second injury fund purposes. Id.³ Because an employer's medical history questionnaire can be used to establish that an employer knowingly hired or retained an employee with a permanent partial disability, the legislative grant that flows from the statute is vital. Id.

DISCUSSION

We now review whether Cajun proved the untruthfulness, prejudice, and notice required to establish Mr. Stewart's violation of LSA-R.S. 23:1208.1.

Notice

The parties do not dispute the questionnaire provided the requisite notice required by LSA-R.S. 23:1208.1 such that the third element has been met.

Untruthful Statement

It is undisputed that Mr. Stewart had preexisting disc herniations when he completed the May 23, 2023 medical questionnaire. Specifically, an MRI taken at Bluebonnet Imaging Center on May 1, 2018 following Mr. Stewart's 2018 motor vehicle accident revealed disc herniations at L4-5 and L5-S1.⁴

In its first assignment of error, Cajun asserts that this court should review the matter de novo given that it is undisputed that Mr. Stewart had herniated discs at the time he answered the questionnaire, and Mr. Stewart's knowledge of the condition is irrelevant because his medical records reveal the disc herniations. On the other hand, Mr. Stewart contends that manifest error is the appropriate standard of review given the OWCs factual determination that Mr. Stewart answered truthfully because, although the disc herniations appeared in his medical records, he was unaware that he had a herniated disc when he answered the questionnaire.

For the reasons that follow and applying the more stringent manifest error appellate standard, we find the OWC was clearly wrong in its factual determination that Mr. Stewart did not know he had a herniated disc. Under the manifest error standard of review, the issue to be resolved by a reviewing court is not whether or not the trier of fact was right or wrong, but whether the factfinder's conclusion was a reasonable one. Stobart v. State through Dept, of Transp. and Development, 617 So.2d 880, 882 (La. 1993). Even though an appellate court may feel its own evaluations and inferences are more reasonable than the factfinder's, reasonable evaluations of credibility and reasonable inferences of fact should not be disturbed upon review where conflict exists in the testimony. Id. Where there are two permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder's choice between them cannot be manifestly erroneous or clearly wrong. Watts v. Domino's Pizza, L.L.C., 2025-0162 (La.App. 1 Cir. 2/13/26), — So.3d —, 2026 WL 437241 at *2, writ denied, 2026-0355 (La. 5/27/26), — So.3d —, 2026 WL 1480660.

However, where documentary evidence or objective evidence so contradicts a witness's story, or the story itself is so implausible on its face, that a reasonable factfinder would not credit the witness's story, the court of appeal may find manifest error or clear wrongness even in a finding purportedly based upon a credibility determination. Stobart, 617 So.2d at 882. Even so, the appellate court must be mindful that if a trial court's finding is reasonable in light of the record reviewed in its entirety, the court may not reverse, even if convinced that had it been sitting as the trier of fact, it would have weighed the evidence differently. Id. at 882-83.

In urging that no manifest error exists in the OWC's determination, Mr. Stewart asserts that a permissible view of the evidence shows that he was unaware he had sustained any prior disc herniations when he answered the pre-employment medical questionnaire at issue. Mr. Stewart testified that Dr. McCarthy never told him he had a herniated disc. Mr. Stewart also points out that Dr. McCarthy testified he treated Mr. Stewart for “facets,” and he did not treat Mr. Stewart for any of the herniated discs. Mr. Stewart asserts that the record shows he simply underwent an MRI, was told he had a bulging disc and needed an injection, and had a facet joint injection that solved the problem. Mr. Stewart maintains that Cajun never presented any conclusive evidence that he was ever told he had a herniated disc.

At trial, Mr. Stewart acknowledged that following the 2018 motor vehicle accident Dr. McCarthy and/or his attorney told him he had bulging discs in his back, but maintained that he had never heard the term “herniated.” However, despite Mr. Stewart's indication he had never heard the term “herniated,” Mr. Stewart acknowledged he was aware he had disc bulges and testified he did not believe there was a difference between bulging and herniated discs. Further, Dr. McCarthy indicated he would have reviewed the MRI findings with Mr. Stewart as was his normal protocol, and he “typically” informs his patients they have a disc herniation if the patient's MRI results reflect a herniation. Additionally, in a July 12, 2018 settlement offer sent from Mr. Stewart's counsel following the 2018 motor vehicle accident seeking policy limits from the underinsured motorist carrier, Mr. Stewart's attorney pointed out that Mr. Stewart had “an L5-S1 disc herniation, thoracic disc herniations and cervical disc bulges.”⁵

Additionally, Cajun, in addressing Mr. Stewart's credibility, points out that Mr. Stewart was not truthful on any of his other medical questionnaires completed for other employers following the 2018 accident. At trial, Mr. Stewart was presented with six other medical questionnaires that he completed for other employers following the 2018 accident. Those forms provided broader questions regarding whether Mr. Stewart had ever sustained a back injury or sought treatment for back pain. On all forms, Mr. Stewart answered that he had never sustained a back injury and/or sought treatment for back pain. Some of his explanations as to why he answered “no” to those questions were because he “had a bad memory” and/or he had “boxed a lot.” He also indicated that on some applications perhaps “[he] didn't feel it,” but that he “had no problems working those jobs.” Of note, Mr. Stewart acknowledged completing one of the employment forms on May 30, 2018, when he was still treating for injuries to his back attributable to the 2018 accident, and answering “no” to whether he had “ever been diagnosed or sought treatment for back pain.” In addition, Mr. Stewart filled out another form on June 12, 2018, the same day he visited Dr. McCarthy for his back injury and checked “no” on a form asking if he had “ever had back pain.” When asked why he answered “no” to that question on that particular form when he had sought treatment the same day, Mr. Stewart indicated “Maybe because I was boxing earlier or something. I don't remember. That's the only time.” Moreover, on the May 23, 2023 pre-employment questionnaire at issue, in addition to indicating he had no herniation, Mr. Stewart also indicated he had never had a doctor restrict his activities, even though Dr. McCarthy had restricted Mr. Stewart's activities following the 2018 motor vehicle accident.

Considering the record in toto, a reasonable factfinder would not credit Mr. Stewart's testimony that he was unaware he had a herniated disc prior to filling out the pre-employment medical questionnaire at issue. See Stobart, 617 So.2d at 882. Therefore, we find that Mr. Stewart failed to answer the questionnaire truthfully as required by LSA-R.S. 23:1208.1. See Ambeau, 855 So.2d 967-68, wherein this court upheld the OWC's finding of forfeiture under LSA-R.S. 23:1208.1 notwithstanding the claimant's testimony that “he simply forgot about his previous lower back injuries and radiating leg pain, for which he had received medical treatment on numerous occasions prior to his hiring by defendant.” Accordingly, we find that Cajun met its burden of proof to show that Mr. Stewart was untruthful.

Prejudice

The OWC also found that Cajun did not establish “prejudice” nor did it present any evidence such as an application to the second injury fund denying reimbursement. Cajun maintains that the OWC used an improper standard in ruling that Cajun did not meet its burden of proving “prejudice.”

Untruthful answers alone do not result in the forfeiture of benefits. Dulin v. Levis Mitsubishi, Inc., 2001-2457 (La.App. 1 Cir. 12/20/02), 836 So.2d 340, 345, writ denied, 2003-0218 (La. 3/28/03), 840 So.2d 576. The employer must also prove that the untruthful statements were prejudicial to it. Id. An employer is prejudiced by one of two circumstances: (1) the employee's untruthful answer must directly relate to the medical condition that is the subject of the claim, or (2) the employee's untruthful answer must affect the employer's ability to receive reimbursement from the second injury fund. Id. citing Wise, 707 So.2d at 1217-18. The employer's satisfaction of either prong of the “prejudice to the employer” test is sufficient to withstand its burden of proof as to this element. Dulin, 836 So.2d at 345. Where the employer has shown that the employee's untruthful answers directly relate to the medical condition that is the subject of the claim, it is unnecessary for the court to resolve whether the untruthful answer affected the employer's ability to recover from the second injury fund. Id.

Given the harshness of LSA-R.S. 23:1208.1, the Louisiana Supreme Court has rejected an interpretation of the statute based on a “mere anatomical connexity” of the preexisting medical condition and the work injury. Wise, 707 So.2d at 1220. Rather, there must be a direct relationship whereby “the subsequent injury was inevitable or very likely to occur because of the presence of the preexisting condition.” Id.

In its second assignment of error, Cajun maintains that it introduced sufficient evidence to show that Mr. Stewart's work injury was directly related to his prior disability. Cajun notes it is undisputed Mr. Stewart had preexisting disc herniations at L4-L5 and L5- SI. Dr. McCarthy indicated the MRI taken in 2023 following the work incident reflected that Mr. Stewart's herniations at L4-5 and L5-S1 “are worse” and “bigger.”⁶ Cajun also notes Dr. McCarthy, who was accepted as an expert in the field of orthopedic surgery with a specialization in the spine, testified that a person with a disc herniation is more susceptible to injuring the same disc later, due to it being structurally compromised. Dr. McCarthy further testified that a person with a disc herniation is more likely to develop symptomatic problems on the same disc later in life. Moreover, Dr. McCarthy testified the type of work Mr. Stewart was performing at the time he was injured would be commonly associated with re-injuring a preexisting herniated disc.

Specifically, Dr. McCarthy noted that Mr. Stewart's main complaint following the work accident was radiating pain into his left leg. Dr. McCarthy indicated the herniation at L5-S1 was worse “[i]n the new injury” because it is “caudal,” which means the disc migrated towards the feet. Dr. McCarthy also noted that the physician who treated Mr. Stewart following the work-related accident indicated the injury occurred when Mr. Stewart was “[w]orking with a beam, pulled and twisted his back, felt shocking pains into his legs, left foot went numb.” Dr. McCarthy agreed that the disc was more susceptible to injury because it was herniated and that the mechanics of the injury “could make an already structurally compromised disc worse and result in what we're seeing on this 2023 MRI.”

In opposition, Mr. Stewart contends that Cajun failed to meet its burden of proving that Mr. Stewart's workplace injury to his back was inevitable or substantially likely to occur based on his prior condition. Mr. Stewart maintains that “Cajun weakly attempted to establish a direct relationship due to the fact that the body part injured in the workplace accident is the same body part that was affected by the preexisting condition.” Mr. Stewart asserts this type of “anatomical connexity” is specifically the interpretation rejected by the Louisiana Supreme Court in Wise. Moreover, Mr. Stewart points out Dr. McCarthy declined to state that it was inevitable that Mr. Stewart would have issues with the herniation after the 2018 accident, but rather testified “there's many, many patients that have disc herniations that have no symptoms whatsoever.” Mr. Stewart asserts that Cajun failed to “provide any medical evidence that Mr. Stewart's workplace injury was inevitable or substantially likely to occur because of the presence of the preexisting condition.”

Mr. Stewart avers that Lavalais v. Gilchrist Constr. Co., 14-785 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/4/15), 158 So.3d 195, is instructive. Therein, the employee answered “NO” on a preemployment questionnaire asking whether he had ever been treated for conditions such as a knee, neck, or back injury. Id. at 198. Following an accident at work, the employee allegedly sustained injuries to his neck, back, and right knee. Id. at 197. The employer urged that the employee forfeited his benefits by failing to answer truthfully about his neck, back, and knee, which “directly relates to the medical condition for which a claim for benefits is made.” Id. at 201. Although the employee was untruthful, the Third Circuit found that the employer did not prove prejudice because the doctors in that case used terms such as “could” or “more likely to occur,” whereas the “direct relation test” requires the employer to prove the subsequent injury was “inevitable” or “very likely to occur because of the presence of the preexisting condition.” Id. at 205, citing Wise, 707 So.2d at 1220. The Third Circuit recognized that the employee was previously injured and “more susceptible to re-injury” in those specific areas for a subsequent accident like that work accident, but that none of the doctors testified that the employee's reinjury was “inevitable” or “very likely to occur” in accord with “the plain wording of the applicable jurisprudence.” Id. at 208.

However, we find Ambeau, which was decided by this court post-Wise, more comparable than Lavalais and controlling herein.⁷ Therein, an employee had a disc herniation at L5-S1, and he had treated for lower back pain in 1991, 1993, and 1995 with right radiating leg pain. Ambeau, 855 So.2d at 966. In 2000, he began his employment with his employer. In 2001, the employee allegedly injured his lower back at work when he attempted to move a generator. Id. at 965. The employer asserted that the employee had waived his rights to workers’ compensation benefits because he violated LSA-R.S 23:1208.1 by making misrepresentations on the employer's medical history form. See Id. at 966. After affirming the OWC's finding that the employee was untruthful on the form with regard to his prior injury, this court also affirmed the OWC's “finding that the false statements regarding the previous lower back problems directly relate to the medical condition (lower back pain) for which he now claims benefits.” Id. at 967. In affirming, this court reasoned:

The existence of plaintiff's herniated disc at the L5-S1 level with radiating right leg pain before he was hired by defendant meant that plaintiff was susceptible to a subsequent aggravating injury at the L5-S1 level. An aggravation of plaintiff's lower back condition was very likely to occur given plaintiff's medical history. Thus, defendant was prejudiced by the false statements in that plaintiff withheld information of his identical pre-existing medical condition.

Id. at 967-68. Accordingly, this court affirmed the OWC's ruling that the employee had forfeited his entitlement to workers’ compensation benefits under LSA-R.S. 23:1208.1.

Similarly, this court has addressed the employer's burden of proof in other post-Wise decisions. In Dulin, 836 So.2d at 346, this court also found that a “direct relationship” was established under LSA-R.S. 23:1208.1, wherein a physician performed “the exact same operation that he performed on [the employee prior to the work-related incident] as a result of a re-injury to the same side and same disc space.” The physician explained that “it is not uncommon for a patient who has had lumbar disc surgery to have a recurrent disc problem because of the preexisting condition, especially for someone in [the employee's] line of work.” Id. See also Buggage v. Volks Constructors, 2005-2002 (La.App. 1 Cir. 9/20/06), 945 So.2d 33, 37-38, writ denied, 2006-2757 (La. 1/26/07), 948 So.2d 170 (Employer met burden to show “direct relationship” where physician testified changes at “L3, L4 ․ were consistent with preexisting degenerative changes[,]․ [the employee] had suffered an aggravation of preexisting neck and back conditions[,] ․ [and] a preexisting abnormal back condition can predispose a worker to subsequent injury.”)

The OWC, in making its finding with regard to prejudice, seemed to focus on whether the untruthful statement affected the employer's ability to receive reimbursement from the second injury fund. It did not focus on whether the employee's untruthful answer was directly related to the medical condition that is the subject of the claim, which by itself is also sufficient to show prejudice. See Dulin, 636 So.2d at 345. Nor did it focus on the medical evidence on this issue in rendering its ruling on prejudice. Herein, although Dr. McCarthy did not use the terms “inevitable” or “very likely to occur,” the record reflects that Mr. Stewart reinjured the same disc that was previously diagnosed as herniated in 2018, that the disc was more susceptible to being injured given the herniation, and that Mr. Stewart was performing work that could put pressure on the disc and lead to injury. Accordingly, the medical records reflect that the false statements regarding the previous disc herniation directly relate to the medical condition for which Mr. Stewart now claims benefits. Accordingly, Cajun was prejudiced by Mr. Stewart's untruthful statement. See Ambeau, 855 So.2d at 967-68, Dulin, 836 So.2d at 346, and Buggage, 945 So.2d at 37-38. Accordingly, Cajun's second assignment of error has merit.

As such, Cajun has met its burden to show an untruthful statement, prejudice, and notice such that Mr. Stewart forfeited his workers’ compensation benefits under LSA-R.S. 23:1208.1. The OWC erred in concluding otherwise.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the Office of Workers’ Compensation July 11, 2024 judgment, as amended on July 25, 2025, rendered against Cajun Industries, LLC and American Contractors Insurance Group, that awarded Tyler Stewart workers’ compensation benefits. Costs of this appeal are assessed to appellee, Tyler Stewart.

APPEAL MAINTAINED. JUDGMENT REVERSED.

I concur with the majority opinion but write separately regarding the proper interpretation of La. R.S. 23:1208.1.

In their briefs, the parties devote argument to the appropriate standard of review applicable to the OWC judge's interpretation of La. R.S. 23:1208.1. Cajun argues the OWC judge legally erred by interpreting the statute to require that Cajun prove Mr. Stewart's untruthful answers on the pre-employment questionnaire were intentional or willful. On the other hand, Mr. Stewart argues the OWC judge correctly interpreted the statute to require such and then correctly found that his answers were truthful and that he did not forfeit his right to workers’ compensation benefits. The majority does not resolve whether the forfeiture of benefits under La. R.S. 23.T208.1 requires a finding that an employee's untruthful answers were or were not intentional.

I agree with Cajun. That is, the plain words of La. 23:1208.1 state that an employee's failure to answer truthfully when asked about previous injuries or medical conditions shall result in a forfeiture of workers’ compensation benefits. The statute does not state that the employee's failure to answer truthfully must be intentional. (Compare La. R.S. 23:1208 which requires proof that the employee ’W//i///y[made] a false statement.”) Thus, if this plain interpretation of La. R.S. 23:1208.1 is correct, then I think the OWC judge legally erred in awarding Mr. Stewart benefits, because his answers were untruthful whether he knew he had herniated discs or not. However, if La. R.S. 23:1208.1 cfoes require proof that Mr. Stewart's answers were intentionally untruthful, as Mr. Stewart argues, and as the majority appears to find but does not explain, then I agree with the majority's conclusion that the OWC judge manifestly erred by finding Mr. Stewart's answers were truthful.

Nevertheless, because reversal of the OWC judgment is mandated under either interpretation of La. R.S. 23:1208.1,1 concur with the majority opinion.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Specifically, the July 25, 2025 amended judgment provides, in pertinent part:IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Claimant, Tyler Stewart, is entitled to, and Cajun is ordered to pay, Temporary Total Disability benefits of $771.00 per week from August 3, 2023, until the date of the signing of the judgment dated July 11, 2024 (49 weeks), which amount is $37,779.00. The Claimant is also entitled to, and Cajun is ordered to pay, Temporary Total Disability benefits of $771.00 per week from the date of signing of the judgment dated July 11, 2024[.]

2.   Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:1208.1 provides:Nothing in this Title shall prohibit an employer from inquiring about previous injuries, disabilities, or other medical conditions and the employee shall answer truthfully; failure to answer truthfully shall result in the employee's forfeiture of benefits under this Chapter, provided said failure to answer directly relates to the medical condition for which a claim for benefits is made or affects the employer's ability to receive reimbursement from the second injury fund. This Section shall not be enforceable unless the written form on which the inquiries about previous medical conditions are made contains a notice advising the employee that his failure to answer truthfully may result in his forfeiture of worker's compensation benefits under R.S. 23:1208.1. Such notice shall be prominently displayed in bold faced block lettering of no less than ten point type.

3.   The Second Injury Fund was established in accordance with LSA-R.S. 23:1371, et seq. to encourage employment, re-employment, or retention of employees with preexisting partial disabilities. National Fire Union Ins. Co. v. State Worker's Compensation Second Injury Bd., 2014-0631 (La.App. 1 Cir. 12/23/14), 168 So.3d 585, 588. The Second Injury Fund, which is funded through assessments from insurers and self-insured employers, protects employers from excess liability for compensation and medical expenses by reimbursing employers for additional benefits paid due to an employee's subsequent injury. Id.

4.   The May 1, 2018 MRI findings indicate, in pertinent part:L4-5: Measured on sagittal imaging to the superior L5 endplate cortex (sagittal image 7/14), there is a broad-based central/left paracentral 4.7 mm depth disc herniation. There is a moderate mass effect upon the dura and moderate proximal left greater than right neural foraminal narrowing is identified. Effusions overlie both facet joints. The disc is partially hydrated without loss of height.L5-S1: Measured on midline sagittal imaging to the SI endplate cortex, a 3.4 mm depth broad-based midline subligamentous disc herniation is present. There is abutment of the central SI nerve roots bilaterally with moderate proximal neural foraminal narrowing identified. Hyperintense signal underlies the displaced annular fibers compatible with annular fissure or peridiscal edema/hemorrhage. This may be related to recent traumatic disc insult. Fluid signal or effusions overlie both facet joints. The disc is partially desiccated without collapse.

5.   We note that Mr. Stewart testified he never saw the July 12, 2018 correspondence.

6.   The MRI findings following the 2023 work incident indicate, in pertinent part:L4-L5: A chronic, broad-based posterior central 5.2 mm disc herniation is identified (series 2, image 6, series 4, image 22). There is a flattening of the thecal sac contour, the AP diameter of the canal is preserved. A left facet joint effusion is noted. The neural foramen are mildly narrowed.L5-S1: A left paracentral 5.1 mm subligamentous disc herniation with caudal migration. Caudal migrated component is a new finding. There is extensive deformity of [a] posterior displacement of the descending left SI nerve root with partial occlusion of the lateral recess.

7.   Cajun argues that the Louisiana Supreme Court's decision in Wise was legislatively overruled by the adoption of LSA-R.S. 23:1020.1 by 2012 La. Acts No. 860, § 1. Specifically, Cajun references subsection D(2), which provides: “Disputes concerning the facts in workers’ compensation cases shall not be given a broad, liberal construction in favor of either employees or employers; the laws pertaining to workers’ compensation shall be construed in accordance with the basic principles of statutory construction and not in favor of either employer or employee.” Given our ruling herein, we need not address this issue.

MCCLENDON, C.J.

Greene, J. Concurs and assigns reasons.