JEFFREY TUCKER v. EXXON MOBIL CORPORATION EXXONMOBIL CHEMICAL COMPANY (2026)

Plaintiff Jeffrey H. Tucker appeals the trial court's judgment sustaining defendant Exxon Mobil Corporation d/b/a ExxonMobil Chemical Company's (“Exxon”) peremptory exception raising the objections of no cause of action and no right of action and dismissing plaintiff's claims against Exxon, with prejudice. For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff worked for ISC Constructors, LLC (“ISC”) as an electrician and was assigned to work at Exxon's plant from approximately June 2012 to January 2014. Tucker initially filed suit on January 23, 2014, for personal injury damages, alleging negligence and intentional acts against Exxon. In April 2014, he filed a supplemental and amended petition, adding a claim against Exxon under the Louisiana Wage Payment Act (“LWPA”), La. R.S. 23:631, et seq., for alleged past due wages, rightfully due, for penalties and attorney's fees, and for all other damages provided in the LWPA.

As alleged in the supplemental and amended petition, ISC employed plaintiff as an electrician and assigned him to work at the Exxon plant. Plaintiff also alleged that he was “jointly employed by ISC and Exxon.” While at the Exxon plant, plaintiff often worked with and was supervised by Exxon employees. Plaintiff alleged that he was required to arrive to work at Exxon 20 to 30 minutes before the start of his 6:30 a.m. shift, but was “never paid for any time, prior to 6:30 am.” According to plaintiff, Exxon is liable to him for the non-payment of wages. Plaintiff further alleged that he made demand upon Exxon for the past due wages to no avail.

In December 2016, Tucker obtained leave to file a second supplemental and amended petition, incorporating all allegations made in the original petition and the supplemental and amended petition and adding ISC as defendant to his individual LWPA claim. Plaintiff also modified the allegations regarding his employment, stating he was “employed by ISC and/or Exxon.”

On March 2021, Tucker obtained leave to file a third amended petition, which incorporated all allegations made in prior petitions, added class action claims against the defendants under the LWPA, and made additional allegations concerning his LWPA claim. While no change was made to the allegation that plaintiff was “employed by ISC and/or Exxon[,]” plaintiff made the following modifications to prior allegations:

4.

Despite the fact that Exxon required the ISC employees to arrive at work 20 to 30 minutes prior to the start of their daily shift at 6:30 am, these employees were never paid for any time prior to 6:30 am.

5.

Petitioner and other ISC employees were employed by the hour.

(Emphasis added.)

In response to the third amended petition, Exxon filed peremptory exceptions asserting the objections of no cause of action, prescription, and no right of action, which Tucker opposed. At the conclusion of the hearing on the exceptions, the trial court sustained Exxon's peremptory exception asserting the objection of no right of action, dismissing with prejudice Tucker's negligence and intentional tort claims, but denied Exxon's remaining exceptions. Exxon sought supervisory review with this court. On May 13, 2024, another panel of this court granted Exxon's writ application, reversing the portion of the trial court's ruling denying peremptory exception asserting the objection of no cause of action as to plaintiffs LWPA claims, as he “failed to plead he is owed wages under a term of employment.” Tucker v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 2024-0075 (La. App. 1st Cir. 5/13/24), 2024 WL 2179232 (unpublished writ action) (citing La. R.S. 23:631; Bennett v. McDermott International, Inc., 855 Fed.Appx. 932, 938-39 (5th Cir. 2021)). However, this court remanded the matter to the trial court with instructions that plaintiff be permitted to amend his petition to state a cause of action, if he could, against Exxon. Id.

Plaintiff filed a fourth amended petition and again incorporated all allegations contained in his previous petitions. Plaintiff alleged, in part, as follows:

5.

Petitioner alleges that he accepted his employment with the understanding that, as a term of his employment, he would be paid wages for all of the time that he was required by Exxon and/or ISC to be present on the premises of the Exxon Plant.

․

10.

Petitioner and Class Representative Jeffrey Tucker asserts, individually and on behalf of all Class members, that Exxon and ISC knowingly and systematically failed to pay workers for time that those workers were required by Exxon and ISC to be on the job site in accordance to the terms of their employment.

Plaintiff also alternatively claimed defendants were unjustly enriched by labor performed by the class members and owed compensation to the class members.

In response to the fourth amended petition, Exxon raised peremptory exceptions asserting the objections of no cause of action and no right of action. Exxon maintained that, even taking the allegations as true, plaintiff failed to state a cause of action under the LWPA, as he did not plead that he was owed wages under a term of employment. Further, Exxon maintained that plaintiff had no right of action for unjust enrichment because another remedy existed at law. Plaintiff opposed the exceptions. At the January 13, 2025 hearing, the trial court sustained Exxon's exceptions and dismissed plaintiff's claims against Exxon, with prejudice. A judgment memorializing the ruling was signed on February 3, 2025. Plaintiff appealed. In his sole assignment of error, plaintiff maintains the trial court erred in dismissing his LWPA claim.¹

LAW AND DISCUSSION

The peremptory exception raising the objection of no cause of action tests the legal sufficiency of a pleading by determining whether the law affords a remedy on the facts alleged. Allstate Vehicle and Property Insurance Company v. Andrus Restoration, LLC, 2019-1279 (La. App. 1st Cir. 9/21/20), 314 So.3d 51, 5 5. In the context of the peremptory exception, a “cause of action” is defined as the operative facts that give rise to the plaintiff's right to judicially assert the action against the defendant. Paulsell v. State, Department of Transportation and Development, 2012-0396 (La. App. 1st Cir. 12/28/12), 112 So.3d 856, 864, writ denied, 2013-0274 (La. 3/15/13), 109 So.3d 386. No evidence may be introduced, and the exception is triable solely on the face of the petition and any attached documents. La. Code Civ. P. art. 931; Melancon v. Commonwealth Land Title Insurance Company, 2020-0196 (La. App. 1st Cir. 12/30/20), 318 So.3d 171, 174.

For purposes of determining the issues raised by the exception of no cause of action, all well-pleaded facts in the petition must be accepted as true. CamSoft Data Systems, Inc. v. Southern Electronics Supply, Inc., 2015-1260 (La. App. 1st Cir. 9/23/15), 182 So.3d 1009, 1015. The issue at the trial of the exception is whether, on the face of the petition, the plaintiff is legally entitled to the relief sought. Melancon, 318 So.3d at 174. The pertinent question is whether, in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and with every doubt resolved in the plaintiff's behalf, the petition states any valid cause of action for relief. Id. Because the exception of no cause of action raises a question of law and the trial court's decision is based solely on the sufficiency of the petition, review of the trial court's ruling on an exception of no cause of action is de novo. Scheffler v. Adams and Reese, LLP, 2006-1774 (La. 2/22/07), 950 So.2d 641, 647.

In this case, the question presented is whether plaintiff stated a cause of action against Exxon under the LWPA, which provides for the payment of wages due after termination of employment. The main purpose of the LWPA is to compel an employer to pay the earned wages of an employee promptly after his dismissal or resignation and to protect discharged Louisiana employees from unfair and dilatory wage practices by employers. Newton v. St. Tammany Fire Dist. No. 12, 2020-0797 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2/19/21), 318 So.3d 206, 211. The LWPA provides that upon the discharge or resignation of an employee, the employer shall pay the employee “the amount then due under the terms of employment.”² La. R.S. 23:631(A)(1). For purposes of La. R.S. 23:631(A), wages are equivalent to “the amount then due under the terms of employment,” i.e., wages, or compensation, earned during a pay period. Molina v. Oilfield Prod. Contractors, Inc., 2017-0455 (La. App. 1 Cir. 12/29/17), 241 So.3d 337, 339. Any employer who fails or refuses to comply with the provisions of La. R.S. 23:631 shall be liable to the employee either for ninety days wages at the employee's daily rate of pay or full wages from the time the employee demands payment until the employer pays or tenders the amount of unpaid wages due to such employee, whichever is the lesser amount of penalty wages.³ La. R.S. 23:632(A).

Plaintiff argues that he sufficiently pled a cause of action under the LWPA and that the ruling of the trial court should be reversed. We disagree. Plaintiff's petitions fail to allege that, upon his termination of employment with Exxon, Exxon failed to pay plaintiff wages or compensation earned during a pay period. See Molina, 241 So.3d at 339. Further, plaintiff did not allege that he was owed wages by Exxon under the terms of his employment. See La. R.S. 631(A)(1). Rather, plaintiff alleged that he was never paid for the time he was required to report to the Exxon plant prior to the start of his 6:30 a.m. shift. Notwithstanding, plaintiff argues to this court that an obligation for Exxon to pay plaintiff's wages for this time should be implied, noting that an employment agreement is a contract. See Read v. Willwoods Cmty., 2014-1475 (La. 3/17/15), 165 So.3d 883, 886.

The employer-employee relationship is a contractual relationship, and thus an employer and employee may negotiate the terms of an employment contract and agree to any terms not prohibited by law or public policy. Read, 165 So.3d at 886-87. However, a plaintiff need not show a written agreement existed to prove “terms of employment”; a “normal procedure” or “internal policy” will suffice. Bennett, 855 Fed.Appx. at 939; Cf Nassauer v. Marine Offshore Catering Co., Inc., 413 So.2d 946, 948 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1982) (finding employees were entitled to wages spent traveling to and from the rig based on evidence that it was “normal procedure” for company to compensate for this time). While an employment contract is not generally required to be in writing, there must be both offer and acceptance and a meeting of the minds. See La. Civ. Code 1927; Hampton v. McDermott Int'l, Inc., 2019 WL 5617025, at *2 (W.D. La. 2019) (citing Read, 165 So.3d at 887).

In Bennett, 855 Fed.Appx. at 933, the Federal Fifth Circuit affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the plaintiffs’ LWPA claims for failure to state a claim under the LWPA. The Bennett plaintiffs brought claims under both the LWPA and the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), claiming they were owed compensation for the time they had to spend waiting for and riding on buses to access a rural worksite.⁴ However, the Bennett plaintiffs conceded there was no express agreement in which the defendants promised them compensation for the commute time, and the allegations in the complaint indicated that neither internal policy nor normal practice mandated compensation for the commute time. Id. at 939. Specifically, the Bennett plaintiffs alleged they could not clock in until they arrived to the jobsite and were prohibited from recording travel time on their time sheets. Id. In addressing the LWPA claims, the court found that the Bennett plaintiffs’ allegations “undermine[d], if not entirely preclude[d], any argument that compensated commute time was a ‘term of employment’ ” and “indicate[d] that neither internal policy nor normal practice mandated compensation for [the disputed] travel time.” Id. Accordingly, the court concluded the district court properly dismissed the plaintiffs’ LWPA claim.⁵ Id.

In Hampton, 2019 WL 5617025, at *3, the court found the plaintiffs did not sufficiently set forth their LWPA claims because they did not allege an agreement or understanding that the plaintiffs would be compensated for the disputed time. In connection with their LWPA claims, the Hampton plaintiffs alleged the following: (i) the defendants required them to work “off-the-clock” during their commutes; (ii) they were required to engage in “pre-work activities” upon arrival to the jobsite before their scheduled shifts; and (iii) they were not paid the amounts due them in violation of the LWPA when their employment ended. Id. at * 1. The court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, explaining, “the allegations are that Plaintiffs were not paid for ‘off-the-clock’ work, which indicates that there was no agreement as to the payment for the disputed time or it would not be ‘off-the-clock.’ There is simply no allegation that the parties ever agreed or had a meeting of the minds regarding compensation for the disputed time in question.” Id. at *3.

We find Bennett and Hampton are both apposite to this matter. While plaintiff attempted to add allegations to establish a cause of action under the LWPA in his fourth amended petition, plaintiff merely reiterated that Exxon did not pay workers for the time required to be at the Exxon plant prior to the start of the shift but added “in accordance to the terms of their employment” to this allegation. Plaintiff then alleged that it was his “understanding that, as a term of his employment, he would be paid wages for all of the time that he was required by Exxon and/or ISC to be present on the premises of the Exxon Plant.”

Taking plaintiff's allegations as true, it was neither an internal policy nor a normal practice of Exxon to pay plaintiff for the time prior to his shift. See Bennett, 855 Fed.Appx. at 939. The allegation that Exxon never paid plaintiff for any time prior to 6:30 a.m. belies his contention that payment for this time was a term of his employment. As in Hampton, 2019 WL 5617025, at *3, there is no allegation here that the plaintiff and Exxon ever agreed or had a meeting of the minds regarding compensation for the time in question.⁶ Instead, plaintiff only alleged that he “underst[ood] that, as a term of his employment, he would be paid wages” for the disputed time, which only indicates one parties’ position on a provision in a purported contract.⁷

Accordingly, plaintiff's sole assignment of error lacks merit. We find no error in the trial court's sustaining of Exxon's peremptory exception raising the objection of no cause of action, dismissing plaintiff's claims against Exxon, with prejudice and without the opportunity to amend his petition pursuant to La. Code Civ. P. art. 934. See Price v. North, 2021-0236 (La. App. 1st Cir. 10/18/21), 331 So.3d 959, 976.

CONCLUSION

For the above and foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court's February 3, 2025 judgment, dismissing Jeffrey H. Tucker's claims against Exxon Mobil Corporation d/b/a ExxonMobil Chemical Company, with prejudice. Costs of this appeal are assessed to Jeffrey H. Tucker.

AFFIRMED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Plaintiff did not assign as error the portion of the trial court's February 3, 2025 judgment sustaining Exxon's peremptory exception asserting the objection of no right of action and dismissing his claim for unjust enrichment, with prejudice.

2.   The amount due must be paid on or before the earlier of the next regular pay day or fifteen days following the employee's discharge or, for employees who resigned, on the earlier of the next regular payday for the pay cycle during which the employee was working at the time of separation or fifteen days following the date of resignation. La. R.S. 23:631(A)(1).

3.   To establish entitlement to penalty wages under La. R.S. 23:632, the employee must prove: (1) that wages were due and owing, (2) that demand for payment was made at the place where the employee was usually paid, and (3) that the employer failed to pay upon demand. Haber v. Ocean Canyon Properties, Inc., 2017-1472 (La. App. 1st Cir. 5/31/18), 251 So.3d 454, 45 8. Louisiana Revised Statute 23:632 is penal in nature and, therefore, must be strictly construed. Id.

4.   The Fifth Circuit determined the Bennett plaintiffs’ FLSA claims were not compensable because the plaintiffs failed to sufficiently allege that the time spent waiting for and taking bus rides to the worksite were integral and indispensable to their work. Bennett, 855 Fed.Appx. at 937-38. Plaintiff attempts to distinguish Bennett, arguing that he does not seek compensation for commuting; rather, he seeks compensation for time while physically on Exxon's property. However, the discussion of commute-time compensation in Bennett is related to the court's ruling as to the FLSA claim, and therefore, are not relevant to the issue herein.

5.   Notably, the Bennett plaintiffs also argued that the travel time should be considered part of the work they were hired to do and thus an implicit term of their employment, likening their case to tort and workers’ compensation cases where courts determined travel time was within the course and scope of employment. Bennett, 855 Fed.Appx. at 939. The Fifth Circuit found that, unlike the tort and workers’ compensation cases, the LWPA requires plaintiffs to prove they were owed wages as a term of employment, which plaintiffs failed to plead. Id.

6.   In fact, the petitions are devoid of allegations that plaintiff and Exxon had any agreement or meeting of the minds regarding any compensation.

7.   “A contract is incomplete unless there be a meeting of the minds of the parties upon the common ground of a mutual understanding of facts and of subject-matter.” AmeriFactors Fin. Grp., LLC v. Dunham Price Grp., LLC, 2023-101 (La. App. 3d Cir. 11/15/23), 389 So.3d 71, 92, writ denied, 2024-00529 (La. 11/6/24), 395 So.3d 871 (quoting Jones v. Janes, 156 La. 715, 101 So. 116, 117(1924)).

HESTER, J.