KELVIN WELLS v. ST GEORGE (2026)

For the following reasons, we affirm the portion of the April 25, 2025 judgment sustaining the peremptory exception of no cause of action filed by the City of St. George in response to the petition filed by Kelvin Wells. We reverse the portion of the April 25, 2025 judgment sustaining the City's exceptions of no right of action and peremption, finding the statutory basis for those exceptions, La. R.S. 33:3, et seq, is inapplicable.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Kelvin Wells, appearing pro se, filed an “Amended Complaint, Petition for Dissolution” against the City of St. George in December 2024, seeking to dissolve the City's incorporated status. In response, the City urged peremptory exceptions of no cause of action, no right of action, and peremption. See La. C.C.P. art. 927(A)(2), (5), and (6). The City argued that no cause of action exists to dissolve an incorporated municipality. Louisiana Revised Statutes 33:3 and 33:4 provide a cause of action to specified individuals to contest incorporation following a special election held pursuant to La. R.S. 33:3, but the cause of action only exists before the municipality is legally incorporated. See La. R.S. 33:3(D) and 33:4(A).

The City further asserted that Wells had no right of action under La. R.S. 33:4 because he does not belong to the class of persons authorized to challenge incorporation. The right of action exclusively belongs to any elector residing in the area proposed for incorporation, any person owning land in such area, and any municipality which might be adversely affected or an elected official of the governing authority of such a municipality. La. R.S. 33:4(A); Broome v. Rials, 2023-01108 (La. 4/26/24), 383 So.3d 578, 584. Wells’ petition does not set forth facts to establish that he falls within any of these categories.

Finally, the City asserted that legal action contesting an incorporation must be filed and notice of such action must be served on the chairperson for the petition of incorporation within thirty days following the notice of publication of the election results. The City maintains this period is peremptive, and Wells’ petition is untimely, since it was filed more than thirty days after the notice of publication of the election results concerning its incorporation.

The City requested that Wells be served with notice of the hearing on the exceptions at an email address included in the documents attached to Wells’ petition. See La. C.C.P. art. 1313(C). The hearing was held on March 25, 2025; however, Wells did not appear. After discussions with counsel for the City, the trial court sustained the exceptions of no cause of action, no right of action, and peremption. A judgment in conformity with this ruling was signed on April 25, 2025, and this timely appeal by Wells followed.

ISSUES ON APPEAL

Wells, again appearing pro se, argues the incorporation of the City of St. George has resulted in and will worsen discrimination and disparate treatment of minorities in East Baton Rouge Parish. These factual issues are not before us.

Wells also asserts that he had multiple hearings set at the same time on March 25, 2025, and, as a result, was unable to attend the hearing in this matter. He does not contend that he was not served with notice of the hearing on the City's exceptions but only asserts that the instant hearing had concluded by the time he was finished in a different courtroom. However, Wells did not file a motion to continue the hearing on the City's exceptions. La. C.C.P. art. 1601, et seq. Thus, we find no basis to reverse the trial court's judgment for this reason.

Wells does not assign error to the trial court's judgment sustaining the City's exceptions. See Uniform Rules of Louisiana Courts of Appeal, Rule 2-12.4(A)(5). Nevertheless, for completeness, we find the trial court properly sustained the exception of no cause of action.² There is no provision in Louisiana law that creates a cause of action against a city to dissolve its incorporated status, properly voted on by the electorate. See La. R.S. 33:231 (giving the governor the authority to issue a proclamation abolishing a municipality) and La. R.S. 33:251 (providing the procedure to hold an election for the dissolution of municipalities of a certain size).

In Broome, the Louisiana Supreme Court found the City of St. George's incorporation was reasonable, reversed the denial of incorporation, and rendered judgment in favor of the proponents of incorporation. Broome, 383 So.3d at 595. Thus, the City of St. George was legally incorporated pursuant to the people's vote. Judicial review prior to incorporation only arises if a proper challenge is lodged pursuant to La. R.S. 33:4. Broome, 383 So.3d 585. Therefore, Wells has no cause of action against the City of St. George to dissolve its legal incorporation.³

Additionally, because the City has been incorporated, La. R.S. 33:3, et seq does not apply under the facts of this case. We reverse the portion of the April 25, 2025 judgment sustaining the exceptions of no right of action and peremption premised on La. R.S. 33:3 and 33:4.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the portion of the April 25, 2025 judgment sustaining the peremptory exception of no cause of action filed by the City of St. George and dismissing the petition filed by Kelvin Wells, with prejudice. We reverse the portions of the April 25, 2025 judgment sustaining the City's exceptions of no right of action and peremption. All costs of this appeal are assessed against Kelvin Wells.

AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART.

FOOTNOTES

2.   The sustaining of an exception of no cause of action is subject to de novo review. Watson Memorial Spiritual Temple of Christ v. Korban, 2024-00055 (La. 6/28/24), 387 So.3d 499, 506, cert. denied, 145 S.Ct. 1169, 221 L.Ed.2d 251 (2025). A cause of action, when examined in the context of a peremptory exception, is defined as the operative facts that give rise to the plaintiff's right to judicially assert the action against the defendant. The function of the peremptory exception of no cause of action is to test the legal sufficiency of the petition, which is done by determining whether the law affords a remedy on the well-pleaded facts alleged in the pleading, which are accepted as true. Watson, 387 So.3d at 506. The issue is whether, on the face of the petition, the plaintiff is legally entitled to the relief sought. Watson, 387 So.3d at 506.

3.   Wells did not request an opportunity to amend his petition to cure any deficiencies pursuant to La. C.C.P. art. 934. Therefore, the issue is waived. Additionally, amending the petition would be “a vain and useless act.” Martin v. Board of Adjustment Through Chairman, 2023-065 8 (La. App. 1 Cir. 2/23/24), 3 87 So.3d 17, 22 n.9.

HAGGERTY, J.