STEPHEN ANGELLOZ v. TAYLOR SEIDENBACH INC ET AL (2026)

Relator, Turner Industries Group LLC (“Turner”), seeks a stay and expedited supervisory review of the trial court's April 9, 2026 oral ruling, which granted the “Daubert/Foret Motion in Limine to Exclude and/or Limit the Testimony of Angela Perez [(“Dr. Perez”)], CIH” (“Motion in Limine”) filed by Respondent, Stephen Angelloz (“Mr. Angelloz”). For the following reasons, we grant Turner's writ application, vacate the trial court's ruling, and remand this matter for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.

RELEVANT FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Mr. Angelloz received diagnoses of malignant pleural and peritoneal mesotheliomas and renal cell carcinoma in 2023. Thereafter, Mr. Angelloz filed suit against multiple defendants, including Turner, and alleged that the foregoing diagnoses were the result of his secondary exposure to asbestos as a child through contact with his father and his father's clothing because of the work his father performed. Particularly, according to the record, Mr. Angelloz's father performed “rod busting” work and was a boilermaker or ironworker, and he sometimes assisted pipefitters at industrial facilities, including some owned or operated by Turner.

On March 25, 2026, Mr. Angelloz filed his Motion in Limine, wherein he moved the trial court to prohibit Turner's expert, Dr. Perez, from offering testimony or evidence regarding:

(1) Purported “dose reconstruction” (a/k/a risk or exposure assessment);

(2) That the exposures in this case involved only chrysotile asbestos;

(3) Genetics and/or causation; and,

(4) Whether Turner “acted appropriately” and/or “reasonably provided a safe work environment” in this case.

On April 2, 2026, the trial court held a hearing on Mr. Angelloz's Motion in Limine and then took the matter under advisement. Then, on April 9, 2026, the trial court issued the following oral ruling:

[Mr. Angelloz] moves to prohibit Dr. Perez from offering testimony or evidence regarding:

Number one, purported dose reconstruction, a/k/a risk or exposure assessment. That is denied.

Number two, that the exposure in the case involved only chrysotile asbestos. That is granted.

Three, genetics and/or causation; granted.

And, four, whether Turner acted appropriately and/or reasonably provided a safe work environment in this case․ [She is] allowed to testify to best practices, but cannot come to a conclusion.

The trial court did not provide written reasons for the above ruling. Turner's timely expedited writ application to this Court followed.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

In its expedited writ application to this Court, Turner asserts three assignments of error:

(1) The [trial] court committed legal error in failing to provide any findings of fact, conclusions of law, and reasons for judgment – oral or written – at the hearing on April 9, 2026, warranting de novo review, as held in Leininger [v. Heaney, 2023-0574 (La.App. 4 Cir. 8/15/24), 414 So.3d 535] and Taylor [v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 2023-0759 (La. App. 4 Cir. 12/27/23), 381 So.3d 108 (“Taylor 1”) and Taylor v. Exxon Mobil Corp., unpub., 2023-631 (La. App. 4 Cir. 11/14/23) (“Taylor 2”)].

(2) The [trial] court committed reversible legal error or otherwise abused its discretion in granting [Mr. Angelloz]’s Motion to Exclude and/or limit the testimony of Dr. Perez. Dr. Perez’ opinions fully complied with the requirements of [La. C.E.] art. 702, as to the likely level of asbestos exposure that played no role in [Mr. Angelloz]’s cancers.

(3) The [trial] court committed reversible error in excluding Dr. Perez's conclusions that ․ Turner acted reasonably and provided a safe workplace environment for [Mr. Angelloz]’s father. [Louisiana Code of Evidence Article] 704 permits expert testimony that “embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact,” that includes the allegation that [Turner] was negligent in providing a safe workplace environment.

Turner asks this Court to reverse the trial court's April 9, 2026 ruling and render judgment entitling Dr. Perez to testify on all opinion rendered in her expert report.

DISCUSSION

We find Turner’ first assignment of error dispositive in this case. Therein, Turner argues the trial court did not follow the mandates of La. C.C.P. art. 1425(F), thus necessitating de novo review. We agree with the first part of Turner's contention but not the latter.

Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 1425(F) provides, in pertinent part:

F. (1) A party seeking to challenge whether a witness qualifies as an expert or whether the methodologies employed by the witness are reliable under Code of Evidence Articles 702 through 705 shall file a motion for a pretrial hearing. The motion shall be filed not later than sixty days prior to trial and shall set forth sufficient allegations showing the necessity for these determinations by the court.

(2) The court shall hold a contradictory hearing and shall rule on the motion not later than thirty days prior to the trial. At the hearing, the court shall consider the qualifications and methodologies of the proposed witness based upon the provisions of Code of Evidence Articles 104(A) and 702 through 705. For good cause shown, the court may allow live testimony at the contradictory hearing.

(3) If the ruling of the court is made at the conclusion of the hearing, the court shall recite orally its findings of fact, conclusions of law, and reasons for judgment. If the matter is taken under advisement, the court shall render its ruling and provide written findings of fact, conclusions of law, and reasons for judgment not later than five days after the hearing.

(4) The findings of facts, conclusions of law, and reasons for judgment shall be made part of the record of the proceedings. The findings of facts, conclusions of law, and reasons for judgment shall specifically include and address:

(a) The elements required to be satisfied for a person to testify under Articles 702 through 705 of the Louisiana Code of Evidence.

(b) The evidence presented at the hearing to satisfy the requirements of Articles 702 through 705 of the Louisiana Code of Evidence at trial.

(c) A decision by the judge as to whether or not a person shall be allowed to testify under Articles 702 through 705 of the Louisiana Code of Evidence at trial.

(d) The reasons of the judge detailing in law and fact why a person shall be allowed or disallowed to testify under Articles 702 through 705 of the Louisiana Code of Evidence.

(Emphasis Added.)

We note that La. C.C.P. art. 1425(F) uses the word shall, which “is mandatory.” Feingerts v. Feingerts, 2025-0397, p. 8 (La. App. 4 Cir. 8/19/25), 420 So.3d 264, 270 (citing Chapital v. Orleans Par. Sch. Bd., 2000-0646, pp. 15-16 (La. App. 4 Cir. 2/7/01), 780 So.2d 1110, 1119). As this Court has further explained, “Under well-established rules of interpretation, the word shall excludes the possibility of being optional or even subject to discretion, but instead means imperative, of similar effect and import with the word must.” Bankers Ins. Co. v. EMIII Holdings, LLC, 2024-0386, p. 17 (La. App. 4 Cir. 12/16/24), 407 So.3d 681, 693 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Auricchio v. Harriston, 2020-01167, p. 4 (La. 10/10/21), 332 So.3d 660, 663). Nonetheless, in the matter sub judice, the trial court ruled on each of the topics raised by Mr. Angelloz's Motion in Limine but provided no reasoning for the rulings. The trial court stated no specific findings of fact, conclusions of law or reasons for judgment that in any way addressed La. C.E. arts. 702-705 as required by La. C.C.P. art. 1425(F).

As Turner notes, this Court faced the same situation in Leininger, Taylor 1, and Taylor 2. In Taylor 1 and Taylor 2, the relators therein sought pretrial review of the trial court's rulings on motions in limine, and this Court declined to reach the merits of same, instead remanding the matters to the trial court to comply with La. C.C.P. art. 1425(F). By contrast, in Leininger, this Court conducted a de novo review of the record and determined whether the trial court had ruled correctly on the merits of the motions in limine, so Turner likewise asks us to conduct a de novo review. However, Leininger was—procedurally speaking—distinct from the present writ. In Leininger, the trial court ruled on the motions in limine immediately before proceeding with trial, so the issue of the trial court's compliance with La. C.C.P. art. 1425(F) and the correctness of the trial court's ruling on the motions came to this Court post-trial on appeal. Turner argues it “does not have [the] same luxury of time as in Taylor” 1 and 2;¹ but we disagree and decline to consider the merits of Mr. Angelloz's Motion in Limine at this pretrial stage of the proceedings. Instead, we remand the matter to the trial court with instructions to not only rule on Mr. Angelloz's Motion in Limine but also comply with La. C.C.P. art. 1425(F).

DECREE

For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the trial court's April 9, 2026 ruling, which granted Mr. Angelloz's Motion in Limine regarding Dr. Perez's expert testimony. We remand this matter to the trial court for compliance with La. C.C.P. art. 1425(F).

WRIT GRANTED; VACATED AND REMANDED

FOOTNOTES

1.   Trial in this matter is scheduled to begin on May 4, 2026.

Judge Dale N. Atkins