STATE OF LOUISIANA v. LIONEL DAVIS (2026)

Lionel Davis ¹ (hereinafter “Defendant”) appeals his sentence and conviction for one count of failure to register and notify as a sex offender in violation of La. R.S. 15:542.1.4(A)(l). After consideration of the record before this Court, and the applicable law, we affirm the conviction, affirm Defendant's sentence and remand the case to the district court for the imposition of the statutory fine.

Relevant Facts and Procedural History

In 1990, while incarcerated, Defendant pled guilty to forcible rape and attempted aggravated rape. He received sentences of ten years on each count with the sentences to run concurrently. In 2013, Defendant was released early based on good time credits and placed on parole for the remaining seven (7) months of his sentences. As a condition of his parole, Defendant signed a diminution of sentence form which included stipulations, among them, that he register as a sex offender. Defendant signed the sex offender registration form which required him to register pursuant to La. R.S. 15:542, et seq, Registration of Sex Offenders and Child Predators.

Defendant was arrested on October 25, 2018 after failing to comply with the required registration of a sex offender, and remanded into custody, thus forfeiting his good time service. Defendant served the remaining seven (7) months of his ten-year sentences and was released on June 16, 2019. On March 31, 2021, the State entered a nolle prosequi of his October 25, 2018 arrest.

On May 20, 2021, Defendant was arrested again for failure to comply with registration and notification as a sex offender. The State filed a bill of information charging Defendant with one count of violating La. R.S. 15:542.1.4(A)(l). The bill of information read as follows:

In violation of La R.S. 15:542.1.4(A)(l), on or about May 3, 2021, did fail to timely register, timely provide any information required by the provisions of this Chapter, timely and periodically renew and update registration as required by the provisions of this Chapter, timely provide proof of residence, timely provide notification of change of address or other registration information, or provide community notification as required by the provisions of this Chapter, or did knowingly provide false information as provided in R.S. 15:542(C)(3), said Lionel Davis AKA Lionel Bailey being previously convicted of Aggravated Rape on October 25, 1990 in Case # 339459 in Orleans Criminal District Court.

Defendant pled not guilty and elected to represent himself.² Defendant filed a motion to quash the bill of information and filed a memorandum in support of his motion to quash. He argued that the charge against him implicated double jeopardy and that the trial court failed to advise him of his duty to register. The district court denied the motion to quash the bill of information.

After a trial by jury, Defendant was found guilty as charged. The district court sentenced Defendant to two years at hard labor, waiving fines and fees. This appeal followed.

Testimony

Only one witness testified at trial. Detective Reuben Henry (“hereinafter Det. Henry”), of the New Orleans Police Department's Special Victim's Unit testified that he monitors sex offenders in Orleans Parish, and ensures their compliance with registration requirements. Det. Henry explained the history of Louisiana's sex offender registry and his duties as the person responsible for compliance. Det. Henry stated that he monitors every sex offender on a program called “Offender Watch,” which allows him to keep track of all offenders’ compliance of registration and reporting. In addition to reporting in person to a supervisor, convicted sex offenders must provide their current address or report any change in address within three (3) days. Offenders who are away from their primary address for more than thirty (30) days have to register their secondary address.

Det. Henry confirmed that Defendant was a convicted sex offender and recounted that he had been supervising Defendant since 2014. Det. Henry testified that as a result of Defendant's 1990 convictions for forcible rape, he was a tier-three offender, which mandated compliance with registration requirements every ninety days for the rest of his life. Det. Henry stated that he advised Defendant, on at least three occasions, the consequence of not complying with registration requirements. Det. Henry explained that in 2019, following Defendant's release from prison, he again failed to comply with the reporting requirements by not reporting to his in-person quarterly update and failed to provide notice of his change of address.

Errors Patent Review

In accordance with La. C.Cr.P. art. 920, this Court reviews all criminal appeals for errors patent on the face of the record. An error patent is one “that is discoverable by a mere inspection of the pleadings and proceedings and without inspection of the evidence.” La. C.Cr.P. art. 920(2). Our review of the record reveals one error patent.

La. R.S. 15:542.1.4(A)(l) provides, in pertinent part:

A person who fails to timely register ․ shall, upon first conviction, be fined not more than one thousand dollars and imprisoned with hard labor for not less than two years nor more than ten years without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

While the district court imposed a mandatory minimum sentence of two years at hard labor, it did not impose the statutorily mandated fine. This Court has previously held that “the failure to impose a mandatory fine requires that the matter be remanded for the imposition of that fine.” State v. Hart, 2010-1614, p. 4 (La.App. 4 Cir. 11/2/11), 80 So.3d 25, 29 (citation omitted). “[A] reviewing court must remand cases for the imposition of a mandatory fine where the [district] court failed to do so.” State v. Watts, 2009-0912, p. 8 (La.App. 4 Cir. 6/16/10), 41 So.3d 625, 632. We remand this case to the district court to impose the mandatory fine.

Discussion

Defendant raises four assignments of error:

1. The bill of information is not compliant with La.C.Cr.P. Art. 464 and does not provide the notice required by La. Const. Art. 1, Sec. 13, and the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.

2. The State failed to prove the elements of La. R.S. 15:542.1.4(A)(1), or that the requirements applied to [Defendant], or that [Defendant] was properly notified of the requirements as provided in La. R.S. 15:543, beyond a reasonable doubt.

3. The [district] court erred in denying the motions to quash and dismiss, as the prosecution for this offense violated the double jeopardy clause.

4. The [district] court erred in denying the motion to quash and motion to dismiss as the prosecution for this offense violated the ex post facto clause and was in violation of the 1990 plea agreement.

As assignment of error No. 2, raises a sufficiency of evidence argument, we will consider that assignment of error first and address the other assignments in turn.

Assignment of Error No. 2

Defendant maintains that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to support his conviction of failing to comply with sex offender registration as required by La. R.S. 15:542.1.4(A)(l).

It is well settled that when sufficiency of the evidence, and one or more trial errors, are raised on appeal, this Court should first determine the sufficiency of the evidence. State v. Groves, 2020-0450, p. 21 (La.App. 4 Cir. 6/10/21), 323 So.3d 957, 971 (quoting State v. Hearold, 603 So.2d 731, 734 (La. 1992)). We review sufficiency of the evidence first because “if there is not sufficient evidence to support a conviction, an accused is not entitled to a new trial; rather, an accused is entitled to an acquittal. If an accused is entitled to an acquittal, this prevents the need for a retrial.” Groves, 2020-0450, p. 21, 323 So.3d at 971 (citation omitted).

This Court has previously set forth the applicable standard of review for sufficiency of the evidence:

In evaluating whether evidence is constitutionally sufficient to support a conviction, an appellate court must determine whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); State v. Green, 588 So.2d 757 (La.App. 4 Cir.1991). However, the reviewing court may not disregard this duty simply because the record contains evidence that tends to support each fact necessary to constitute the crime. State v. Mussall, 523 So.2d 1305 (La. 1988). The reviewing court must consider the record as a whole since that is what a rational trier of fact would do. If rational triers of fact could disagree as to the interpretation of the evidence, the rational trier's view of all the evidence most favorable to the prosecution must be adopted. The fact finder's discretion will be impinged upon only to the extent necessary to guarantee the fundamental protection of due process of law. Mussall; Green; supra. “[A] reviewing court is not called upon to decide whether it believes the witnesses or whether the conviction is contrary to the weight of the evidence.” State v. Smith, 600 So.2d 1319 (La. 1992) at 1324.

State v. Huckabay, 2000-1082, p. 32 (La.App. 4 Cir. 2/6/02), 809 So.2d 1093, 1111 (citation omitted). Pursuant to Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979), this Court must determine that the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, “was sufficient to convince a rational trier of fact that all of the elements of the crime had been proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Neal, 2000-0674, p. 9 (La. 6/29/01), 796 So.2d 649, 657 (quoting State v. Captville, 448 So.2d 676, 678 (La. 1984)). As an appellate court we must review the record as a whole, just as the trier of fact would do. State v. Wilson, 2022-0346, p. 4 (La.App. 4 Cir. 12/9/22), 353 So.3d 389, 393) (citation omitted).

The State charged Defendant with one count of failing to register and notify as a sex offender. La. R.S. 15:542.1.4(A)(l) outlines mandatory punishment and specific violations that constitute a failure to register, and provides,

A person who fails to timely register, fails to timely provide any information required by the provisions of this Chapter, fails to timely and periodically renew and update registration as required by the provisions of this Chapter, fails to timely provide proof of residence, fails to timely provide notification of change of address or other registration information, or fails to provide community notification as required by the provisions of this Chapter, and a person who knowingly provides false information as provided in R.S. 15:542(C)(3), shall, upon first conviction, be fined not more than one thousand dollars and imprisoned with hard labor for not less than two years nor more than ten years without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

La. R.S. 15:542.1.4(A)(l). In order to support Defendant's conviction of failing to register as a sex offender, “the State must prove that the defendant pled guilty or was convicted of a sex offense, that he resided in Louisiana for the period during which he was required to register and that he failed to register within the requisite time allotted for registration.”³ Watts, 2009-0912, p. 22, 41 So.3d at 641 (citation omitted).

Det. Henry testified that he has monitored Defendant since 2014 and that he was classified as a tier-three sex offender as a result of his conviction for forcible rape. He explained that over the course of Defendant's supervision he notified Defendant, “at least three times,” that he is required to comply with registration. Moreover, in Defendant's opening statement, he admitted to signing his name to the form registering as a sex offender as a term and condition of parole. The jury was also provided with the signed notice of Defendant's 2013 registration as a condition of the diminution of his sentence; and multiple notifications and registrations—all signed by Defendant.

The State also established that Defendant resided in Louisiana at the time of his non-compliance. Defendant's affidavit for arrest warrant, arrest screening form, arrest register, arrest bulletin, police report and arrest warrant all listed Defendant's Orleans Parish home address.

The testimony established that Defendant failed to register within the requisite time period allowed. Det. Henry testified that he monitored “Offender Watch” and explained that the program notified him that Defendant was non-compliant with his registration and issued a warrant for his arrest. Finally, Defendant conceded that he stopped registering “when he was told that he had to do so for life.”

Viewing the evidence presented, in light most favorable to the prosecution, we find the trier of fact was presented with sufficient evidence to convict Defendant for failure to register and notify as a sex offender in violation of La. R.S. 15:542.1.4(A)(l). Further, the State satisfied its burden of proof through the testimony of its witness and the evidence. We find no merit to this assignment of error.

Assignment of Error No. 1

Defendant argues that the language of the bill of information was defective because it failed to specify the charges listed in the indictment.

Defendant filed a motion to quash the bill of information, arguing that it constitutes double jeopardy because the State entered a nolle prosequi on the previous charge for the same offense. Defendant further contended that the district court failed to provide him with notice of the requirements to register and notify as a sex offender. After the district court denied the motion to quash the bill of information, Defendant contemporaneously objected to the ruling and sought supervisory review from this Court and the Louisiana Supreme Court. Both writs were denied. See State v. Davis, 2022-0147 (La.App. 4 Cir. 4/8/22) (unpub'd) and State v. Davis, 2022-00617 (La. 11/1/22), 349 So.3d 20.

Preliminarily, we note that the issue of lack of informed notice on the bill of information was not preserved for appeal. While Defendant argued that he was not advised of the requirement to register, his argument is procedurally barred from review by this Court. “Generally, issues and objections not raised at trial cannot be considered on appeal unless they are alleged to be discoverable upon mere inspection of the pleadings and proceedings without inspection of the evidence.” State v. Jones, 2011-1141, p. 7 (La.App. 4 Cir. 9/5/12), 99 So.3d 1061, 1065 (citations omitted). “An irregularity or error cannot be availed of after verdict unless it was objected to at the time of occurrence.” La. C.Cr.P. art. 841(A). See also La. C.Cr.P. art. 920. Thus, this Court will not address this matter.

Assignment of Error No. 3

Defendant argues that he was “already punished by the forfeiture of his good time credits and revocation of ‘his release upon diminution of sentence’ and could not be punished a second time for the same act.” Thus, the charge against him violates the double jeopardy clause.⁴ “The Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and La. Const. Art. I, § 15 guarantees that no person shall be twice placed in jeopardy for the same offense. This guarantee protects against a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal; a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction; and multiple punishments for the same offense.” State v. Childs, 2013-0948, p. 2 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1/15/14), 133 So.3d 104, 105 (citations omitted), see La. C.Cr.P. art. 532(6), La. C.Cr.P. art. 596.

Defendant was released early from the Department of Corrections in 2013, and placed on parole.⁵ He was arrested on October 25, 2018 as a consequence of his failure to comply with registration and notification of a sex offender and his parole was revoked. As such, Defendant was remanded for the remainder of his sentence.

Following his release for the term of his original sentence, Defendant failed to comply with the registration requirement of a sex offender. He was arrested May 20, 2021 and charged with violating La. R.S. 15:542.1.4(A)(1). These charges, while charged under the same statute, are different offenses. The charge from the May 20, 2021 arrest is not a second prosecution of the same offense. The testimony of Det. Henry reaffirmed the continuing obligation of a tier-three sex offender to register every ninety days, report and be under supervision for life.

Additionally, the State entered a nolle prosequi on the October 25, 2018 arrest. Even in the event that the charges result from the same previous offense charged, “[the district court's] resolution of motions to quash in cases where the district attorney entered a nolle prosequi and later reinstituted charges must be decided on a case-by-case basis. It is well-settled that the State has the authority to enter a nolle prosequi and reinstitute the charge.” State v. Jones, 2015-0688, p. 5 (La.App. 4 Cir. 10/28/15), 178 So.3d 1112, 1115 (alterations in original) (footnotes omitted). “Dismissal by the district attorney of an indictment or of a count of an indictment, discharges that particular indictment or count. The dismissal is not a bar to a subsequent prosecution.” La. C.Cr.P. art. 693.⁶ Accordingly, we find no merit to this assignment of error.

Assignment of Error No. 4

Defendant argues that the prosecution of his offense violates ex post facto principles, because his 1990 conviction for forcible rape pre-dated the current scheme of the Louisiana Sex Offender Registration Notification Act, which was enacted in 1992.⁷

The United States Constitution prohibits any State from establishing an ex post facto law. U.S. Const. art. I, § 10. The Louisiana Constitution further enumerates that “[n]o ․ ex post facto․ law shall be enacted.” La. Const. art. I, § 23.

“Louisiana jurisprudence has addressed this issue by making a determination of whether a law passed after the commission of an offense which in relation to that offense or its punishment altered the situation of a party to his disadvantage. Under such an inquiry, suspect legislation qualified as an ex post facto law if: (1) it was passed after the date of the offense; (2) it related to the offense or its punishment; and (3) the legislation altered the situation of the accused to his disadvantage.” State ex rel. Olivieri v. State, 2000-0172, p. 14 (La. 2/21/01), 779 So.2d 735, 743-744. However, this Court in State v. Mitchell noted:

La. [R.S.] 15:542.1.4 does not present an ex post facto problem because any conviction based upon this statute is dependent upon proving that other relevant conduct took place after the statute's passage, i.e., a defendant's failure to register as a sex offender. Accordingly, the [district] court erred when it concluded that the defendant's prosecution for failure to register as a sex offender violated ex post facto principles.

State v. Mitchell, 2010-0193, p. 3 (La.App. 4 Cir. 9/29/10), 49 So.3d 958, 959. As a result of Defendant's conviction, and as a condition of Defendant's 2013 diminution of sentence, he is required to comply with registration of a sex offender.⁸ Defendant has an obligation to comply for the remainder of his life.⁹ Further, the obligation to keep up to date with registration is not an expanded punishment, but a separate penalty. The failure of Defendant to comply with registration was a violation of La. R.S. 15:542.1.4(A)(l) that took place well after the legislation was passed. We find no merit to this assignment of error.

Decree

After consideration of the record before this Court, and the applicable law, we affirm the conviction, affirm Defendant's sentence and remand the case to the district court for the imposition of the statutory fine.

CONVICTION AFFIRMED; SENTENCE AFFIRMED; REMANDED

FOOTNOTES

1.   Defendant's name appears as both Lionel “Bailey” and Lionel “Davis” in court documents.

2.   Defendant was pro se, with an appointed stand-in-counsel.

3.   The district court instructed the jury that there are three elements needed to be found to find Defendant guilty: (1) Defendant was legally required to register (“to notify”); (2) Defendant knowingly failed to comply with the requirement to register; (that Defendant was aware of the legal obligation and intentionally failed to fulfill it); (3) Defendant received adequate notice that he was required to register. The State is required to prove these elements beyond a reasonable doubt.

4.   Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the charges on December 3, 2024. Defendant sought expedited supervisory review in this Court. The writ was denied because it was premature, as the district court had not yet ruled on the motion. The minute entries in the record do not indicate if the district court denied the motion to dismiss. Therefore, the motion will not be addressed. See State v. Walton, 2006-2553 (La. 6/1/07), 957 So.2d 133.

5.   Pursuant to La. R.S. 15:571.3(A)(1), offender “may earn a diminution of sentence, to be known as ‘good time’, by good behavior and performance of work or self-improvement activities, or both.”

6.   There are narrow exceptions that bar subsequent prosecution where jeopardy would attach to the charged offense. These are outlined in La. C.Cr.P. art. 693(1): “A dismissal entered without the defendant's consent after the first witness is sworn at the trial on the merits․ ;” and La. C.Cr.P. art. 693(2): “A dismissal entered after a city court conviction has been appealed to the district court for a trial de novo․” These exceptions do not apply to the facts of this case.

7.   “[La. R.S.] 15:542, added by 1992 La. Acts 388, provides, in pertinent part, that ‘[a]ny adult residing in this state who has plead guilty or has been convicted of any sex offense shall register with the sheriff of the person's residence.’ ” State ex rel. Olivieri v. State, 2000-0172, p. 5 (La. 2/21/01), 779 So.2d 735, 738.

8.   “Before any prisoner is released on parole upon diminution of sentence, he shall be issued a certificate of parole that enumerates the conditions of parole. These conditions shall be explained to the prisoner and the prisoner shall agree in writing to such conditions prior to his release on parole.” La. R.S. 15:571.5(B)(1).

9.   “Any person convicted of an aggravated offense as defined in [La.] R.S. 15:541․ shall renew and update his registration required by [La.] R.S. 15:542 in person every three months from the date of initial registration.” La. R.S. 15:542.1.1(A)(1).

Judge Tiffany Gautier Chase