STATE OF LOUISIANA v. RICSHAD KING (2026)

WRIT DENIED WITH REASONS

Relator, the State of Louisiana, seeks review of the trial court's January 30, 2026 judgment which granted the motion to suppress statement of Defendant/Respondent, Ricshad King. For the reasons that follow, we deny the State's writ application.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The State charged Defendant by bill of information with one count of armed robbery with a firearm, in violation of La. R.S. 14:64.3. Defendant filed various pre-trial motions, including a motion to suppress statement. Defendant alleged in the motion to suppress statement that he did not waive his constitutional right to remain silent. After a hearing, the trial court granted Defendant's motion to suppress statement.

The present writ application by the State followed.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

The State's sole assignment of error is that the trial court abused is discretion in granting Defendant's motion to suppress statement, arguing Defendant knowingly waived his Miranda rights.

DISCUSSION

Both the Louisiana Constitution and the United States Constitution require officers to provide Miranda warnings to any person subjected to “custodial interrogation.” Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602 (1966); State v. Menne, 380 So. 2d 14, 16-17 (La. 1980).

Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure art. 703(D) provides “that the State shall have the burden of proving the admissibility of a purported confession or statement by the defendant.” As the Louisiana Supreme Court expounded in State v. Coleman, 2022-00382, pp. 1-2 (La. 6/8/22), 338 So.3d 1179, 1180 (per curiam):

For a confession to be admissible, the State bears the heavy burden to show that before he was questioned, Defendant was advised of his constitutional rights and executed a knowing and intelligent waiver of those rights. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966); State v. Brown, 16-0998, p. 50 (La. 1/28/22), [347] So.3d [745]; La. Const. art. I, § 13; La.C.Cr.P. art. 703(D). Miranda requires that,

[p]rior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed. The defendant may waive effectuation of these rights, provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently.

384 U.S. at 444, 86 S.Ct. at 1612.

Before the State may introduce a defendant's statements, it must establish that “the accused in fact knowingly and voluntarily waived Miranda rights when making the statement.” North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 373, 99 S. Ct. 1755, 1757 (1979). In Moran v. Burbine, the United States Supreme Court stated:

The inquiry into [whether the defendant made a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver] has two distinct dimensions. First, the relinquishment of the right must have been voluntary in the sense that it was the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception. Second, the waiver must have been made with a full awareness both of the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it.

475 U.S. 412, 421, 106 S. Ct. 1135, 1140-41 (1986) (citations removed).

A waiver is not valid if the State merely shows that Miranda warnings were given and that the accused made an uncoerced statement. Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 380, 383, 130 S. Ct. 2250, 2261 (2010); State v. Vigne, 2001-2940, p. 6 (La. 6/21/02), 820 So.2d 533, 537. Rather, the State must further show that the accused understood those rights, that is, the right being abandoned and the consequences of such abandonment. Berghuis, 560 U.S. at 384, 130 S. Ct. at 2261-62; Moran, 475 U.S. at 421-22, 106 S. Ct. at 1141; Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564, 573-75, 107 S. Ct. 851 (1987).

Additionally, “Miranda waivers may be either explicit or implicit and their validity turns on the totality of the circumstances surrounding the statement.” State v. Ross, 95-1798, pp. 3-4 (La. 3/8/96), 669 So. 2d 384, 386, citing Butler, 441 U.S. at 374-75, 99 S.Ct. at 1757-58; see also State v. Villegas-Ardon, 2023-323 (La. App. 5 Cir. 2/28/24), 383 So. 3d 259, writ denied, 2024-00416 (La. 10/15/24), 394 So. 3d 818.

When reviewing trial court decisions on motions to suppress, the trial court's determinations of fact are reviewed for abuse of discretion, and legal decisions are reviewed de novo. State v. Candebat, 2013-0780, pp.6-7 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1/30/14), 33 So.3d 304, 306, citing State v. Wells, 2008-2262 (La. 7/6/10), 45 So.3d 577; see also State v. Olvarrieta, 2025-0403, p. 3 (La. App. 4 Cir. 8/8/25), 418 So.3d 546, 2025 WL 2301573; State v. Willis, 2022-0452, p. 6 (La. App. 4 Cir. 9/1/22), 348 So.3d 167, 172. “A trial judge's ruling on whether or not a statement is voluntary is given great weight and will not be disturbed on appeal unless clearly unsupported by the evidence.” State v. Vigne, 2001-2940, p. 6 (La. 6/21/02), 820 So.2d 533, 537.

Motion to Suppress Hearing 1

At the motion to suppress hearing, the State called Detective Dylan Suarez as a witness and introduced into evidence a recording of the interrogation of Defendant. Det. Suarez testified that Defendant voluntarily came to the police station for questioning. After his arrival, Det. Suarez read Defendant his Miranda rights, including that he was being detained in connection to an armed robbery. The transcript of the recorded interrogation revealed the following exchange:

Defendant:

So I'm arrested?

Det. Suarez:

No. No. That's why I stated, you're detained. So you understand.

Defendant:

Yeah I understand.

Det. Suarez:

So having these rights in mind, we'll get you to sign this form right here.

Other Detective:

That's just saying that you understand.

Det. Suarez:

That's all it's saying. You understand that I read you your rights.

Defendant:

Right here?

Det. Suarez:

Yep, right there, the signature of the person being advised.

Det. Suarez also testified that Defendant “did not want to speak to us” and that “he didn't want to talk.” On cross-examination, he confirmed the interrogation lasted an hour and was not sure whether Defendant had signed an acknowledgment of rights form.

Per Curiam

In its review of this evidence, the trial court made the following findings as outlined in its per curiam.

Here, Mr. King's purported waiver was not knowing or voluntary. Although officers read Mr. King his Miranda rights, Mr. King never verbally indicated he understood those rights. Instead, he said he understood that he was not under arrest. Then, when presented with the waiver of rights form, an officer erroneously informed Mr. King that signing the form indicated he understood those rights. Officers omitted the truth that signing the form also meant that Mr. King was waiving his rights. This court notes that the State failed to enter the Waiver of Rights form into evidence during the Hearing on [the] Motions. Thus, the form is not in the record. During the hearing, the officer could not recall whether Mr. King had in fact signed the form. Thus, the State did not even prove that Mr. King perfected the waiver. Under the totality of the circumstances, Mr. King's purported waiver was not knowing or voluntary. For that reason, this court granted Mr. King's Motion to Suppress Statements.

Upon consideration of the trial court's findings, this Court cannot say that the trial court's grant of Defendant's motion to suppress statement is clearly unsupported by the record or constitutes an abuse of the trial court's discretion. Neither the testimony of Det. Suarez or the recorded interrogation conclusively establishes that Defendant made a knowing and voluntary waiver of his Miranda rights and understood the consequences of abandoning those rights. As such, the State failed to meet its burden of proof to admit Defendant's statements into evidence.

DECREE

Based on the foregoing reasons, the State's writ application is denied.

WRIT DENIED WITH REASONS

Judge Sandra Cabrina Jenkins

DYSART, J., DISSENTS WITH REASONS