DAX PREJEAN v. WARDEN ROLAND RODRIGUE ASSISTANT WARDEN CONRAD LEWIS ASSUMPTION PARISH DETENTION CENTER SHERIFF LELAND FALCON EX OFFICIO ASSUMPTION PARISH SHERIFF OFFICE ASSUMPTION PARISH POLICE JURY THROUGH THE PARISH PRESIDENT IRVING COMEAUX (2026)

Plaintiff-appellant, Dax Prejean, appeals the trial court's judgment sustaining the dilatory exception raising the objection of prematurity and dismissing his claims against defendant-appellee, Keith Landry, M.D., without prejudice. For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In the underlying suit, Mr. Prejean seeks damages for injuries he allegedly sustained while held by the Assumption Parish Sheriff as an arrestee and pretrial detainee at the Assumption Parish Detention Center (the prison) in August of 2020.¹ Mr. Prejean's initial suit named as defendants Sheriff Leland Falcon, Warden Roland Rodrigue, Assistant Warden Conrad Lewis, and the Assumption Parish Police Jury. The sheriff, warden, and assistant warden filed affirmative defenses and answered the original petition; the Police Jury was dismissed.

Thereafter, Mr. Prejean filed an amended petition naming Dr. Landry as an additional defendant. Mr. Prejean alleged Dr. Landry was under contract to provide medical services to the prisoners in the prison, but “never checked [on] him” and “breached his duty to properly maintain medical service at the [prison] and/or to supervise those of his employees hired to provide same.”

In response to Mr. Prejean's amended petition, Dr. Landry filed a dilatory exception pleading the objection of prematurity (original exception of prematurity). Dr. Landry maintained that he is a qualified health care provider under the Louisiana Medical Malpractice Act (LMMA), LSA-R.S. 40:1231.1, et seq.; that Mr. Prejean's claims against him sounded in medical malpractice; that Mr. Prejean had not submitted his claims to a medical review panel prior to instituting suit; and that Mr. Prejean's suit was therefore premature. In support of his original exception of prematurity, Dr. Landry submitted a certified copy of his certificate of enrollment with the Louisiana Patient's Compensation Fund dated April 1, 2022 (2022 PCF certificate).

Mr. Prejean opposed Dr. Landry's original exception of prematurity. Mr. Prejean argued his suit was not premature, because his claims were subject to the Louisiana Corrections Administrative Remedy Procedure Act, LSA-R.S. 15:1171, et seq. (CARP) and the prison's Inmate Grievance Procedures (prison grievance procedures) rather than the LMMA. Mr. Prejean also argued that the prison grievance procedures required him to pursue administrative remedies by filing a grievance, rather than by requesting a medical review panel. Thus, Mr. Prejean contended he was misled by the prison grievance procedures and had no notice that he was required to request a medical review panel.

Trial of Dr. Landry's original exception of prematurity was held on July 25, 2022. After arguments and consideration of documents admitted into evidence, the trial court sustained the original exception of prematurity and dismissed Mr. Prejean's claims against Dr. Landry, without prejudice, pending completion of a medical review panel. The judgment was reduced to writing and signed on August 23, 2022. Mr. Prejean appealed.²

On appeal, this court in Prejean v. Rodrigue, 2023-0646 (La.App. 1 Cir. 12/27/23), 381 So.3d 98, 102, as corrected on rehearing (Mar. 13, 2024) (Prejean I) specifically found that Mr. Prejean's malpractice claims against Dr. Landry are subject to the LMMA, rather than CARP and the prison grievance procedures. Prejean I, 381 So.3d at 104-106. Prejean I also found the Malpractice Liability for State Services Act (MLSSA), LSA-R.S. 40:1237.1, et seq.r did not apply to Mr. Prejean's claims against Dr. Landry. Prejean I, 381 So.3d at 104-106.

Nevertheless, Prejean I reversed the trial court's judgment sustaining Dr. Landry's original exception of prematurity. Specifically, Prejean I found that the 2022 PCF certificate Dr. Landry submitted as evidence in support of his original exception of prematurity was insufficient to establish his status as a qualified health care provider under the LMMA for the time period encompassing the alleged medical malpractice, i.e., August and September of 2020 (the relevant time period). Prejean I noted that although the 2022 PCF certificate reflected the existence of minimum insurance coverage and payment of the required surcharges for excess coverage for the “indicated period(s)” of July 14, 2021 to November 1, 2021, and November 1, 2021 to November 1, 2022, both of the indicated periods were after the alleged malpractice. See Prejean I, 381 So.3d at 107. Prejean I further noted that although the 2022 PCF certificate appeared to indicate Dr. Landry had insurance coverage for the relevant time period, it did not indicate whether the required surcharge was paid for the relevant time period. See Prejean I, 381 So.3d at 107 n.9. Thus, Prejean I reversed the trial court's judgment sustaining Dr. Landry's original exception of prematurity and remanded the matter for further proceedings.³ Prejean I, 381 So.3d at 107-108.

On remand, Dr. Landry re-urged his dilatory exception raising the objection of prematurity (re-urged exception of prematurity). In support of his re-urged exception of prematurity, Dr. Landry offered a certified copy of his March 28, 2024 PCF certificate of enrollment (2024 PCF certificate). The 2024 PCF certificate reflected the existence of minimum insurance coverage and payment of the required surcharges for excess coverage for the “indicated period(s)” of July 14, 2020 to July 14, 2021; July 14, 2021 to November 1, 2021; and November 1, 2021 to November 1, 2022. Dr. Landry argued that because the 2024 PCF certificate established the existence of minimum insurance coverage and payment of the required surcharges for excess coverage for the relevant time period, his re-urged exception of prematurity should be sustained.

In opposition, Mr. Prejean argued that Dr. Landry's re-urged exception of prematurity was procedurally barred by the law of the case doctrine in light of Prejean I and/or was waived under LSA-C.C.P. art. 926. Alternatively, Mr. Prejean argued that Dr. Landry's re-urged exception of prematurity should be denied because the 2024 PCF certificate was insufficient to establish Dr. Landry's status as a qualified health care provider during the relevant time period. Mr. Prejean asserted the 2024 PCF certificate was “newly created evidence of a ‘retroactive claims-made policy’ ” and therefore, did not establish that Dr. Landry had insurance coverage at the time of the alleged malpractice. Mr. Prejean also argued the 2024 PCF certificate did not establish that Dr. Landry had paid the required surcharge at the time of the alleged malpractice. Additionally, Mr. Prejean re-asserted his arguments that his claims against Dr. Landry were subject to CARP and the prison's grievance procedures, rather than the LMMA pre-suit medical review panel procedure, and that he was misled by the prison grievance procedures.

Following a September 23, 2024 hearing, the trial court sustained Dr. Landry's re-urged exception of prematurity. The trial court signed a written judgment on October 9, 2024 and dismissed Mr. Prejean's claims against Dr. Landry without prejudice, pending the completion of a properly convened medical review panel.⁴ Mr. Prejean has appealed.

PREMATURITY AND THE LMMA

Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 926(A)(1) provides for the dilatory exception raising the objection of prematurity. The exception of prematurity neither challenges nor attempts to defeat the elements of the plaintiff's cause of action. See LSA-C.C.P. arts. 923, 926(A)(1); Doe v. Banks, 2023-0914 (La.App. 1 Cir. 3/13/24), 385 So.3d 706, 709. Rather, the exception of prematurity tests whether the cause of action asserted is ripe for judicial determination by questioning whether the plaintiffs have complied with a required procedure before filing suit. See LSA-C.C.P. art. 926(A)(1); see also Couvillion v. Matherne, 2015-1762 (La.App. 1 Cir. 6/3/16), 196 So.3d 706, 708, writ denied, 2016-1559 (La. 11/18/16), 213 So.3d 386. The viability of the exception of prematurity is determined by the facts existing at the time the lawsuit is filed. McCain v. Lewis Companies, Inc., 2019-0416 (La.App. 1 Cir. 2/6/20), 302 So.3d 1145, 1153. Evidence may be introduced to support or controvert the grounds of the exception. See LSA-C.C.P. art. 930. If no evidence is presented at trial, then the court must render its decision based on the facts alleged in the petition, with all allegations therein being accepted as true. Couvillion, 196 So.3d at 709. The exceptor bears the initial burden of showing that an administrative remedy or procedure applies, by reason of which the lawsuit is premature. Once the existence of an administrative remedy is established, the burden then shifts to the plaintiff to show that the specific administrative remedy or procedure has been exhausted. Dutrey v. Plaquemine Manor Nursing Home, 2012-1295 (La.App. 1 Cir. 6/17/13), 205 So.3d 934, 941.

Under the LMMA, no action against a qualified health care provider, or his insurer, “may be commenced in any court before the claimant's proposed complaint has been presented to a medical review panel.” LSA-R.S. 40:1231.8(B)(1)(a)(i); see also Garner v. Louisiana Medical Mutual Insurance Company, 2022-0778 (La.App. 1 Cir. 3/29/23), 364 So.3d 508, 512. Thus, a medical malpractice claim against a qualified health care provider is subject to dismissal on a timely exception of prematurity if the claim has not first been reviewed by a pre-suit medical review panel. See LSA-R.S. 40:1231.8; Arrington v. St. Tammany Parish Hospital Service District No. 1, 2018-0215 (La.App. 1 Cir. 10/31/18), 267 So.3d 618, 621. The exceptor bears the burden of proving he is entitled to have the claims presented to a medical review panel before suit is filed. This requires the exceptor to show both that he is a qualified health care provider under the LMMA and that the claims alleged sound in malpractice. See Couvillion, 196 So.3d at 708.

DISCUSSION

The law of the case doctrine determines the relationship and effect of prior judgments by the trial and appellate courts rendered within the same case. See Quality Environmental Processes, Inc. v. IP Petroleum Company, Inc., 2016-0230 (La.App. 1 Cir. 4/12/17), 219 So.3d 349, 365-366, writ denied, 2017-00915 (La. 10/9/17), 227 So.3d 833; Bank One, National Association v. Velten, 2004-2001 (La.App. 4 Cir. 8/17/05), 917 So.2d 454, 458-459, writ denied, 2006-0040 (La. 4/28/06), 927 So.2d 283. Although Mr. Prejean only specifically raises the law of the case doctrine in one assignment of error, several of Mr. Prejean's other arguments are related to issues considered in Prejean I.

The law of the case doctrine embodies the principle that an appellate court generally does not revisit its own rulings of law on a subsequent appeal in the same case. Barringer v. Robertson, 2015-0698 (La.App. 1 Cir. 12/2/15), 216 So.3d 919, 924, writ denied, 2016-0010 (La. 2/26/16), 187 So.3d 1004. It applies only to those issues actually presented and resolved by the appellate court, and only to those parties who have previously had the identical question presented and resolved by the appellate court. See Meadows v. Adams, 2018-1544R (La.App. 1 Cir. 11/9/20), 316 So.3d 5, 10; Mire v. Eatelcorp., Inc., 2004-2603 (La.App. 1 Cir. 12/22/05), 927 So.2d 1113, 1117, writ denied, 2006-0209 (La. 4/24/06), 926 So.2d 549. It does not apply to dicta. See also Garrison v. St. Charles General Hospital, 2003-0423 (La. 4/25/03), 845 So.2d 1047, 1048 (per curiam). In short, the law of the case doctrine bars reconsideration of issues that were previously fully litigated. Meadows, 316 So.3d at 10.

The reasoning behind the law of the case doctrine is to avoid re-litigation of the same issue, to promote consistency of result in the same litigation, and to promote efficiency and fairness to the parties by affording a single opportunity for the argument and decision of the matter at issue. Meadows, 316 So.3d at 10. It applies to all prior rulings or decisions of an appellate court or the supreme court in the same case, not merely those arising from the full appeal process. Thus, re-argument in the same case of a previously decided point will be barred where there is simply a doubt as to the correctness of the earlier ruling. Barringer, 216 So.3d at 925. However, the doctrine is discretionary rather than inflexible. See Meadows, 316 So.3d at 10. It does not apply in cases of palpable error; when its application would result in manifest injustice; or when the underlying operative facts upon which the court's prior decision was based have changed. Family Worship Center Church, Inc. v. Solomon, 2017-0064 (La.App. 1 Cir. 6/21/18), 255 So.3d 649, 658, writ denied, 2018-1778 (La. 1/28/19), 263 So.3d 427.

Assignment of Error No. 1

Mr. Prejean's first assignment of error requires us to consider whether, in light of Prejean I, the law of the case doctrine or res judicata precluded Dr. Landry from re-urging his exception of prematurity.

As noted herein, the law of the case doctrine does not apply when the underlying operative facts upon which the court's prior decision was based have changed. Family Worship, 255 So.3d at 658. Here, Prejean I considered whether the trial court properly sustained Dr. Landry's original exception of prematurity based on the evidence submitted in connection with Dr. Landry's original exception of prematurity, i.e., the 2022 PCF certificate. Prejean I found, in part, that the trial court erred in sustaining Dr. Landry's original exception of prematurity, because the 2022 PCF certificate was not sufficient to establish Dr. Landry's status as a qualified health care provider under the LMMA for the relevant time period. In contrast, this appeal questions whether the trial court properly sustained Dr. Landry's re-urged exception of prematurity based on the 2024 PCF certificate. Significantly, the 2024 PCF certificate contained information relative to Dr. Landry's status during the relevant time period that was not contained in the 2022 PCF certificate. Because the judgment presently on appeal was based on different operative facts than those underlying the Prejean I ruling on the issue of prematurity, the law of the case doctrine did not preclude Dr. Landry from re-urging his exception of prematurity.

We next address res judicata, which is codified in LSA-R.S. 13:4231. Generally, res judicata precludes the re-litigation of claims arising out of the same facts and circumstances between the same parties of a previous suit in which there is a valid, final judgment. See Sutter v. Jarvis, 2024-0045 (La.App. 1 Cir. 10/3/24), 405 So.3d 836, 841-842, writ denied, 2024-01340 (La. 1/14/25), 398 So.3d 1172. The chief inquiry in determining whether res judicata applies is whether the second action asserts a cause of action that arises out of the transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the first action. Family Worship, 255 So.3d at 658. Thus, at its core, res judicata envisions a second lawsuit. Quality, 219 So.3d at 365. It does not apply in a case where there is no second suit, but merely judgments of the trial and appellate courts within the same suit. Here, there is no second suit, merely judgments within the same suit. See Family Worship, 255 So.3d at 658; Quality, 219 So.3d at 365-366. Moreover, an interlocutory judgment, such as the Prejean I ruling on the issue of prematurity, cannot serve as the basis for a plea of res judicata. See Talbert v. Restoration Hardware, Inc., 2017-0986 (La.App. 1 Cir. 5/31/18), 251 So.3d 532, 536, writ denied, 2018-1102 (La. 10/15/18), 253 So.3d 1304. Accordingly, res judicata does not apply to the Prejean I ruling on the issue of prematurity.

Assignment of Error No. 2

In Mr. Prejean's second assignment of error, he contends that LSA-C.C.P. art. 928 precluded Dr. Landry from re-urging his exception of prematurity. We disagree. Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 928(A) states that the dilatory exception “shall be pleaded prior to or in the answer and, prior to or along with the filing of any pleading seeking relief,” other than certain enumerated instances not applicable in this case. There is no prohibition against filing a second dilatory exception prior to answer. To the contrary, the courts have always considered the merits of a second exception of prematurity, if it was filed prior to the answer. See Spillman v. Parker, 54,532 (La.App. 2 Cir. 5/25/22), 339 So.3d 1268, 1274, writ denied, 2022-01005 (La. 10/12/22), 348 So.3d 77, citing Armand v. Lady of the Sea General Hospital, 2011-1083 (La.App. 1 Cir. 12/21/11), 80 So.3d 1222, 1227, writ denied, 2012-0230 (La. 3/30/12), 85 So.3d 121;⁵ see also Couvillion, 196 So.3d at 709 and Couvillion v. Matherne, 2019-0543 (La.App. 1 Cir. 2/18/20), 302 So.3d 1156, 1159 n.2, writ denied, 2020-01022 (La. 11/4/20), 303 So.3d 650.⁶

Thus, even after an appellate court has overruled an original exception based on lack of evidence, LSA-C.C.P. art. 928(A) permits a party to re-urge a previously overruled exception and offer additional evidence in support thereof, if the exception is re-urged before the moving party answers the petition. See Couvillion, 196 So.3d at 709; Couvillion, 302 So.3d at 1159; Armand, 80 So.3d at 1227; see also Spillman, 339 So.3d at 1274. In this matter, Dr. Landry re-urged his exception of prematurity before he filed an answer to Mr. Prejean's petition. Accordingly, LSA-C.C.P. art. 928(A) did not preclude the trial court from considering Dr. Landry's second exception of prematurity. See Armand, 80 So.3d at 1227; Couvillion, 196 So.3d at 709; Couvillion, 302 So.3d at 1159 n.2; see also Spillman, 339 So.3d at 1274. This assignment of error lacks merit.

Assignment of Error No. 3

In Mr. Prejean's third assignment of error, he contends that because LSA-C.C.P. art. 929(A)⁷ references the “trial” of exceptions, the trial court could not consider Dr. Landry's re-urged exception of prematurity in the absence of grounds for a new trial pursuant to LSA-C.C.P. art. 1972(2).⁸ Mr. Prejean asserts Dr. Landry “created” the 2024 PCF certificate, and it does not constitute newly discovered evidence sufficient to support the grant of a motion for new trial. This argument is misplaced. As discussed herein, this matter is before us on Dr. Landry's re-urged exception of prematurity, which is authorized pursuant to LSA-C.C.P. art. 928(A) and the jurisprudence of this court. This assignment of error lacks merit.

Assignment of Error No. 4

Mr. Prejean's fourth assignment of error argues that the trial court erred in finding he was required to file a pre-suit medical review panel, even though the prison's grievance procedures did not provide him notice of said requirement. However, in Prejean I, this court addressed the issue of whether Mr. Prejean's claims against Dr. Landry were subject to the LMMA or CARP and the prison grievance procedures, and specifically considered Mr. Prejean's contention that he should not be subject to the pre-suit medical review panel requirement of the LMMA because he was misled by the prison's grievance procedures. Prejean I, 381 So.3d at 103-104. Following an analysis of the relevant statutory language, Prejean I found that because CARP encompasses claims against “a sheriff, his deputies, or employees,” and Dr. Landry was an independent contractor of the Assumption Parish Police Jury, the trial court did not err in determining that CARP and the prison's grievance procedures did not apply to Mr. Prejean's claims against Dr. Landry.⁹ Prejean I, 381 So.3d at 104. Prejean I further explicitly found that “the malpractice claims of [Mr. Prejean], a prisoner at the Assumption Parish Detention Center, against Dr. Landry, the contracted health care provider, must be governed by the [LMMA].”¹⁰ Prejean I, 381 So.3d at 106.

With respect to the issue of whether Mr. Prejean's claims against Dr. Landry are subject to CARP and the prison grievance procedures or the LMMA, the identical question was presented to and decided by this court in Prejean I. Further, the operative facts - i.e., that Dr. Landry was an independent contractor of the Assumption Parish Police Jury and that the prison's grievance procedures failed to notify Mr. Prejean that this relationship required him to pursue a pre-suit medical review panel regarding his claims against Dr. Landry - have not changed. See Family Worship, 255 So.3d at 658. Thus, we will not reconsider the ruling of law in Prejean I on this point. This argument lacks merit.

Assignment of Error No. 5

In Mr. Prejean's fifth assignment of error, he argues the trial court erred in sustaining Dr. Landry's re-urged exception of prematurity on the merits. Specifically, Mr. Prejean contends that Dr. Landry failed to carry his burden of proof to establish he was a qualified health care provider under the LMMA during the relevant time period. To be qualified as a health care provider under the LMMA, LSA-R.S. 40:1231.2(A)¹¹ provides, in pertinent part:

To be qualified under the provisions of this Part, a health care provider shall:

(1) Cause to be filed with the board proof of financial responsibility as provided by Subsection E of this Section.

(2) Pay the surcharge assessed by this Part on all health care providers according to R.S. 40:1231.4.

(3) For self-insured health care providers, initial qualification shall be effective upon acceptance of proof of financial responsibility by and payment of the surcharge to the board. Initial qualification shall be effective for all other health care providers at the time the malpractice insurer accepts payment of the surcharge.

On the trial of the dilatory exception, evidence may be introduced to support or controvert any of the objections pleaded, when the grounds for the exception do not appear from the petition. LSA-C.C.P. art. 930; Dutrey, 205 So.3d at 944. Louisiana Revised Statutes 40:1231.8(B)(l)(a)(ii) provides that a certificate of enrollment issued by the PCF board shall be admitted into evidence. Thus, a defendant may prove its status as a qualified health care provider by offering into evidence a certificate of enrollment issued by the PCF showing it was an enrollee at the time of the alleged malpractice. Dutrey, 205 So.3d at 945. Here, in support of his re-urged exception of prematurity, Dr. Landry placed into evidence the 2024 PCF certificate, and the trial court determined that Mr. Prejean's petition for damages was premature. A judgment sustaining a dilatory exception of prematurity is subject to the manifest error standard of review. See Pinegar v. Harris, 2008-1112 (La.App. 1 Cir. 6/12/09), 20 So.3d 1081, 1087-1088.

Upon review, we find that the district court did not commit manifest error in granting the re-urged exception of prematurity. In order to obtain status as a qualified health care provider under the LMMA, Dr. Landry was required to provide proof of financial responsibility with the PCF pursuant to LSA-R.S. 40.1231.2(E) and to pay the applicable surcharge in accordance with LSA-R.S. 40:1231.4(A)(3). Prejean I, 381 So.3d at 107. Dr. Landry offered the 2024 PCF certificate in support of his re-urged exception of prematurity. Like the 2022 PCF certificate, the 2024 PCF certificate established the existence of minimum insurance coverage and payment of the required surcharges for excess coverage for the indicated periods of July 14, 2021 to November 1, 2021 and November 1, 2021 to November 1, 2022. See Prejean I, 381 So.3d at 107. Significantly, the 2024 PCF certificate also identified July 14, 2020 to July 14, 2021 as an additional “enrollment period” for which surcharges “are paid.” Thus, the 2024 PCF certificate indicated that the annual required surcharge was paid for the relevant time period - that is, the period encompassing the alleged medical malpractice in August and September of 2020 - and thereby corrected the deficiency Prejean I noted in the first certificate.

In applying the manifest error-clearly wrong standard, this court must not determine whether the trier of fact was right or wrong, but whether the fact finder's conclusion was a reasonable one. Consequently, when there are two permissible views of the evidence, the fact finder's choice between them cannot be manifestly erroneous. Clifford v. OLOL Regional Medical Center, 2018-1483 (La.App. 1 Cir. 5/31/19), 277 So.3d 1210, 1213. Here, we find no manifest error in the trial court's determination that the 2024 PCF Certificate corrected the deficiency noted in Prejean I. See Pinegar, 20 So.3d at 1087-1088. This assignment of error lacks merit.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the trial court's October 9, 2024 judgment sustaining the exception raising the objection of prematurity filed by Keith Landry, M.D., is affirmed. Costs of this appeal are assessed to Dax Prejean.

AFFIRMED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   A more detailed summary of Mr. Prejean's allegations may be found in Prejean v. Rodrigue, 2023-0646 (La.App. 1 Cir. 12/27/23), 381 So.3d 98, 100-102, as corrected on rehearing (March 13, 2024) (Prejean I). We incorporate portions of Prejean I throughout.

2.   Initially, Mr. Prejean sought a supervisory writ, which this court granted for the limited purpose of remanding the matter to the trial court with instructions to grant Mr. Prejean an appeal. See Prejean v. Rodrigue, 2022-1186 (La.App. 1 Cir. 1/3/23), 2023 WL 149093, *1 (unpublished writ action).

3.   Subsequently, this court, ex proprio motu, granted rehearing for the limited purpose of correcting a clerical error. Prejean I, 381 So.3d at 108.

4.   Mr. Prejean again sought a supervisory writ, and this court again granted his writ for the limited purpose of remanding the matter to the trial court with instructions to grant Mr. Prejean an appeal. See Prejean v. Rodrigue, 2024-1214 (La.App. 1 Cir. 3/14/25), 2025 WL 819499, *1 (unpublished writ action).

5.   In Armand, this court affirmed the trial court's judgment sustaining the objection of prematurity where the defendant filed all of its original exceptions and motions together in one pleading, and refiled its dilatory exception raising the objection of prematurity, prior to filing an answer to the petition. Armand, 80 So.3d at 1227.

6.   In Couvillion v. Matherne, 2015-1762 (La.App. 1 Cir. 6/3/16), 196 So.3d 706, 709, writ denied, 2016-1559 (La. 11/18/16), 213 So.3d 386, this court reversed the trial court's judgment sustaining the exception raising the objection of prematurity because the defendant failed to introduce evidence establishing his status as a qualified health care provider under the LMMA. Thus, this court remanded for further proceedings, noting in a footnote that the defendant was entitled to re-urge the exception raising the objection of prematurity, provided he complied with the requirements of LSA-C.C.P. art. 928(A). Couvillion, 196 So.3d at 709 n.2, citing Armand, 80 So.3d at 1227. On remand, documents establishing the defendant's status as a qualified health care provider were admitted into evidence, and the trial court sustained the re-urged exception of prematurity. Couvillion v. Matherne, 2019-0543 (La.App. 1 Cir. 2/18/20), 302 So.3d 1156, 1159 n.2, writ denied, 2020-01022 (La. 11/4/20), 303 So.3d 650. When the plaintiff appealed a second time, the medical review panel had been completed, and this court dismissed the appeal as moot. Couvillion, 302 So.3d at 1160.

7.   Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 929(A) provides, “[t]he declinatory exception, the dilatory exception, and the peremptory exception when pleaded before or in the answer shall be tried and decided in advance of the trial of the case.”

8.   Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 1972(2) provides that “[a] new trial shall be granted, upon contradictory motion of any party, ․ [w]hen the party has discovered, since the trial, evidence important to the cause, which he could not, with due diligence, have obtained before or during the trial.”

9.   Prejean I further noted that Mr. Prejean's arguments that the prison's grievance procedures were misleading “are more properly directed to the claims against the remaining defendants in this case, as they are inapplicable to [Mr. Prejean's] claims against Dr. Landry.” Prejean I, 381 So.3d at 104.

10.   Prejean I also found the Malpractice Liability for State Services Act (MLSSA), LSA-R.S. 40:1237.1, et seq., did not apply to Mr. Prejean's claims against Dr. Landry. Prejean I, 381 So.3d at 105.

11.   In short, LSA-R.S. 40:1231.2(A)(1) required Dr. Landry to cause to be filed with the board proof of financial responsibility; and LSA-R.S. 40:1231.2(A)(2) required Dr. Landry to pay the surcharge assessed on all health care providers in accordance with the LMMA. Further, because Dr. Landry was not self-insured, his qualification became effective: when proof of financial responsibility was filed and the assessed surcharge was paid. See Douglas v. Pathway Management of Louisiana, LLC, 56,040 (La.App. 2 Cir. 4/9/25), 408 So.3d 1186, 1193.

McCLENDON, CJ.