KENNETH TALLEY EUNICESTINE WILLIAMS AND BEAUTY AND BEYOND LLC v. FATEH ALRADI HEND MOHAMMAD ALFAKIN AND ARABI LAUNDROMAT INC (2026)

Appellants, defendants Fateh H. Alradi, his wife Hend Mohammad Alfakin, and their corporation, Arabi Laundromat, Inc. (collectively “Appellants”), seek review of the August 11, 2025 district court judgment finding them negligent and awarding Appellees, plaintiffs Kenneth Talley, his mother Eunicestine Williams, and their company, Beauty and Beyond, LLC (collectively “Appellees”), $66,989 in property damages, and Mr. Talley $15,000 in general damages. Additionally, Appellees raise a motion to strike Appellants’ brief. For the reasons that follow, Appellees’ motion to strike is denied and the district court's judgment is affirmed.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Mr. Alradi and Ms. Alfakin own a commercial building located at 7547 and 7549 W. Judge Perez Dr. in Arabi, Louisiana (“the Property”), where their corporation, Arabi Laundromat, Inc., operated a laundromat (“the Laundromat”) in a section of the Property. In May 2021, Appellants leased vacant space in the Property, adjacent to the Laundromat, to Appellees to operate their beauty store and salon, Beauty and Beyond LLC (“the Salon”). This negligence action arises from a December 14, 2021 fire that originated in the Laundromat before spreading to and destroying the Salon.

Appellees filed suit against Appellants in June 2022, raising negligence claims and seeking awards for personal and business property damages, mental anguish, loss of earnings and loss of use. A bench trial was held on March 25, 2025, where Appellees presented three witnesses: 1) Lieutenant Josh Correa of the Office of State Fire Marshal, who testified as to the origin of the fire; 2) Laundromat employee Kathleen Griffin, who testified regarding the management of the Laundromat and what occurred in the hours prior to the fire; 3) Mr. Talley, who testified about starting the Salon with his family, the renovation costs and losses he incurred, and his observations of how the Laundromat and/or the Property were managed. Additionally, Appellees introduced Kaylin Duarte's deposition testimony, another Laundromat employee. Mr. Alradi and his son, Ahmed Alradi (“Ahmed”), testified on behalf of Appellants regarding their management of the Property and the Laundromat leading up to the fire.

During the course of the trial, Appellants orally raised an exception of no cause of action, asserting that Appellees were attempting to pierce the corporate veil by suing Mr. Alradi and Ms. Alfakin individually when the Laundromat is owned by a corporation. The district court denied the exception. At the conclusion of trial, the district court took the matter under advisement.

On August 11, 2025, the district court issued Reasons for Judgment and a Judgment against Appellants and in favor of Appellees, awarding them $66,989 for property damages and awarding Mr. Talley $15,000 in general damages, with judicial interest from the date of judicial demand, as well as costs.¹ This timely appeal followed. After Appellants filed their brief, Appellees moved to strike Appellants’ brief.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

Appellants raise seven assignments of error; however, the crux of this appeal involves three issues: whether the district court erred in rejecting Appellants’ piercing the corporate veil defense; whether the district court manifestly erred in finding Appellants negligent; and whether the district court erred in awarding property and general damages to Appellees. Prior to addressing these assignments of error, we first address Appellees’ motion to strike.

MOTION TO STRIKE

Appellees assert that the Appellants’ brief should be stricken pursuant to Rule 2-12.4(A)(9)(a), Uniform Rules, Courts of Appeal, because their brief raises assignments of error that do not contain references to the pages of the trial record. Alternatively, Appellees pray that this Court either disregard all unsupported arguments or order Appellants to file a conforming brief. The motion to strike is denied. However, Appellants’ unsupported arguments will be disregarded. See Henry v. Henry, 17-0282, pp. 4-5 (La. App. 4 Cir. 10/18/17), 316 So. 3d 876, 879.

PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL

Appellants assert the Laundromat is the only proper defendant in this matter since Appellees’ negligence claims and the district court's judgment are “predicated on the alleged conduct of [the Laundromat]—an enterprise that, under [La.] Civil Code art. 21, is a separate juridical person.” Appellants assert that the personal judgment against Mr. Alradi and Ms. Alfakin should be reversed and the claims against them should be dismissed because Appellees failed to plead—and the district court did not find—that the statutory or jurisprudential requirements of piercing the corporate veil were satisfied.

Here, Appellants do not address the denial of their oral exception of no cause of action at trial where they initially raised this argument. This is integral to our review as this Court does not consider arguments raised for the first time on appeal. See Bixby v. Arnold, 19-0477, p. 14 (La. App. 4 Cir. 12/5/19), 287 So. 3d 43, 52 (quoting Crosby v. Sahuque Realty Co., 17-0424, p. 7 (La. App. 4 Cir. 12/28/17), 234 So. 3d 1190, 1196).

At trial, Mr. Alradi and Ms. Alfakin, orally raised an exception of no cause of action, alleging that the claims against them, individually, should be dismissed because none of the testimony adduced at trial evidenced they were negligent and the Laundromat is owned by Arabi Laundromat, Inc. They further asserted there was nothing to suggest that the veil of their corporation should be pierced to enable Appellees to sue them personally.

Appellees responded by producing Exhibit 5, a St. Bernard Parish Assessor's report showing Mr. Alradi and Ms. Alfakin are the owners of the Property, and thus, the couple is liable, pursuant to La. Civ. Code art. 2322.² The district court, applying La. Code Civ. Proc. art. 931, denied Appellants’ exception, explaining that an exception of no cause of action is solely triable of the face of the petition.

On appeal, Appellants revive their argument in part, asserting that they are shielded from liability as members of a limited liability company (LLC) and that Appellees failed to plead that they were seeking to pierce the corporate veil of the Laundromat. “The alter ego doctrine evolved after the creation of limited liability entities such as corporations came into vogue. The purpose of the doctrine is to allow plaintiffs to ‘pierce the corporate veil’ of a corporation in order to hold individual shareholders liable for wrongdoing.” Scott v. Am. Tobacco Co., 04-2095, p. 8 (La. App. 4 Cir. 2/7/07), 949 So. 2d 1266, 1274. This argument is unpersuasive.

Appellants’ assignment of error is falsely premised on their assertion that the Laundromat is a limited liability company (LLC). For the first time on appeal, Appellants refer to the Laundromat as being a LLC instead of as a corporation as pled by Appellees’ and as captioned herein. We take judicial notice of the Louisiana Secretary of State's website showing this business is and was registered as the “Arabi Laundromat, Inc.” at the time of the fire. See Mendoza v. Mendoza, 17-0070, p. 6 (La. App. 4 Cir. 6/6/18), 249 So. 3d 67, 71 (citation omitted). Nevertheless, the piercing the corporate veil doctrine is applicable to both LLCs and corporations, such as the Laundromat. See An Erny Girl, L.L.C. v. BCNO 4 L.L.C., 18-0360, pp. 9-10 (La. App. 4 Cir. 9/26/18), 257 So. 3d 212, 221 (citing ORX Res., Inc. v. MBW Expl., L.L.C., 09-0662, p. 6 (La. App. 4 Cir. 2/10/10), 32 So. 3d 931, 935).

Moreover, on the merits, Appellees established at trial that Mr. Alradi and Ms. Alfakin own the Property and therefore could be sued personally pursuant to La. Civ. Code art. 2322. Mr. Alradi and Ms. Alfakin did not offer rebuttal testimony or evidence in response to prove the Laundromat owns the Property. Accordingly, a discussion of the applicability of the “alter ego doctrine” is unnecessary. Mr. Alradi and Ms. Alfakin are proper parties. This assignment of error is without merit.

Negligence

In every negligence action, plaintiffs have the burden of proving the following five elements:

(1) the defendant had a duty to conform his conduct to a specific standard of care;

(2) the defendant's conduct failed to conform to the appropriate standard of care [breach of duty];

(3) the defendant's substandard conduct was a cause-in-fact of the plaintiff's injuries;

(4) the defendant's substandard conduct was a legal cause of the plaintiff's injuries; and

(5) the plaintiff was damaged.

In re Favret, 17-0464, p. 30 (La. App. 4 Cir. 6/1/18), 317 So. 3d 470, 487 (alteration in original) (citation omitted). See also Ponseti v. Touro Infirmary, 18-0109, p. 3 (La. App. 4 Cir. 12/5/18), 259 So. 3d 1097, 1100. Moreover, plaintiffs “alleging negligence or strict liability of a building owner or custodian must prove three elements: (1) the defendant either owned or had care, custody, or control of the thing in question; (2) the thing was a cause-in-fact of the plaintiff's injuries; and (3) the thing presented an unreasonable risk of harm.” Daniel v. Clarion Inn & Suites, p. 5, 16-0760 (La. App. 4 Cir. 2/22/17), 214 So. 3d 38, 41 (citation omitted).

“Placing the burden of proof on the plaintiff requires him ultimately to persuade the factfinder concerning each element of the defendant's negligence ․” Rando v. Anco Insulations Inc., 08-1163, p. 33 (La. 5/22/09), 16 So. 3d 1065, 1089 (citation omitted). “If the plaintiffs fail to prove any one element by a preponderance of the evidence, the defendant is not liable.” Barakat v. Timberland Invs., LLC, 23-122, p. 4 (La. App. 5 Cir. 11/29/23), 377 So. 3d 447, 451 (citation omitted). “Direct or circumstantial evidence constitutes a preponderance when it shows that causation is more probable than not.” Pontchartrain Nat. Gas Sys. v. Texas Brine Co., 18-0631, p. 8 (La. App. 1 Cir. 7/3/19), 281 So. 3d 1, 6.

In negligence matters involving fires, Louisiana jurisprudence provides that “[t]he mere occurrence of a fire does not justify the inference of negligence, since fires may occur from many separate and distinct causes.” MJH Props., L.L.C. v. Farley, 23-0142, p. 9 (La. App. 4 Cir. 10/4/23), 382 So. 3d 910, 916 (quoting Toussant v. Guice, 414 So. 2d 850, 854 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1982)). “Moreover, ‘no recovery can be had when there is no evidence whatever suggesting that a fire which spreads to a building was caused by the negligence of a[n] ․ owner ․ of an adjoining building.’ ” Id. (quoting Barber v. Books, Etc., Inc., 316 So. 2d 154, 157-58 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1975)) (alteration in original). “The determination of preponderance depends on whether the evidence taken as a whole shows that the particular defendant's negligence was the most plausible or likely cause of the fire.” Aetna Life & Cas. Co. v. Solloway, 630 So. 2d 1353, 1356 (La. App. 2d 1994).

Appellate courts “may not set aside a trial court's or a jury's finding of fact in absence of ‘manifest error’ or unless it is clearly wrong.” In re New Orleans Train Car Leakage Fire Litig., 00-1919, p. 4 (La. App. 4 Cir. 4/20/05), 903 So. 2d 9, 14-15. “The reviewing court must give great weight to factual conclusions of the trier of fact; where there is conflict in the testimony, reasonable evaluations of credibility and reasonable inferences of fact should not be disturbed upon review, even though the appellate court may feel that its evaluations and inferences are as reasonable.” Id., pp. 4-5, 903 So. 2d at 15. “[W]here two permissible views of the evidence exist, the factfinder's choice between them cannot be manifestly erroneous or clearly wrong.” Stobart v. State through Dep't. of Transp. & Dev., 617 So. 2d 880, 883 (La.1993)(citation omitted).

In the instant matter, the district court's finding of negligence, according to the Reasons for Judgment, was supported by its consideration of the evidence and testimony adduced at trial and Ms. Duarte's deposition testimony:³

It is clear from the evidence and testimony presented that the fire originated in Arabi Laundromat as a result of an appliance located in the utility room[.] Lt. Joshua Correa, expert in fire investigation - cause and origin - opined that there were no other possible ignition sources other than a dryer or the gas heater located in the laundromat[.] Additionally, it is evident through the testimony of the Arabi Laundromat employees, Kathleen Griffin and Kaylin Duarte, that there were consistent problems with the equipment in the laundromat[.] The dryers often overheated and/or cut off[.] They were hot to the touch[.] [Mr.] Alradi had a pattern of not properly nor expeditiously responding to problems with the laundromat equipment[.] There were no maintenance and/or repair records produced into evidence due to the fact that the Defendants failed to maintain said records for the business[.] Moreover, Mr. Alradi and Ahmed [ ] failed to identify the person they contend maintained and/or repaired the equipment[.] Furthermore, it is clear that the employees of Arabi Laundromat consistently had communication problems with [Mr.] Alradi, the owner of Arabi Laundromat[.] Mr Alradi failed to respond to his employees’ concerns about the equipment on a regular basis[.] Based on the above, the Court finds that Defendants are negligent and said negligence caused damages to Plaintiffs[.]

Appellants contest the district court's determination that Appellees proved causation because the fire was classified as having an “undetermined” cause. They further assert that the district court improperly shifted the burden of proof to Appellants instead of requiring Appellees to carry their burden of proof. Lastly, Appellants assert that the district court legally erred when it declined to consider the lease provision requiring Appellees be insured.

“Undetermined” Classification

Appellants aver that the district court manifestly erred in finding Appellants negligent because the cause of the fire was officially classified as “undetermined” and the Appellees did not establish causation by a preponderance of the evidence. Appellants here confuse an “undetermined” classification as one that absolves them from liability despite the evidence establishing the fire commenced in the Laundromat.

Lt. Correa, a 10-year employee of the Office of Louisiana State Fire Marshal, testified as an expert in the field of fire cause and origin investigations. He explained that an “undetermined” cause is a governmental term meaning that an electrical engineer was unavailable to determine the specific fire source. Lt. Correa, however, discovered that the fire spread from a machine in the rear of the Laundromat into the Salon. This testimony is buttressed by Ms. Duarte's testimony that she smelled smoke coming from a dryer in the rear of the Laundromat in the hours leading up to the fire. The fire also began in the same area— the rear of the Laundromat— that Mr. Talley witnessed Ahmed tinkering with electrical wiring and the control panel. Therefore, Appellants’ argument that the Office of State Fire Marshal's “undetermined” classification precludes a finding that Appellants’ property was the source of the fire under the unique facts presented is misplaced and without merit. In our discussion below, we address whether Appellees established causation.

Shifting of the Burden of Proof

Appellants assert that Appellees failed to carry their burden of proving each element of their negligence claim by a preponderance of the evidence. Thus, they aver that the district court improperly shifted the burden of proof from Appellees to Appellants. In light of the testimony and evidence Appellees produced, as discussed below, we reach a differing conclusion. We discuss below the first four elements of Appellees’ negligence claim excluding damages, which is addressed separately below.

Duty

As stated above, Appellees established that Appellants owned the Property at issue where Appellants operated the Laundromat adjacent to the Salon space Appellees were renting from Appellants. Therefore, pursuant to La. Civ. Code Proc. articles 2322 and 2317.1, Appellants, as the owners and custodians of the Property owed certain duties to Appellees. Louisiana Civil Code article 2322 imposes a duty on a property owner “to keep it in a safe condition, and makes him answerable for the damage occasioned by its ruin ․ whether such is due to structural vice or neglect to repair.” Hero v. Hankins, 247 F. 664, 666 (5th Cir. 1917). Similarly, La. Civ. Code art. 2317.1 “imposes a duty on a custodian of property to keep [that] property in a reasonably safe condition.” Johnson v. Dolgencorp, LLC, 25-0494, p. 7 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1/9/26), 430 So. 3d 1213, 1217 (alteration in original) (citation omitted). Therefore, the element of duty was met.

Breach

Second, the testimony of Appellants’ employees and Mr. Talley provided the district court with a reasonable basis to conclude that Appellees established Appellants breached the aforementioned duties. Ms. Duarte testified that she smelled smoke and/or gas in the rear of the Laundromat where Mr. Talley had previously witnessed Ahmed, the unsupervised teenage manager of the Laundromat, tinkering with electrical wires. Mr. Talley recalled that Ahmed was fascinated with manipulating the electrical wiring in the Laundromat to an extent that he became concerned and believed Ahmed required Mr. Alradi's supervision.

Misses Griffin and Duarte testified that the Laundromat was poorly managed and their requests to have machines repaired went unanswered. They further testified that Mr. Alradi was not present to supervise Ahmed while he managed the Laundromat.

Ms. Griffin testified that “[the employees] had a lot of trouble with them [sic] dryers,” which she described as overheating and often working briefly before shutting off. She explained that the dryers overheated a week before the fire occurred. She described that the temperature of the dryers would exceed the heat level a dryer should emit.

Moreover, Ms. Duarte also recounted that a dryer became so overheated one day that she burned her hand when she touched it. While she complained about the machines reaching high temperatures to Ahmed, he dismissed her complaints. She further testified that neither Ahmed nor Mr. Alradi instructed her on how to respond if she smelled smoke or needed to respond to a fire. She related that Mr. Talley tried to mentor and assist Ahmed with the Laundromat, demonstrating how Ahmed should manage the business and advising him to mature. She recalled seeing Mr. Alradi inspect the Laundromat once while she worked there but that Ahmed, on the other hand, was present at work more than Mr. Alradi. However, she noted Ahmed had a laid-back management style. She testified that in the hours before the fire Ahmed did not arrive at work as scheduled and was unreachable by phone. She testified that she ultimately ignored the smoldering aroma permeating the Laundromat for hours when she could not reach Mr. Alradi and Ahmed. She admitted that she should have called the St. Bernard Fire Department, but she was afraid of being fired.

The testimony of Appellees’ witnesses provided a reasonable basis for the district court to conclude that Appellants, as both property owners and custodians, failed keep the Property in a safe and reasonably safe condition pursuant to La. Civ. Code arts. 2322 and 2317.1, respectively. While Appellants’ attempted to rebut this testimony with their own, the district court found Appellees’ witnesses more credible. This was not manifestly erroneous or clearly wrong.

Causation

Lastly, as discussed above, Appellees provided the expert testimony of Lt. Correa and Ms. Duarte to establish that the cause-in-fact of Appellees damages was Appellants’ conduct. Lt. Correa opined that the fire spread from a machine in the rear of the Laundromat into the Salon. He testified that his level of certainty as to where the fire originated is closer to 100 percent instead of the minimum required level of certainty pursuant to the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 921 guide, which is 51 percent. Based upon fire dynamics, fire movement patterns and an examination of items in the area, he believed the fire originated in the utility space near an office in the rear of the laundromat where dryers and gas-powered heaters were located. Appellees here utilized Lt. Correa's testimony to prove the fire that began in Appellants’ business was the cause-in-fact of the destruction of their business. Appellants did not offer a rebuttal expert witness.

Ms. Duarte further testified that she smelled smoke and/or gas also in the rear of the Laundromat, where she had been drying large volumes of clothes during the course of her last shift just hours before the fire. Her calls to Appellants for direction and help went unanswered; she had not been trained on how to respond to fires; and she left the Laundromat at the end of her shift without reporting the potential hazard to the local fire department.

To this, add that the testimony Misses Griffin and Duarte described Appellants’ failure to address overheating dryers and Appellants’ absence from and lack of management of the Laundromat. Appellants did not produce repair records or their alleged equipment repairman to rebut this testimony.

Lastly, the same testimony discussed above supported the district court's finding that Appellants’ substandard conduct was the legal cause of the fire that destroyed Appellees’ Salon. The harm Appellees sustained, losing their business and its contents in a fire emanating from an unrepaired defective appliance in their landlords’ adjacent Laundromat, was encompassed by the Appellants’ duty to keep their property in a safe and reasonably safe condition. Appellants failed to do this. Applying Aetna Life & Cas. Co., supra, the testimony Appellees produced, taken as a whole, supports the district court's finding that Appellants’ negligence was the most plausible or likely cause of the fire.

Legal Error

Appellants contend that the district court legally erred by ignoring Section 8(B) of the parties’ lease, an unsigned document that was not admitted into evidence. They assert that a reversal or reduction of Appellees’ property damages is warranted. The Appellants, however, do not provide legal support for this argument. “A legal error occurs when the trial court applies incorrect principles of law and such errors are prejudicial.” Dejoie v. Guidry, 10-1542, p. 14 (La. App. 4 Cir. 7/13/11), 71 So. 3d 1111, 1120 (quoting Evans v. Lungrin, 97-0541, 97-0577, p. 6 (La. 2/6/98), 708 So. 2d 731, 735).

Rule 2-12.4(B)(4), Uniform Rules, Courts of Appeal, provides that “[a]ll assignments of error and issues for review must be briefed [,]” and the appellate court “may deem as abandoned any assignment of error or issue for review which has not been briefed.” A mere statement of an assignment of error in a brief does not constitute the briefing of the assignment. State v. Davis, 52,517, p. 33 (La. App. 2 Cir. 5/22/19), 273 So. 3d 670, 692 (citation omitted). Appellants failed to properly brief this assignment of error because they did not provide legal authority to support this issue. Accordingly, this issue is deemed abandoned.

DAMAGES

Appellants challenge the district court's award of property and general damages to the Appellees. Appellants aver that there was insufficient evidence to support the $66,989 property damage award, which they contend are “typically” supported by expert testimony “to establish the value of the damaged items with reasonable certainty.” Moreover, Appellants contend that the district court abused its discretion in awarding $15,000 in general damages to Mr. Talley. We reach a differing conclusion.

Appellants here seek review of Appellees compensatory damages, which are defined as follows:

Compensatory damages are designed to place an injured party in the position he or she would have been in had the tortious conduct not occurred. Wainwright v. Fontenot, 00-0492, p. 5 (La. 10/17/00), 774 So. 2d 70, 74. Compensatory damages are “divided into the broad categories of special damages and general damages.” Id.; see also McGee v. A C and S, Inc., 05-1036, p. 3 (La. 7/10/06), 933 So. 2d 770, 774. General damages are defined as “those which may not be fixed with pecuniary exactitude.” Duncan v. Kansas City Southern Railway Co., 00-0066, p. 13 (La. 10/30/00), 773 So. 2d 670, 682. In contrast, special damages are those having a “ready market value” such that the amount theoretically may be determined with relative certainty. McGee, supra.

Jensen v. Matute, 19-0706, p. 6 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1/29/20), 289 So. 3d 1136, 1141-42 (emphasis added).

Differing standards of review apply to special and general damage claims. Id. at p. 7, 289 So. 3d 1136, 1142. “An appellate court reviews a trial court's conclusion regarding a special damage claim by applying the manifest error standard of review.” Id. (citing Kaiser v. Hardin, 06-2092, pp. 11-12 (La. 4/11/07), 953 So. 2d 802, 810). However, the abuse of discretion standard is applied to the review of “a trial court's conclusion regarding a general damage claim․” Id. (citing Wainwright, p. 6, 774 So. 2d at 74).

“The function of an appellate court in reviewing a damage award is not to decide what it considers an appropriate award on the basis of the evidence, but rather only to review the exercise of the trier of fact's discretion.” Hardy v. Poydras Props., 97-2547, p. 6 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1/13/99), 737 So. 2d 793, 798. “A reviewing court might disagree with the amount of the award, but it should not substitute its opinion for that of the trier of fact.” Id.

Below we discuss the district court's awards of property damages— a type of special damages— and general damages, respectively.

Property Damages

Appellees presented witness testimony, pictures and receipts to substantiate their claims for property damages. Mr. Talley testified as to the property damages sustained from the fire. Appellees also introduced into evidence exhibit 4, representing the value of their property loss, along with receipts, totaling $66,989, which were calculated by adding the following sums:

a. carpentry and materials- $28,000

b. graphics- $1,489

c. hair bundles and wigs- $27,500

d. hair products and accessories- $10,000

Photographs of the improvements, décor, stock and equipment of the salon were identified by Mr. Talley and introduced at trial as well as photographs showing the destroyed salon.

The district court explained in its Reasons for Judgment, that it determined Appellees’ property damage demand was supported by Mr. Talley's testimony as well as the photographs and receipts introduced into evidence. This Court has held that substantial witness testimony provides a reasonable basis for the trier of fact to determine that there is “sufficient proof of loss,” where property damages resulted from a fire. Hardy, 97-2547, pp. 10-11, 737 So. 2d at 800. In light of the vast discretion afforded to the district court coupled with the testimony and evidence adduced at trial, the district court had a rational basis to award Appellees $66,989 in property damages. The district court did not abuse its vast discretion. Accordingly, this assignment of error is without merit.

General Damages

As mentioned above, general damages “involve mental or physical pain or suffering, inconvenience, the loss of intellectual gratification or physical enjoyment, or other losses of life or life-style which cannot be definitely measured in monetary terms.” Jones v. Mkt. Basket Stores, Inc., 22-00841, p. 15 (La. 3/17/23), 359 So. 3d 452, 464 (citation omitted). The Louisiana Supreme Court expanded the scope of appellate review of general damages by requiring the examination of previous awards:

The Pete Court recently altered the well-settled abuse of discretion standard of review in damage award cases. It determined that “some measure of objectivity” needed to be “incorporated into the determination of an award's reasonableness, so that there is some standard for comparison” due to the “inherently subjective nature of the abuse of discretion standard.” Pete [v. Boland Marine & Mfg. Co., LLC, 23-00170, p. 2 (La. 10/20/23), 379 So. 3d 636, 639]. Thus, the Louisiana Supreme Court held that appellate courts “must consider relevant prior general damage awards as guidance in determining whether a trier of fact's award is an abuse of discretion.” Id. “[R]eview of prior awards is not the only factor to be considered in evaluating whether a general damage award is an abuse of discretion; it is a starting point. No two cases will be identical.” Id., 23-00170, p. 9, 379 So. 3d at 643.

Stauder v. Shell Oil Co., 22-0593, pp. 4-5 (La. App. 4 Cir. 6/3/24), 409 So. 3d 1, 4, writ denied, 24-00860 (La. 4/23/25), 406 So. 3d 1175.

Here, the district court's Reasons for Judgment evidence that its $15,000 general damages award to Mr. Talley was premised upon an analogous appeal, Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. New Orleans Public Serv., Inc., 590 So. 2d 839 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1991). In Fireman's Fund, this Court reduced a $30,000 general damage award to $15,000 for a plaintiff who likewise testified to being “really upset” after her home burned but did not provide documentation of her alleged medical treatment, economic losses or disability beyond four months. Id. at 841. The record further reflects that the district court considered Mr. Talley's devastation at losing his life savings and the family business he established. The Court further weighed his failure to present evidence supporting his testimony that he underwent psychiatric treatment and had been prescribed anti-depressants.

Under the unique facts presented, Appellants have not established that the district court abused its vast discretion especially where, as consistent with Pete, the Court considered a relevant prior general damage award as a guide in determining its award. This assignment of error is without merit.

DECREE

For the foregoing reasons, Appellees’ motion to strike is denied, and the August 11, 2025 district court judgment is affirmed.

AFFIRMED

FOOTNOTES

1.   Although Appellees requested special damages for loss of income in the amount of $145,600, none were awarded.

2.   Article 2322 of the Louisiana Civil Code, entitled Damage caused by ruin of building, provides:The owner of a building is answerable for the damage occasioned by its ruin, when this is caused by neglect to repair it, or when it is the result of a vice or defect in its original construction. However, he is answerable for damages only upon a showing that he knew or, in the exercise of reasonable care, should have known of the vice or defect which caused the damage, that the damage could have been prevented by the exercise of reasonable care, and that he failed to exercise such reasonable care. Nothing in this Article shall preclude the court from the application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in an appropriate case.

3.   Although appellate courts review judgments, not reasons for judgment, on appeal, reasons for judgment present insight into the district court's determinations. Wooley v. Lucksinger, 09-0571, p. 77 (La. 4/1/11), 61 So. 3d 507, 572; Growe v. Johnson, 20-0143, p. 6, n.3 (La. App. 4 Cir. 2/17/21), 314 So. 3d 87, 93.

Judge Rachael D. Johnson