STATE OF LOUISIANA v. PATRICK GILTON (2026)

The defendant, Patrick Gilton, was charged by bill of information with attempted carjacking, in violation of La. R.S. 14:64.2 and La. R.S. 14:27. He entered a plea of not guilty and was allowed to represent himself at trial. Following a jury trial, the defendant was found guilty as charged. The trial court sentenced the defendant to ten years imprisonment without the benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence. The defendant filed a post-verdict judgment of acquittal, a motion for new trial and a motion to reconsider sentence, all of which were denied. The defendant now appeals, arguing the trial court erred in denying his motion for new trial because the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction and that his ten-year sentence is unconstitutionally excessive. For the following reasons, we affirm the defendant's conviction and sentence.

FACTS

On the night of May 24, 2022, Taryn Terrell drove her vehicle, an Infiniti QX SUV, to the Wag-A-Pack gas station located in Lafourche Parish. Taryn's husband, Jonathan, and their son ² followed Taryn in Johnathan's truck into the parking lot. While Taryn was pumping gas, the Terrells heard gunshots and hurried to leave the gas station. As Taryn closed her vehicle's gas tank, the defendant jumped into her passenger seat.

Jonathan, who was standing by his truck, ran to his wife's vehicle and confronted the defendant. The defendant told the Terrells he was shot and asked them to call 911. Jonathan called 911. Eventually, the defendant asked for the vehicle and said, “don't make me do this[,]” before leaning back and reaching into his waist band. The Terrells left the Infiniti and went into Johnathan's truck. They proceeded to drive to the other side of the gas station. The defendant could not start the car because Jonathan had the key fob. The defendant fled on foot and was arrested in the early morning of May 25, 2022 by the Lafourche Parish Sheriff's Office (“LPSO”).

FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

In his first assignment of error, the defendant argues the trial court erred in denying his post-trial motions because the evidence was insufficient to prove the elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Specifically, the defendant argues the State failed to prove he had specific intent to take the vehicle and used force or intimidation.

A conviction based on insufficient evidence cannot stand, as it violates due process. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV; La. Const. art. I, § 2. The standard of reviewing a claim of insufficient evidence is whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found that the State proved the essential elements of the crime. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); State v. Coleman, 2021-0870 (La. App. 1 Cir. 04/08/22), 342 So. 3d 7, 11, writ denied, 2022-00759 (La. 11/21/23), 3 73 So. 3d 460. The Jackson standard of review, incorporated in La. Code Crim. P. art. 821(B), is an objective standard for testing the overall evidence, both direct and circumstantial, for reasonable doubt. State v. Welch, 2019-0826 (La. App. 1 Cir. 02/21/20), 297 So. 3d 23, 27, writ denied, 2020-00554 (La. 09/29/20), 301 So. 3d 1193.

When a conviction is based on both direct and circumstantial evidence, the reviewing court must resolve any conflict in the direct evidence by viewing that evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution. When the direct evidence is thus viewed, the facts established by the direct evidence and the facts reasonably inferred from the circumstantial evidence must be sufficient for a rational juror to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was guilty of every essential element of the crime. Coleman, 342 So. 3d at 12. When a case involves circumstantial evidence and the jury reasonably rejects the hypothesis of innocence presented by the defendant's own testimony, that hypothesis falls, and the defendant is guilty unless there is another hypothesis that raises a reasonable doubt. State v. Nixon, 2017-1582 (La. App. 1 Cir. 04/13/18), 250 So. 3d 273, 291, writ denied, 2018-0770 (La. 11/14/18), 256 So. 3d 290.

Louisiana Revised Statutes 14:64.2 defines carjacking as the “intentional taking of a motor vehicle [ ], belonging to another person, in the presence of that person, by use of force or intimidation.”³ Louisiana Revised Statutes 14:27(A) defines “attempt” as:

Any person who, having specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object is guilty of an attempt to commit the offense intended; and it shall be immaterial whether, under the circumstances, he would have actually accomplished his purpose.

Herein, the defendant argues the State failed to prove he had specific criminal intent to take the vehicle and that the State failed to prove he used force or intimidation.

The trier of fact is free to accept or reject, in whole or in part, the testimony of any witness. State v. Williams, 2001-0944 (La. App. 1 Cir. 12/28/01), 804 So. 2d 932, 939, writ denied, 2002-0399 (La. 02/14/03), 836 So. 2d 135. The reviewing court does not determine whether another possible hypothesis has been suggested by the defendant which could explain the events in an exculpatory fashion; rather, the reviewing court evaluates the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and determines whether the alternative hypothesis is sufficiently reasonable that a rational factfinder could not have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Jones, 2016-1502 (La. 01/30/18), 318 So. 3d 678, 682 (per curiam).

Thus, in the absence of internal contradiction or irreconcilable conflict with the physical evidence, one witness's testimony, if believed by the factfinder, is sufficient to support a factual conclusion. State v. Higgins, 2003-1980 (La. 4/1/05), 898 So. 2d 1219, 1226, cert. denied, 546 U.S. 883, 126 S.Ct. 182, 163 L.Ed.2d 187 (2005).

Taryn testified that she stopped for gas after leaving her nephew's graduation party while her husband, Jonathan, and their son followed her in Jonathan's truck. Taryn testified, “[a]s I was pumping, we heard a gunshot and so I hurried up to try to stop pumping.” As Taryn closed her gas tank, the defendant ran to the side of her vehicle and jumped into the passenger seat. Taryn testified that she began screaming, causing Jonathan to approach her vehicle. Both yelled at the defendant to get out of her vehicle. Taryn explained that she attempted to leave the gas station with their son in Jonathan's truck; however, she was shaking so badly she could not do anything. As Taryn sat inside Jonathan's truck, she saw that he was on the phone with 911 attempting to get help. Taryn explained that Jonathan eventually got into his truck and drove the family to the other side of the gas station away from her vehicle. Taryn testified that the defendant did not have permission to enter her vehicle or take it. Taryn testified she feared being shot, her husband being shot, and her son being shot.

On cross-examination, Taryn admitted that as the defendant approached her vehicle, he said “I'm not trying to hurt you.” Nonetheless, Taryn was afraid of the defendant because he was inside the vehicle. Taryn testified the defendant did not threaten her with words; however, he intimidated her by jumping into her vehicle. She did not know if he had a gun, but Taryn admitted she did not see a weapon. Taryn reiterated she had never seen the defendant before that night, she was scared when he jumped into her vehicle, he intimidated her when he jumped into the vehicle, and she feared he was going to hurt her.

Jonathan testified he heard a “shot” and told Taryn, “let's hurry up and go.” As he walked towards his truck, he heard Taryn scream “no, no, no” and turned to see a man inside her vehicle. The Terrells began screaming at the defendant to get out of the vehicle before Jonathan told Taryn to go towards his truck. The defendant told Jonathan that he had been shot and asked him to call 911. Johnathan called 911.⁴ Jonathan did not see any injuries on the defendant. Jonathan testified he “went back and forth” with the defendant in an attempt to keep Taryn's vehicle.⁵

The defendant leaned back and said, “don't make me do this.” Jonathan believed the defendant had a gun and he was fearful at that point. Once he thought the defendant had a weapon, Jonathan said “take the f***in car.” Jonathan testified that Taryn's key fob was inside his truck. According to Jonathan, once the defendant realized he could not start the vehicle, he ran away.

Jonathan testified that he believed the defendant wanted to commit a carjacking because he asked to take the vehicle. Jonathan agreed he did not see a gun. However, he testified he did not know whether the defendant had a weapon concealed in his underwear band. Jonathan testified that he was “one hundred percent sure” the defendant said “don't make me do this” and he understood that to mean the defendant had a weapon and he needed to get away.

LPSO Patrol Deputy Reece Guidry was one of two officers who responded to the attempted carjacking complaint at the Wag-A-Pack. Dpt. Guidry testified he learned the Terrells went to a gas station, heard a gunshot, and a short time later a man jumped into the passenger side of Taryn's vehicle. LPSO Patrol Sergeant Henry Perez assisted in locating the defendant. Sgt. Perez testified the defendant was found by a credit union near the crime scene. The defendant was crouched behind air conditioning units wearing dark colored pants and no shirt. Dpt. Guidry testified that the offense occurred at 10:16 p.m. and sheriffs apprehended the defendant a few blocks from the crime scene at 2:10 a.m.

Dpt. Guidry read the defendant his Miranda ⁶ rights and he agreed to give police a statement. The defendant told police that he tried to start Taryn's vehicle after the Terrells left the gas station. Dpt. Guidry also spoke to Jonathan, who told him that the defendant reached into his waistband causing him to fear the defendant had a firearm. The State provided ample evidence that the defendant possessed the specific intent to take the vehicle from the Terrells. Upon his arrest, the defendant admitted he tried to start Taryn's vehicle. Further, Jonathan testified the defendant attempted to start the vehicle but could not because the key fob was outside the vehicle. Surveillance video shows the defendant climbed into the driver's seat and attempted to start the vehicle. In his testimony, Jonathan testified he feared the defendant was reaching for a weapon, so he told him “take the f***in car.” This Court has held that, when a defendant creates an atmosphere of intimidation prompting the victim to react reasonably with fear for his life, an armed robbery conviction is justified. State v. Fairley, 2014-1412 (La. App. 1 Cir. 03/06/15), 2015 WL 996870, at *3 (unpublished). The carjacking statute, La. R.S. 14:64.2, is included in the criminal code with other robbery statutes, and is itself a type of robbery. Therefore, this court's reasoning in Fairley applies. See State v. Goudeau, 2023-736 (La. App. 3d Cir. 04/24/24), 388 So. 3d 425, 436.

The verdict reflects the jury found the defendant used intimidation when attempting to take the Terrells’ vehicle. Taryn and Jonathan both testified the defendant's actions and statements made them feel intimidated. The incident itself left Taryn shaken to the point she was unable to drive Jonathan's truck drive away from the crime scene. Jonathan described his fear when he believed the defendant may have had a concealed weapon. Despite the defendant's argument that his statement, “don't make me do this,” could mean anything, the jury clearly determined it intimidated Jonathan.

Finally, the defendant claims he approached the victims because he was in fear of his life. It was established that gunshots were heard in the area near the crime scene; however, the sheriff's deputies were unable to locate any bullet casings or other evidence of a shooting. The facts and evidence indicate that the defendant made no attempts to reach safety other than entering Taryn's vehicle without her permission. Even after being asked to get out Taryn's vehicle and being told that 911 was called, the defendant remained inside the vehicle and continued to attempt to take it. The jury dismissed the defendant's claim that his actions arose from a desire to escape the threat on his life.

An appellate court errs by substituting its appreciation of the evidence and credibility of witnesses for that of the factfinder and thereby overturning a verdict on the basis of an exculpatory hypothesis presented to, and rationally rejected by, the jury. See State v. Calloway, 2007-2306 (La. 01/21/09), 1 So. 3d 417, 418 (per curiam). And as stated, when a conviction is based on both direct and circumstantial evidence, the reviewing court must resolve any conflict in the direct evidence by viewing that evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution. When the direct evidence is thus viewed, the facts established by the direct evidence and the facts reasonably inferred from the circumstantial evidence must be sufficient for a rational juror to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was guilty of every essential element of the crime. Coleman, 342 So. 3d at 12. Herein, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, we find based on the record before us, a rational trier of fact could have found the State proved all elements of attempted carjacking beyond a reasonable doubt.

Accordingly, this assignment of error is meritless.

SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

In his second assignment of error, the defendant argues the trial court erred in imposing the maximum sentence based on the facts in the present case and the defendant's prior criminal history.

Whoever commits the crime of carjacking shall be imprisoned at hard labor for not less than two years and for not more than twenty years, without the benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. La. R.S. 14:64.2(B). A defendant found guilty of attempted carjacking shall be fined or imprisoned, or both, in the same manner as for the offense attempted; such imprisonment shall not exceed one half of the longest term of imprisonment prescribed for the offense. La. R.S. 14:27(D)(3). The trial court sentenced the defendant to ten years imprisonment at hard labor, receiving the maximum sentence. Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure art. 881.1 provides, in pertinent part:

A. (1) In felony cases, within thirty days following the imposition of sentence or with such longer period as the trial court may set at sentence, the state or the defendant may make or file a motion to reconsider sentence.

․

B. The motion shall be oral at the time of sentence or shall be in writing thereafter and shall set forth the specific grounds on which the motion is based.

․.

E. Failure to make or file a motion to reconsider sentence or to include a specific ground upon which a motion to reconsider sentence may be based, including a claim of excessiveness, shall preclude the state or the defendant from raising an objection to the sentence or from urging any ground not raised in the motion on appeal or review.

One purpose of the motion to reconsider sentence is to allow the defendant to raise any errors that may have occurred in sentencing while the trial court still has jurisdiction to change or correct the sentence. State v. Thames, 2015-1298 (La. App. 1 Cir. 09/19/16), 2016 WL 5118581, at *3 (unpublished), writ denied, 2016-1911 (La. 09/06/17), 224 So. 3d 981. The defendant may point out such errors or deficiencies, or may present argument or evidence not considered in the original sentencing, thereby preventing the necessity of a remand for resentencing. State v. Mims, 619 So. 2d 1059, 1059 (La. 1993) (per curiam).

The thirty-day deadline provided by La. Code Crim. P. art. 881.1(A)(1) prohibits a trial court from reconsidering a defendant's sentence once the deadline has passed. State v. Ybarzabal, 2018-0555 (La. App. 1 Cir. 02/25/19), 2019 WL 926891, at *4 (unpublished). An out-of-time motion to reconsider sentence is not contemplated by the Code of Criminal Procedure or allowed by the jurisprudence. Likewise, a motion for appeal is not a substitute for a timely motion to reconsider sentence and does not satisfy the requirements of La. Code Crim. P. art. 881.1. Id.

Under La. Code Crim. P. arts. 881.1(E) and 881.2(A)(1),⁷ the failure to make or file a motion to reconsider sentence or to include a specific ground upon which a motion to reconsider may be based shall preclude the defendant from raising an objection to the sentence on appeal, including a claim of excessiveness. Ybarzabal, 2019 WL 926891 at *4 (citing State v. Ferguson, 2015-0427 (La. App. 1 Cir. 09/18/15), 181 So. 3d 120, 136-37, writ denied, 2015-1919 (La. 11/18/16), 210 So. 3d 282). Thus, the defendant's failure to timely urge a claim of excessiveness or any specific ground for reconsideration of the sentence by oral or written motion at the trial court precludes our review of his claim of sentence excessiveness.⁸ See Ybarzabal, 2019 WL926891 at *4; State v. Campbell, 2016-1349, 2016-1350 (La. App. 1 Cir. 04/12/17), 217 So. 3d 1197, 1198.

Accordingly, we find review of this assignment of error is procedurally barred. See State v. Smith, 2022-0231 (La. App. 1 Cir. 11/04/22), 3 54 So. 3d 697, 703.

CONCLUSION

For the above and foregoing reasons, the defendant's conviction and sentence are affirmed.

CONVICTION AND SENTENCE AFFIRMED.

FOOTNOTES

2.   J.T. was under the age of eighteen at the time of the offense, accordingly we use his initials to identify and refer to this individual. See La. R.S. 46:1844(W).

3.   We note that La. R.S. 14:64.2 was amended in 2024. “However, the law in effect at the time of the commission of the offense” applies. State v. Sugasti, 2001-3407 (La. 6/21/02), 820 So. 2d 518, 520.

4.   The 911 call was introduced into evidence as State's Exhibit 9.

5.   The State introduced video surveillance from the gas station as State's Exhibit 8. The exhibit contains no audio, but depicts the interaction between Jonathan and the defendant and shows the defendant's unsuccessful attempt to drive away with the car.

6.   See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).

7.   Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure art. 881.2(A)(1) provides the “defendant may appeal or seek review of a sentence based on any ground asserted in a motion to reconsider sentence” and “also may seek review of a sentence which exceeds the maximum sentence authorized by statute under which the defendant was convicted and any applicable statutory enhancement provisions.”

8.   The defendant was pro se at sentencing on July 13, 2023. The defendant filed a motion titled “Motion for Arrest of Judgment” on October 30, 2023, alleging the sentence is “excessive[.]” Once counsel enrolled to assist with the defendant's appeal, defense counsel filed a motion to reconsider sentence that was denied. Even if we were to liberally construe the defendant's motions to find he was moving for reconsideration of his sentence, his motions were untimely and well-past the delay set in La. Code Crim. P. art. 881.1(A)(1).

BALFOUR, J.