STATE OF LOUISIANA IN THE INTERST OF v. << (2026)

T.Q.,¹ a fourteen-year-old juvenile, was alleged to be delinquent by a juvenile delinquency petition based upon resisting an officer, a violation of La. R.S. 14:108. He denied the allegations and filed various motions, including a motion to suppress evidence. Following an adjudication hearing, he was adjudged delinquent as alleged. Following a disposition hearing, he was placed in the custody of the Office of Juvenile Justice for six months, suspended, and placed on unsupervised probation for one year, with conditions. The juvenile now appeals, asserting eight assignments of error. For the following reasons, we affirm the adjudication and disposition.

FACTS

On May 4, 2024, Lafourche Parish Sheriff's Office Officer and Federal Task Force Drug Enforcement Agent Tara Lynn Sutton attended the Thibodaux Fireman's Fair in an off-duty capacity. After she parked her vehicle, she smelled a very strong odor of marijuana. Thereafter, Agent Sutton observed smoke coming from behind the eighteen-wheeler parking area inside the fenced perimeter of the fairgrounds. She saw T.Q. wearing a red cap and another individual with dark brown hair wearing a red hoodie in the area of the smoke. The juvenile and the other person were passing a backpack between themselves. Agent Sutton reported her observations to two Thibodaux Police Officers located at the fairground's police booth and to her husband, Captain John Sutton, Jr.

Captain Sutton, a twenty-two-year veteran of the Thibodaux Police Department, was the fairground Security Commander on the date in question. His uniform included a high visibility shirt with highlighter yellow on top and reflective stripes around the center. The front of the shirt was embroidered with a police badge, and the word “POLICE” was written on the back of the shirt. Captain Sutton was also wearing his metal police badge on his shirt.

Captain Sutton testified that the fairgrounds were completely enclosed by a cyclone fence with four points of entry. Each point of entry was equipped with metal detectors and manned by a private security company. Signs were posted before the gates stating that all persons were subject to search in the private grounds. The signs also stated that purses larger than twelve inches, backpacks, and weapons were prohibited. Both a police stand and a police tent were set up next to each other inside the fairgrounds.

At approximately 9:20 p.m., Agent Sutton advised Captain Sutton that one of the individuals she saw earlier was standing in front of the police stand with the backpack. Captain Sutton approached the juvenile, who had the backpack on his left shoulder. Captain Sutton advised the juvenile that the backpack was a prohibited item on the fairground. The juvenile stated that the backpack did not belong to him. Captain Sutton detected an odor of marijuana. Based on the odor indicating the presence of drugs and the backpack being a prohibited item, Captain Sutton seized the backpack.² Captain Sutton asked the juvenile for his name and age. The juvenile questioned why Captain Sutton needed this information and the reason for the stop. Since the juvenile refused to provide basic information, Captain Sutton reached his left arm out to the juvenile's forearm to escort him to the police tent, but the juvenile jerked back and spun to his left. Captain Sutton then placed the juvenile in a “seatbelt hold”³ and, due to the juvenile's small size, he was lifted off the ground. The juvenile wrapped both his legs around Captain Sutton's left leg and “pushed” into his groin. Captain Sutton put the juvenile down by the ice chests under the police tent. Two police officers assisted Captain Sutton in handcuffing the juvenile.

Lieutenant Jeremy Gaudet, a thirteen-year veteran of the Thibodaux Police Department, came to Captain Sutton's assistance after he saw the juvenile wrapping his leg around Captain Sutton and attempting to pull himself down and get away. Lieutenant Gaudet was also wearing a high-visibility shirt with an embroidered police badge on the front and the word “POLICE” on the back. He activated his body camera during the incident and recorded the juvenile identifying himself with a false name after being placed under the police tent.

Surveillance video without audio from the day of the incident showed: the juvenile standing by the police trailer and tent with a backpack; Captain Sutton approaching and speaking to the juvenile; Captain Sutton taking the backpack away from the juvenile and looking inside the backpack; and Captain Sutton grabbing the juvenile (in a seatbelt hold) and carrying him away after he pulled away from Captain Sutton's attempt to reach for him.

SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

In assignment of error number five, the juvenile challenges the denial of his motion for directed verdict, contending that no rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that he resisted arrest.⁴ He argues the trial court elevated a “fair rule” into a crime, ignored the absence of probable cause, and disregarded exculpatory testimony. He further argues that there was no lawful arrest, no proof that he knew he was detained, and no independent eyewitness evidence that he resisted.

In a juvenile adjudication proceeding, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the child committed the delinquent act alleged in the petition. La. Ch.C. art. 883. Accordingly, in delinquency cases, the standard of review for the sufficiency of evidence is that enunciated in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789,61 L. Ed. 2d 560, 573 (1979), i.e., whether viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the State proved the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. See La. C.Cr.P. art. 821.⁵

Louisiana Revised Statutes 14:108(A) provides, in pertinent part:

Resisting an officer is the intentional interference with, opposition or resistance to, or obstruction of[6] an individual acting in his official capacity and authorized by law to make a lawful arrest, lawful detention, or seizure of property ․ when the offender knows or has reason to know that the person arresting, detaining, seizing property, or serving process is acting in his official capacity.

The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and La. Const. art. I, § 5 protect against unreasonable searches and seizures. However, the right of law enforcement officers to stop and interrogate one reasonably suspected of criminal conduct is recognized by La. C.Cr.P. art. 215.1, as well as by both state and federal jurisprudence. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,27, 88 S. Ct. 1868,1883,20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968); State v. Andrishok, 434 So. 2d 389, 391 (La. 1983).

A law enforcement officer may stop a person in a public place ⁷ whom he reasonably suspects is committing, has committed, or is about to commit an offense and may demand of him his name, address, and an explanation of his actions.⁸ La. C.Cr.P. art. 215.1(A). In making a brief investigatory stop on less than probable cause to arrest, the police must have a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the person stopped of criminal activity. A reviewing court must consider the totality of the circumstances, giving deference to the inferences and deductions of a trained police officer “that might well elude an untrained person.” State v. Young, 2020-0412 (La. App. 1st Cir. 3/18/21), 322 So. 3d 830, 834, writ denied, 2021-00524 (La. 10/1/21), 324 So. 3d 1055. To assess the validity of an investigatory stop, the critical inquiry focuses on the officer's knowledge at the time of the stop. State v. Johnson, 32,384 (La. App. 2nd Cir. 9/22/99), 748 So. 2d 31, 34.

In the instant case, Captain Sutton received information from Agent Sutton that the person she had seen with a prohibited backpack apparently smoking marijuana was standing by the police tent with the backpack. Acting in his official capacity as a police officer, Captain Sutton approached the juvenile to investigate Agent Sutton's particular, objective concerns. The juvenile knew or had reason to know Captain Sutton was acting in his official capacity because he was dressed in a high-visibility police uniform and wearing multiple police badges. The juvenile also knew or had reason to know he was being lawfully detained when he refused to provide his name and intentionally opposed and obstructed Captain Sutton's actions in moving him to a more secure location.

Although the juvenile was carrying a prohibited item, i.e., the backpack, that was not “the crime” at issue. Rather, based on the information provided by Agent Sutton, as well as Captain Sutton's detection of the odor of marijuana when speaking to the juvenile, Captain Sutton reasonably suspected the juvenile of illegal drug use and/or distribution. Reasonable suspicion was present for the investigatory stop. Under the totality of the circumstances, Captain Sutton had an objective and apparently reliable basis for suspecting the juvenile of a drug offense. See Palmer, 14 So. 3d at 308.

The “exculpatory testimony” referenced by the juvenile concerns Agent Sutton's testimony that she saw the juvenile and another person passing a backpack back and forth in an area in which she smelled marijuana and saw smoke and that she later saw the juvenile carrying the backpack, and Captain Sutton's testimony that Agent Sutton advised him that one of the individuals she had seen earlier was standing in front of the police stand with the backpack. The fact that the juvenile may not have had sole possession of the backpack earlier in the day would not exculpate him from responsibility for possession of illegal drugs if he exercised dominion and control over the drugs. See State v. Cisnero, 2010-0138 (La. App. 1st Cir. 9/10/10), 2010 WL 3526467, *6 (unpublished). More importantly, the juvenile was charged with resisting an officer, so the testimony is not exculpatory.

The juvenile correctly notes that Louisiana recognizes the right to resist an unlawful arrest.⁹ White v. Morris, 345 So. 2d 461,466 (La. 1977); State v. K.B., 2024-00491 (La. 5/9/25), 408 So. 3d 938, 947, n.4 (per curiam). However, in this case, whether or not the juvenile resisted an unlawful arrest, he resisted a lawful investigatory stop. It is a violation of La. R.S. 14:108(A) for a person being lawfully detained by an officer to resist that detention. State v. Jenkins, 2010-1471 (La. App. 1st Cir. 3/25/11), 2011 WL 1103319, *6 (unpublished), writ denied, 2011-0857 (La. 11/4/11), 75 So. 3d 921.

Lastly, the juvenile fails to cite any authority requiring “independent eyewitness evidence,” presumably non-police officer testimony. The trier of fact is charged with making credibility determinations. Credibility determinations, as well as the weight to be attributed to the evidence, are soundly within the province of the fact finder. In the absence of internal contradictions and irreconcilable conflicts with physical evidence, the testimony of one witness, if believed by the trial court, is sufficient to support a conviction. However, because a review of the law and facts in a juvenile delinquency proceeding is constitutionally mandated, an appellate court must review the record to determine if the trial court was clearly wrong in its factual findings. See La. Const, art. V, § 10; State in Interest of D.B., 2022-0028 (La. App. 1st Cir. 7/29/22), 2022 WL 3010210, *2 (unpublished).

The adjudication returned in this matter indicates the trial court credited the testimony from Agent Sutton, Captain Sutton, and Lieutenant Gaudet that the juvenile resisted Captain Sutton's lawful detention. The court also twice viewed the surveillance video of the incident. The court found Captain Sutton acted in accordance with La. C.Cr.P. art. 215.1, but the juvenile refused to provide any information. This is sufficient to constitute a violation of La. R.S. 14:108. The court noted Captain Sutton then grabbed the juvenile by the forearm to escort him to the police tent, and the juvenile wrapped his legs around Captain Sutton trying to drop to the ground, which is also sufficient to violate the statute. The trial court's determination was not clearly contrary to the evidence. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the State proved the essential elements of resisting an officer beyond a reasonable doubt and to the exclusion of every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. Further, the trial court was not clearly in error in adjudicating the child a delinquent and finding him guilty of resisting an officer. This assignment of error is without merit.

EVIDENCE OF OTHER CRIMES, WRONGS, OR ACTS

In assignment of error number one, the juvenile contends the trial court erred in allowing testimony of other crimes and/or bad acts over his objection, without notice under La. C.E. art. 404(B)(1) and Prieur,¹⁰ and without a pretrial hearing. He argues that Agent Sutton's testimony concerning marijuana was inadmissible other crimes and/or bad acts evidence.

Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts committed by the defendant is generally inadmissible because of the substantial risk of grave prejudice to the defendant. It is well settled that courts may not admit evidence of other crimes to show the defendant as a man of bad character who has acted in conformity with his bad character. However, evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts may be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake or accident, or when it relates to conduct that constitutes an integral part of the act or transaction that is the subject of the present proceeding. La. C.E. art. 404(B)(1). Even when the other crimes evidence is offered for a purpose allowed under Article 404(B)(1), the evidence is not admissible unless it tends to prove a material fact at issue or to rebut a defendant's defense. The State bears the burden of proving that the defendant committed the other crimes, wrongs, or acts. State v. Braggs, 2022-1008 (La. App 1st Cir. 3/6/23), 368 So. 3d 93, 100, writ denied, 2023-00465 (La. 10/3/23), 370 So. 3d 1072.

Other crimes evidence is admissible under the integral act exception (formerly known as res gestae) when the evidence relates to conduct that constitutes an integral part of the act or transaction that is the subject of the present proceeding. The integral act exception in Louisiana is broad and includes not only spontaneous utterances and declarations made before or after the commission of the crime, but also testimony of witnesses and police officers pertaining to what they heard or observed before, during, or after the commission of the crime, if a continuous chain of events is evident under the circumstances. Integral act evidence in Louisiana incorporates a rule of narrative completeness without which the State's case would lose its narrative momentum and cohesiveness. Braggs, 368 So. 3d at 100-01. Notice required under La. C.E. art. 404(B)(1) and under Prieur is not mandated when the evidence relates to “conduct that constitutes an integral part of the act or transaction that is the subject of the present proceeding.” La. C.E. art. 404(B)(1); Prieur, 277 So. 2d at 130.

Relevant evidence is evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. La. C.E. art. 401. All relevant evidence is admissible except as otherwise provided by positive law. Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible. La. C.E. art. 402. Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, or waste of time. La. C.E. art. 403. A trial court's determination regarding the relevancy and admissibility of evidence will not be overturned on appeal absent a clear abuse of discretion. Braggs, 368 So. 3d at 101.

Prior to the adjudication hearing, the juvenile filed a combined motion for bill of particulars, motion for Prieur notice, and motion for disclosure of evidence favorable to the defense. At the adjudication hearing, defense counsel objected to the relevance of Agent Sutton's testimony that she smelled marijuana after parking and attempting to exit her vehicle. Additionally, defense counsel noted she had requested disclosure by the State of any other acts charged against the juvenile. The court overruled the objections, finding that a police officer had a right to testify about what led up to the incident and the evidence concerned the lawfulness of the detention or arrest.

There was no clear abuse of discretion in the ruling on the admissibility of the evidence concerning the alleged marijuana. The juvenile challenged the lawfulness of the investigatory stop. Therefore, whether or not there was reasonable suspicion for Captain Sutton to approach and question the juvenile was relevant. The challenged evidence was not impermissible other crimes evidence offered to show bad character or a criminal disposition; rather, it was offered to prove an integral part of a challenged investigatory stop. The prejudicial effect to the juvenile from the challenged evidence did not rise to the level of undue or unfair prejudice when balanced against the probative value of the evidence, which provided reasonable suspicion for the investigatory stop. See State v. Alexander, 2021-1346 (La. App. 1st Cir. 7/13/22), 344 So. 3d 705, 722, writ denied, 2022-01262 (La. 11/8/23), 373 So. 3d 62. This assignment of error is without merit.

MOTION TO SUPPRESS

In assignment of error number two, the juvenile contends the trial court erred in denying the motion to suppress his statements. The juvenile argues Captain Sutton admitted he was trying to talk to the juvenile to get basic information when the juvenile said the backpack “wasn't his.” He further argues he was not provided Miranda warnings prior to being asked for his name, date of birth, and address.¹¹

The juvenile may move to suppress evidence obtained in violation of the Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of Louisiana. La. Ch.C. art. 872. Louisiana Children's Code article 881.1(A) provides that before a purported confession by a juvenile can be introduced in evidence, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the statement was free and voluntary, and not made under the influence of fear, duress, intimidation, menaces, threats, inducements, or promises. In re E.D.J., 2015-0315 (La. App. 1st Cir. 6/5/15), 2015 WL 3551970, *2 (unpublished). When a trial court denies a motion to suppress, factual and credibility determinations should not be reversed in the absence of a clear abuse of the trial court's discretion. However, a trial court's legal findings are subject to a de novo standard of review. State in Interest of C.H., 2015-1024 (La. App. 1st Cir. 11/6/15), 183 So. 3d 567, 570.

In the instant case, prior to the adjudication, the juvenile moved to suppress all involuntary statements obtained in violation of his federal and state constitutional rights. At the adjudication hearing, defense counsel agreed with the trial court that because only a general motion to suppress had been filed, the motion would be ruled upon as evidence was presented. Defense counsel, however, failed to object when Captain Sutton testified that he approached the juvenile and informed him that the backpack was a prohibited item on the fairgrounds and that the juvenile stated the backpack “wasn't his.” Accordingly, the challenge to the admissibility of the juvenile's statement that the backpack “wasn't his” was not preserved for review. See La. Ch.C. art. 104(1) and La. C.Cr.P. art. 841(A); State in Interest of J.F., 2003-0321 (La. App. 3rd Cir. 8/6/03), 851 So. 2d 1282, 1285; see also La. C.E. art. 103(A)(1).

Moreover, questioning the juvenile concerning his name and age required no Miranda warning because Captain Sutton was attempting to obtain basic information rather than an incriminating response. Any words and actions on the part of the police attendant to arrest and custody are not within Miranda's safeguards for express questioning or its functional equivalent unless the police should know that the words or actions are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect. Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 601-02, 110 S. Ct. 2638, 2650, 110 L. Ed. 2d 528 (1990); see also State v. Gage, 42,279 (La. App. 2nd Cir. 8/29/07), 965 So. 2d 592, 600, writ denied, 2007-1910 (La. 2/22/08), 976 So. 2d 1283. This assignment of error was not preserved for review and is without merit.

MOTION TO DISMISS

In assignment of error number three, the juvenile contends the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the petition for multiple reasons. First, he argues the court erred in allowing a defective bill of particulars which merely recited the statute. Next, he argues the court erred in allowing the State to provide a list of witnesses and RAP sheets after sequestration and not in advance of trial. Lastly, he argues the court erred in not excluding testimony from Captain Sutton and Lieutenant Gaudet for alleged violations of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215 (1963); Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 92 S. Ct. 763, 31 L. Ed. 2d 104 (1972); and Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 115 S. Ct. 1555, 131 L. Ed. 2d 490 (1995), and prosecutorial misconduct in suppressing files from a Louisiana State Police (“LSP”) investigation.

Bill of Particulars

On motion of the juvenile or on its own motion, the court may require the district attorney to furnish a bill of particulars setting forth more specifically the nature and cause of the allegations charging that the child committed a delinquent act. La. Ch.C. art. 870(A). The scope of the bill of particulars rests within the sound discretion of the trial judge, and his ruling will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of a clear showing of abuse of that discretion and prejudice to the defendant. The purpose of a bill of particulars is to inform the defendant about the nature and cause of the charge against him; it is not a method for the defendant to obtain the State's evidence. State v. Ohrberg, 448 So. 2d 1316, 1319 (La. App. 1st Cir 1984).

Prior to the adjudication hearing, the juvenile filed a combined motion for bill of particulars, motion for Prieur notice, and motion for disclosure of evidence favorable to the defense. He requested the State furnish “a detailed statement of all facts, constituting each element of the offense, including the date and time that the State will contend the alleged offense was committed and against whom it was committed.” Additionally, the juvenile requested he be “informed as to the specific and exact means and method by which the State will contend the alleged offense was committed.” The State answered, pointing out that, “A detailed statement of all facts constituting each element of the offense, including the date and time of the offense, is contained in the open file discovery which has been provided to the defense[.]”

At the adjudication hearing, the trial court recognized that the State had provided open-file discovery. Defense counsel, however, objected that “[t]here is no deputy or officer who the resisting arrest is directed to.” Though defense counsel conceded she had the State's entire file, including the report listing the officer's names and “who did what[,]” she maintained her objection. The court overruled the juvenile's objection.

In the instant case, the trial court did not clearly abuse its discretion in denying the objection to the bill of particulars. The petition, bill of particulars, and State's file advised the juvenile of the nature and cause of the charge against him, specifically, that he intentionally interfered with, opposed, and obstructed Captain Sutton's official actions in conducting an investigatory stop by refusing to provide his name, by pulling away, and by wrapping his legs around Captain Sutton. The juvenile also failed to establish prejudice from the alleged insufficient response to his motion for bill of particulars. See Ohrberg, 448 So. 2d at 1319.

Witness List and Brady Violation

Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure ¹² article 716(D) provides:

Upon written motion of the defendant, the court shall order the district attorney to disclose to the defendant, and to permit or authorize the defendant to inspect and copy any written or recorded statements of any witness the state intends to call in its case in chief at the trial. For purposes of this Article: (1) “written or recorded statement of a witness” shall mean any audio or audio-video recording of an oral statement or interview of a witness, and any statement a witness writes or signs; (2) for the purposes of this Article, “trial” shall mean the phase of the case at which the state attempts to meet its burden as to guilt, and specifically does not extend to pretrial matters or hearings, or to the penalty phase in capital prosecutions. The state need not provide the defendant any written or recorded statement of its witnesses until immediately prior to the opening statement at trial.

Subject to the defendant's rights under Brady and its progeny, except as otherwise provided in the discovery articles, La. C.Cr.P. art. 723(A) exempts from defense discovery and inspection “reports, memoranda, notes, or other internal [S]tate documents made by the district attorney or by agents of the [S]tate in connection with the investigation or prosecution of the case[.]” Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure article 716(F) provides, “[n]othing contained in [the discovery and inspection articles of the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure] shall obligate the [S]tate to provide to any defendant a witness list for any trial or pretrial matter.” The prosecutor's witness list generally is not discoverable in the absence of extraordinary circumstances. Only when there is a determination that there exist peculiar and distinctive reasons why fundamental fairness dictates discovery is such material discoverable. State v. Legaux, 2019-0075 (La. App. 1st Cir. 9/27/19), 288 So. 3d 791, 796.

The defendant has no general constitutional right to unlimited discovery in a criminal case. However, the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution. Brady, 373 U.S. at 87, 83 S. Ct. at 1196-97. Favorable evidence includes both exculpatory evidence and evidence impeaching the testimony of a witness when the reliability or credibility of that witness may be determinative of the defendant's guilt or innocence, or when it may have a direct bearing on the sentencing determination of the jury. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676, 105 S. Ct. 3375, 3380, 87 L. Ed. 2d 481 (1985); Giglio, 405 U.S. at 154-55, 92 S. Ct. at 766. Regardless of request, favorable evidence is material, and constitutional error results from its suppression by the government, “if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Kyles, 514 U.S. at 433-34, 115 S. Ct. at 1565 (citing Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682, 105 S. Ct. at 3383).

Bagley's touchstone of materiality is a “reasonable probability” of a different result. The question is not whether the defendant would more likely than not have received a different verdict with the evidence, but whether in its absence, he received a fair trial, which is understood as a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence. A “reasonable probability” of a different result is accordingly shown when the government's evidentiary suppression “undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial.” Kyles, 514 U.S. at 434, 115 S. Ct. at 1566; Bagley, 473 U.S. at 678, 105 S. Ct. at 3381; State v. Ferguson, 2015-0427 (La. App. 1st Cir. 9/18/15), 181 So. 3d 120,142, writ denied, 2015-1919 (La. 11/18/16), 210 So. 3d 282. Brady violations constitute reversible error only when actual prejudice to the defendant's case is shown. State v. Batts, 2013-0813 (La. App. 1st Cir. 12/27/13), 2013 WL 6858308, *3 (unpublished).

The juvenile moved for dismissal at the adjudication hearing, arguing the State failed to timely provide him with a list of the witnesses it expected to call at trial. He relied upon La. C.Cr.P. art. 716(D). In response to questioning from the court, the State indicated it was unaware of any statement from the juvenile. The court asked the State if it had any written or recorded statements of any witness other than those in the reports. The State replied it had no such statements other than the body camera footage which it had provided to the juvenile. The juvenile further alleged the State was withholding statements made in connection with the LSP investigation into Captain Sutton's actions in regard to the arrest of the juvenile on the basis that the State had no intention to use the information at trial. The State replied it had no copies of recordings made in connection with the investigation of Captain Sutton and had nothing to do with the LSP investigation into the arrest. However, defense counsel indicated she had received the file from LSP.

The court noted defense counsel was arguing the State failed to provide her with evidence that she already had and that was not part of the State's file, and contending the evidence was exculpatory because another officer present at the incident allegedly did not agree that the juvenile resisted arrest. The State explained that Captain Sutton was cleared of any wrongdoing following LSP's investigation, at the request of the Thibodaux Police Department Chief of Police, into whether or not he used excessive force during the incident. The court denied the motion to dismiss under La. C.Cr.P. art. 716.

The court referenced La. C.Cr.P. art. 717(A), which provides for the disclosure of “the record of arrests and convictions of the defendant, any codefendant, and any witness the [S]tate calls, or intends to call at trial.” In response to questioning from the court, the State indicated the juvenile had no prior criminal record. The court denied the motion to dismiss under La. C.Cr.P. art. 717(A). Thereafter, the court noted La. C.Cr.P. art. 717(C) provided, “[t]he time for disclosure provided for by this Article shall be set by the court, provided that the district attorney shall not be required to disclose inducements or records of arrests and convictions until the commencement of trial.” The trial court found that trial had not commenced because it was addressing the motion to dismiss. The court noted La. C.Cr.P. art. 761 provided, “[a] trial by a judge alone commences when the first witness is sworn” and no witness had been sworn. The State provided defense counsel a list of the witnesses it intended to call and their “rap sheets,” but noted counsel already knew their identity because they had been present at every hearing in the case.

The juvenile then argued that the State did not disclose the fact that another police officer had a different opinion as to whether the juvenile violated the statute, so Brady applied. The court indicated it would decide whether or not the juvenile suffered prejudice sufficient for dismissal from a Brady violation after reviewing the surveillance video of the incident. The court rendered the adjudication of delinquency after watching the surveillance video and without granting a dismissal.

There was no abuse of discretion by the trial court in denying the motion to dismiss. The juvenile failed to establish extraordinary circumstances which made the State witness list subject to discovery. He also did not establish the State withheld written or recorded statements of witnesses the State intended to call in its case in chief. The State provided the records of arrests and convictions to the juvenile prior to the commencement of trial. Lastly, the juvenile failed to establish he was actually prejudiced from a violation of Brady and its progeny. See State v. Ramsey, 2024-0259 (La. App. 1st Cir. 12/27/24), 2024 WL 5232929, *2 (unpublished). This assignment of error is without merit.

TIMELINESS OF ADJUDICATION HEARING

In assignment of error number four, the juvenile contends the trial court erred in failing to dismiss the petition pursuant to La. Ch.C. art. 877 because the State failed to commence the adjudication hearing within the ninety-day deadline or make a showing of good cause for an extension prior to expiration of the deadline.

If the child is not continued in custody, the adjudication hearing shall commence within ninety days of the appearance to answer the petition. La. Ch.C. art. 877(B). If the hearing has not been commenced timely, upon motion of the child, the court shall release a child continued in custody and shall dismiss the petition. La. Ch.C. art. 877(C). For good cause, the court may extend such period. La. Ch.C. art. 877(D).

The Children's Code clearly establishes that the only procedure that will suspend the time limitations to commence adjudication is by a showing of good cause. State in Interest of J.M., 2013-2573 (La. 12/9/14), 156 So. 3d 1161, 1165. Good cause is not defined in the Children's Code, but the Louisiana Supreme Court has held it may be demonstrated where “causes beyond the control of the [S]tate may impinge on its ability to prepare for the hearing.” Id.

On August 13, 2024, the juvenile appeared to answer the petition, pled not guilty, and indicated he would be filing multiple motions. With the agreement of all parties, the court set the adjudication hearing, discovery hearing, and recusal hearing for September 24, 2024.¹³ On September 24, 2024, the matter was continued to November 12, 2024. On November 12, 2024, the court denied the juvenile's motion to recuse the district attorney's office. The court granted the motion for bill of particulars and gave the State ten days to comply. Defense counsel set forth that discovery was outstanding and no dates had been set, pending the ruling on the motion to recuse. Additionally, defense counsel stated she would supplement her general motion to suppress. With the agreement of all parties, the court set December 5, 2024 for the ruling on the motion to suppress and a status on the bill of particulars.

The December 5, 2024 hearing was continued because defense counsel was ill. After contacting defense counsel by telephone, with the agreement of all parties, the court set the matter for adjudication on January 22, 2025. The court was closed that date due to a rare winter snowstorm, so the matter was rescheduled to March 19, 2025. The adjudication hearing commenced without objection on that date.

In this matter, the initial deadline for the adjudication hearing was November 12, 2024. However, on that date, the matter was not ready for adjudication because discovery was incomplete and the motion to recuse prevented the State from proceeding. Additionally, defense counsel requested additional time to supplement the motion to suppress. The court, with agreement of all parties, set the matter for adjudication on a date beyond the deadline for the adjudication hearing. Accordingly, the court granted an extension for good cause. See La. Ch.C. art. 877(D) and State in Interest of D.J., 2013-1111 (La. 1/10/14), 131 So. 3d 35 (per curiam). This assignment of error is without merit.

HEARSAY

In assignment of error number six, the juvenile contends the trial court erred in admitting hearsay evidence. He argues the State elicited testimony from officers referencing out-of-court statements under the guise of “explaining” their actions, but actually used the statements to prove he resisted arrest.

The juvenile references Agent Sutton's testimony concerning parking her vehicle, smelling marijuana, and seeing the juvenile and another person in the area of smoke. The juvenile objected, arguing that the testimony was irrelevant to resisting arrest, and the court overruled the objection. The juvenile also references a colloquy between defense counsel and Lieutenant Gaudet regarding when Lieutenant Gaudet first saw the juvenile and whether he knew why the juvenile was being escorted to the police tent. The State correctly notes neither of the portions of the record referenced by the juvenile contain hearsay elicited by the State nor the juvenile's contemporaneous objection on the basis of hearsay. Accordingly, this assignment of error was not preserved for review. La. Ch.C. art. 104(1); La. C.Cr.P. art. 841(A); State in Interest of J.F., 851 So. 2d at 1285; see also La. C.E. art. 103(A)(1).¹⁴

CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO PRESENT A DEFENSE

In assignment of error number seven, the juvenile contends the trial court erred in excluding proffered evidence, which deprived him of his constitutional right to present a defense. He challenges the trial court's refusal to admit his medical records, the testimony of Captain Ricky Ross, and letters to and from the State.

Under compelling circumstances, formal rules of evidence must yield to a defendant's constitutional right to confront and cross-examine witnesses and to present a defense. Normally inadmissible hearsay may be admitted if it is reliable, trustworthy, and relevant, and if to exclude it would compromise the defendant's right to present a defense. See U.S. Const, amend. VI; La. Const, art. I, § 16; Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302, 93 S. Ct. 1038, 1049,35 L. Ed. 2d 297 (1973); State v, Gremillion, 542 So. 2d 1074 (La. 1989).

At the adjudication hearing, the juvenile moved to introduce his certified medical records into evidence. The court sustained the State's objection as to the relevance of the evidence. The juvenile proffered the records. Thereafter, the juvenile moved to introduce audio recordings of written statements from Kyle Cressione and Javon Harvey made to LSP. The juvenile argued the statements were admissible under the business records exception to the hearsay rule. The court found the statements were irrelevant because the court had watched “the whole incident on the videotape.” The court noted the State and the juvenile stipulated the video was “what happened,” and found no reason to “put in anybody else's statements[.]” The court ruled it would not allow statements from the internal investigation to be admitted “without bringing the people here to impeach them where they're under cross-examination by the State.”

The juvenile proffered numerous additional items into the record. Defense Proffer #3, in globo, included a September 23, 2024 letter from defense counsel to the State indicating counsel had received certain items in discovery, but on “information and belief’ requested: additional body camera recordings; additional statements from Captain Sutton; the entire file from LSP; all text messages and emails between the State and the Thibodaux Chief of Police concerning Captain Sutton and/or the investigation; and all papers concerning the Internal Affairs Investigation of the excessive force complaint against Captain Sutton.

Defense Proffer #3, in globo, also included a September 27, 2024 letter from the State to defense counsel indicating it had provided open-file discovery to the defense and provided copies of all reports, documents, and other materials in its custody. Notably, this letter was filed into the record on October 28, 2024. In regard to the specific defense requests, the State set forth: it had provided the defense with all body camera recordings; there were no handwritten statements from Captain Sutton, and further, any statement made by Captain Sutton was contained in the investigative report provided to the defense. The State indicated it had reviewed the LSP materials concerning the investigation of Captain Sutton and did not intend to use any of the information in its case-in-chief, and thus, the materials were not discoverable under La. C.Cr.P. art. 718. Additionally, the State set forth it had determined there was no exculpatory or impeachment evidence in the materials, and thus, the materials were not discoverable under La. C.Cr.P. art. 723(B). The State also set forth that the requested text messages were contained in the police report and, in any event, the State did not intend to use the information in its case-in-chief, and thus, the materials were not discoverable under La. C.Cr.P. art. 718. Lastly, the State indicated it was not in possession of any documents concerning the internal affairs investigation of Captain Sutton.

Defense Proffer # 4 was the testimony of Thibodaux Police Department Internal Affairs Officer Ricky Ross. Officer Ross testified he investigated the incident involving the juvenile. In connection with the investigation, Dusten Arabie provided Officer Ross a copy of the LSP investigation. Officer Ross notarized a document indicating the documents concerning the LSP investigation were true and correct to the best of his knowledge.

There was no clear abuse of discretion in the trial court's exclusion of the proffered evidence. The juvenile's reliance on the hearsay exception for business records was misplaced because the exception excludes “[f]actual findings resulting from investigation of a particular complaint, case, or incident, including an investigation into the facts and circumstances on which the present proceeding is based or an investigation into a similar occurrence or occurrences.” La. C.E. art. 803(8)(b)(iv). The juvenile also failed to show the trustworthiness and relevance of the proffered evidence and that its exclusion would compromise his right to present a defense. The probative value of the evidence was substantially outweighed by considerations of undue delay and waste of time. See La. C.E. art. 403 and Braggs, 368 So. 3d at 101. In this bench trial, the trial court acting as fact finder heard all of the juvenile's arguments and defenses. The court found the proffered evidence was cumulative of the evidence already before it, and in particular, the video surveillance of the incident. See State v. Claiborne, 2011-1605 (La. App. 1st Cir. 3/23/12), 2012 WL 996880, *8 (unpublished), writ denied, 2012-0900 (La. 10/8/12), 98 So. 3d 848. This assignment of error is without merit.

DISPOSITION HEARING

In assignment of error number eight, the juvenile contends the trial court erred in failing to conduct a separate disposition hearing in violation of La. Ch.C. art. 892. He argues the failure to comply with Article 892 deprived him of a critical safeguard designed to ensure that any disposition was tailored to his rehabilitative needs rather than summarily imposed after a contested adjudication.¹⁵

Louisiana Children's Code article 892 provides, “Prior to entering a judgment of disposition, the court shall conduct a disposition hearing. The disposition hearing may be conducted immediately after the adjudication and shall be conducted within thirty days after the adjudication. Such period may be extended for good cause.”

Louisiana Children's Code article 893 provides:

A. At the disposition hearing, unless the child waives the presentation, the court shall hear evidence as to whether the child is in need of treatment or rehabilitation and shall make and file its findings.

B. All evidence helpful in determining the proper disposition, including oral and written reports, the report of the predisposition investigation, any reports of mental evaluation, and all other evidence offered by the child or the state shall be received by the court and may be relied upon to the extent of its probative value even though not admissible at the adjudication hearing. Upon motion of the district attorney or the child, the court may hear testimony from the victim of the offense.

C. Counsel for the state and for the child shall be afforded an opportunity to present evidence and to examine and controvert written reports so received and to cross-examine individuals preparing the reports or other witnesses who give testimony at the hearing. Sources of confidential information need not be disclosed.

D. If the court finds that the child is in need of treatment or rehabilitation as a delinquent child, the court shall proceed immediately to make any appropriate disposition authorized by Articles 895 through 899.

Prior to disposition in the instant matter, counsel for the juvenile presented testimony from T.B., the juvenile's guardian with whom he resided. The trial court questioned T.B. concerning where the juvenile went to school, whether he was involved in extracurricular activities, whether he came home at night, and whether he obeyed her commands to come inside. The court also addressed defense counsel's arguments that the juvenile did not run or resist with force or violence during the incident. The court allowed defense counsel to point out the juvenile was fourteen years old at the time of the incident, had no prior criminal record, and became terrified of police officers following the incident. Additionally, the court independently viewed surveillance footage of the incident which allowed it to personally observe the juvenile's conduct. Thereafter, the court imposed a disposition of six months in the custody of the office of juvenile justice, but suspended the entire disposition and placed the juvenile on unsupervised probation for one year with conditions.

The purpose of a disposition hearing is to provide an opportunity for the trial court to receive the information necessary for it to make the appropriate disposition for the child. State in Interest of N.H., 2008-2464 (La. App. 1st Cir. 3/27/09), 11 So. 3d 27, 33. There is no requirement that certain evidence must be heard before a disposition can be rendered. Indeed, by allowing the child to waive the presentation of evidence, La. Ch.C. art. 893 supports the opposite proposition. Any other rule would prevent the court from rendering a disposition if the parties failed to offer “required” evidence. Id. at 32. Here, the trial court conducted an informal disposition hearing at which it received the necessary information for disposition. Therefore, this assignment of error is without merit.

CONCLUSION

For the above and foregoing reasons, the juvenile's adjudication and disposition is affirmed.

ADJUDICATION AND DISPOSITION AFFIRMED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Pursuant to Rules 5-1(a) and 5-2 of the Uniform Rules-Louisiana Courts of Appeal, we reference the minor by his initials.

2.   The contents of the backpack were not discussed at the adjudication hearing. In a May 10, 2024 supporting narrative report, Captain Sutton stated the backpack contained loose green vegetable matter, suspected to be marijuana, two large knives, vape smoking devices, rolling papers, and packages of suspected marijuana or synthetic marijuana.

3.   In a “seat belt hold,” the Officer places one of his arms over the shoulder of the suspect while placing the Officer's other arm under the opposite armpit of the suspect. The Officer then interlocks his hands.

4.   When issues are raised on appeal both as to the sufficiency of the evidence and as to one or more trial errors, the reviewing court should first address whether there is sufficient evidence to convict or adjudicate because the lack of sufficient evidence to sustain the adjudication would entitle the juvenile to an acquittal under Hudson v. Louisiana, 450 U.S. 40, 44-45, 101 S. Ct. 970, 973, 67 L. Ed. 2d 30 (1981). State in Interest of M.J., 2020-0928 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2/19/21), 2021 WL 651324, *2, n.5 (unpublished). When the entirety of the evidence is sufficient to support the conviction, the accused is not entitled to an acquittal, and the reviewing court must then consider the other assignments of error to determine whether the accused is entitled to a new trial. State v. King, 2023-1192 (La. App. 1st Cir. 9/20/24), 405 So. 3d 678, 685, n.2.

5.   In the absence of specific procedures provided by the Louisiana Children's Code, the court shall proceed in accordance with the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure. See La. Ch.C. art. 803.

6.   The phrase “obstruction of’ as used in La. R.S. 14:108(A) “shall, in addition to its common meaning, signification, and connotation, mean ․ Any violence toward or any resistance or opposition to the arresting officer after the arrested party is actually placed under arrest and before he is incarcerated in jail[;] ․ [or] Refusal by the arrested or detained party to give his name and make his identity known to the arresting or detaining officer or providing false information regarding the identity of such party to the officer[.]” La. R.S. 14:108(B)(l)(b) and (c). Additionally, the word “officer” as used in La. R.S. 14:108, in pertinent part, means “any peace officer, as defined in [La.] R.S. 40:2402, and includes deputy sheriffs, municipal police officers, [and] ․ city ․ deputies[.]” La. R.S. 14:108(B)(2).

7.   For purposes of the Fourth Amendment, the distinction is not between public and private property but between public and private places, and when an individual exits a home (steps across the threshold) he enters a public place and is subject to seizure by the police acting upon probable cause for an arrest or reasonable suspicion for an investigatory stop. See State v. Palmer, 2009-0044 (La. 7/1/09), 14 So. 3d 304, 308, n.2 (per curiam).

8.   The juvenile's reliance upon Holmes v. Reddoch, 117 F.4th 309 (5th Cir. 2024), which involved an appeal from a verdict against a police officer in a civil rights lawsuit, is misplaced. The court found that Holmes’ asking “why” when asked for identification did not provide probable cause to arrest him for resisting an officer. The court noted La. R.S.14:108(B)(l)(b)-(c) criminalized the refusal to provide a name after lawful detention or arrest, and Holmes never refused to identify himself; rather, he merely wanted to know why the demand was being made. The court specifically noted, “the Fourth Amendment is not offended when a state statute only requires a detainee to state his or her name.” Holmes, 117 F.4th at 316-17.

9.   The right to resist an unlawful arrest is only available where the arrest is illegal and is tempered by the requirement that in preventing such illegal restraint of his liberty, a person may use only such force as may be necessary. State v. Ceaser, 2002-3021 (La. 10/21/03), 859 So. 2d 639, 643.

10.   State v. Prieur, 277 So. 2d 126 (La. 1973).

11.   In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966), the Supreme Court promulgated a set of safeguards to protect therein delineated constitutional rights of persons subject to custodial police interrogation. The warnings must inform the person in custody that he has the right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444-45, 86 S. Ct. at 1612; State v. Coleman, 2010-2093 (La. App. 1st Cir. 5/6/11), 2011 WL 2617665, *5 (unpublished), writ denied, 2011-1186 (La. 1/20/12), 78 So. 3d 139; see also State in Interest of K.B.J., 2023-0734 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1/19/24), 383 So. 3d 943, 947, n.4, writ denied, 2024-00234 (La. 9/17/24), 392 So. 3d 632. Miranda warnings apply to juvenile cases. See State in Interest of K.B.J., 383 So. 3d 943; see also La. C.Cr.P. art. 15(A) (“The provisions of this Code, except as otherwise specially provided by other statutes, shall govern and regulate the procedure in criminal prosecutions and proceedings in district courts. They also shall govern criminal prosecutions in city, parish, juvenile, and family courts, except insofar as a particular provision is incompatible with the general nature and organization of, or special procedures established or authorized by law for, those courts.”); see also State in Interest of C.H., 2015-1024 (La. App. 1st Cir. 11/6/15), 183 So. 3d 567.

12.   Louisiana Children's Code article 104 provides, in part, that where procedures are not provided in the Children's Code, or otherwise by law, the court shall proceed in accordance with the Code of Criminal Procedure in a delinquency proceeding and in a criminal trial of an adult.

13.   The juvenile filed a motion to recuse the Lafourche Parish District Attorney and the Lafourche Parish District Attorney's Office, contending that the district attorney “is a material witness in a civil case and has acted in a manner to exhibit a personal interest in the cause which is in conflict with fair and impartial administration of justice[.]”

14.   Louisiana Code of Evidence article 1101(A)(1) provides, in part, “Juvenile adjudication hearings in delinquency proceedings shall be governed by the provisions of this Code applicable to criminal cases.”

15.   The juvenile relies upon State in Interest of K.B., 2023-0409 (La. App. 4th Cir. 9/26/23), 372 So. 3d 864, writ denied, 2023-01421 (La. 4/3/24), 382 So. 3d 106. In that case, the trial court imposed two juvenile life terms on the juvenile following his adjudication of delinquency on two counts of armed robbery with a firearm. The appellate court affirmed the adjudication, vacated the disposition, and remanded, noting the trial court failed to conduct a hearing prior to entering the disposition, as only counsel for the codefendant waived delays. State in Interest of K.B., 372 So. 3d at 889.

MILLER, J.