BREAUX v. BLOCK LAW FIRM (2026)

In this suit for unpaid wages filed pursuant to the Louisiana Wage Payment Act, La. R.S. 23:631, et seq., the defendant, Block Law Firm, A Professional Law Corporation (“BLF”), appeals the trial court's February 26, 2025 amended judgment awarding the plaintiff, Richard C. Breaux, unpaid wages in the amount of $250,000.00, penalty wages in the amount of $38,958.90, attorney fees, and costs. For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Richard C. Breaux began working as an attorney at BLF in 2011. Breaux did not have a written employment contract with BLF, but the parties verbally agreed that Breaux would be paid an annual salary of $40,000.00 plus discretionary bonuses. Beginning around 2013, Breaux was given the opportunity to receive “a one-third fee” for cases he generated—cases he brought to BLF. Kendall John Krielow was hired by BLF as an associate attorney in 2012 and received an annual salary of $58,000.00. In January 2016, attorney Matthew Block (“Matthew”), the then-owner of BLF, accepted a position with the administration of then-Governor John Bel Edwards, and Matthew's father, Jerald Block (“Block”), took over ownership of BLF. On January 12, 2016, Block convened a meeting with Breaux and Krielow to discuss the operation of BLF after Matthew's departure. The discussion revolved around the fact that the remaining attorneys at BLF—Block, Breaux, and Krielow—would have a heavier caseload since Matthew was no longer part of the firm. In consideration for the increased workload, Block agreed to increase the case-generation fee to 50% for cases brought to BLF by Breaux and Krielow. Block further agreed to pay both Breaux and Krielow an annual salary of $58,000.00, quarterly payments of $25,000.00, and, potentially, a discretionary bonus payment at the end of the year. Notably, the agreement stemming from the January 2016 meeting was not reduced to writing.

After the January 2016 meeting, Krielow and Breaux began receiving their $25,000.00 quarterly payments from BLF, in addition to their annual salaries. Krielow and Breaux continued to receive quarterly payments in 2016, 2017, and 2018; however, BLF did not pay either Krielow or Breaux the first quarterly payment due in 2019. According to Breaux, he met with Block in July 2019 after BLF failed to pay him the second quarterly payment due in 2019 and was told the missed quarterly payments would be “caught up.” By October 2019, after BLF had failed make any quarterly payments for the year, Krielow and Breaux both met separately with Block to discuss the issue. In December 2019, Krielow, Block, and Breaux met to discuss the possibility of Breaux and Krielow purchasing BLF from Block. According to Breaux, Block proposed giving them a “credit” toward the purchase price of BLF based on the unpaid quarterly payments. BLF did not pay Krielow or Breaux any quarterly payments in 2020 or 2021, but the parties continued to meet to talk about the possibility of Krielow and Breaux purchasing BLF. Ultimately, Krielow and Breaux did not purchase BLF, and both left their employment with the firm in October 2021. In March 2022, Breaux sent Block a demand letter asking for the quarterly payments that were not previously paid by BLF to Breaux in 2019, 2020, and 2021.

On March 31, 2022, Breaux filed a petition for unpaid wages, alleging he was an employee of BLF beginning around October 2011, and that Breaux and BLF, through Block, had an oral contract that Breaux would receive an annual salary of $158,000.00, consisting of $58,000.00, paid bimonthly, and $25,000.00 quarterly payments beginning in 2016. Breaux alleged he received his $158,000.00 wages annually from January 2016 through December 31, 2018, but that on or about March 31, 2019 and/or April 1, 2019, BLF failed to remit payment of Breaux's “quarterly salary payment” and continued to fail to remit the quarterly payments during the remainder of Breaux's employment with BLF. Breaux alleged that at the time of his resignation, he was owed eleven quarterly payments, a total sum of $275,000.00. Breaux alleged BLF's failure to pay him the quarterly payments was arbitrary and capricious and sought penalty wages and attorney fees pursuant to La. R.S. 23:632, in addition to the unpaid quarterly payments.

On February 3, 2025, following a three-day bench trial on October 30, October 31, and November 29, 2023, the trial court gave oral reasons for judgment, finding in favor of Breaux, determining that an oral agreement existed between Breaux and BLF to pay Breaux quarterly payments as part of his wages, and finding that BLF failed to pay Breaux the quarterly payments in 2019, 2020, and 2021. In doing so, the trial court found Breaux's testimony to be credible and that the quarterly payments “were additional wages being paid by [BLF] for not hiring an attorney to pick up Matthew Block's workload.” The trial court further found Krielow's testimony corroborated the existence of the oral contract for additional wages, which was also corroborated by Breaux's income tax documents, his W-2 and 1099 statements, evidencing the quarterly payments totaling $300,000.00 in 2016 through 2018. Additionally, the trial court found that BLF's failure to pay Breaux the quarterly payments was not done in good faith, and therefore, BLF was liable to Breaux for penalty wages. The trial court determined that Breaux was entitled to reasonable attorney fees pursuant to La. R.S. 23:632(C). On February 26, 2025, the trial court signed an amended judgment ordering BLF to pay Breaux unpaid wages in the amount of $250,000.00, penalty wages in the amount of $38,958.90, and attorney fees in the amount of $28,995.80.¹

BLF suspensively appeals the trial court's February 26, 2025 amended judgment, raising the following assignments of error: (1) the trial court erred in finding Krielow's testimony was sufficient corroborating evidence of an oral contract between Breaux and Block because Krielow was the plaintiff in an identical suit on the same alleged oral contract; (2) the trial court improperly excluded evidence and testimony by Block regarding the history or pattern of the quarterly payments; and (3) the trial court improperly applied the Louisiana Wage Payment Act when there had been no guarantee of quarterly payments, the history of these payments indicated they were discretionary, and there was no evidence of bad faith.

LAW AND DISCUSSION

Evidentiary Issue – Assignment of Error No. 2

BLF argues in its second assignment of error that the trial court committed legal error when it excluded “Exhibit 25,” which was proffered by BLF and contained in the record before this Court as “Defendant Proffer 3” (hereinafter “Defendant Proffer 3”). BLF also argues the trial court erred by excluding Block's testimony related to Defendant Proffer 3.

If a trial court commits an evidentiary error that interdicts its factfinding process, this court must conduct a de novo review. Thus, any alleged evidentiary errors must be addressed first on appeal, inasmuch as a finding of error may affect the applicable standard of review. Marshall v. Marshall, 2023-0193 (La. App. 1 Cir. 9/28/23), 376 So. 3d 891, 894-95. Accordingly, we first address BLF's second assignment of error.

During trial, Krielow and Breaux testified about their income during their employment with BLF, and Breaux's income tax documents for 2016 through 2021, including W-2s and 1099s, were admitted into evidence. Breaux testified that in 2016, he received all four quarterly payments, a total sum of $100,000.00, which was included in the total income listed on his W-2 for 2016. Breaux explained the income listed on his W-2 for 2016, a total sum of $184,490.70, included his annual salary of $5 8,000.00, four quarterly payments of $25,000.00, and approximately $26,000.00 in case-generation fees. For 2017, Breaux was issued a W-2 and a 1099, and explained that the total income listed on the W-2, approximately $105,000.00, included his annual salary of $5 8,000.00, one quarterly payment of $25,000.00, and the remaining amount was for case-generation fees.² Breaux's 1099 for 2017 listed an income of approximately $199,000.00, and he testified that amount included the three remaining quarterly payments of $25,000.00, and a bonus payment of $100,000.00, which he received for substantial work on cases that brought significant income into BLF.

On his 2018 W-2, Breaux's income was listed as $53,902.18, and Breaux testified that amount included his salary after contributions to his 401(k) retirement account. Breaux's 1099 for 2018 listed his income as approximately $187,930.41, and Breaux testified that $100,000.00 of that amount was for quarterly payments and the remainder was for case-generation fees. Breaux testified that during 2016 through 2018, the quarterly payments were “fairly regular,” but sometimes there would be a “catch-up payment” the following quarter.

As discussed, Breaux testified that BLF stopped paying him quarterly payments beginning in 2019. Breaux identified his W-2 for 2019, which listed an income of $58,000.08, Breaux's annual salary. Breaux's 1099 for 2019 listed an income of $91,132.27, which Breaux testified was his case-generation fees. Breaux's W-2 for 2020 listed an income of $58,000.08, which represented his annual salary. Breaux's 1099 for 2020 listed income of $80,83 7.66, which consisted of his case-generation fees. Breaux's W-2 for 2021 listed an income of $49,05 8.45, his annual salary earned prior to his resignation from BLF. Breaux's 1099 for 2021 listed an income of $61,242.07, which Breaux explained was for case-generation fees.

Catherine Block (“Catherine”), who is married to Block and assists with managing BLF's accounting records, testified that she is familiar with the attorneys’ tax documents, their W-2s and 1099s. Catherine was asked about a document she drafted, which is labeled as “Exhibit 24,” captioned “INCOME SCHEDULE 2016-2021,” and contains a purported summary of income received by Breaux, Krielow, and Block from 2016 through 2021. Catherine stated she prepared the summary using W-2s and 1099s. Breaux objected to Exhibit 24 as an improper summary of documents that were not provided to him, especially noting that Block's W-2 was never provided to Breaux during discovery. The trial court sustained Breaux's objection and denied admission of Exhibit 24. BLF then proffered Exhibit 24 as “Block Proffer #2” (hereinafter “Block Proffer 2”).

During Breaux's cross-examination of Block, he was asked whether Breaux received four quarterly payments of $25,000.00 in 2016. Block responded, “I don't know.” Likewise, Block stated he did not know whether Krielow received four $25,000.00 quarterly payments from BLF in 2016. Block further testified he did not know if Krielow or Breaux received quarterly payments in 2017 and 2018. Block explained that all payment records for Breaux and Krielow in 2016 would probably have been managed by Kim Means, BLF's office manager. During BLF's redirect of Block, BLF attempted to introduce Defendant Proffer 3, the first page of which is substantially similar to Block Proffer 2, and contains a purported summary of income received by Breaux, Krielow, and Block from 2016 through 2021. According to counsel for BLF, there was an error of approximately $1,900.00 on Block Proffer 2, and Defendant Proffer 3 was amended to fix the error. The second page of Defendant Proffer 3 contains a purported list of “bonus payments” made to Breaux and Krielow in 2016 through 2018, with specific dates listed for each payment. Defendant Proffer 3 also contains a list of Breaux's and Krielow's annual income for 2016 through 2021, with specific dates listed for the payment of bonuses and case-generation fees. Defendant Proffer 3 lists the W-2s and 1099s of Krielow and Breaux, which are also included as part of Defendant Proffer 3 as the “source” of the bonus and case-generation fee payments.

Breaux objected to Defendant Proffer 3, pointing out the first page, with the summary of income received by Breaux, Krielow, and Block from 2016 through 2021, was already properly excluded by the trial court when it sustained Breaux's objection to Block Proffer 2. The trial court sustained Breaux's objection and excluded Defendant Proffer 3, explaining that the summary was not brought up during cross-examination and “because that's somebody's work on to what these documents say.” During BLF's proffer of Defendant Proffer 3, counsel for BLF asked Block about the contents of the document, but there was no testimony from Block regarding who created Defendant Proffer 3. Block stated the information contained in Defendant Proffer 3 came from 1099s and W-2s. However, during his proffer testimony, Block did not provide a source for the dates and the amounts of the bonus payments and case-generation fees listed in Defendant Proffer 3.

BLF argues the trial court legally erred by excluding Defendant Proffer 3 pursuant to La. C.E. art. 1006 because the “source documents” of Defendant Proffer 3 are the W-2s and 1099s for Breaux, Krielow, and Block. BLF argues Block could have been questioned and cross-examined as to the accuracy of the summary using those W-2s and 1099s. BLF asserts that the trial court's exclusion of Defendant Proffer 3 materially affected the outcome of the case because without the evidence contained therein, BLF could not refute Breaux's and Krielow's testimony that the quarterly payments were in the amount of $25,000.00 and were consistently paid approximately every quarter. BLF argues the information provided in Defendant Proffer 3 shows that the quarterly payments were not paid at regular intervals and therefore, could not be considered wages under the Louisiana Wage Payment Act. BLF further argues that Defendant Proffer 3 would support Block's testimony that the quarterly wages were actually bonuses paid to Breaux and Krielow at Block's sole discretion based on their performance and the financial state of BLF.

Generally, the trial court is granted broad discretion in its evidentiary rulings and its determinations will not be disturbed on appeal absent a clear abuse of that discretion. Chiasson v. Louisiana Medical Mutual Insurance Company, 2019-0618 (La. App. 1 Cir. 6/18/20), 307 So. 3d 204, 208. Furthermore, La. C.E. art. 103(A) provides, in pertinent part, that “[e]rror may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the party is affected[.]” The proper inquiry for determining whether a party was prejudiced by a trial court's alleged erroneous ruling on the admission or exclusion of evidence is whether the alleged error, when compared to the entire record, had a substantial effect on the outcome of the case. Chiasson, 307 So. 3d at 208. If the effect on the outcome of the case is not substantial, reversal is not warranted. La. C.E. art. 103(A); Chiasson, 307 So. 3d at 209.

Louisiana Code of Evidence article 1006 provides:

The contents of otherwise admissible voluminous writings, recordings, or photographs which cannot conveniently be examined in court may be presented in the form of a chart, summary, or calculation. The originals, or duplicates, shall be made available for examination or copying, or both, by other parties at a reasonable time and place. The court may order that they be produced in court.

The first page of Defendant Proffer 3, the summary of income for Breaux, Krielow, and Block, is based on their W-2s and 1099s. The W-2s and 1099s are not voluminous and could have been examined during trial. Notwithstanding this fact, Breaux's objection to the summary of income was based on the fact that BLF did not provide Block's W-2s and 1099s prior to trial. A trial court has great discretion with regard to admission of evidence when a party objects on the ground that his opponent failed to supplement discovery. Savoie-Moore v. Moore, 98-0235 (La. App. 4 Cir. 9/16/98), 719 So. 2d 551, 554.

Furthermore, although Block stated the information contained in Defendant Proffer 3 came from the W-2s and 1099s, the remaining pages of Defendant Proffer 3 include information that is not contained in the W-2s and 1099s. As discussed, during cross-examination, Block testified that he did not know whether Breaux or Krielow received quarterly payments in 2016, 2017, and 2018. Block further explained that the payment records for Breaux and Krielow would probably have been managed by the office manager at the time, Kim Means, who did not testify at trial. However, Defendant Proffer 3 contains specific payments of bonuses and case-generation fees made on particular days. BLF did not provide any source for this information, and during its proffer of Defendant Proffer 3, Block did not identify who created Defendant Proffer 3, or where the payment information was obtained. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by determining that Defendant Proffer 3 was not a summary admissible under La. C.E. art. 1006.

We likewise find the trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to allow Block to testify about the contents of Defendant Proffer 3. As discussed, during BLF's proffer of Defendant Proffer 3, Block was not questioned, and never stated, that he had firsthand knowledge of the contents of Defendant Proffer 3, or more specifically, the exact dates and amounts of bonuses paid to Breaux. In sum, there was no evidence to show that Block had personal knowledge to testify regarding the contents of Defendant Proffer 3. See La. C.E. art. 602. Accordingly, this assignment of error is without merit.

Evidence of an Oral Contract – Assignment of Error No. 1

In its first assignment of error, BLF argues Breaux did not introduce independent evidence of an oral contract that guaranteed him quarterly payments during his employment with BLF. BLF asserts that Krielow's testimony regarding an oral contract with BLF for quarterly wages could not be utilized to corroborate Breaux's testimony because Krielow has a pending action against BLF for unpaid wages.

A trial court's determination of the existence or nonexistence of an oral contract is a finding of fact governed by the manifest error or clearly wrong standard of review. Read v. Willwoods Community, 2014-1475 (La. 3/17/15), 165 So. 3d 883, 888. Similarly, the issue of whether there were corroborating circumstances sufficient to establish an oral contract is a question of fact. Id. When evaluating the evidence needed to establish the existence or non-existence of a contract, the trier of fact is allowed to make credibility determinations. Id. The standard of review we must apply to a trial court's findings of fact is well settled. Id. A reviewing court may not set aside a trial court's finding of fact in the absence of “manifest error” or unless it is “clearly wrong.” Id. If the factual findings are reasonable in light of the record reviewed in its entirety, an appellate court may not reverse, even if convinced that had it been sitting as the trier of fact, it would have weighed the evidence differently. Stobart v. State through Dept. of Transp. & Development, 617 So. 2d 880, 882-83 (La. 1993).

Breaux, the party demanding performance of an obligation, must prove the existence of the obligation. La. C.C. art. 1831; Suire v. Lafayette City-Parish Consol. Government, 2004-1459 (La. 4/12/05), 907 So. 2d 37, 58. Additionally, as Breaux alleged that BLF was obligated to pay him wages that exceeded $500.00, proof of the obligation is governed by La. C.C. art. 1846, which states, in relevant part, “[i]f the price or value [of a contract not reduced to writing] is in excess of five hundred dollars, the contract must be proved by at least one witness and other corroborating circumstances.” The plaintiff himself may serve as the witness to establish the existence of the oral contract. Suire, 907 So. 2d at 58. The “other corroborating circumstances” need only be general in nature; independent proof of every detail of the agreement is not required. Id.

BLF cites Pennington Construction, Inc. v. R A Eagle Corp., 94-0575 (La. App. 1 Cir. 3/3/95), 652 So. 2d 637, in support of its argument that Krielow's testimony could not be used to corroborate Breaux's testimony that an oral contract existed between him and BLF. In Pennington Construction, the plaintiff, a construction company, sued the defendant alleging breach of a construction contract. Id. The defendant reconvened, arguing the plaintiff failed to perform a separate contract to construct a building for defendant for $15,000.00 more than the lowest bid received by the defendant. Id. In support of its breach of contract claim, the plaintiff presented a construction contract that was not signed by the defendant or the plaintiff's officers, Cecil J. Pennington and Ronald Pennington. Id. at 638. The trial court found there was contradictory testimony over the timing of the subject documents, and therefore, focused on the credibility of the witnesses, finding the Penningtons’ testimony to be more credible. Id. at 639.

On appeal, this Court initially found the trial court erred by failing to characterize either of the contracts as written or verbal, and therefore, “overlooked the requisite burden of proof.” Id. This Court explained that because neither of the construction contracts were signed by both of the parties, the trial court should have applied the burden of proof required to prove an oral contract, provided in La. C.C. art. 1846. This Court noted that the trial court did not consider whether corroborating circumstances existed to prove the existence of the contracts. Pennington Construction, 652 So. 2d at 639. This Court accepted the trial court's finding that the Penningtons’ testimony was more credible, but found the record did not contain any evidence to corroborate their testimony. Id. at 639-40. Furthermore, this Court found other evidence refuted their testimony. In sum, this Court found the trial court failed to consider whether the plaintiff carried its burden of proving an oral contract, and found the record did not contain the requisite corroborating circumstances. As such, this Court reversed the trial court's judgment in favor of the plaintiff. Id. at 640.

BLF also cites Mr. Mudbug, Inc. v. Bloomin’ Brands, Inc., 770 F. Appx. 658 (5th Cir. 2019) (per curiam), in support of its argument that Krielow could not provide corroborating evidence of an oral contract between BLF and Breaux. In Mr. Mudbug, the plaintiff, a food products manufacturer, filed suit against the defendant, the owner of several restaurant chains, alleging the defendant breached an oral contract to purchase 28 million pounds of dressing from the plaintiff. Id. at 659-60. The defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing there was no evidence of a contract. The trial court granted the defendant's motion and the plaintiff appealed. Id. at 659. The United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, explaining the plaintiff produced sworn declarations from its executive officers asserting the existence of an oral contract, but failed to produce corroborating evidence. Id. at 660.

We find the instant case to be distinguishable from Pennington and Mr. Mudbug. In Pennington, unlike the instant case, the plaintiff company relied on the testimony from its own officers. Pennington, 652 So. 2d at 638. Furthermore, in Pennington, there was evidence contradicting the existence of an oral contract, including uncontradicted evidence that it was industry practice to have written building contracts. Id. at 640. Similarly, in Mr. Mudbug, the plaintiff company attempted to rely on the sworn affidavits of its officers to prove the existence of an oral contract and survive the defendant's motion for summary judgment. Mr. Mudbug, 770 F. Appx. at 660. We also note the court's standard of review in Mr. Mudbug was de novo, while this Court must review the trial court's finding of an oral contract in the instant case under the manifest error or clearly wrong standard of review. See Mr. Mudbug, 770 F. Appx. at 659; Read, 165 So. 3d at 888.

In the instant case, Breaux testified as to the existence of an oral contract between him and BLF for the payment of wages arising from the January 2016 meeting with Block. Breaux stated that in consideration of the additional work he would have after Matthew's departure, Block proposed to increase his annual salary to $58,000.00, paid bimonthly and to provide $25,000.00 quarterly payments, in addition to an increase in his case-generation fee to 50%. Breaux testified the oral agreement provided that the quarterly payments would be paid every quarter, and there was no limitation on the payment of the quarterly payments based on his performance or BLF's financial state.

Krielow testified at trial that during the January 2016 meeting, Block agreed that Krielow's annual salary of $58,000.00 would remain the same, but that he would received $25,000.00 quarterly payments, with the fourth quarterly payment possibly exceeding $25,000.00, depending on BLF's performance. Krielow stated the quarterly payments were “guaranteed.” During cross-examination, Krielow was asked “whether or not Mr. Breaux will be a witness in your case where you're suing [BLF]?” Krielow responded, “I don't know for a fact. I anticipate that he will be.” Notably, however, neither party introduced the record of Krielow's proceeding against Block or BLF, and therefore, this Court has no evidence regarding the specifics of Krielow's case. Nevertheless, Krielow is clearly not a plaintiff in the instant matter. Although he may have an interest in the outcome of Breaux's suit, La. C.C. art. 1846 does not require that corroborating evidence of an oral contract be provided by a disinterested witness, and we decline to judicially impose such a restriction. In this case, the trier of fact, the trial court, was aware of Krielow's pending case and, interpreting his testimony through that lens, found his testimony to be credible. When evaluating the evidence needed to establish the existence or non-existence of a contract, the trier of fact is allowed to make credibility determinations. Read, 165 So. 3d at 888. A review of the record in its entirety demonstrates that the trial court's finding of an oral contract between BLF and Breaux requiring BLF to pay Breaux the quarterly payments as part of his wages was reasonable. As such, the trial court's findings were not clearly wrong or manifestly erroneous. See Stobart, 617 So. 2d at 882-83. Accordingly, this assignment of error is without merit.

Application of the Louisiana Wage Payment Act – Assignment of Error No. 3

In its third assignment of error, BLF argues the trial court erred by finding BLF violated the Louisiana Wage Payment Act (“Wage Act”) for failing to pay Breaux the quarterly payments because they were bonuses and not wages. BLF further argues the trial court erred by finding it acted in bad faith and assessing penalties pursuant to La. R.S. 23:632(A).³

The Wage Act is designed to compel prompt payment of earned wages upon an employee's discharge or resignation.⁴ See La. R.S. 23:631(A)(1)(a) & (b); Haber v. Ocean Canyon Properties, Inc., 2017-1472 (La. App. 1 Cir. 5/31/18), 251 So. 3d 454, 458.

Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:632 provides, in pertinent part:

A. Except as provided for in Subsection B of this Section, any employer who fails or refuses to comply with the provisions of R.S. 23:631 shall be liable to the employee either for ninety days wages at the employee's daily rate of pay, or else for full wages from the time the employee's demand for payment is made until the employer shall pay or tender the amount of unpaid wages due to such employee, whichever is the lesser amount of penalty wages.

B. When the court finds that an employer's dispute over the amount of wages due was in good faith, but the employer is subsequently found by the court to owe the amount in dispute, the employer shall be liable only for the amount of wages in dispute plus judicial interest incurred from the date that the suit is filed. If the court determines that the employer's failure or refusal to pay the amount of wages owed was not in good faith, then the employer shall be subject to the penalty provided for in Subsection A of this Section.

Accordingly, to prove entitlement to penalty wages under La. R.S. 23:632, the employee must prove: (1) that wages were due and owing, (2) that demand for payment was made at the place where the employee was usually paid and, (3) that the employer failed to pay upon demand. Haber, 251 So. 3d at 458. Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:632 is penal in nature, and therefore, must be strictly construed. Haber, 251 So. 3d at 458.

Whether there exists a valid, equitable defense to a claim of penalty wages depends on the particular facts of each case. Scarbrough v. Lynmar Holdings, LLC, 2021-1566 (La. App. 1 Cir. 8/31/22), 349 So. 3d 34, 38, writ denied, 2022-01474 (La. 11/22/22), 350 So. 3d 500. A trial court's findings of fact with regard to whether the plaintiff is entitled to penalty wages cannot be reversed on appeal in the absence of manifest error or unless clearly wrong. Loup v. Louisiana State School for the Deaf, 98-0329 (La. App. 1 Cir. 2/19/99), 729 So. 2d 689, 693.

As discussed, the trial court found an oral contract existed between Breaux and BLF, which obligated BLF to pay Breaux the quarterly payments as wages in exchange for the increased workload after Matthew's departure from BLF. The trial court further found, based on the testimony of Breaux and Krielow, and Breaux's 1099s and W-2s in 2019, 2020, and 2021, BLF failed to pay the quarterly payments beginning in 2019 through the time Breaux left BLF. BLF does not dispute that no quarterly payments were made in 2019, 2020, and 2021. BLF's only defense to Breaux's claim for penalty wages is that the quarterly payments were bonuses, not wages, because they were not consistently paid each quarter and the amount of each payment varied. However, there is no evidentiary support for this assertion. Breaux testified he sent BLF a letter demanding payment of the unpaid wages, and BLF failed to pay Breaux those wages. In sum, the record does not indicate that the trial court's finding that Breaux was entitled to penalty wages was clearly wrong or manifestly erroneous. Accordingly, this assignment of error is without merit.

CONCLUSION

For the aforementioned reasons, we affirm the trial court's February 26, 2025 amended judgment. Costs of this appeal are assessed to the appellant, Block Law Firm, APLC.

AFFIRMED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The trial court signed an amended judgment pursuant to a motion filed by Breaux to correct the full legal name of BLF on the original judgment from “BLOCK LAW FIRM, PLC” to “BLOCK LAW FIRM, A PROFESSIONAL LAW CORPORATION.” The amendment was proper under La. C.C.P. art. 1951. See Dubose v. Plant Depot, 2005-1149 (La. App. 4 Cir. 5/17/06), 933 So. 2d 814, 816 (explaining “when the identity of the defendant is fixed with certainty, the amendment of the judgment to correctly reflect the name of the defendant is not a substantive change.”). On February 26, 2025, the trial court signed written reasons for judgment, the language of which tracks the oral reasons provided by the trial court in open court on February 3, 2025.

2.   Breaux signed an agreement in 2018 wherein he stated he worked at BLF as a salaried employee and an independent contractor. Breaux explained the 2018 agreement “was related to our 1099 payments that we received in [2017] and moving forward.”

3.   BLF does not appeal the specific amounts of the awards.

4.   The Wage Act does not define the term “wages.” In Russo v. OnPath Fed. Credit Union, 23-537 (La. App. 5 Cir. 5/29/24), 388 So. 3d 1274, 1279, the court explained, in pertinent part:Wages include compensation that is earned during a pay period. Whether a bonus constitutes a “wage” under La. R.S. 23:632, et seq. is mixed question of law and fact generally reviewed under the manifest error standard. Bonuses paid as part of an incentive plan to encourage longevity or production may be called “bonuses” but are more in the nature of commissions and are considered wages. (Internal citations omitted).

BALFOUR, J.