COLIN JACOB HINDS v. SYDNEY PETITE HINDS (2026)

I respectfully concur in part and dissent in part. I would grant the writ application of Relator Colin Hinds (“Father”) and exercise this Court's supervisory jurisdiction. Upon review, I would affirm the January 20, 2026 judgment in part, vacate Paragraph 2 of that judgment, and remand with limited instructions for a contradictory hearing on the prospective designation of appropriate visitation supervisors.

The district court erred in finding that the designation of Father's parents and/or brother as visitation supervisors in any consent judgment was contrary to law under La. R.S. 9:362(7). Moreover, I disagree with the majority's broader disposition remanding for proceedings that would permit Sydney Hinds (“Mother”) to re-urge allegations of family violence against Father and vacating the January 20, 2026 judgment in its entirety rather than limiting the vacatur to the specific error identified. Neither action is warranted, for the reasons set forth below.

In the January 20, 2026 judgment, the district court maintained supervised visitation, vacated the prior contempt ruling against Mother, vacated the order requiring Mother to pay attorney's fees and costs, vacated the seven-month suspension of Father's child-support obligation, vacated the order requiring Mother to comply with the September 5, 2024 judgment, denied Father's ex parte custody motion, and ordered that future supervisors meet the criteria of La. R.S. 9:362(7), which provides:

“Supervised visitation” means face-to-face contact between a parent and a child which occurs in the immediate presence of a supervising person approved by the court under conditions which prevent any physical abuse, threats, intimidation, abduction, or humiliation of either the abused parent or the child. The supervising person shall not be any relative, friend, therapist, or associate of the parent perpetrating family violence. With the consent of the abused parent, the supervising person may be a family member or friend of the abused parent. At the request of the abused parent, the court may order that the supervising person shall be a police officer or other competent professional. The parent who perpetrated family violence shall pay any and all costs incurred in the supervision of visitation. In no case shall supervised visitation be overnight or in the home of the violent parent.

Id

Paragraph 2 of the January 20, 2026 judgment provides, in pertinent part:

For the reasons set forth in Defendant's Supplemental Notice of Termination of Visitation Supervisors and Defendant's Motion for Termination of Designated Visitation Supervisors, the designation of Colin Hinds's parents and/or brother as his visitation supervisors in any ‘consent judgments’ is contrary to the law, and prospectively any such visitation supervisors must meet the criteria set forth in R.S. 9:362(7), such as Tanya Brancato; Janet Stoudemire; Leon Petite, Jr.; Leon Petite, III; John Decastra; Nick McClendon; and, any Birmingham or Mountain Brook, Alabama law enforcement officer[.]

Father seeks supervisory review, arguing that the district court committed legal error in its interpretation of the consent judgments and its application of La. R.S. 9:362(7). The interpretation of a consent judgment presents a question of law, as consent judgments are construed according to the same principles applicable to contracts. Jones v. City of New Orleans, 20-0247, p. 5 (La. App. 4 Cir. 4/14/21), 315 So.3d 963, 967 (citing La. C.C. art. 2045). The application of a statute likewise presents a question of law. Benjamin v. Zeichner, 12-1763, p. 5 (La. 4/5/13), 113 So.3d 197, 201. Therefore, I review both questions de novo.

Upon my de novo review, I would vacate Paragraph 2 because the district court erred in finding that the designation of Father's parents and/or brother as visitation supervisors in any consent judgment was contrary to law under La. R.S. 9:362(7). The 2018 ¹ consent judgment awarded Mother sole custody of the minor children, subject to Father's supervised visitation, in consideration of Mother's dismissal with prejudice of two petitions for protection. The January 16, 2020 consent judgment thereafter designated Father's mother, Father's father, and Father's brother as visitation supervisors “without prejudice to either party.” This language preserves either party's right to seek prospective modification or reconsideration of the supervisor designation. It does not render the 2020 supervisor designation void from inception under La. R.S. 9:362(7). Moreover, the combined effect of the 2018 compromise, the dismissal with prejudice of the protection petitions, the absence of judicial finding that Father was a “parent perpetrating family violence,” and the 2020 “without prejudice” designation preserving prospective modification or reconsideration, support this conclusion. I therefore would vacate Paragraph 2, including its treatment of the family-member supervisor designation in “any consent judgments” as invalid or void under La. R.S. 9:362(7).

This Court, in the exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction, may correct the legal error presented by Paragraph 2 without vacating the January 20, 2026 judgment in its entirety. This Court has vacated a judgment and remanded for a contradictory hearing when the district court proceeded under an incorrect legal framework and further proceedings were necessary to implement the correct one. See Walker v. Brown, 24-0198, pp. 4-7 (La. App. 4 Cir. 5/17/24), 390 So.3d 427, 430-32 (citing appellate court's constitutional and codal authority to correct procedural and legal errors sua sponte and to vacate trial court's judgment and remand for a contradictory hearing); see also La. C.C.P. art. 2164 (providing that the appellate court “shall render any judgment which is just, legal, and proper upon the record on appeal”). Because the prospective designation of appropriate visitation supervisors requires factual determinations that are best made by the district court in the first instance, remand for a contradictory hearing limited to the prospective suitability of parent of Father (“Grandfather”) and any other proposed supervisors is the appropriate remedy. Harris v. Doucette, 539 So.2d 997, 999 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1989) (recognizing the trial court “is in a better position than the appellate court to evaluate the credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence”) (citation omitted).

I find the majority errs by remanding with instructions that would permit Mother to re-urge allegations of family violence against Father and by vacating the January 20, 2026 judgment in its entirety rather than limiting the vacatur to the specific error identified. Neither action is warranted.

As to whether Father is a perpetrator of family violence, that inquiry is unnecessary to resolve this writ and would require the parties and the children to relitigate the historical circumstances that produced the consent judgment years ago. Such a remand risks precisely the harm the Legislature sought to prevent when it recognized that, in cases involving family violence, “child custody and visitation become the new forum for the continuation of the abuse,” and that ordinary custody rules may work against protection because of “the unique dynamics of family violence.” La. R.S. 9:361.

The parties’ prior 2018 consent judgment already provides the operative framework. Mother received sole custody. Father received supervised visitation. Father agreed that his supervised visitation would be conducted pursuant to La. R.S. 9:361, et seq. Father also agreed to comply with La. R.S. 9:364(B) before seeking to modify custody or visitation. The judgment further states that Father's agreement was not an admission that he has a history of perpetrating family violence. Thus, the consent judgment avoided a formal adjudication while still requiring Father to comply with agreed statutory conditions before seeking modification.

The non-admission clause may prevent the 2018 consent judgment from being treated as a formal adjudication that Father is a parent who has perpetrated family violence for every statutory purpose. But the non-admission clause does not dissolve Father's prospective obligations under the same consent judgment. Father accepted supervised visitation and the requirement that he comply with La. R.S. 9:364(B) before seeking to modify custody or visitation. Father should not be permitted to rely on the non-admission clause while avoiding the conditions he accepted as part of the same compromise. These two aspects of the 2018 consent judgment must be read together.

La. R.S. 9:364(B) provides:

The presumption shall be overcome only if the court finds all of the following by a preponderance of the evidence:

(1) The perpetrating parent has successfully completed a court-monitored domestic abuse intervention program as defined in R.S. 9:362, or a treatment program designed for sexual abusers, after the last instance of abuse.

(2) The perpetrating parent is not abusing alcohol or using illegal substances scheduled in R.S. 40:964.

(3) The best interest of the child or children, considering the factors listed in Civil Code Article 134, requires the perpetrating parent's participation as a custodial parent because of the other parent's absence, mental illness, substance abuse, or other circumstance negatively affecting the child or children.

Id.

The 2018 consent judgment required Father to comply with that statutory framework before seeking modification of custody or visitation. Father therefore remains subject to supervised visitation unless and until he satisfies the conditions imposed by the consent judgment and carries the applicable burden for modification. A retrospective hearing to determine whether Father should now be adjudicated a perpetrator of family violence is unnecessary to maintain supervision already imposed by consent judgment. The relevant inquiry is whether Father has complied with the judgment's conditions and whether any proposed modification of custody or visitation is authorized under the governing custody and visitation standards, not whether Father should be formally adjudicated a perpetrator at this late stage.

The majority's approach creates the risk of additional harm. This case has already involved years of litigation, multiple consent judgments, protective-order proceedings, contempt proceedings, writs, and repeated disputes over visitation. Sending the matter back for a broad inquiry into whether Father is a perpetrator of family violence reopens the very controversy the parties compromised when Mother received sole custody and Father received supervised visitation. That remand does not advance stability for the children. It risks further delay, renewed allegations, renewed defenses, and renewed uncertainty over a custody structure that already limits Father to supervised visitation.

The Family Violence Act was enacted because domestic violence custody cases require flexibility and attention to context, not rigid formalism. La. R.S. 9:362 requires court-monitored domestic abuse intervention programs to include training in the “causes and dynamics of domestic violence, characteristics of batterers, victim safety, and sensitivity of victims.” La. R.S. 9:362(3)(c). In State v. Koederitz, 14-1526 (La. 3/17/15), 166 So.3d 981, the Louisiana Supreme Court similarly recognized, in the evidentiary context, that domestic violence cases require attention to relationship context, treatment, safety, and prevention of future injury. Although Koederitz arose in a criminal evidentiary posture, its reasoning supports the broader principle that courts should not analyze domestic violence matters through rigid formalism detached from context.

That principle applies with particular force in custody and visitation matters. The court's focus should be on the children's present safety and stability, not on relitigating old allegations when the existing judgment already requires supervised visitation and imposes conditions on Father before modification. La. C.C. art. 134 provides that “[t]he potential for the child to be abused” is “the primary consideration” in determining best interest. La. C.C. art. 136 further provides that a parent not granted custody is entitled to reasonable visitation only “[s]ubject to R.S. 9:341 ² and 364 ³ .” This approach counsels against a remedy that sends the parties backward to relitigate historical allegations when the existing consent judgment already imposes supervised visitation and conditions on Father before modification. The proper focus at this stage is prospective and whether the proposed supervisors are appropriate and whether the visitation structure protects the children's safety and best interest.

Louisiana custody modification principles also support this approach and result. Tracie F. v. Francisco D., 15-1812, p. 2 (La. 3/15/16), 188 So.3d 231, 235, recognizes that when the prior decree is a stipulated or consent judgment, the mover must prove a material change in circumstances and that the proposed modification is in the child's best interest. In the case sub judice, Father is the party seeking to move beyond the existing supervised visitation structure and the conditions of the judgment he accepted. He therefore bears the burden of pursuing modification.

The only issue requiring remand is the prospective supervisor issue. Grandfather was one of the supervisors designated in the January 2020 consent judgment. A subsequent protective order proceeding involving Grandfather was vacated by the Louisiana Supreme Court, finding Mother did not satisfy her burden of proof. Petite v. Hinds, 24-00010 (La. 3/12/24), 380 So.3d 553. That ruling only addressed the validity of the protective order. And while it cannot be treated as a proven adjudication of abuse by Grandfather, it does not limit the district court's vast discretion over supervisory arrangements on remand. See Coie v. Coie, 42,077, pp. 7-8 (La. App. 2 Cir. 2/21/07), 948 So.2d 1276, 1279-80 (holding that expiration of a domestic-abuse protective order on its own terms did not preclude the trial court from enforcing supervised visitation).

La. R.S. 9:362(7) defines supervised visitation as face-to-face contact between parent and child in the immediate presence of a court-approved supervisor “under conditions which prevent any physical abuse, threats, intimidation, abduction, or humiliation of either the abused parent or the child.” That language gives the district court continuing authority to decide whether Grandfather, or any other proposed supervisor, is presently appropriate. The determination should be made after a contradictory hearing focused on the suitability of Grandfather and any proposed supervisors, not on relitigating whether Father is a perpetrator of family violence.

Furthermore, I disagree with the majority's decision to vacate the January 20, 2026 judgment in its entirety rather than limiting the vacatur to the specific error identified. The majority's approach has the effect of reinstating the contempt ruling, the attorney's fee award, the child support suspension, and the order compelling compliance with the September 5, 2024 judgment, all of which the district court vacated as part of the same judgment. Those rulings should not be reinstated automatically merely because Paragraph 2 was legally erroneous. Because the district court acted within its discretion in vacating them, this Court's ruling on supervisory review should reach no further than the specific error committed.

I would affirm the district court's decision to grant a new trial and vacate the contempt ruling. A trial court's decision to grant a motion for new trial is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Lepree v. Dorsey, 22-0853, p. 22 (La. App. 4 Cir. 8/11/23), 370 So.3d 1191, 1204-05 (citations omitted). Similarly, a finding of contempt and the imposition of sanctions are reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. Succession of Bailey, 20-0145, p. 4 (La. App. 4 Cir. 11/18/20), 311 So.3d 422, 425 (citations omitted). The district court did not abuse its discretion in either respect.

The contempt ruling was tied to Mother's refusal to allow visitation with the challenged family member supervisors. Once the district court determined that the supervisor arrangement required reconsideration, it was within the court's discretion to vacate the contempt adjudication, attorney fee award, and child support suspension, and order compelling compliance with the September 5, 2024 judgment. The majority's decision to vacate the January 20, 2026 judgment in its entirety necessarily reinstates those sanctions. This result is neither compelled by the writ record nor consistent with the limited error the majority itself identifies. I would not reinstate those contempt sanctions on writ review.

This is especially true as to the suspension of child support. La. R.S. 9:346 authorizes remedies for failure to exercise or allow court-ordered visitation, including contempt, actual expenses, additional visitation, attorney fees, costs, and counseling costs. It also recognizes a defense where the failure to allow or exercise visitation was by mutual consent, beyond the party's control, or for other good cause shown. La. R.S. 9:346 does not support reinstating a child support suspension on this writ record without careful analysis of the statutory basis and the children's interests.

For these reasons, I would grant Father's writ application and exercise this Court's supervisory jurisdiction. On the merits, I would affirm the January 20, 2026 judgment in part, vacate Paragraph 2 of that judgment, and remand with instructions that the district court conduct a contradictory hearing limited to the prospective designation of appropriate visitation supervisors, including whether Grandfather may serve as a supervisor. I would affirm the January 20, 2026 judgment in all other respects.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The parties signed this judgment in 2018; however, the district court did not sign the judgment until February 2019. This dissent refers to it as the “2018 consent judgment” for consistency with the majority.

2.   La. R.S. 9:341 governs the conditions and requirements for supervised visitation in cases involving family violence.

3.   La. R.S. 9:364 sets forth the presumption against awarding custody to a parent with a history of perpetrating family violence and the conditions a perpetrating parent must satisfy to overcome that presumption. The pertinent provisions of La. R.S. 9:364(B) are discussed in the body of this opinion.

LOBRANO, J., CONCURS IN PART AND DISSENTS IN PART WITH REASONS