STATE OF LOUISIANA v. SHONE JORDAN AKA DEVINE JORDAN (2025)

Defendant Shone Jordan, a.k.a. Devine Jordan, appeals his life sentence as a fourth-felony offender, imposed upon resentencing pursuant to the ruling in State ex rel. Esteen v. State, 16-949 (La. 1/30/18), 239 So.3d 233, arguing that it is unconstitutionally excessive. For the following reasons, we affirm Defendant's sentence.

BACKGROUND

Procedural History

On December 18, 1998, a jury found Defendant guilty as charged on three counts of manslaughter, in violation of La. R.S. 14:31 (counts one, two, and three), and one count of attempted first-degree murder, in violation of La. R.S. 14:27 and La. R.S. 14:30 (count four), committed on November 30, 1997. On January 11, 1999, the trial court sentenced Defendant to thirty years imprisonment at hard labor on each of counts one, two, and three—to run concurrently—and to twenty-five years imprisonment at hard labor without the benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence on count four—to run consecutively to counts one, two, and three. On October 18, 1999, the trial court adjudicated Defendant a fourth-felony offender and imposed an enhanced sentence of life imprisonment without parole in accordance with the then-existing version of La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1)(c)(ii).

In State v. Jordan, 00-282 (La. App. 5 Cir. 10/18/00), 774 So.2d 267, writ denied, 00-3329 (La. 11/9/01), 801 So.2d 363, this Court affirmed Defendant's convictions,¹ but remanded the matter for correction of the habitual offender sentence. On December 7, 2000, the trial court vacated Defendant's sentence on count one and resentenced him under the habitual bill statute to life imprisonment at hard labor, to run concurrently with all other sentences.

Facts and Trial Evidence

In this Court's previous opinion, the facts and evidence adduced at trial in this case were summarized, as follows:

On November 30th, 1997, Agent Robert Gerdes of the Jefferson Parish Sheriff's Office was working a paid detail for Dillard's Department Store in Lakeside Mall. As part of the detail, Gerdes was in full departmental uniform dress. At approximately 5:30 p.m. on November 30th, Gerdes was standing near the exit of the store into the mall when an alarm went off indicating that someone had left the store with an item on which the security tag was still attached.

Gerdes then walked to the entrance to Dillard's from the mall to see who was standing in the area when the alarm sounded. Gerdes noticed Defendant in the middle of the mall carrying a Saks Fifth Avenue bag. Gerdes saw Defendant cradling the bag like a football and that the bag was torn and clothes were spilling out of the bag. At this point, a Dillard's employee approached Gerdes and told him that Defendant was the person who set off the alarm.

Gerdes yelled at Defendant that he was under arrest, and Defendant began to run toward a fire exit. Gerdes focused on Defendant because he was carrying the bag. Defendant went through the fire exit which led into the Causeway parking lot of Lakeside Shopping Center.

Defendant ran to a white Lincoln Town Car. Gerdes continued to yell at Defendant to stop. Defendant got into the passenger side of the car and yelled at another black male who was near the car to get in. When Gerdes arrived at the car, he threw the second man out of the way and focused on Defendant. Defendant then began to reach under the seat and Gerdes drew his weapon and ordered Defendant to show his hands.

Defendant would not comply with Gerdes's orders and slid into the driver's seat of the Lincoln. As Gerdes was ordering Defendant out of the car, Sergeant Harrison of the Jefferson Parish Sheriff's Office arrived. Harrison was also working a paid detail in Dillard's that day. Once Harrison arrived in the area, Gerdes moved closer to the Lincoln to physically arrest Defendant. Gerdes moved between the Lincoln and the van parked next to it.

At this point, Defendant put the Lincoln into drive and attempted to crush Gerdes between the Lincoln and the van parked next to it. To avoid being crushed, Gerdes dove into the open driver's window of the Lincoln. Gerdes was hanging half in and half out of the Lincoln when Defendant began to struggle with Gerdes over the officer's weapon. Defendant attempted to point Gerdes's gun back at Gerdes. Gerdes was able to point the gun away from him and discharge a round. When Gerdes fired the gun, Defendant let go of Gerdes's hand and Gerdes fell out of the car.

Defendant continued to drive away hitting a Suburban, knocking over a tree and a street sign, and blowing out the right front tire on the Lincoln in the process. Defendant continued to flee. He drove out of the parking lot and got on Causeway Boulevard heading south.

Defendant fled on Causeway Boulevard toward Jefferson Highway. Andrew Ramsey was driving on Causeway that evening when he saw the Lincoln coming up behind him and pass him. Ramsey noticed that the Lincoln's right front tire had been blown out and that there were sparks coming from that area. Ramsey called 9–1–1 and began to chase the Lincoln. Ramsey watched as Defendant continued to accelerate the Lincoln. He testified that Defendant was driving in excess of 85 miles per hour and was “pushing 100.” Ramsey fell back as marked Jefferson Parish police units began to give chase. The record is clear that as many as three marked police units chased Defendant, each with sirens and lights activated. In addition, two other witnesses testified that Defendant's car was exceeding seventy miles per hour.

The marked units chased Defendant as he exited Causeway onto Jefferson Highway. Defendant did not stop at the intersection, but traveled across three lanes of traffic. Defendant hit the median, and the Lincoln went airborne. The Lincoln crashed into a car traveling on Jefferson Highway toward Orleans Parish.

The car that Defendant crashed into was driven by Dana Jones and carried passengers Patrick Hamilton, Ashley Williams, and Jeremy Jones. As a result of the collision, Dana Jones, Patrick Hamilton, and Ashley Williams were killed.

After the collision, Defendant was apprehended and taken to Charity Hospital where blood and urine were drawn for chemical screening.

The State presented testimony that Defendant's blood and urine were screened and that his urine tested positive for cocaine and heroin. The State further presented testimony that the drugs had been taken hours before the accident. Additionally, the State presented expert testimony that the combination of drugs in Defendant's system would tend to make a person aggressive and reckless.

The Defense's sole witness was Adam Laurence. He testified that he drove Defendant to the mall on November 30th, 1997. Defendant promised Laurence $100.00 if Laurence drove him to the mall. Laurence testified that the police officer chasing Defendant had his gun drawn during the entire chase. Laurence also denied that Defendant and the officer struggled over the gun.

Jordan, 774 So.2d at 267, 270–72.

Sentencing Reform: Act No. 403 of 2001 and La. R.S. 15:308

In the years following Defendant's trial and conviction, the Louisiana legislature enacted more lenient penalty provisions in Act No. 403 of 2001 (effective June 15, 2001), which reduced the penalties for many crimes including certain sentences under La. R.S. 15:529.1. In 2006, the legislature enacted La. R.S. 15:308 authorizing the more lenient penalty provisions enacted by Act 403 to be applied retroactively to those defendants who committed certain enumerated offenses, or who were convicted of or sentenced for certain enumerated offenses, before June 15, 2001, but only if the application would ameliorate the defendant's circumstances. Then, in 2018, the Louisiana Supreme Court decided State ex rel. Esteen v. State, affirming that La. R.S. 15:308(B) allows the more lenient penalty provisions enacted by Act 403 to be applied retroactively, and further providing that the defendant's remedy is by resentencing in the trial court pursuant to his motion to correct illegal sentence. 239 So.3d at 238.

Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence

On July 24, 2024, Defendant filed a motion seeking to correct his illegal sentence, arguing that under Esteen he is entitled to be resentenced subject to a new sentencing range of “no less than the maximum of his current charge and no more than his natural life.” In response, the State conceded that Defendant was entitled to the benefit of the ameliorative changes to the law and to correction of his illegal sentence under Esteen, such that Defendant should be resentenced to not less than forty years imprisonment and not more than life imprisonment.

On October 9, 2024, the trial court granted Defendant's motion to correct illegal sentence, explaining that:

Here, Defendant was convicted on December 18, 1998. On October 18, 1999, the trial court adjudicated Defendant a fourth-felony offender and resentenced him to life imprisonment on count one. In 1998, Defendant was properly sentenced to life imprisonment as a fourth-felony offender as to count one. However, in 2001, after the amendment, he was no longer subjected to a mandatory life sentence under La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1)(c)(ii). Additionally, this Court finds the more lenient sentences provisions apply retroactively to Defendant's life sentence as a fourth-felony offender, in light of the Esteen decision.

As a result, the trial court allowed for Defendant to be resentenced, but only as to the enhanced sentence on count one.

Resentencing

On December 13, 2024, the trial court held a resentencing hearing, during which both sides presented evidence, witness testimony, and oral argument. The State argued that Defendant's life sentence was appropriate when originally imposed and remains appropriate today. It emphasized Defendant's criminal history, including an aggravated battery involving a stabbing during a shoplifting incident, and asserted that a “quad bill” was filed in 1999 because Defendant's crimes and prior offenses warranted life imprisonment. The State further asserted that, although Esteen now makes a life sentence discretionary for quad offenders, the sentencing range of 40 years to life still supports the court imposing a life term. It encouraged the trial court to consider the seriousness of Defendant's crimes, his department of correction records, and his lack of remorse or rehabilitation efforts, and maintained that the evidence reinforced that life imprisonment is the only suitable sentence.

In support of its position, the State introduced the entire record, which the trial court accepted into evidence, and called three witnesses to testify. The State's first witness, Jane Bable, testified as custodian of Department of Correction (DOC) records, confirming Defendant's release from incarceration for aggravated battery and theft approximately four months before the instant offense. She introduced records showing that during his current incarceration, Defendant has had fifty-three disciplinary violations, including recent contraband and intoxication infractions. She testified that the records also showed that Defendant completed just four rehabilitation programs during twenty-five years in custody, with multiple terminations from those programs for disciplinary issues.

The State's second witness, Joann Joyce, testified that two victims, Dana Jones and Ashley Williams, were her daughter and granddaughter respectively, and that Patrick Hamilton was a foster child in their care at the time of the accident. She described the emotional impact on her grandson, Jeremy Jones, who survived the crash. She expressed the profound loss and devastation caused by Defendant, emphasizing the absence of her loved ones at significant life events. The State's third and final witness, Reginald Smith, provided similar testimony. As the father of victim Ashley Williams, he testified about the profound emotional and personal impact that his daughter's death has had on him—that he went from living to merely existing. He also expressed disappointment at never receiving an apology from Defendant.

In turn, the Defense presented testimony from two witnesses at the resentencing hearing. James Schanbien, an investigator with the Public Defender's Office, testified about his unsuccessful attempts to locate Shonna Hamilton, who is believed to be the birth mother of Patrick Hamilton. Defendant then testified in his own defense. During his testimony, Defendant apologized to the victims’ families, and stated the killings were accidental while fleeing police. He mentioned his prior attempts to reconnect with Ms. Hamilton and explained his inability to complete a victim awareness class due to disciplinary issues.

After Defendant's testimony, Defense counsel urged the trial court to impose any sentence but a life sentence to give Defendant the opportunity to seek parole one day. Counsel argued that Defendant was only twenty-two years old at the time of the offense and made “horrible, stupid decisions.” She further urged the trial court to consider Judge Sullivan's original sentence of Defendant before the habitual offender bill was filed—thirty years for each manslaughter count, to run concurrently, and twenty-five years for the attempted first-degree murder count, to run consecutively to the manslaughter counts, for a total sentence of fifty-five years. Defense counsel emphasized that Judge Sullivan's original sentence reflected an appropriate balance without imposing life imprisonment.

The trial court vacated the original enhanced sentence on count one and resentenced Defendant under the habitual offender statute to life imprisonment without the benefit of parole, probation, or suspension, to run concurrently with Defendant's other sentences. In resentencing Defendant, the trial court emphasized that the offenses occurred only months after his release from the Department of Corrections and rejected his assertion that he was merely attempting to evade law enforcement, finding that such testimony minimized the gravity of his conduct. The trial court highlighted that by driving at speeds between eighty-five and one hundred miles per hour, Defendant placed hundreds of individuals at risk and caused the deaths of three innocent victims, describing the crimes as violent and underscoring the devastating impact on the victims’ families. The judge referenced photographic evidence depicting the severity of the crash and testimony reflecting the emotional toll on those affected. In assessing Defendant's post-conviction behavior, the trial court observed that he had ample opportunity to reform yet failed to attend a victim awareness program without credible justification, which the court deemed particularly offensive.

The trial court stated that Defendant was subject to a sentencing range of forty years to life imprisonment. Applying the sentencing considerations of La. C.Cr.P. art. 894.1, the trial court found under Subsection A that Defendant required correctional treatment and that a lesser sentence would deprecate the seriousness of the offenses. Under Subsection B,² the court identified no mitigating factors beyond a belated apology, while finding multiple aggravating factors, including that Defendant knowingly created a risk of great bodily harm to more than one person, employed threats or violence to facilitate or conceal another offense, and used both a vehicle and an officer's weapon as dangerous instruments. Concluding that these considerations warranted the most severe penalty allowed, and notwithstanding legislative changes to sentencing provisions, the trial court imposed a sentence of life imprisonment without the benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence, to run concurrently all other counts. Defendant appeals his sentence.

ANALYSIS

On appeal, Defendant's sole assignment of error is that his life sentence is unconstitutionally excessive.³ The failure to file a motion to reconsider sentence, or to state the specific grounds upon which the motion is based, limits a defendant to a review of the sentence for constitutional excessiveness only. State v. Harmon, 19-570 (La. App. 5 Cir. 9/9/20), 301 So.3d 1278, 1288, writ denied, 20-1160 (La. 10/14/20), 303 So.3d 306. This Court has held that when the specific grounds for objection to the sentences, including alleged non-compliance with La. C.Cr.P. art. 894.1, are not specifically raised in the trial court, they are not included in the bare review for constitutional excessiveness, and the defendant is precluded from raising these issues on appeal. State v. Clark, 19-518 (La. App. 5 Cir. 6/24/20), 296 So.3d 1281, 1291, writ denied, 21-62 (La. 3/9/21), 312 So.3d 585.

Here, the resentencing transcript does not show that Defense counsel objected to the sentence or made an oral motion to reconsider sentence, nor does the record indicate that counsel filed a written motion to reconsider sentence. Accordingly, Defendant is limited to a bare review of his sentence for constitutional excessiveness, under the U.S. Constitution and the Louisiana Constitution. See Clark, 296 So.3d at 1291.⁴ Specifically, the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Article I, § 20 of the Louisiana Constitution prohibit the imposition of excessive punishment. A sentence is considered excessive, even if it is within the statutory limits, if it is grossly disproportionate to the severity of the offense, or imposes needless and purposeless pain and suffering. State v. Adams, 23-427 (La. App. 5 Cir. 4/24/24), 386 So.3d 676, 683.

According to La. C.Cr.P. art. 881.4(D), the appellate court shall not set aside a sentence for excessiveness if the record supports the sentence imposed. In reviewing a sentence for excessiveness, the reviewing court shall consider the crime and the punishment in light of the harm to society and gauge whether the penalty is so disproportionate as to shock the court's sense of justice, while recognizing the trial court's wide discretion. Adams, 386 So.3d at 676. In reviewing a trial court's sentencing discretion, three factors are considered: 1) the nature of the crime; 2) the nature and background of the offender; and 3) the sentence imposed for similar crimes by the same court and other courts. However, there is no requirement that specific matters be given any particular weight at sentencing. State v. Kelson, 23-274 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/27/23), 379 So.3d 779, 784–85.

A trial court should consider the defendant's personal history such as age, family ties, marital status, health, employment record, as well as his prior criminal record, seriousness of offense, and the likelihood of rehabilitation in determining an appropriate sentence. Adams, 386 So.3d at 686. A trial judge is in the best position to consider the aggravating and mitigating circumstances of a particular case and, therefore, is given broad discretion when imposing a sentence. State v. Barnes, 23-208 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/27/23), 379 So.3d 196, 204, writ denied, 24-136 (La. 9/24/24), 392 So.3d 1141.

Here, the trial court resentenced Defendant on December 13, 2024 as to count one (manslaughter) as a fourth-felony offender to life imprisonment without the benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence, to run concurrently with Defendant's other sentences. For purposes of his habitual offender adjudication, Defendant committed the underlying crime of manslaughter in count one on November 30, 1997.⁵ At that time, Louisiana's habitual offender law, La. R.S. 15:529.1, provided, in pertinent part, as follows:

(c) If the fourth or subsequent felony is such that, upon a first conviction the offender would be punishable by imprisonment for any term less than his natural life then:

(i) The person shall be sentenced to imprisonment for the fourth or subsequent felony for a determinate term not less than the longest prescribed for a first conviction but in no event less than twenty years and not more than his natural life;or

(ii) If the fourth or subsequent felony or any of the prior felonies is a felony defined as a crime of violence under R.S. 14:2(13) or as a violation of the Uniform Controlled Dangerous Substances Law punishable by imprisonment for more than five years or of any other crime punishable by imprisonment for more than twelve years, the person shall be imprisoned for the remainder of his natural life, without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1)(c)(i)–(ii).

In 2001, Act No. 403 reduced the penalties for many crimes, including certain sentences under La. R.S. 15:529.1, which was amended to provide, in pertinent part, as follows:

(c) If the fourth or subsequent felony is such that, upon a first conviction the offender would be punishable by imprisonment for any term less than his natural life then:

(i) The person shall be sentenced to imprisonment for the fourth or subsequent felony for a determinate term not less than the longest prescribed for a first conviction but in no event less than twenty years and not more than his natural life;or

(ii) If the fourth felony and two of the prior felonies are felonies defined as a crime of violence under R.S. 14:2(13), a sex offense as defined in R.S. 15:540 et seq. when the victim is under the age of eighteen at the time of commission of the offense, or as a violation of the Uniform Controlled Dangerous Substances Law punishable by imprisonment for ten years or more or of any other crime punishable by imprisonment for twelve years or more, or any combination of such crimes, the person shall be imprisoned for the remainder of his natural life, without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1)(c)(i)–(ii).

Under the applicable version of La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1)(c)(ii) in 1997, Defendant was properly sentenced to life imprisonment as a fourth-felony offender; however, after the 2001 amendment, Defendant's underlying predicate crimes no longer subjected him to a mandatory life sentence. The amended provision required the fourth felony and two of the prior felonies to be crimes of violence, sex offenses where the victim is under the age of eighteen, a violation of the Uniform Controlled Dangerous Substances Law punishable by ten years or more, or any other crime punishable by imprisonment for twelve years or more. Defendant's prior convictions were for aggravated battery, possession of stolen property valued at $100-$500, and theft of goods valued at $100-$500.

Under La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1)(c)(i) in 1997, Defendant's sentence as a fourth-felony offender with his predicate convictions would have been for a determinate term not less than the longest prescribed for a first conviction, which would have been forty years, the maximum sentence for manslaughter under La. R.S. 14:31, and not more than his natural life. On December 13, 2024, the trial court resentenced Defendant to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence—the maximum sentence. The record does not reflect that defense counsel objected to the sentence or that counsel filed a motion to reconsider sentence.

As to the nature of the crime, Defendant was suspected of shoplifting by a JPSO officer at the mall and fled on foot, ignoring repeated commands to stop. He entered a vehicle and tried to crush the officer between cars, forcing the officer to dive inside. Defendant struggled for the officer's gun until a round was discharged away from him, causing him to release the officer, who fell out of the car. Defendant then sped off, striking a vehicle, a tree, and a street sign. Witnesses reported him driving 85–100 mph on Causeway Boulevard. Defendant led police on a high-speed chase, ran an intersection, hit a median, and went airborne. Then, Defendant crashed into a car on Jefferson Highway and killed the twenty-eight-year-old driver, Dana Jones; the ten-year-old passenger, Ashley Williams; and the six-week-old passenger, Patrick Hamilton. Six-year-old passenger, Jeremy Jones, survived the crash that killed his mother, and testimony at sentencing revealed that he still grieved for her. After he was apprehended, Defendant's urine tested positive for cocaine and heroin.

At resentencing, the victims’ family members testified about the profound impact of the deaths. The State presented evidence that Defendant was released from custody six months before the crimes and had numerous disciplinary violations in prison, including drug possession and intoxication. Although Defendant completed some rehabilitative programs, he never attended the victim awareness class he enrolled in. Defendant testified, apologized to the families, but attempted to justify his actions as fleeing police. The trial court discussed the facts of the case and stated that in addition to killing three innocent victims, Defendant put hundreds of individuals at risk. The trial court discussed its consideration of various provisions of La. C.Cr.P. art. 894.1 and found that there were no mitigating factors that applied to Defendant. The trial court also highlighted that the day of the resentencing hearing was the first time that Defendant had apologized to the victims’ families.

As to the nature and background of the offender, the record reflects that Defendant had various previous convictions that included aggravated battery, possession of stolen property valued at $100-$500, and theft of goods valued at $100-$500. The State presented evidence that Defendant was released from custody six months before the crimes and had numerous disciplinary violations in prison, including drug possession and intoxication. Although Defendant completed some rehabilitative programs, he never attended the victim awareness class he enrolled in.

The third factor requires consideration of sentences imposed for similar crimes by this Court and other courts. As to count one, we have found no cases in which the defendant was convicted of manslaughter, received a life sentence as a fourth-felony offender, and challenged the sentence on appeal. “Although a comparison of sentences imposed for similar crimes may provide guidance, ‘[i]t is well settled that sentences must be individualized to the particular offender and to the particular offense committed.’ ” State v. Barnes, 23-208 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/27/23), 379 So.3d 196, 206, writ denied, 24-136 (La. 9/24/24), 392 So.3d 1141 (citation omitted). “While comparison with other similar cases is useful in itself and sets the stage, the focus of sentence review remains on the character and propensities of the offender and the circumstances of the offense.” Id. (citing State v. LeBlanc, 09-1355 (La. 7/6/10), 41 So.3d 1168, 1173).

The record here reflects the severity of Defendant's convictions and his lack of remorse and refusal to take responsibility. He killed three people, attempted to kill a police officer, and put hundreds of other people at risk while fleeing. Moreover, Defendant committed the instant crime within mere months of his release for similar offenses. Having reviewed the character and propensities of the offender, the circumstances of the offense, and the penalties imposed in similar cases, we find no constitutional infirmity in imposing the maximum enhanced sentence permitted for count one. Defendant was subject to a sentencing range of forty years to life imprisonment. We find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by resentencing Defendant as a fourth-felony offender to a sentence of life imprisonment. We find that the record adequately supports the sentence and that it is not constitutionally excessive. Therefore, this assignment of error lacks merit.

Errors Patent

We have reviewed the record for errors patent according to La. C.Cr.P. art. 920; State v. Oliveaux, 312 So.2d 337 (La. 1975); and State v. Weiland, 556 So.2d 175 (La. App. 5 Cir. 1990). Defendant's second appeal is limited to the resentencing on his enhanced sentence. As such, our errors patent review is likewise limited to the resentencing on Defendant's enhanced sentence. See State v. Beason, 17-254 (La. App. 5 Cir. 11/15/17), 232 So.3d 1255, 1260 n.8, writ denied, 17-2170 (La. 11/20/18), 256 So.3d 998.

1. Hard Labor

Defendant was sentenced under La. R.S. 15:529.1, which requires the sentence to be served at hard labor. See La. R.S. 15:529.1(G). The transcript does not reflect that the trial court ordered the sentence to be served at hard labor. Although the sentencing minute entry and UCO reflect that the sentence was imposed at hard labor, the transcript prevails. See State v. Lynch, 441 So.2d 732, 734 (La. 1983). Because the statute mandates hard labor, and there is no discretion allowed, the trial court's failure to state that Defendant's sentence was to be served at hard labor is nevertheless harmless, and no corrective action is required. See State v. Pollard, 12-346 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/18/12), 106 So.3d 1194, 1203, writ denied, 13-140 (La. 6/21/13), 118 So.3d 408; State v. Stewart, 10-389 (La. App. 5 Cir. 5/10/11), 65 So.3d 771, 784, writ denied, 11-1245 (La. 1/20/12), 78 So.3d 140.

2. Parole Restriction

The resentencing transcript reflects that Defendant's enhanced life sentence is to be served without the benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. The sentencing minute entry and the UCO also reflect these restrictions. The restrictions on parole eligibility imposed on multiple offender sentences under La. R.S. 15:529.1 “are those called for in the reference statute.” State v. Carter, 17-148 (La. App. 5 Cir. 10/25/17), 230 So.3d 277, 284; State v. Esteen, 01-879 (La. App. 5 Cir. 5/15/02), 821 So.2d 60, 79 n.24, writ denied, 02-1540 (La. 12/13/02), 831 So.2d 983. The underlying statute in the present case does not restrict parole. See La. R.S. 14:31. As such, the trial court should not have imposed Defendant's enhanced sentence with a parole restriction.

When a sentencing error involves the imposition of restrictions beyond what the legislature has authorized in the sentencing statute, the Louisiana Supreme Court has ruled that the appellate courts should not rely on La. R.S. 15:301.1(A) to correct the error as a matter of law, but should correct the sentence on its own authority under La. C.Cr.P. art. 882 to correct an illegal sentence at any time. State v. Raines, 24-177 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/18/24), 410 So.3d 337, 347. We accordingly amend Defendant's enhanced sentence to delete the restriction on parole. Id. We also order the 24th Judicial District Court Clerk of Court to transmit notice of the amended sentence to the appropriate authorities in accordance with La. C.Cr.P. art. 892(B)(2) and to the Department of Corrections’ legal department. Id.

DECREE

For the foregoing reasons, we amend Defendant's enhanced sentence to delete the restriction on parole, and affirm Defendant's sentence as amended. We further remand the matter with instructions to the Clerk of Court as set forth above.

AFFIRMED AS AMENDED; REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS

FIFTH CIRCUIT

101 DERBIGNY STREET (70053)

POST OFFICE BOX 489

GRETNA, LOUISIANA 70054

www.fifthcircuit.org

SUSAN M. CHEHARDY CHIEF JUDGE

FREDERICKA H. WICKER

JUDE G. GRAVOIS

MARC E. JOHNSON

STEPHEN J. WINDHORST

JOHN J. MOLAISON, JR.

SCOTT U. SCHLEGEL

TIMOTHY S. MARCEL

JUDGES

CURTIS B. PURSELL CLERK OF COURT

SUSAN S. BUCHHOLZ CHIEF DEPUTY CLERK

LINDA M. TRAN FIRST DEPUTY CLERK

MELISSA C. LEDET DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL STAFF

(504) 376-1400

(504) 376-1498 FAX

NOTICE OF JUDGMENT AND CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY

I CERTIFY THAT A COPY OF THE OPINION IN THE BELOW-NUMBERED MATTER HAS BEEN DELIVERED IN ACCORDANCE WITH UNIFORM RULES - COURT OF APPEAL, RULE 2-16.4 AND 2-16.5 THIS DAY DECEMBER 29, 2025 TO THE TRIAL JUDGE, CLERK OF COURT, COUNSEL OF RECORD AND ALL PARTIES NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL, AS LISTED BELOW:

25-KA-137

CURTIS B. PURSELL CLERK OF COURT

E-NOTIFIED

24TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT (CLERK)

HONORABLE SHAYNA BEEVERS MORVANT (DISTRICT JUDGE)

DARREN A. ALLEMAND (APPELLEE) THOMAS J. BUTLER (APPELLEE) CHAD M. IKERD (APPELLANT)

MAILED

HONORABLE PAUL D. CONNICK, JR. (APPELLEE)

DISTRICT ATTORNEY

DAVID P. WOLFF (APPELLEE)

ASSISTANT DISTRICT ATTORNEY

TWENTY-FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

200 DERBIGNY STREET

GRETNA, LA 70053

FOOTNOTES

1.   Defendant appealed his manslaughter convictions only (counts one, two, and three); he did not appeal his conviction for attempted first-degree murder (count four).

2.   The trial judge explained that while Subsection B of La. C.Cr.P. art. 894.1 provides grounds for the trial court to determine suspension of sentence or probation, which did not apply to Defendant, she considered the mitigating and aggravating factors to determine the sentence between the range of forty years to life imprisonment.

3.   Although Defendant's sole assignment of error concerns excessiveness, in briefing Defendant also includes arguments of ineffective assistance of counsel. Generally, an ineffective assistance of counsel claim is most appropriately addressed through an application for post-conviction relief filed in the district court, where a full evidentiary hearing can be conducted, if necessary, rather than by direct appeal. State v. Richards, 23-448 (La. App. 5 Cir. 11/20/24), 411 So.3d 739, 766, reh'g denied, (12/6/24), writ granted in part, 24-1355 (La. 12/11/24), 396 So.3d 945, and writ denied, 25-28 (La. 4/1/25), 404 So.3d 652, and writ denied, 24-1547 (La. 4/1/25), 404 So.3d 656. As such, we decline to address the merits of any of the claims of ineffective assistance of counsel at this time.

4.   Defendant does not directly argue on appeal that the trial court failed to consider La. C.Cr.P. art. 894.1; however, he avers that had defense counsel filed a motion to reconsider sentence, counsel could have raised the trial court's inadequate consideration of La. C.Cr.P. art. 894.1 and not be limited on appeal to a bare review of his sentence for constitutional excessiveness.

5.   See State v. Parker, 03-924 (La. 4/14/04), 871 So.2d 317, 327 (“[T]he punishment to be imposed on defendant, a habitual offender, is that provided by La. R.S. 15:529.1 as it existed on the date he committed the underlying offense.”); State v. Williams, 03-571 (La. App. 5 Cir. 11/12/03), 862 So.2d 108, 119, writ denied, 04-51 (La. 5/21/04), 874 So.2d 171 (“[T]his Court has consistently held that the date of the commission of the offense controls the penalty to be applied in multiple offender sentencing. From our earliest decisions on the subject until our more recent pronouncement, we have been unwavering on this issue.”).

FREDERICKA HOMBERG WICKER JUDGE