STATE OF LOUISIANA v. JARRET ANTHONY WILLIAMS (2026)

A grand jury indicted the defendant, Jarret Anthony Williams, with first degree murder, a violation of La. R.S. 14:30(A)(1). The state amended the defendant's indictment to second degree murder, a violation of La. R.S. 14:30.1(A)(1). The defendant entered dual pleas of not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity and, following a jury trial, was unanimously found guilty as charged. The defendant did not file any post verdict motions and was sentenced to life imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. The defendant now appeals, arguing the trial court erred in denying his motion for mistrial. For the following reasons, we affirm the defendant's conviction and sentence.

FACTS

On the evening of March 24, 2019, LaRita Kay Buck found her 82-year-old husband, Riley Joseph Buck, Sr., lying on the ground, unresponsive, in front of their Domino Drive home in Patterson, Louisiana.¹ LaRita called Carol Doucet, her friend and next-door neighbor, after finding Riley. While Carol called 911, her husband, Troy Doucet, checked on Riley. Carol saw Riley laying down, gurgling blood, with a cut on the right side of his head. Troy saw blood by Riley's nose and mouth and believed Riley was having trouble breathing, so he tried to support Riley's head until the ambulance arrived.

Kevin Kinslow, a Patterson volunteer fireman, responded to a call at 103 Domino Drive. When Kinslow arrived, he found Riley face down in the center of the yard, adjacent to the home's front door. Riley was profusely bleeding from his head, he had a large knot on his head, both eyes were completely swollen shut, he had severe bruising, and his nose appeared crushed. Riley was put into an ambulance and transported to a New Orleans hospital, where he eventually succumbed to his injuries. Dr. Yen Van Vo performed Riley's autopsy and determined the cause of death to be blunt force injuries to the head and neck and identified the manner of death as homicide.

On the same evening, Chancey and Melanie Blarkley, their sons Trey and Jean, and Melanie's aunt, Sue Verdin, were out to dinner when Ms. Verdin received a call that her father, Riley, had been hurt. When Trey and Jean, along with their parents and aunt, arrived to the Buck's home, Riley was already in the ambulance. Trey began to look around the Buck's home for the dog Riley had been walking that evening. While looking for the dog, Trey found keys for a Chevrolet, and Jean found a black phone along the Buck's fence line near the keys. The brothers gave the items to their father, who gave the keys and the phone the police.

Patterson Police Department (“PPD”) Sergeant Cathy Notto plugged in the phone found at the Buck's home and saw a picture of two males on the home screen. Sgt. Notto recognized one male as the defendant. PPD Lieutenant Kevin Stewart located the defendant as his mother's home. As Lt. Stewart was advising the defendant of his Miranda 2 rights, the defendant stated “God made [me] do it.” At the time, the defendant was wearing slippers. Lt. Stewart noticed the slippers contained spots, which later testing confirmed were blood. DNA analyst Jeremy Dubois determined that Riley's DNA was on the blood stains found on the defendant's slippers.

At trial, the defendant testified that on March 24, 2019, he was smoking marijuana and PCP. In the days prior to March 24th, the defendant claimed he heard voices from God and Jesus Christ. According to the defendant, God told him to ball up his right fist and punch Riley. The defendant ran away because a voice said “[Riley] got a gun, run.” A call from jail was played for the jury, wherein the defendant is heard telling his mother, “I've been told (sic) them people that ․ ain't been (sic) nothing wrong with me. I was just high.”

MOTION FOR MISTRIAL

In his sole assignment of error, the defendant argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion for mistrial. Specifically, he argues that the state made a substantive amendment to his indictment after the commencement of trial, requiring the court to order a mistrial under La. Code Crim. P. art. 487(A).

It is not disputed that the state amended the indictment after the commencement of trial. A jury trial commences when the first prospective juror is called for examination. La. Code Crim. P. art. 761. A court may at any time cause the indictment to be amended with respect to any formal defect, imperfection, omission, or uncertainty. However, when the defect is one of substance, an indictment may only be amended prior to trial. After the trial begins, a mistrial shall be ordered on the ground of a defect of substance. See La. Code Crim. P. art. 487(A)

The original indictment, filed July 29, 2019, charged the defendant with violating La. R.S. 14:30(A)(1), for the March 24, 2019 first degree murder of Riley Buck.³ On February 27, 2023, during the first panel of jury selection, the state sought to amend the indictment to correct the statute cited to La. R.S. 14:30(A)(5) (the killing of a victim over the age of 65). The defendant objected, arguing the indictment listed (A)(1) and the state's attempt to amend to (A)(5) completely changed the theory of the case. He moved for a mistrial in accord with La. Code Crim. P. art. 487. The trial court noted that, if the trial had not started, the district attorney could do “whatever [he] need[ed] to do to correct [the indictment],” but, because trial had commenced, the court's discretion was limited. The state responded by citing State v. Offord, 95-290 (La. App. 3d Cir. 10/4/95), 663 So.2d 296,299, which held that a defendant suffers no prejudice from the state's amending an indictment of first degree murder to second degree murder after jury selection was completed and that such amendment is “not a defect of substance.” The trial court distinguished Offord from the instant case, as the defendant in Offord did not request a mistrial, but only objected and challenged the amendment on appeal.

The state then sought to amend the instant indictment to reflect a charge of second degree murder, in violation of La. R.S. 14:30.1(A)(1).⁴ In response, the defendant again moved for a mistrial on the ground of a defect of substance. As prejudice, he cited the fact that, unlike first degree murder, second degree murder includes a responsive offense of negligent homicide, and, had he known he was proceeding under second degree murder, he would have prepared a defense accordingly. The trial court denied the motion for mistrial, overruled the defense objection, and allowed the state to amend the indictment to second degree murder. The state amended the indictment, charging the defendant with second degree murder, in violation of La. R.S. 14:30.1 (A)(1).⁵

On appeal, we must determine if this amendment constituted a substantive change that, because it occurred after the commencement of trial, warranted a mistrial.

An accused shall be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. La. Const. art. I, § 13. Under Louisiana law, prosecution for an offense punishable by life imprisonment must be instituted by indictment by a grand jury. La. Const. Art. 1 § 15; La. Code Crim. P. art. 382(A). Title XIII of the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure deals with indictments and bills of information. Specifically, Article 464 provides:

The indictment shall be a plain, concise, and definite written statement of the essential facts constituting the offense charged. It shall state for each count the official or customary citation of the statute which the defendant is alleged to have violated. Error in the citation or its omission shall not be ground for dismissal of the indictment or for reversal of a conviction if the error or omission did not mislead the defendant to his prejudice.

Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure article 465 authorizes the use of specific short-form indictments in charging certain offenses, including first degree murder.⁶ When those forms are used, it is intended that a defendant may procure details as to the statutory method by which he committed the offense through a bill of particulars. La. Code Crim. P. art. 465, Official Revision Comment (b). Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure article 487(A) provides:

An indictment that charges an offense in accordance with the provisions of this Title shall not be invalid or insufficient because of any defect or imperfection in, or omission of, any matter of form only, or because of any miswriting, misspelling, or improper English, or because of the use of any sign, symbol, figure, or abbreviation, or because any similar defect, imperfection, omission, or uncertainty exists therein. The court may at any time cause the indictment to be amended in respect to any such formal defect, imperfection, omission, or uncertainty.

Before the trial begins the court may order an indictment amended with respect to a defect of substance. After the trial begins a mistrial shall be ordered on the ground of a defect of substance.

(Emphasis added.)

Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure article 488 provides:

When there is a variance between the allegations of an indictment or bill of particulars which state the particulars of the offense, and the evidence offered in support thereof, the court may order the indictment or bill of particulars amended in respect to the variance, and then admit the evidence.

Official Revision Comment (c) to Article 488 provides, in pertinent part:

The defendant's interest in being protected from vexatious and surprise amendments of the indictment or bill of particulars is doubly safeguarded by this article. First, the ordering of the amendment is discretionary with the court. Although the court will usually permit an amendment rather than provide a technical escape for a defendant ․ the court may hold the district attorney to his allegations if it appears that he has been trifling with the accuracy of his bill of particulars.

Finally, the “double” protection referenced above is contained in La. Code Crim. P. art. 489, which allows for continuances if the defendant can show that he has been prejudiced in his defense on the merits by the defect, imperfection, omission, uncertainty, or variance, with respect to which an amendment is made. “In determining whether the defendant has been prejudiced in his defense upon the merits, the court shall consider all circumstances of the case and the entire course of the prosecution.” La. Code Crim. P. art. 489.

We must look to caselaw for guidance on what constitutes a “defect of substance.” La. Code Crim. P. art. 487. “A ‘defect of substance’ as contemplated by Article 487 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is intended to mean a defect which will work to the prejudice of the party accused.” City of Baton Rouge v. Norman, 290 So.2d 865, 870 (La. 1974); see also State v. Harris, 478 So.2d 229, 231 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1985), writ denied, 481 So.2d 1331 (La. 1986). “It has the same effect which an error in the citation of the statute or its omission from the indictment has under Article 464.” Norman, 290 So.2d at 870. “Such an error ‘shall not be ground for dismissal of the indictment or for reversal of a conviction if the error or omission did not mislead the defendant to his prejudice.’ ” Norman, 290 So.2d at 870 (citing La. Code. Crim. P. art. 464).

It is well settled in Louisiana law that district attorneys are empowered to amend indictments to charge lesser offenses and the state may abandon the charge of the greater crime and proceed with the prosecution for the lesser crime and no formal indictment is necessary for that purpose. State v. Young, 615 So.2d 948, 951 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 620 So.2d 873 (La. 1993) (citing State v. Davis, 385 So.2d 193, 196 (La. 1980)). The fact that the state amends the charging document to clarify the crime charged does not necessarily prejudice the defendant. State v. Roberts, 319 So.2d 317, 320 (La. 1975), rev'd on other grounds, 428 U.S. 325, 96 S.Ct. 3001, 49 L.Ed.2d 974 (1976). Stated differently, as recognized by this court in State v. Jones, 2015-0757 (La. App. 1st Cir. 11/9/15), 2015 WL 6951576, *4n. 7 (unpublished), writ not considered, 2016-0097 (La. 3/14/16), 189 So.3d 1064, a defect may be substantive, but not prejudicial.

The purpose of requiring the state to file an amendment to the indictment before trial is to provide the defendant with adequate notice of the charge so that he may properly prepare his defense. State v. Young, 615 So.2d 948, 951 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 620 So.2d 873 (La. 1993); State v. Delandro, 2001-2514 (La. App. 1st Cir. 5/10/02), 818 So.2d 1011, 1017. When the indictment against him provides sufficient notice of the crime with which he is charged, a defendant suffers no prejudice. Delandro, 818 So.2d at 1017.

Further, it has been held that following the amendment of a grand jury indictment for first degree murder to second degree murder, the defendant could not assert a lack of notice of the crime for which he was charged as amendment of the indictment to the charge of second degree did not alter the notice of the crime charged since all elements of the lesser offense were included within the greater. Davis, 385 So.2d at 197-98; Young, 615 So.2d at 951; and State v. Miller, 448 So.2d 137, 141 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 449 So.2d 1355 (La. 1984).

In Delandro, 818 So.2d at 1017, this court reviewed an amendment to a charging document after the commencement of trial. There, the front of the original bill of information charged the defendant with distribution of cocaine. At his initial arraignment, he was charged with distribution, not possession with intent to distribute. However, the portion of the original bill that listed the details of the offense provided, in part, as follows: “Brian Thomas Delandra Alias: Derrick Robinson ․,, ․ DID KNOWINGLY, WILLINGLY, AND INTENTIONALLY possess with the intent to distribute a schedule II controlled dangerous substance to wit: Cocaine, in violation of La. R.S. 40:967A.” Id. at 1016. After the first panel of prospective jurors was questioned, the state amended the bill to conform to the front of the bill, and the original arraignment charge. That amended bill of information provided, in part, as follows: “Brian Thomas Delandro Alias: Derrick Robinson ․, on or about the 15th day of August in the year of Our Lord 2000 in the Parish of Terrebonne, ․ DID THEN AND THERE Unlawfully and intentionally distribute a scheduled (sic) II controlled dangerous substance, to wit: Cocaine, in violation of La. R.S. 40:967A.” Id. at 1016.

When the prosecution moved for the re-arraignment of the defendant, the defense counsel objected, stating that the amendment completely changed the charge. The defense counsel also asked for a continuance based upon the potential prejudice resulting from the amendment. Upon questioning by the trial court, the defense counsel admitted that he always believed that the prosecution of the defendant was for distribution of cocaine, and not for possession with intent to distribute. The trial court found the amendment did not prejudice defendant. On review, this court noted that care must be taken to avoid undue prejudice. However, under the particular facts of that case, this court found the defendant failed to prove any prejudice flowing from the defect in the original indictment. The record fully supported the finding that the bill of information provided the defendant with sufficient notice for adequate trial preparation. Therefore, the trial court committed no error in allowing the amendment after the commencement of trial. Delandro, 818 So.2d at 1016-17.

Similarly, in Jones, 2015 WL 6951576, *4, this court found that an amendment made after the commencement of trial was not a “defect of substance” where the primary effect of the amendment was to change a defendant's prior offense listed in the bill of information requiring him to register as a sex offender from “forcible rape” to “sexual battery.” Citing the fact that defendant was aware of his prior convictions and that the state provided the defendant with certified copies of his prior conviction in discovery, this court found defendant suffered no prejudice from the amendment. As such, the defect did not rise to the level of “defects of substance.”

In contrast, a legal defect leading to a proper mistrial occurred in State v. Riche, 94-533 (La. App. 3d Cir. 11/2/94), 649 So.2d 562. After trial began, it was discovered that the bill of information did not name the correct juvenile victim. Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure articles 487 and 775(3) required the trial court to declare a mistrial in order for the state to correct the substantial defect in the bill of information. Riche, 649 So.2d at 565. Another example of a legal defect as contemplated by Article 775(3) occurs when a defendant is impermissibly charged by bill of information rather than an indictment. State v. Ruple, 437 So.2d 873, 875-876 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1983).

In the instant case, the charging error appeared inadvertent and did not materialize until the state was presenting its slideshow to the first panel of prospective jurors. After much back and forth between the parties and the court, and the state's pivot to amending to the lesser included offense of second degree murder, the defendant's only argument for prejudice was that he would have prepared a defense of negligent homicide, had he known that was a potential defense to which he was entitled. Unlike the defendant in Delandro, the instant defendant did not request a continuance. See La. Code Crim. P. art. 489. On the contrary, he insisted that this was a defect of substance, which mandated a mistrial.

The defendant and his counsel were well aware that he was on trial for murdering Riley Buck on March 24, 2019.⁷ The defendant was twice arraigned on the original charge of first degree murder. On August 2, 2019, the defendant appeared with counsel, who waived formal reading of the indictment and entered a plea of not guilty. On February 17, 2023, the defendant again appeared with counsel, who waived formal reading of the indictment, and entered a dual plea of not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity. Once the state amended the indictment to reflect a charge of second degree murder, the court again arraigned the defendant, at which time the defendant, through his counsel, again waived formal reading of the indictment, and entered a dual plea of not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity.

Further, the state provided complete discovery to the defense six months in advance of trial.⁸ As expressed in the state's inventory of discovery, the discovery included 89 items, which consisted of multiple police reports, witness statements, photographs, and crime lab reports. From that discovery, the defendant was able to present a dual plea of not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity, but, that theory was severely undermined at trial due to the defendant's mid-trial jail call to his mother, wherein he explained there was “nothing wrong with me. I was just high.”

Given the facts of this case, which include an 82-year-old deceased victim whose injuries were consistent with sustaining multiple blows to the face and neck region, leaving his face severely bloody and swollen, leading to trauma induced respiratory failure, we are unable to see how the failure to prepare a negligent homicide defense could possibly have prejudiced the defendant.⁹ The defect present in the original indictment did not prejudice defendant and, therefore, did not rise to the level of defect of substance. Therefore, the trial court committed no error in allowing the state to amend the indictment after the commencement of trial. Accordingly, the trial court was correct in denying defendant's motion for a mistrial under La. Code Crim. P art. 487(A).

This assignment of error is without merit.

CONCLUSION

For the above and foregoing reasons, the defendant's conviction and sentence are affirmed.

CONVICTION AND SENTENCE AFFIRMED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Since the parties involved share surnames, we refer to each by their first name to avoid confusion.

2.   See Miranda v. Arizona, 3 84 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).

3.   Louisiana Revised Statutes 14:30(A)(1) is the killing of a human being when the offender has the specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm and is engaged in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of aggravated kidnapping, second degree kidnapping, aggravated escape, aggravated arson, aggravated or first degree rape, forcible or second degree rape, aggravated burglary, armed robbery, assault by drive-by shooting, first degree robbery, second degree robbery, simple robbery, terrorism, cruelty to juveniles, second degree cruelty to juveniles, or cruelty to the elderly and persons with infirmities. The state did not specify which enumerated offense it sought to prove.

4.   This provision defines second degree murder as the killing of a human being when the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm.

5.   The state handwrote the changes on the indictment. The state made no changes to the indictment other than editing the statute to cite La. R.S. 14:30.1(A)(1) and changing “first degree murder” to “second degree murder” throughout the indictment. Thereafter, the defendant was re-arraigned.

6.   The constitutionality of short-form indictments has been consistently upheld in capital cases. State v. Lee, 2010-1592 (La. App. 1stCir. 11/10/10), 52 So.3d 210, 213, writ denied, 2010-2741 (La. 9/2/11), 68 So.3d 523.

7.   The Fourth Circuit has held that, where the amended charges are based on the same facts and circumstances as the original charge, the defendant has been apprised of the incident. State v. Olivia, 2013-0496 (La. App. 4th Cir. 3/26/14), 137 So.3d 752, 755, writ denied, 2014-0884 (La. 11/14/14), 152 So.3d 879; see also State v. Skinner, 2015-0510 (La. App. 4th Cir. 4/27/16), 191 So.3d 676, 684, writ not considered, 2016-0961 (La. 5/1/17), 221 So.3d 72.

8.   On August 2, 2022, the defendant and his counsel appeared in court regarding several pending pro se motions, one of which was a motion for bill of particulars. However, defense counsel informed the court that he did not adopt the pro se motions and that he had been provided with all discovery. Maintaining the motion for a bill of particulars may have remedied the defect in the original indictment.

9.   Negligent homicide is the killing of a human being by criminal negligence. La. R.S. 14:32. Criminal negligence exists when, although neither specific nor general criminal intent is present, there is such disregard of the interest of others that the offender's conduct amounts to a gross deviation below the standard of care expected to be maintained by a reasonably careful man under like circumstances. La. R.S. 14:12.

HESTER, J.