SUCCESSION OF AMERICA JEAN METZLER v. << (2026)

Edward Benton Cadow (hereinafter “Edward”) seeks review of the trial court's April 8, 2025 judgment granting the “Petition to Homologate Independent Executor's First and Final Account” filed by Stanton Lee Cadow (hereinafter “Stanton”). After consideration of the record before this Court and the applicable law, we affirm the trial court's April 8, 2025 judgment granting the petition to homologate the first and final accounting.

Facts and Procedural History

The facts of this case primarily center around certain legal actions conducted by the parties prior to the death of their mother America Jean Metzler (hereinafter “Decedent”). On November 14, 2011, Decedent executed a general power of attorney naming Stanton; Edward; her husband; and her daughter, Kim Cadow Richard as agents. On August 21, 2014, the Clerk of Court, 22nd Judicial District Court, issued a “Notice of Interdiction” declaring that a petition for interdiction was filed.¹ On January 30, 2015, Stanton created a limited liability company, “America Jean's Queen of Peace, L.L.C.,” with the certificate naming him as manager.² On the same date, Decedent, through her agents Stanton and Kim Cadow Richard, transferred immovable property located at 610 Queen of Peace Parkway in Covington, Louisiana, by Act of Conveyance, to America Jean's Queen of Peace, L.L.C.³ On June 26, 2015, by Act of Cash Sale, America Jean's Queen of Peace, L.L.C. sold the property to a third party.

Decedent died testate in December 2020, naming six legatees, with Stanton as executor of her estate. On January 27, 2025, Stanton filed a “Petition to Homologate Independent Executor's First and Final Account” (hereinafter “the petition”), seeking approval of the final accounting and to be discharged as succession representative. Stanton attached a first and final account of administration specifying the assets and debts of the succession. The petition noted that three legatees waived service of the petition; however, he requested service on the three remaining legatees, including Edward. On January 31, 2025, Edward filed an “Objection to Accounting” asserting that the executor illegally transferred and sold Decedent's immovable property ⁴ ; failed to provide an accounting of an irrevocable trust created in Decedent's name; and failed to provide an accounting of annuity funds distributed to Decedent after her death.

The matter was heard by the trial court, at the conclusion of which it requested post-trial memoranda from both parties. In his post-trial memorandum Stanton maintained that he complied with the requirements of a succession representative, by accounting for the Decedent's assets at death and any subsequent receipts and disbursements. He further maintained that Edward's contentions arise from circumstances occurring prior to the Decedent's death and thus, the succession proceeding was not the proper procedural vehicle to assert his claims. Conversely, Edward directed the trial court to consider the following issues: (1) whether the transfer of the immovable property constituted illegal self-dealing; (2) Stanton's failure to provide an accounting of the annuity; (3) and allegations that certain transactions occurred while Decedent was legally interdicted. He maintained that the succession proceeding was the proper procedural vehicle to assert his challenges to the accounting because the claims became the property of Decedent's estate upon her death. Further, a succession representative has a legal duty to prosecute the claims on behalf of the succession. After taking the matter under advisement, by judgment dated April 8, 2025, the trial court granted the petition and discharged Stanton as “independent executor” finding his duties fulfilled. In its reasons for judgment, the trial court stated that Edward's objections lacked merit because Stanton had power of attorney over Decedent. This appeal followed.

Assignment of Error

On appeal, Edward presents the following assignment of error:

The [trial] court erred as a matter of law in granting the executor's petition to homologate the succession without requiring a full accounting of estate assets where undisputed evidence showed that real property belonging to the decedent was transferred and sold in violation of a power of attorney and during the [D]ecedent's legal interdiction.

Edward seeks a remand for a full accounting of the estate assets, specifically arguing that the proceeds from the sale of Decedent's immovable property is an estate asset and therefore was erroneously excluded from the final accounting. Thus, according to Edward, the trial court erred in granting the petition.

Standard of Review

“[T]he appellate standard of review of factual findings is whether the lower court was manifestly erroneous or clearly wrong.” Succession of Randazzo, 2023-0715, p. 5 (La.App. 4 Cir. 9/6/24), 400 So.3d 197, 203 (citation omitted). However, if the trial court applies incorrect principles of law and this legal error interdicts the fact-finding process, the manifest error standard no longer applies and this Court reviews the matter under the de novo standard of review. Id., 2023-0715, p. 6, 400 So.3d at 204 (citations omitted).

Discussion

Edward's primary complaint is that the proceeds from the sale of Decedent's immovable property is not listed on the final accounting attached to the petition. Thus, he seeks a remand for an inquiry regarding the funds as well as the circumstances surrounding the sale of the immovable property.

“Whenever an inventory of succession property otherwise would be required by law, the person at whose instance the inventory would be taken may file in the succession proceeding․a detailed descriptive list of all succession property.” La. C.C.P. art. 3136(A). “This list shall be sworn to and subscribed by the person filing it, shall show the location of all items of succession property, and shall set forth the fair market value of each item thereof at the date of the death of the deceased.” Id. The descriptive list of succession property shall be accepted as prima facie proof of all property listed, unless amended or traversed successfully. La. C.C.P. art. 3137. The purpose of a detailed descriptive list is to provide a complete, concise evaluation of the property of the deceased thereby “enabling the succession representative to properly administer the succession and inform heirs, creditors, and other interested parties of the nature and value of succession property.” Succession of Danese, 459 So.2d 725, 728 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1984) (citation omitted).

La. C.C.P. art. 3332 provides:

A. A succession representative may file a final account of his administration at any time after homologation of the final tableau of distribution and the payment of all estate debts and legacies as set forth in the tableau.

B. The court shall order the filing of a final account upon the application of an heir or residuary legatee who has been sent into possession or upon the rendition of a judgment ordering the removal of a succession representative.

An account shall show the money and other property received by and in the possession of the succession representative at the beginning of the period covered by the account, the revenue, other receipts, disbursements, and disposition of property during the period, and the remainder in his possession at the end of the period. La. C.C.P. art. 3333. “A judgment homologating a final account has the same effect as a final judgment in an ordinary action.” La. C.C.P. art. 3337.

Stanton attached an “Independent Executor's First and Final Account” to the petition, which detailed Decedent's assets and debts. In the petition, Stanton noted that the attached first and final account “supplements and restates those items previously disclosed on the Detailed Descriptive List now with the specific amount for one of the previously listed debts of the Decedent and to reflect subsequent matters through the date of this accounting.” Decedent's immovable property is not listed on this pleading. Edward's argument focuses on his allegation that the sale of the immovable property was illegal because Stanton did not have the authority to sell the immovable property and the proceeds from that sale are required to be included in the final accounting.

La. R.S. 9:5647(A) provides,

Any action to set aside a document or instrument on the ground that the party executing the document or instrument under authority of a power of attorney was without authority to do so, or that the power of attorney was not valid, is prescribed by five years, beginning from the date on which the document or instrument is recorded in the conveyance records, or the mortgage records if appropriate. Nothing contained in this Section shall be construed to limit or prescribe any action or proceeding which may arise between a principal and the person acting under authority of a power of attorney.

In considering the timeliness of Edward's claims, we consider the relevant dates surrounding the transfer, and subsequent sale, of Decedent's immovable property. Decedent's immovable property was transferred, by Stanton and Kim Cadow Richard, Decedent's agents, to America Jean's Queen of Peace, L.L.C. on January 30, 2015. The Act of Conveyance transferring the immovable property was recorded in St. Tammany Parish on February 2, 2015. Therefore, Edward had until February 2, 2020 to challenge the validity of the transfer. However, the immovable property was then sold to a third party on June 26, 2015, and the Act of Cash Sale recorded in St. Tammany Parish on July 6, 2015. As to this sale, Edward had until July 6, 2020 to challenge the validity of the sale. “La. R.S. 9:5647 specifically establishes the prescriptive period to set aside an instrument executed under authority of an invalid power of attorney.” In re Succession of Samuel, 2013-1677, p. 6 (La.App. 4 Cir. 7/23/14), 158 So.3d 27, 32. Any challenge to the sale of the property based upon the authority of a power of attorney, should have been initiated by an action within five years of the date the instrument transferring the property was recorded. Challenging the sale of the property by objecting to the final accounting in the succession proceedings is not the proper procedural vehicle to invalidate the sale. Further, Edward's argument that the proceeds from the sale of Decedent's immovable property should have been included in the succession is without merit since the immovable property was sold prior to her death. See In re Succession of Samuel, 2013-1677, p. 7, 158 So.3d at 32 (“The record demonstrates that [the] property was validly transferred while [decedent] was still living․thus, the one-half interest at the time of its transfer was not a part of the succession.”).

Based on the record before this Court, we find Stanton satisfied his burden of proof under La. C.C.P. art. 3332 and Edward's assignment of error lacks merit. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in granting the petition.

Decree

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court's April 8, 2025 judgment granting the petition to homologate the first and final accounting.

AFFIRMED

FOOTNOTES

1.   The record does not contain the petition for interdiction nor the court order granting the interdiction. Edward asserts that the interdiction was granted and Kim Cadow Richard was named as curator for Decedent.

2.   The Louisiana Secretary of State's website also lists Kim Cadow Richard as a manager.

3.   Decedent purchased the property in 2006.

4.   The immovable property at issue in this matter is the immovable property located at 610 Queen of Peace Parkway in Covington, Louisiana.

Judge Tiffany Gautier Chase

LOBRANO, J., CONCURS IN THE RESULTS