NOLA URBAN REDEVELOPMENT LLC v. GEORGE EARL THOMAS ALEA LONDON LTD LVNV FUNDING LLC AND GULFCO OF LOUISIANA LLC (2026)

Appellant-Defendant, George Earl Thomas (“Thomas”), appeals the trial court's April 3, 2025 judgment, which granted the default judgment in favor of Appellee-Plaintiff, Nola Urban Redevelopment, LLC (“NUR”). For the following reasons, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKROUND

This is a tax sale suit. On March 23, 1997, Thomas purchased property located at 2025-27 Third Street in New Orleans, Louisiana via an act of cash sale. Thomas stopped paying taxes on the property in 2015.

Thereafter, the City of New Orleans (“the City”) sent pre-sale notice of tax sale advising Thomas his property taxes were delinquent and subject to a tax sale in twenty days. The notice was sent by first class and certified mail to 2027 Third Street. The return receipt showed that the certified mail was received by Thomas on September 1, 2015.

On April 12, 2016, the City conducted a tax sale in order to collect the 2015 delinquent taxes for the Third Street property. After paying $2,034.04, Christopher Collins (“Collins”) acquired tax title to the Third Street property. On May 5, 2016, the City executed a tax sale certificate in favor of Collins, transferring tax sale title to 99% of the Third Street property. The tax sale certificate was recorded on May 25, 2016.

Thereafter, in June 2016, the City sent post-sale notice via first class mail to 2027 Third Street advising that Thomas had until May 25, 2019 to redeem the property and that the tax sale purchaser may take possession after the expiration of the redemptive period. The record indicates that the post-sale notice was “not returned to sender.” Thomas did not redeem the tax sale.

On April 24, 2023, NUR purchased the tax sale certificate to the Third Street property from Collins. The transfer of tax sale certificate was recorded on March 28, 2024.

On May 9, 2024, NUR filed a petition to quiet tax title and for partition by licitation against Thomas, Alea London, Ltd., LVNV Funding, LLC, and Gulfco of Louisiana, LLC.¹ All the defendants were served, including Thomas who was served via a court appointed process server at his domicile at 4200 General Pershing Street.

The record shows that on July 29, 2024, counsel for NUR, Jonah Freedman (“Freedman”), received an email from Randy McKee (“McKee”), stating that McKee represented Thomas in a separate matter. The email, contained the subject line “George Thomas v. Christopher Collins, CDC No. 23-11277” and stated in part:

I represent George Thomas in the above-captioned matter. Please find the Transfer of Tax Sale Interest executed by Christopher Collins to NOLA Urban Development, LLC (“NOLA Urban”) regarding property located at 2025-2027 Third Street. My client is interested in redeeming this property from your client so that he can cancel this lien from the property.2

Freedman received another email from McKee on August 31, 2024, which included a motion for extension of time and discovery requests. Freedman answered the discovery requests on September 30, 2025. According to an affidavit executed by Freedman, he later discovered McKee was not actually enrolled as counsel for Thomas in the present case.

On February 24, 2025, Freedman via certified mail sent a notice of intent to default to McKee, which was delivered at McKee's office on March 5, 2025. On March 7, 2025 McKee texted Freedman indicating that he received the intent to default and would file an answer by March 10, 2025.³ However, neither Thomas nor any other defendants filed responsive pleadings to NUR's petition to quiet title.

On April 3, 2025, NUR filed a motion for default judgment against Thomas as well as the other remaining defendants.⁴ The matter came for hearing before the trial court the same date.

At the hearing, Spencer Scholnik, the manager/officer of DMC24, LLC, the parent company of NUR, testified on behalf of NUR. He noted that NUR purchased the tax sale certificate from Collins, who originally purchased the Third Street property at the tax sale. He testified that he seeks to quiet title to 99% of the Third Street property by partition by licitation.

NUR also introduced several exhibits into evidence, including: the transfer of tax sale interest; a certified copy of the tax sale certificate; the affidavit of Lauren Ryan of CivicSource,⁵ which attested to (and included) the various notices issued to Thomas related to the tax sale;⁶ the 1997 act of sale, wherein Thomas purchased the property; the domiciliary service return, dated August 23, 2024, of the petition; and the affidavit of the court appointed process server, evidencing domiciliary service was made by leaving citation/petition with Thomas's adult son.⁷ Also, as part of the record, NUR introduced all exhibits and the entire record of the proceedings, which includes an affidavit of compliance with La. C.C.P. art. 1702(3) executed by Freedman. In the affidavit, Freedman attested to his communications with McKee. The relevant correspondence and notice of intent to default were attached to Freedman's affidavit.

After hearing the testimony and considering the evidence, the trial court granted a default judgment in favor of NUR, quieting its tax title to 99% full ownership of the property and ordering partition by licitation. Judgment on the default judgment was executed the same date.

On April 7, 2025, Thomas filed an answer and petition to annul tax sale and to quiet title and reconventional demand. He also filed a motion for new trial on April 15, 2025.⁸ The motion for new trial alleged that the default judgment was contrary to the evidence because NUR “knowingly failed to disclose” that Thomas had filed a petition to annul the tax sale in 2023 (entitled Thomas v. Collins, bearing docket number 2023-11277 hereinafter “the Collins suit”). The motion further alleged that the default judgment should be set aside because NUR failed to provide notice of the judgment to counsel for Thomas, which constitutes ill practices.

In response, on May 8, 2025, NUR filed an exception of prescription, an exception of res judicata, a motion to strike, and a motion for sanctions. On June 10, 2025, NUR filed an opposition to the motion for new trial. The same date, Thomas filed an opposition to NUR's exceptions and motions.

On June 18, 2025, Thomas filed a reply memorandum in support of his motion for new trial. Thomas attached several exhibits to his reply memorandum, including: his petition to annul filed in the Collins suit; correspondence dated November 11, 2022, addressed to Collins, which included a return receipt showing that citation/petition was received by “K. Bennett” in Coppell, Texas; the transfer of tax sale from Collins to NUR; the July 29, 2024 email from McKee to Freedman; and his June 10, 2025 motion for leave to file amended petition to annul, which sought to add NUR as a defendant in the Collins suit.

The motion for new trial, exceptions, motion to strike, and motion for sanctions came for hearing before the trial court on June 18, 2025.⁹ Following arguments of counsel, the trial court denied the motion for new trial and mooted the exceptions, the motion to strike, and the motion for sanctions.

This appeal follows.¹⁰

DISCUSSION

Thomas contends that the trial court erred in granting the default judgment, which quieted the tax title and ordered partition by licitation, because Thomas had instituted an action to annul the validity of the tax in the Collins suit and because NUR was aware of this lawsuit. He also argues the trial court erred in granting the default judgment because NUR failed to provide notice of default judgment to Thomas prior to its submission to the trial court.

“In reviewing default judgments, the appellate court is restricted to determining the sufficiency of the evidence offered in support of the judgment.” Aegean Prop. Grp., LLC v. Sumler, 2024-0466, p. 8 (La. App. 4 Cir. 2/3/25), 409 So.3d 245, 250 (quoting Arias v. Stolthaven New Orleans, L.L.C., 2008-1111, p. 5 (La. 5/5/09), 9 So.3d 815, 818). “This determination is a factual one governed by the manifest error standard of review.” Id. Appellate courts thus review the default judgment “to determine whether the trial court's ‘finding of fact ․ is clearly wrong in light of the record reviewed in its entirety.’ ” Id. (quoting Sarasota, CCM, Inc. v. Supreme Quality Transp., LLC, 2023-0658, p. 4 (La. App. 4 Cir. 3/6/24), 385 So.3d 307, 311).

Prior Action to Annul & Entry of Default Judgment

With regard to his first assignment of error, Thomas contends his petition to annual the tax sale in the Collins suit precluded the rendering of a default judgment in the instant case because NUR “was aware of the first lawsuit filed in this matter, which clearly was an ‘an action to annul or otherwise challenge the validity of the tax sale at issue.’ ”

Thomas did file the Collins suit in 2023 prior to NUR filing the instant lawsuit.¹¹ However, the record does not show that NUR was served with the Collins suit or was aware of the suit to annul the tax sale before proceeding with the motion for default judgment.

As noted above, Thomas's attorney, McKee emailed NUR's counsel, Freedman, that he represented Thomas in the “above referenced matter” and expressed an interest in redeeming the tax sale. However, McKee's email did not specifically state that Thomas had filed a nullity action challenging the validity of the tax sale. Moreover, the record shows counsel for both parties subsequently communicated several times and at no point did Thomas indicate there was a pending suit to annul against Collins. Accordingly, contrary to Thomas's claims, NUR was not “clearly” aware that a prior suit challenged the validity of the tax sale before it moved for a default judgment.¹²

Further, Thomas's emphasis on the Collins suit is misplaced because the fact of the matter is that Thomas failed to timely file an answer or assert a defense in the instant case. The procedure for obtaining a default judgment is set forth in La. C.C.P. art. 1702, which states in part:

A. (1) If a defendant in the principal or incidental demand fails to answer or file other pleadings within the time prescribed by law or by the court, and the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case by competent and admissible evidence that is admitted on the record, a default judgment in favor of the plaintiff may be rendered, provided that notice that the plaintiff intends to obtain a default judgment is sent if required by this Paragraph, unless such notice is waived. The court may permit documentary evidence to be filed in the record in any electronically stored format authorized by the local rules of the district court or approved by the clerk of the district court for receipt of evidence.

(2) If a party who fails to answer has made an appearance of record in the case, notice that the plaintiff intends to obtain a default judgment shall be sent by certified mail or actually delivered to counsel of record for the party, or if there is no counsel of record, to the party, at least seven days before a default judgment may be rendered.

(3) If an attorney for a party who fails to answer has contacted the plaintiff or the plaintiff's attorney in writing concerning the action after it has been filed, notice that the plaintiff intends to obtain a default judgment shall be sent by certified mail or actually delivered to the party's attorney at least seven days before a default judgment may be rendered.

(emphasis added).

As noted herein, the petition to quiet title was filed on May 9, 2024. Thomas was served with the petition at his home on August 23, 2024. McKee contacted Freedman in July and August 2024, but failed to file any response to the petition. Thereafter, Freedman sent notice of intent to default to McKee by certified mail on February 24, 2025. McKee again communicated with Freedman on March 7, 2024, stating he was in receipt of the notice of intent to default and would file an answer the following Monday. However, Thomas still failed to file any responsive pleadings. Approximately 27 days later, NUR filed its motion for default judgment.

La. R.S. 47:2155(B) provides that “[a] certified copy of the tax sale certificate is prima facie evidence of the regularity of all matters regarding the tax sale and the validity of the tax sale.” “A live hearing and submission of the evidence on the record is also necessary to establish a prima facie case.” Johnson v. Sotomayor, 2021-0460, p. 8 (La. App. 4 Cir. 2/2/22), 366 So.3d 173, 179 (citing Precept Credit Opportunities Fund, L.P. v. Brown, 2020-0114, p. 7 (La. App. 4 Cir. 7/22/20), 364 So.3d 291, 296).

In Johnson, 2021-0460, 366 So.3d 173, the plaintiff-appellee, the tax sale purchaser, filed a petition to quiet title against several parties, including the defendant-appellant, the prior owner of the property. The prior owner was served with citation and petition. None of the defendants filed an answer nor any other pleadings. Following a hearing, the trial court rendered a default judgment. The prior owner filed a motion for new trial, which the trial court denied noting in part that he failed to show “good reason for failing to file responsive pleadings.” Id. at p. 3, 366 So.3d at177. The prior owner appealed.

This Court affirmed the entry of default judgment because the defendants were served with the petition but failed to answer, and the plaintiff offered live testimony and certified copy of the tax sale certificate. The Johnson Court stated:

Appellee [the tax sale purchaser] submitted a certified copy of the tax sale as evidence. Additionally, Appellee provided live testimony at the hearing on the petition. All defendants were duly served with the petition and thus notified in accordance with La. R.S. 47:2122(4). The certified tax sale certificate was prima facie evidence, the defendants were timely and duly notified and failed to answer or make an appearance. A live hearing was conducted and competent evidence was entered into the record. Thus, we find that the trial court did not err in granting the default judgment in favor of Appellee.

Id. at p. 8, 366 So.3d at 179-80. Moreover, with regard to the motion for new trial, this Court noted that the failure of the prior property owner to answer the petition to assert of a defense of redemption did constitute good cause to grant a new trial:

Appellant [the prior property owner] did not answer the petition in any way, not even after making the redemption payment.13 Instead, Appellant waited until after the default judgment to act and assert an absolute defense. Appellant's failure to act was not due to inability or poor legal advice, but rather the result of a personal choice not to act. The absolute defense does not exist to create good cause.

Id. at pp. 10-11, 366 So.3d at 181.

Similarly, in the instant case, despite being served with the petition to quiet title and the notice of intent of to default, Thomas did not act or make an appearance until after the default judgment was entered. Thomas could have added NUR as a defendant in the Collins suit or attempted to reconvene against NUR in the present case prior to the default judgment but declined to do so. Moreover, at the hearing for the default judgment, NUR presented live testimony and several exhibits, which included the notices Thomas received relating to the tax sale, the petition to quiet title, the intent to default, as well as a certified copy of the tax sale certificate. As such, like in Johnson, because NUR established prime face case regarding the tax sale and showed Thomas was duly notified yet failed to file responsive pleadings. Accordingly, the trial court was not clearly wrong in granting default judgment against Thomas.

Moreover, to date, Thomas has not submitted any evidence to show that the tax sale was null nor refute the validity of the tax sale certificate. See Aegean Prop. Grp., LLC, 2024-0466, p. 9, 409 So.3d at 250 (quoting Lepree v. Dorsey, 2022-0853, p. 15, 370 So.3d 1191, 1201) (“if the tax sale purchaser presents a certified copy of the tax sale certificate, then the burden shifts ․ to ‘prov[e] any defects in the tax adjudication proceedings’ ”). In light of the foregoing, Thomas has failed to demonstrate that the trial court manifestly erred in granting the motion for default judgment.

Ill Practices & Notice of Proposed Default Judgment

With regard to his second assignment of error, Thomas claims that the failure of NUR to provide notice of the default judgment constitutes ill practice sufficient to nullify the default judgment.

“A final judgment obtained by fraud or ill practices may be annulled.” La. C.C.P. art. 2004(A). Ill practice is defined as “any improper practice or procedure that operates, even innocently, to deprive a litigant of some legal right.” Williams v. Breeden, 2018-1015, p. 4 (La. App. 4 Cir. 3/27/19), 267 So.3d 154, 157 (citing Mike v. Bob's Painting, 2007-2190, p. 4 (La. App. 1 Cir. 9/26/08), 995 So.2d 43, 47).

Thomas cites Precept Credit Opportunities Fund, LP v. Walker, 2020-00818 (La. 11/18/20), 304 So.3d 68, to support his contention. In Precept, the defendant had not filed an answer or formally appeared. However, defense counsel emailed plaintiff's counsel about an extension to file response pleadings, to which plaintiff's counsel agreed. The plaintiff later retained new counsel and moved for default against the defendant. The defendant moved for new trial on the grounds that new counsel for plaintiff failed to give notice of entry of default judgment. The trial court found, based on the prior communications and agreement with prior counsel and in the interests of justice, a new trial was warranted. The Court of Appeal reversed. The Louisiana Supreme Court disagreed and reinstated the judgment of the trial court. The Precept Court stated, in part:

We find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in setting aside the default judgment and granting a new trial in this case. Rather, the uncontested facts support the trial court's finding that the plaintiff's failure to notify the defendant of its entry of preliminary default in this case constitutes “ill practices,” which is a valid basis for nullification of the default judgment under La. C.C.P. art. 2004. Russell v. Illinois Central Gulf R.R., 96-2649 (La. 1/10/97), 686 So.2d 817. Although the court of appeal correctly notes that the article which provides the procedure for confirmation of preliminary default, La. C.C.P. art. 1702, only requires notice of the entry of preliminary default in cases where a party has “made an appearance of record,” this provision does not preclude a finding of ill practices where counsel for one party, through its actions and communications, lulls the other into believing that no such appearance is necessary, and then fails to provide notice of entry of default judgment. Having found a basis for nullifying the default judgment, we find no error by the trial court in vacating that judgment and granting the defendant's motion for new trial. Accordingly, we reverse the court of appeal's decision and reinstate the judgment of the trial court.

Id. at p. 2, 304 So.3d at 69 (emphasis added).

However, at the time Precept was decided notice was only required if counsel made an appearance on the record. As noted by NUR, La. C.C.P. art. 1702 was amended in 2021 to add subparagraph (A)(3), “a new rule that, prior to the rendition of a default judgment, notice must be sent to a party's attorney who has contacted the plaintiff or the plaintiff's attorney in writing about the case.” See Cmt.(a), 2021. La. C.C.P. art. 1702(3) now provides that when an “an attorney for a party who fails to answer has contacted the plaintiff or the plaintiff's attorney in writing concerning the action after it has been filed,” the party seeking a default judgment must send notice of intent by “certified mail or actually delivered to the party's attorney at least seven days before a default judgment may be rendered.”

Again, the record shows Freedman sent McKee notice of its intent to default via certified mail on February 24, 2025 pursuant to La. C.C.P. art. 1702(3). Thus, contrary to Thomas's assertions, NUR provided the requisite notice prior to obtaining a default judgment. Moreover, McKee texted Freedman subsequent to his receipt acknowledging he received the notice of intent to default. Thus, unlike Precept, Freedman's communications did not lull McKee into believing an appearance or inaction was unnecessary. As such, Precept is inapplicable to the case at hand.

Thomas has failed to establish NUR obtained the default judgment by ill practices. This assignment of error therefore lacks merit. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in rendering the default judgment against Thomas.

DECREE

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court's April 3, 2025 default judgment in favor of NUR.

AFFIRMED

FOOTNOTES

1.   The petition alleged that Alea London may have an interest in the property pursuant to a judgment recorded on August 17, 2016 under NA #2016-33327 and MIN 1225901; LVNV may have an interest in the property pursuant to a judgment recorded on December 13, 2017 under NA #2017-47657 and MIN 1263385; and Gulfco may have an interest in the property pursuant to a UCC1 Filing recorded on July 7, 2023 under NA #2023-21080 and UCC No. 36-2023-2108. These parties are not at issue in this appeal.

2.   According to the hearing transcript on the motion for new trial, Freedman and McKee spoke on the phone briefly following this email and “there was no mention of a prior suit.”

3.   The text stated: “Jonah, I received your letter regarding default in the NOLA Urban v. George Thomas case. I was in trial last week. I will file an Answer by Monday so that we can move this case.”

4.   On August 26, 2024, NUR and Alea London entered into a consent judgment, dismissing Alea London from the lawsuit.

5.   The affidavit provides that CivicSource is a vendor of the City that “provides services related to the collection of delinquent property taxes, including tax sales.” Such services include “making reasonable efforts to identify and locate persons with interest in properties on which taxes are delinquent and preparing and sending pre-sale and post-sale notices of tax sales to the identified persons.”

6.   The affidavit attested to and attached hereto copies of the following tax sale noticing records: notice tax sale addressed to Thomas and mailed to 2027 Third Street via first class mail (the first-class mailing was not returned to sender); a notice of tax sale mailed via certified mail (signed by Thomas); a notice of post-tax sale via first class mail (the first-class mailing was not returned to sender).

7.   Some other exhibits included: service returns made against other defendants; a judgment rendered in favor LVNV against Thomas; and Gulfco's UCC-1 filing against Thomas. NUR asked the trial court to cancel the judgment and the UCC-1filing as to the Third Street Property.

8.   As noted by the trial court at the hearing, the motion for new trial was untimely. La. C.C. art. 1974 provides that a party may move for a motion for a new trial “not later than seven days, exclusive of legal holidays, after the clerk has mailed or delivered in open court, or the sheriff has served, the notice of judgment as required by Article 1913.” The record reflects that notice of judgment was mailed on April 3, 2025 and thus Thomas had until April 14, 2025 to file a motion for new trial.

9.   At the hearing, NUR objected to exhibits attached to Thomas's motion for new trial on the grounds that they were not authenticated by affidavit. The trial court indicated it would review the Code of Civil Procedure and rule, but the transcript does not contain such a ruling. Thomas also attached these exhibits to his appellate brief and in its brief NUR again objected to the exhibits as unauthenticated and inadmissible because they were not accompanied by an affidavit as required by La. C.C.P. art. 1975. La. C.C.P. art. 1975 states that “[w]hen the motion is based on Article 1972(2) and (3), the allegations of fact therein shall be verified by the affidavit of the applicant.” However, comment (a) to La. C.C.P. art. 1975, explicitly provides that “[n]o affidavit is necessary ․ when the application for new trial is on the grounds that the judgment is contrary to the law and the evidence.” Here, Thomas moved for new trial on the grounds that the judgment was contrary to the law and the evidence under La. C.C.P. art. 1972(1) and discretionary grounds under La. C.C.P. art. 1973. Accordingly, Thomas was not required to include an affidavit verifying the allegations. Nevertheless, because this appeal concerns the default judgment and not a motion for new trial, La. C.C.P. art. 1975 is inapplicable to the matter at hand.

10.   Thomas's appeal concerns solely the default judgment rendered on April 3, 2025. Thomas filed a motion for suspensive appeal on May 14, 2025. The trial court granted the motion on June 11, 2025 and ordered Thomas post a $2,500 bond.

11.   Notably, the Collins suit to annul appears untimely. A tax sale may be set aside or declared nulled based on a redemption nullity, a payment nullity, or a sale to a prohibited person under La. R.S. 47:2162. “ ‘Redemption nullity’ means the right of a person to annul a tax sale in accordance with [La.] R.S. 47:2286 because he was not duly notified at least six months before the termination of the redemptive period.” La. R.S. 47:2122(10). Payment nullity is “a nullity arising from payment of taxes prior to a tax sale, including payment based on dual assessment.” La. R.S. 47:2122(8). Thomas's petition alleges the tax sale should be annulled because he paid the 2015 property taxes and City failed to provide notice to Thomas regarding the tax delinquency and tax sale. Under La. R.S. 47:2287(A) an action to annul a tax sale based on redemption nullity must be brought before the earlier of two dates: “[s]ix months after a person is duly notified using a notice, other than the notice provided in R.S. 47:2156 that is sent between the time that the redemptive period ends and five years after the date of the recordation of the tax sale certificate” or “[i]f a person is duly notified more than five years after the date of the recordation of the tax sale certificate, sixty days after the person is duly notified.” For a payment nullity, an action must be brought the later of: “[f]ive years after the recordation of the tax sale certificate or “[i]f the person bringing the action was not duly notified at least sixty days before the end of that five-year period, then within sixty days after the date that the person was duly notified.” Thomas was notified of the pre-tax sale in 2015 and of the post-tax sale in 2016. The record also shows that the tax sale certificate was filed in 2016 but the Collins suit was not filed until June 2023.

12.   Additionally, there is no evidence in the record proving that Collins actually was served with the petition to annul. Although the November 11, 2022 correspondence accompanying the petition to annul and citation listed Collins's address as 2620 Jefferson Avenue (the address also contained in the tax sale certificate for Collins; the transfer of tax sale interest, on the other hand, lists Collins's address as “2 Canal Street #415, New Orleans, LA 70130.”), the citation was addressed to 1199 South Belt Line Road in Coppell, Texas, and the return receipt shows that it was signed by a “K. Bennett” in Coppell, Texas. Also, the November 2022 letter, similar to the email received by Freedman, does not reference the nullity suit.

13.   Prior owner argued it made a redemption payment on August 26, 2020 and that it served as an absolute defense to the tax sale.

Judge Karen K. Herman