PATRICIA ANN DORDAN GILLEY ALEX MONTINEZ MITCHELL AND JACOB BRANDON LOWRING v. THE BOARD OF SUPERVISORS OF LOUISIANA STATE UNIVERSITY AND AGRICULTURAL AND MECHANICAL COLLEGE (2026)

Plaintiffs filed suit against the Board of Supervisors of Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical College (“the Board”) and sought injunctive relief and a declaratory judgment, alleging violations of Louisiana's Open Meetings Law, La. R.S. 42:11 et seq., and La. Const. Art. 12 § 3, in connection with a faculty due process hearing held on the Louisiana State University campus in Shreveport (“LSU-S”). Plaintiffs appeal the trial court's July 17, 2024 judgment that denied their requests for injunctive relief and declaratory judgment. As set forth herein, we affirm.

BACKGROUND

According to the record on appeal, Dr. Brian Salvatore—a non-party to this lawsuit—is a professor of chemistry with tenure at LSU-S. Dr. Salvatore earned tenure in 2007 and was promoted to a full professor in 2012. From 2016 to 2022, he served as Chairman of the Department of Chemistry and Physics at LSU-S.

By letter dated November 8, 2023, LSU-S Chancellor Robert T. Smith issued notice of his formal recommendation to commence faculty due process for the termination of Dr. Salvatore's tenure and employment at LSU-S. Pursuant to LSU-S Policy Statement 2.19.02, Chancellor Smith made his recommendation based on Dr. Salvatore's alleged “misconduct egregious enough to warrant discipline.”

Each of the eight campuses in the LSU system campus has developed its own policies and procedures for the removal of tenured faculty. Relevant to the instant matter, LSU-S Policy Statement 2.19.02—originally effective October 16, 2000 and revised September 10, 2001—is titled “SUBJECT: Faculty Due Process” and provides, in pertinent part:

I PURPOSE

To define the policies and procedures under which the University may discipline a faculty member for cause.

II DEFINITIONS

Insubordination is defined, generally, as disobedience to constituted authority and as refusal to obey some instruction which a university administrator or other authorized person is entitled to give and have obeyed. The term imports a willful or intentional disregard of the lawful and reasonable instructions of the university.

Cause is generally defined as “an impairment of the efficiency of the public service in which the conduct in question bears a real and substantial relation to the efficient and orderly operation of the public service.” Examples include, but are not limited to:

1. Failure to work efficiently or effectively;

2. Insubordination;

3. If the faculty member has been found responsible for professional or personal misconduct[,] such conduct may lead to dismissal for cause.

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III. DISCIPLINARY POLICIES AND PROCEDURES

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Article VII Section 4.d. of the Bylaws and Regulations of the Board of Supervisors of the Louisiana State University provides that “The Chancellor, after consultation with the appropriate academic and/or administrative staff, shall make recommendation to the President for ․ appointments, promotions, transfers, suspensions, and dismissals of all academic ․ employees subject to the approval of the President and confirmation of the Board.”

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IV. PROCEDURES

The following steps shall be taken in requesting review for dismissal for cause or other discipline. ․

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The faculty member will be notified of the charges against him/her, in writing, by the Chancellor. Such notice will also state that, upon the faculty member's request, a Committee will be appointed to conduct a hearing at a specified time and place, and he/she shall be advised of his/her right to respond to the charge(s), in writing. Such notice must include the charges in sufficient detail to enable the faculty member to prepare a defense. It is the faculty member's responsibility to arrange for his/her own advisor if he/she wishes to have someone present his/her case at the hearing․ In addition to having an advisor, the faculty member has the right to be represented by legal counsel at the hearing. (Legal counsel may not cross-examine witnesses or address the Hearing Committee but rather may only advise the faculty member.)

If a hearing on the charges is requested by the faculty member, a Hearing Committee composed of between five and seven members will be appointed. ․ The Chancellor, with full discretionary authority, shall appoint the committee and the members will be selected from faculty whose academic rank is equal to or higher than that of the accused faculty member. ․

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The faculty member shall have a right to attend the hearing; confront and cross-examine the adverse witnesses; present relevant evidence on his or her own behalf; and, testify or choose not to testify. The hearing shall be closed [,] although the faculty member may request that it be open to the public. Notwithstanding a faculty member's request, the Committee or the University may close all or a portion of a hearing if it appears likely that privacy or other interests are relevant and could be affected by an open hearing. All Committee deliberations will be in closed sessions.

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The Hearing Committee, by a majority of the total membership, shall make written findings on the material facts and a recommendation for appropriate action to the Chancellor. Such findings, the recommendations, any supplementary suggestions, and the record of the hearing shall be delivered to the Chancellor and a copy thereof sent to the faculty member. ․

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The Chancellor shall review the record, plus any additional written briefs the parties wish to submit, and render a decision, stating his/her reasons therefore in writing and communicating the same to the faculty member. ․ The Chancellor shall make his/her recommendation to the President subject to approval of the President and the confirmation of the Board of Supervisors of Louisiana State University.

In his November 8, 2023 notice, Chancellor Smith contended that for several years, Dr. Salvatore “made repeated false public statements about [LSU-S] and [LSU-S] employees, including statements alleging illegal activity.” He further alleged that Dr. Salvatore had “engaged in a persistent pattern of vindictive, bullying[,] and harassing conduct against other members of the university community, creating a toxic and hostile work environment.” Chancellor Smith listed thirteen charges, which contained a description of the facts and circumstances surrounding each charge, and a brief summary of LSU-S Policy Statement 2.19.02. Chancellor Smith also noted that Dr. Salvatore had received three official letters of reprimand, a failed Faculty Grievance (during which an LSU-S faculty committee found him responsible for “administrative noncompliance”), and a censure from the LSU-S Faculty Senate. Chancellor Smith placed Dr. Salvatore on administrative leave with pay and banned him from the LSU-S campus absent express permission from Human Resources.

The November 8, 2023 notice instituted formal termination proceedings against Dr. Salvatore. In response, Dr. Salvatore requested that a hearing committee be appointed to hear the charges against him at a due process hearing. In accordance with LSU-S Policy Statement 2.19.02, Chancellor Smith appointed five tenured full professors to comprise the hearing committee to hear the charges against Dr. Salvatore at a due process hearing.¹

In a letter dated March 6, 2024, LSU-S Provost and Vice-Chancellor for Academic Affairs, Dr. Helen Clare Taylor, informed Dr. Salvatore that his due process hearing was set for April 3, 2024 at 8:00 a.m. in the Chancellor's Board Room on the LSU-S campus. Pertinently, the letter stated, “The hearing shall be closed to the public.”

Counsel for Dr. Salvatore responded in a letter dated March 11, 2024, which stated, “Dr. Salvatore does not consent to a closed hearing and will require that the hearing be open in accordance with the Louisiana Open Meetings Law” and requested that the due process hearing “be converted to an open hearing.” Counsel for Dr. Salvatore cited Lewnau v. Board of Supervisors of Southern State University, 2019-0943 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1/9/20), 295 So.3d 419, writ denied sub nom., Lewnau v. Board of Supervisors of Southern State & Agricultural & Mechanical College, 2020-00240 (La. 5/1/20), 295 So.3d 937, in support of his position that the due process hearing be open in accordance with the Open Meetings Law.²

LSU System Deputy General Counsel, Carlton (Trey) Jones III, responded to counsel for Dr. Salvatore in a letter dated March 12, 2024. He stated that pursuant to LSU-S Policy Statement 2.19.02, “the hearing will be open to the public, subject to closure for privacy interests as may be necessary.” Mr. Jones disagreed with counsel for Dr. Salvatore that the rationale of the Lewnau case applied making Dr. Salvatore's due process hearing subject to the Open Meetings Law. Mr. Jones noted that unlike the grievance committee in the Lewnau case, Dr. Salvatore's hearing committee was formed pursuant to LSU-S Policy Statement 2.19.02 and is therefore not a public body subject to the Open Meetings Law because it is “neither a committee or subcommittee of, nor is it formed under ‘the authority and direction of,’ the [Board].” Additionally, Mr. Jones noted that Dr. Salvatore's due process hearing was scheduled for April 8, 2024. In a follow-up email dated April 7, 2024, Mr. Jones wrote:

[LSU-S] has honored Dr. Salvatore's request that [the] meeting be open to the public, and members of the public and media are welcome to attend. It is not a public forum, however, and any disruption of the proceedings will not be tolerated. Likewise, it is not an open meeting under the Open Meetings Law, and there will be no public comment or participation.”

Prior to the hearing, Dr. Salvatore filed two lawsuits.³ First, he filed suit in Louisiana's Nineteenth Judicial District Court on March 4, 2024, seeking relief pursuant to the Louisiana Public Records Act. See Salvatore v. Smith, Docket Number C-744903, Section 30, Nineteenth Judicial District Court, Parish of East Baton Rouge, State of Louisiana. Second, he filed suit in federal district court on April 4, 2024, seeking a temporary restraining order to prohibit LSU-S from proceeding with the April 8, 2024 due process hearing, as well as seeking injunctive relief and declaratory judgment. In a ruling and order dated April 7, 2024, the federal district court denied Dr. Salvatore's request for a temporary restraining order. See Salvatore v. Smith, No. CV 24-00270-BAJ-RLB (M.D. La. Apr. 7, 2024), 2024 WL 1521570. Pertinently, the federal district court noted:

[T]he April 8 hearing does not necessarily mean that [Dr. Salvatore] will be fired, and said hearing is not the final chance for [Dr. Salvatore] to argue his case. ․ Accordingly, [Dr. Salvatore's] potential termination fails to amount to the “immediate and irreparable harm necessary to justify the issuance of a temporary restraining order.”

Salvatore, 2024 WL 1521570 at * 1.

The due process hearing was held on April 8, 2024. The hearing was not advertised to the public, nor was there an agenda made for the hearing. Dr. Salvatore was present at the hearing and represented by counsel throughout, presented witnesses and evidence on his behalf, and cross-examined LSU-S's witnesses. The due process hearing was recorded, but no written minutes were taken.

Provost Taylor had informed Dr. Salvatore prior to the hearing that its locatio had been moved to the Webster Room of the LSU-S University Center, which is “a larger space to allow room for the witnesses and others.” The Webster Room accommodated approximately twenty-five to thirty-five seats for the public to observe the due process hearing. At the outset of the hearing, the Webster Room was filled with attendees, including at least one member of the press. The hearing committee did not prohibit attendees from recording the hearing on their cell phones. According to Mr. Jones, once the Webster Room reached capacity, LSU-S started “turning ․ observers away” “purely [as a] capacity issue.” Approximately ten to fifteen persons who wanted to attend the hearing had to wait outside the closed door of the Webster Room in the hallway and sign a wait list to secure a spot in line. Provost Taylor announced that the hearing was “not an open meeting”, and armed security officers escorted those waiting into a lobby area. However, as an attendee would leave the hearing, the officers allowed a person waiting to enter the Webster Room to “take their place.” According to Mr. Jones, when the due process hearing concluded, there were only two attendees remaining in the audience and “a bunch of empty chairs.”

Thereafter, in a letter dated April 23, 2024, the hearing committee issued its ruling, finding 5-0 in favor of LSU-S's position that Dr. Salvatore was in violation of LSU-S Policy Statement 2.19.02 and recommending to Chancellor Smith “a discipline of termination of employment from LSU-S.”

Following Dr. Salvatore's receipt of the hearing committee's recommendation, Dr. Salvatore sent additional information to Chancellor Smith for his consideration. After viewing the recording of the due process hearing, the materials submitted by Dr. Salvatore, and the report of the hearing committee, Chancellor Smith recommended to LSU System President Dr. William F. Tate IV that he “terminate Dr. Salvatore's tenure at [LSU-S].” Chancellor Smith submitted his recommendation to President Tate in a letter dated May 21, 2024.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On May 7, 2024, Plaintiffs—Patricia Ann Dordan Gilley, Alex Montinez Mitchell, and Jacob Brandon Lowring—filed suit against the Board. Plaintiffs averred that the Board, acting through LSU-S and the hearing committee, barred them from attending or observing Dr. Salvatore's April 8, 2024 due process hearing. Plaintiffs claimed the Board is a “public body created by La. Const. Art. [8] § 7” and that the hearing committee is also a public body, both of which are subject to the Open Meetings Law and La. Const. Art. 12 § 3. Plaintiffs alleged they “attempted to attend a meeting of the [hearing committee]” but “were not allowed to attend this meeting or observe this meeting.” Plaintiffs argued that the Board and hearing committee's actions violated the Open Meetings Law and La. Const. Art. 12 § 3.

Specifically, Plaintiffs alleged these violations by the Board, acting through LSU-S and the hearing committee, included: the decision to close Dr. Salvatore's April 8, 2024 due process hearing to the public without the requisite two-thirds vote of the hearing committee members (as recorded in the minutes, journal, or other official written proceedings of the hearing committee) needed to enter into executive session; the failure to record the votes of the hearing committee members in the minutes, journal, or other official written proceedings of the hearing committee; the failure to give written notice of Dr. Salvatore's April 8, 2024 due process hearing to the public; the failure to provide an agenda no later than twenty-four hours prior to the due process hearing; the failure to allow public comment during the due process hearing prior any vote being taken; the prohibition against recordings or live broadcasts of the due process hearing; the failure to keep written minutes of the due process hearing; and the hearing committee's recommendation to terminate Dr. Salvatore's tenure and employment.

Plaintiffs prayed for injunctive relief, as well as declaratory judgment, damages, reasonable attorney's fees, costs, litigation expenses, and all other general equitable relief. Pertinent to the instant matter, Plaintiffs prayed for a preliminary injunction as follows:

The [Board] be required to show cause ․ why a preliminary injunction should not issue, enjoining, restraining, and prohibiting [the Board] from enforcing, applying[,] and/or implementing any and all actions and decisions taken by it ․ in violation of [the] Open Meetings Law ․ and La[.] Const. Art. 12 § 3.”

Plaintiffs also prayed for declaratory judgment as follows:

That there be judgment in favor of Plaintiffs, and against [the Board], declaring that all actions taken by [the Board] as noted above were in violation of La. Const. Art. 12 § 3 and the Open Meetings Law are null and void[.]

The trial court signed an order setting Plaintiffs’ request for preliminary injunction and request for declaratory judgment for hearing on May 28, 2024.

Each plaintiff testified at the May 28, 2024 hearing. Mrs. Gilley, a friend of Dr. Salvatore, attended the April 8, 2024 due process hearing to support Dr. Salvatore and “to see whether the truth and transparency of our government agencies was ․ going to be in operation that day, because [she] had become somewhat concerned [in] that regard.” Mrs. Gilley had received notice of the due process hearing via a joint email from Dr. Salvatore and his attorney (who is presently Mrs. Gilley's attorney). When Mrs. Gilley arrived at the Webster Room with her husband (also attending in support of Dr. Salvatore) approximately ten minutes prior to the 8:30 a.m. start time of the hearing, they were “blocked from going any further” by several uniformed LSU-S security officers who were armed. Mrs. Gilley testified that a senior security officer told her that the hearing “was a closed meeting”, and Provost Taylor announced to the persons waiting that “this is not an open meeting.” Mrs. Gilley signed her name on a wait list to hold her place in line. After waiting for approximately two hours, at 10:30 a.m. an attendee left the Webster Room, and Mrs. Gilley was permitted to enter the due process hearing. She attended the hearing for approximately fifteen minutes, at which point the hearing committee recessed. She then left the LSU-S campus and did not attempt to reenter the due process hearing.

Jacob Brandon Lowring, a former student of Dr. Salvatore's, attempted to attend the April 8, 2024 due process hearing to support Dr. Salvatore. A few days prior, Mr. Lowring bumped into Dr. Salvatore at the grocery store and learned about the due process hearing. When he arrived at LSU-S the morning of the hearing, Mr. Lowring observed approximately ten to fifteen people standing in the hallway outside the closed door of the Webster Room, in addition to several police officers and Provost Taylor. Mr. Lowring testified that Provost Taylor “kept stating that ․ this is not an open meeting.” He signed his name to the roster to wait his turn to go into the hearing, and officers moved the persons out of the hallway into a lobby area to wait. After waiting for approximately forty-five minutes to attend the meeting, Mr. Lowring testified that he returned to work, as he had taken off that day.

Alex Mitchell, a former grounds supervisor of LSU-S, attempted to attend the April 8, 2024 due process hearing to support Dr. Salvatore. Mr. Mitchell testified that he learned about the hearing after Mr. Salvatore called him, in addition to hearing about the hearing on the radio. When Mr. Mitchell arrived five minutes prior to the start of the hearing, the Webster Room was already full, so he signed his name on the wait list. He testified that Provost Taylor announced the hearing “wasn't a public meeting.” Mr. Mitchell observed ten or twelve people waiting to attend the hearing, in addition to armed police officers guarding the door to the Webster Room. After waiting for thirty minutes, Mr. Mitchell left.

Dr. Salvatore also testified regarding the due process hearing. He stated that he witnessed people seeking to attend the due process hearing who were not allowed into the hearing. He also received text messages from people who were upset that they could not get into the Webster Room to attend the hearing. However, Dr. Salvatore also admitted that he witnessed members of the public being allowed entrance into the hearing. Dr. Salvatore testified that at the hearing, no recorded votes were taken; no discussion or votes about going into executive session were had; a court reporter was denied entrance; no written public notice was issued prior to the hearing; no agenda was provided; no public comment was allowed; and no minutes were taken. Dr. Salvatore admitted that he attended the entirety of the due process hearing along with his attorney; that he was able to present all identified witnesses at the hearing; and that a recording of the hearing was made.

Mr. Jones, who attended the due process hearing, testified that LSU-S's position regarding the due process hearing was that the hearing “could be open to the public. But it doesn't make it an open meeting under the [Open Meetings Law].” Mr. Jones indicated that LSU-S Policy Statement 2.19.02 is a “LSU-S policy for LSU-S faculty.” After Mr. Jones learned about a press release and radio discussions regarding the public's invitation to the hearing, he cautioned Dr. Salvatore's counsel about LSU-S's position regarding the hearing. Mr. Jones testified that “open to the public means something different․ than open meetings under the [Open Meetings Law].”

Plaintiffs’ counsel offered, filed, and introduced the following into evidence: the March 6, 2024 letter from Provost Taylor; LSU-S Policy Statement 2.19.02; the March 11, 2024 letter from Dr. Salvatore's counsel to Mr. Jones; the March 12, 2024 letter from Mr. Jones to Dr. Salvatore's counsel; the April 23, 2024 recommendation of the hearing committee; the May 24, 2024 email from Provost Taylor regarding the due process hearing; and LSU Policy Permanent Memorandum 69.

Counsel for the Board offered, filed, and introduced the following into evidence: the federal district court complaint filed by Dr. Salvatore on April 4, 2024 in Salvatore v. Smith, No. CV 24-00270-BAJ-RLB; the ruling and order dated April 7, 2024 in Salvatore v. Smith, No. CV 24-00270-BAJ-RLB (M.D. La. Apr. 7, 2024), 2024 WL 1521570; the November 8, 2023 notice of Chancellor Smith's formal recommendation to commence faculty due process for the termination of Dr. Salvatore's tenure and employment at LSU-S; the April 7, 2024 email from Mr. Jones to counsel for Dr. Salvatore regarding the hearing; LSU Policy Permanent Memorandum 79; the petition filed by Dr. Salvatore in Salvatore v. Smith, Docket Number C-744903, Section 30, Nineteenth Judicial District Court, Parish of East Baton Rouge, State of Louisiana; and Chancellor Smith's May 21, 2024 recommendation to President Tate that Dr. Salvatore's tenure and employment at LSU-S be terminated.

At the conclusion of counsels’ arguments, the trial court recessed, then issued its oral ruling, denying Plaintiffs’ request for preliminary injunction and request for declaratory judgment. In accordance with its oral ruling, the trial court signed a judgment on July 17, 2024 that denied Plaintiffs’ request for preliminary injunction and denied Plaintiffs’ request for declaratory judgment. Plaintiffs now appeal.⁴

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

On appeal, Plaintiffs assign the following as error to the trial court's July 17, 2024 judgment:

[1.] The trial court committed a reversible error by declining to provide any remedy for [LSU-S's] violation of Louisiana's Open Meetings law, contrary to the mandatory language of La. R.S. 42:24.

[2.] The trial court erred in failing to void the actions taken in connection with [LSU-S's] April 8, 2024 [due process] hearing, despite a finding that [LSU-S] violated the Open Meetings Law.

[3.] The trial court erred in not issuing an injunction or other orders to enforce compliance with the Open Meetings Law and to prevent further violations by [LSU-S], as authorized under La. R.S. 42:26(A).

[4.] The trial court erred in signing a judgment[,] which denied the Plaintiffs’ request for declaratory relief.

[5.] The trial court erred in declining to award Plaintiffs reasonable attorney fees and costs, as provided under La. R.S. 42:26(C).

LAW AND DISCUSSION

Louisiana's Open Meetings Law

The Louisiana state constitution sets forth that “[n]o person shall be denied the right to observe the deliberations of public bodies and examine public documents, except in cases established by law.” La. Const. Art. 12 § 3. In furtherance of that fundamental right, the Louisiana Legislature enacted the Open Meetings Law, La. R.S. 42:11 et seq. Lewnau, 295 So.3d at 424. As pertinently set forth in La. R.S. 42:12(A), “[i]t is essential to the maintenance of a democratic society that public business be performed in an open and public manner and that the citizens be advised of and aware of the performance of public officials and the deliberations and decisions that go into the making of public policy.” To meet this policy objective, the provisions of the Open Meetings Law, “shall be construed liberally.” La. R.S. 42:12(A). Any person who has been denied any rights conferred by the Open Meetings Law or who has reason to believe that the Open Meetings Law has been violated may institute enforcement proceedings. La. R.S. 42:25(C). Any action taken in violation of the Open Meetings Law is voidable by a court of competent jurisdiction. La. R.S. 42:24.

As set forth in La. R.S. 42:26(A), in any enforcement proceeding, the plaintiff may seek, and the court may grant, any or all of the following forms of relief: a writ of mandamus; injunctive relief; declaratory judgment; judgment rendering the action void (as provided in La. R.S. 42:24); and/or judgment awarding civil penalties (as provided in La. R.S. 42:28). If a party who brings an enforcement action under La. R.S. 42:25 prevails, the party shall be awarded reasonable attorney's fees and other costs of litigation. La. R.S. 42:26(C).⁵

In an action to enforce the Open Meetings Law under La. R.S. 42:25-28, the trial court has original jurisdiction, and the appellate court reviews the trial court's findings for errors of law or manifest errors of fact. See La. R.S. 42:25(C) and 42:27(A); Rushing v. Southeastern Louisiana University, 2022-0032 (La. App. 1 Cir. 9/16/22), 2022 WL 4286824, *4 (unpublished), writ denied, 2022-01723 (La. 2/14/23), 355 So.3d 618. Under the manifest error standard, to reverse a trial court's factual conclusion, the appellate court must satisfy a two-step process based on the record as a whole—there must be no reasonable factual basis for the trial court's conclusion, and the finding must be clearly wrong. Rushing, 2022 WL 4286824 at *4.

Injunctive Relief

In their first three assignments of error, Plaintiffs contend that the trial court erred by finding that the Board violated the Open Meetings Law but then declining to provide any remedy, such as voiding the actions of the hearing committee or issuing injunctive relief, when it ruled that the Board's violations were merely “technical.”

Plaintiffs sought injunctive relief to prohibit the Board from enforcing, applying, and/or implementing any actions or decisions of the hearing committee in violation of the Open Meetings Law and La. Const. Art. 12 § 3. The only conduct of the hearing committee that could be enjoined is its April 23, 2024 recommendation that Dr. Salvatore's tenure and employment at LSU-S be terminated. In the instant matter, Plaintiffs did not request to enjoin the Board from conducting a due process hearing in violation of the Open Meetings Law or La. Const. Art. 12 § 3. Rather, Plaintiffs sought to enjoin any potential future implementation of the hearing committee's recommendation that Dr. Salvatore's tenure and employment at LSU-S be terminated. Plaintiffs’ request for injunctive relief was an attempt to remedy what Plaintiffs alleged were the hearing committee's alleged past violations of the Open Meetings Law and La. Const. Art. 12 § 3.⁶

In an action to enforce the Open Meetings Law pursuant to La. R.S. 42:25 - 28, the trial court has original jurisdiction, and this court reviews its findings for errors of law or manifest errors of fact. See La. R.S. 42:25(C) and 42:27(A); Rushing, 2022 WL 4286824 at *4.

Louisiana Revised Statutes 42:26 provides the remedies available in Open Meetings Law enforcement proceedings. Parker v. Livingston Parish Government, 2025-0039 (La. App. 1 Cir. 10/8/25), 423 So.3d 255, 269. It specifies that the court “may grant any or all” of the forms of relief provides therein, and injunctive relief is specifically listed as a form of relief the court may grant. La. R.S. 42:26(A)(2); Parker, 423 So.3d at 269. Moreover, La. R.S. 42:26(B) provides that the trial court “has jurisdiction and authority to issue all necessary orders to require compliance with, or to prevent noncompliance with, or to declare the rights of parties under the provisions of this Chapter.” Further, La. R.S. 42:27(B) directs that “[e]nforcement proceedings shall be tried by preference in a summary manner.” Read in pari materia, the statutes provide that the trial court must hear Open Meetings Law claims summarily and preferentially, and the trial court is empowered to issue all necessary orders to enforce the provisions of the Open Meetings Law—including injunctive relief. Parker, 423 So.3d at 269.

As stated supra, La. R.S. 42:26(A) provides the various remedies for violations of the Open Meetings Law (including injunctive relief) and states that “the court may grant any or all of the [enumerated] forms of relief[.]” (Emphasis added). A cardinal rule of statutory interpretation is that the word “may” is permissive and the word “shall” is mandatory. La. R.S. 1:3; Rushing, 2022 WL 4286824 at *7. Louisiana Revised Statutes 42:26(A) makes clear that upon a finding of a violation of the Open Meetings Law, the trial court has the authority and discretion to grant any or all relief that it deems necessary. Where La. R.S. 42:26(A) provides that the trial court “may” grant relief, as opposed to “shall” grant relief, the grant of such relief is permissive, not mandatory. Rushing, 2022 WL 4286824 at *7.

Thus, even if the trial court were to have found in the instant matter that Plaintiffs met their burden of proving entitlement to injunctive relief, the trial court maintained the discretion to determine the relief, if any, that should be granted for any purported violations of the Open Meetings Law. See Rushing, 2022 WL 4286824 at *7. For these reasons, we conclude the trial court did not err in denying Plaintiffs’ request for injunctive relief.⁷

Declaratory Judgment

In their fourth assignment of error, Plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred in deciding the merits of their request for declaratory judgment at a summary hearing on their request for injunctive relief. Plaintiffs contend that they did not request that the trial court decide the merits of their request for declaratory judgment, which the Plaintiffs argue they intend to seek “in the future.”

Plaintiffs herein utilized a summary proceeding to seek a “preliminary injunction.” The Code of Civil Procedure contemplates the use of summary proceedings for the issuance of a preliminary injunction. See La. C.C.P. arts. 3601-3602, 2592(1), (13); Singleton, 353 So.3d at 173. Summary proceedings are those which are conducted with rapidity, within the delays allowed by the court, and without citation and the observance of all the formalities required in ordinary proceedings. La. C.C.P. art. 2591; Singleton, 353 So.3d at 173. A preliminary injunction is essentially an interlocutory order issued in summary proceedings incidental to the main demand for permanent injunctive relief. Louisiana Convenience & Vape Store Association, Inc. v. Legier, 2024-0730 (La. App. 1 Cir. 12/27/24), 404 So.3d 1018, 1022.

In addition to seeking injunctive relief, Plaintiffs’ petition also requested declaratory judgment.⁸ Generally, a suit for declaratory judgment is an ordinary proceeding. Singleton, 353 So.3d at 173. In some cases, the merits of an action may be decided during an interlocutory proceeding; however, this is only when the parties have expressly agreed to submit the case for final decision at the hearing on the rule for preliminary injunction.⁹ Zachary Mitigation Area, LLC v. Tangipahoa Parish Council, 2016-1675 (La. App. 1 Cir. 9/21/17), 231 So.3d 687, 692.

The order signed by the trial court on May 14, 2024, submitted by Plaintiffs’ with their petition, set a hearing for May 28, 2024 for the Board to show cause why the trial court “should not find and determine that the [Board], through [LSU-S] and [the hearing committee], violated La. Const. Art. 12 § 3 and the Louisiana Open Meetings Law;” and why a “preliminary injunction should not issue, enjoining, restraining, and prohibiting [the Board] from enforcing, applying and/or implementing any and all actions taken in violation of the Open Meetings Law and La. Const. Art. 12 § 3[.]” At the May 28, 2024 hearing, the trial court indicated that it was ready to proceed with hearing the Plaintiffs’ petition for declaratory and injunctive relief pursuant to the Open Meetings Law. However, the Board objected to the trial court hearing Plaintiffs’ request for preliminary injunctive relief combined with Plaintiffs’ request for declaratory judgment in the same proceeding:

The rule that set the hearing today sought to address or ask the court to make a declaratory judgment. And a declaratory judgment is not appropriate on a summary proceeding like this preliminary injunction hearing. So certainly, if the court's going to entertain a preliminary injunction, the court has authority to do that. The court does not have authority at this time to render any declaratory relief relative to anything on Open Meetings Law or otherwise. That would need to be reserved for hearing in ordinary course in an ordinary proceeding.

The record on appeal also shows that after the trial court's oral ruling at the conclusion of the May 28, 2024 hearing, counsel for all parties attempted to agree on a proposed judgment to submit to the trial court for signing. Plaintiffs’ counsel stated: “Plaintiffs have not consented to a trial on the merits of the request for declaratory judgment via summary process.”

On appeal, Plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred in rendering a judgment denying Plaintiffs’ request for a declaratory judgment. In opposition, the Board contends on appeal that Plaintiffs cannot now complain about the procedure they requested in their order setting the hearing which resulted in the denial of their request for declaratory judgment.¹⁰

The Open Meetings Law pertinently sets forth that “[e]nforcement proceedings shall be trial by preference and in a summary manner.” La. R.S. 42:27(B). As discussed supra, La. R.S. 42:26(A) provides the remedies available in Open Meetings Law enforcement proceedings and specifies that the trial court “may grant any or all” of the forms of relief provided for therein—including declaratory judgment. (Emphasis added). Moreover, La. R.S. 42:26(B) sets forth that the trial court “has jurisdiction and authority to issue all necessary orders to require compliance with, or to prevent noncompliance with, or to declare the rights of parties under the provisions of [the Open Meetings Law].” Read in pari materia, these statutes provide that the trial court must hear Open Meetings Law claims summarily and preferentially, and that the trial court is empowered to issue all necessary orders to enforce the provisions of the Open Meetings Law—including injunctive relief and declaratory judgment. Thus, claims brought under the Open Meetings Law must proceed via summary process.¹¹ La. R.S. 42:27(B); Parker, 423 So.3d at 269. Accordingly, we find no error in the trial court's decision to hear the merits of Plaintiffs’ request for declaratory judgment at a summary hearing on their request for injunctive relief.

At the conclusion of counsels’ arguments at the May 28, 2024 hearing, the trial court recessed, then issued its oral ruling, pertinently transcribed as follows:

The question for the court today was whether or not the [Board] ․ failed to adhere to the Open Meetings Law. ․ I don't think anybody would argue that [the] LSU System or the [Board] is not a public body.

***

So from what was tendered to the court as far as the evidence and the argument to the court, it's clear that LSU, the [Board], has del[eg]ated this type of authority to [the] pres[id]ent of the LSU System[ ]. Furthermore, it is clear from the evidence that that was del[eg]ated down [to] the Chancellor and that the Chancellor had to go through a process of appoint[ing] five members to hear the complaint against [Dr. Salvatore]. So for the purposes of this hearing, I do believe that this is a committee or subcommittee of the LSU System[ ] or the [Board]. Therefore, this meeting should have been subject to the Open Meetings Law. ․ However, they are a technical violation of this Open Meeting[s] Law. [Dr.] Salvatore was represented by counsel. He took part in the process. He offered testimony [and] evidence. ․ And the fact that the three named Plaintiff[s] in this matter were there to show support for [Dr.] Salvatore ․ more than likely would not have changed the decision of the [hearing] committee to recommend to the Chancellor the termination of [Dr.] Salvatore.

***

[T]he court finds that this matter should have been subject to the ․ Open Meetings Law. ․ So the [Board] is technically in violation of the Open Meetings Law. However, it would not have changed the outcome, so I do not think that [Dr.] Salvatore, based on the information and the evidence presented to this court, is entitled to any relief. So I will be denying the motion for declaratory and injunctive relief, at this time.

After reviewing the entirety of the record on appeal, we must agree with the trial court that the hearing committee—appointed by LSU-S Chancellor Smith to hear Dr. Salvatore's charges at a due process hearing pursuant to LSU-S Policy Statement 2.19.02—constitutes a committee or subcommittee of the Board and is thus a public body as defined by the Open Meetings Law.

The Board of Supervisors of Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical College was created by La. Const. Art. 8 § 7 and granted exclusive administrative power to supervise and manage the institution and other programs administered through its system. See Student Government Association of Louisiana State University & Agricultural & Mechanical College, Main Campus, Baton Rouge v. Board of Supervisors of Louisiana State University & Agricultural & Mechanical College, 264 So.2d 916, 917 (La. 1972). The Louisiana State University system is composed of the institutions under the supervision and management of the Board, including LSU-S. See La. R.S. 17:3215(7). Pursuant to LSU-S Policy Statement 2.19.02, which was developed by LSU-S, the Board (or the LSU-S Chancellor, under the authority of and at the direction of the Board) may refer faculty due process charges to a hearing committee, whose members are appointed by the LSU-S Chancellor to consider disciplinary actions against faculty members for cause. Because faculty due process matters are referred by the LSU-S Chancellor—acting under the authority of and at the direction of the Board—to a hearing committee for consideration, the rationale in Lewnau, 295 So.3d at 425-27, supports the trial court's conclusion that the LSU-S hearing committee functions as a committee or subcommittee of the Board and is therefore a public body subject to the Open Meetings Law.

Furthermore, we also agree with the trial court that technical violations of the Open Meetings Law occurred in the instant matter. We likewise agree with the trial court that such violations do not offer Plaintiffs any grounds for relief under the facts presented here. The Open Meetings Law was designed to allow the public to observe and evaluate public officials, public conduct, and public institutions and is meant to protect citizens from secret decisions made without any opportunity for public input. Daigre v. Terrebonne Association for Retarded Citizens, 543 So.2d 1108, 1109 (La. App. 1 Cir.), writ denied, 548 So.2d 333 (La. 1989).

It is impossible to say here that Plaintiffs were denied any rights personally as Plaintiffs were aware of the due process hearing and attended or attempted to attend the due process hearing. Mrs. Gilley actually attended the due process hearing. When the hearing committee recessed, she left the meeting room and the LSU-S campus and did not attempt to reenter the due process hearing. Mr. Lowring and Mr. Mitchell attempted to attend the due process hearing. Arriving at the Webster Room on the LSU-S campus, both men signed their names to a wait list to be permitted entry to the due process hearing once a space opened up. After waiting for some time, both men left without entering the Webster Room or attending the due process hearing. The evidence shows, however, had Mr. Lowring and Mr. Mitchell waited for some time longer, they would have in all likelihood been permitted entry to the due process hearing. According to the testimony of Mr. Jones (counsel for LSU-S), at the conclusion of the due process hearing, there were only two attendees remaining in the audience and “a bunch of empty chairs.” And although he is not a party to this lawsuit, we additionally note that Dr. Salvatore was also not denied any rights personally since he attended the entirety of the due process hearing with his attorney; presented witnesses; offered testimony and evidence; and a recording of the due process hearing was made. Based on the facts of the instant matter, we agree with the trial court that these mere “technical violations” of the Open Meetings Law do not afford Plaintiffs any grounds for relief. See Rushing, 2022 WL 4286824 at *7.

And, as discussed supra, La. R.S. 42:26(A) provides the various remedies for violations of the Open Meetings Law (including declaratory judgment) and states that “the court may grant any or all of the [enumerated] forms of relief,” making clear that upon a finding of a violation of the Open Meetings Law, the trial court has the authority and discretion to grant any or all relief that it deems necessary. Rushing, 2022 WL 4286824 at *7. Thus, even though the trial court found that the Board violated the Open Meetings Law in the instant matter, the trial court maintained the discretion to determine the relief, if any, that should be granted for any purported violations. See Rushing, 2022 WL 4286824 at *7.

Based on the foregoing, we find that the trial court did not err in dismissing Plaintiffs’ request for declaratory judgment.

DECREE

We affirm the trial court's July 17, 2024 judgment that denied Plaintiffs’—Patricia Ann Dordan Gilley, Alex Montinez Mitchell, and Jacob Brandon Lowring—request for injunctive relief and request for declaratory judgment. All costs of this appeal are assessed to Plaintiffs—Patricia Ann Dordan Gilley, Alex Montinez Mitchell, and Jacob Brandon Lowring.

AFFIRMED.

Although I agree with the ultimate result expressed in the majority opinion, I concur because I would find that the doctrine of judicial estoppel bars the plaintiffs’ argument that the trial court erred in ruling upon their request for declaratory judgment. In determining whether to apply the doctrine of judicial estoppel, courts look to whether (1) the party against whom judicial estoppel is sought has asserted a legal position which is plainly inconsistent with a prior position; (2) a court accepted the prior position; and (3) the party did not act inadvertently. Hancock Bank of Louisiana v. C & O Enterprises, LLC, 2014-0542 (La. App. 1 Cir. 12/23/14), 168 So.3d 595, 600, writ denied, 2015-0621 (La. 5/22/15), 171 So.3d 251. Each of these factors is met in the instant case.

Relevantly, the plaintiffs in this matter requested declaratory relief (among other relief) in their initial petition. In paragraph 23 of the petition, the plaintiffs requested that the following actions be declared null and void due to the defendant's violation of the Open Meetings Law: the defendant's decision to close the meeting and any related votes to close the meeting; the decision to terminate Dr. Salvatore; and the decision to go into executive session without first obtaining the requisite 2/3 vote from its members. Further, in paragraph 24 of the petition, the plaintiffs requested that the trial court declare the following to be in violation of the Open Meetings Law: the defendant's holding of a closed hearing, removal of the plaintiffs from the hearing, and barring of the public from attending; the defendant's failure to permit public comment before recommending termination; the defendant's failure to permit any recordation; the defendant's failure to record the true reason for entering the executive session on that date; and the defendant's failure to provide sufficient written notice of the meeting and keep written minutes of the meeting. The plaintiffs also requested that the defendant be ordered to show cause why the trial court should not determine that it had violated La. Const, art. 12 § 3 and the Open Meetings Law. In other words, the plaintiffs sought a determination of the merits of their claims pursuant to La. Const. art. 12 § 3 and the Open Meetings Law.

At the beginning of the hearing on the plaintiffs’ request for preliminary injunction and request for declaratory judgment, the trial court acknowledged that the plaintiffs’ petition for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief pursuant to the Open Meetings law was before the court. This is also reflected in the minute entry for the May 28, 2024 hearing. More importantly, during arguments at this hearing, the plaintiffs’ attorney stated the following: “We're asking the court to look at Paragraphs 23 and 24 of the petition and to grant the relief that is ․ [requested in] those paragraphs.” Paragraphs 23 and 24 contain the plaintiffs’ request for declaratory judgment. Thus, the plaintiffs’ attorney specifically asked the court to rule upon the plaintiffs’ request for declaratory judgment. The defendant's attorney objected, arguing that a declaratory judgment is not appropriate in a summary proceeding like the preliminary injunction hearing. Despite this objection, the plaintiffs’ attorney never withdrew the request for declaratory judgment.

The plaintiffs, who now argue on appeal that the trial court erred in ruling on their request for declaratory judgment, are asserting a legal position inconsistent with their prior position. The trial court accepted the prior position even after hearing the defendant's arguments against ruling upon the request for declaratory judgment at that time. The plaintiffs do not allege that their request for declaratory judgment at the hearing was inadvertent; rather, the plaintiffs deny having asked the trial court to decide the merits of their request for a declaratory judgment despite their attorney's request at the hearing that the trial court grant the declarations requested in Paragraphs 23 and 24. Considering the foregoing, I would find that the plaintiffs are judicially estopped from challenging the trial court's usage of a procedure specifically requested by the plaintiffs. See Hancock Bank of Louisiana v. C & O Enterprises, LLC, 168 So.3d at 600.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The hearing committee members were Timothy M. Shaughnessy, Yong Dai, Meredith Nelson, Richard Watson, and Cheryl White.

2.   In Lewnau, current and former faculty members in the Department of Speech-Language Pathology and Audiology at Southern University and Agricultural and Mechanical College's (“Southern”) Baton Rouge campus filed a joint grievance with Southern, alleging illegal workplace practices and seeking to address employment matters, including the termination of two faculty members, the removal of one faculty member as the director of the department's graduate program, and the reduction of one faculty member's salary. Southern notified the faculty members that the Southern University System Grievance Committee (“Grievance Committee”) would review their joint grievance and make recommendations, and a grievance hearing would be scheduled. Lewnau, 295 So.3d at 421. During the grievance hearing, the faculty members responded to the committee chairperson, through counsel, that they “wished to have an open meeting”; however, the chairperson announced that the hearing would be closed. Following brief opening statements given by each faculty member, they—along with their attorney and a journalist—were involuntarily removed from the hearing. Lewnau, 295 So.3d at 422.The faculty members filed suit against Southern, alleging violations of the Louisiana Constitution and the Open Meetings Law. Lewnau, 295 So.3d at 422-23. Following hearings on an exception of no cause of action filed by Southern and the faculty members’ request for injunctive and declaratory judgment, the trial court ruled that the Grievance Committee constituted a “public body” for purposes of the Open Meetings Law and therefore violated the law and La. Const. Art. 12 § 3 by voting to close the hearing to the public and removing the faculty members and their attorney from the hearing. Lewnau, 295 So.3d at 423-24.On appeal, this court affirmed, finding that Southern University's Board of Supervisors was created by La. Const. Art. 8, § 7 and granted exclusive administrative power to supervise and manage the institution, statewide agricultural program, and other programs administered through its system. Lewnau, 295 So.3d at 425. The Southern University Board of Supervisors (or the President-Chancellor, under the authority and at the direction of Southern's Board) refers business, such as employee grievances, to the Grievance Committee for consideration, investigation, oversight, or action. Lewnau, 295 So.3d at 426. Accordingly, this court held that since the Grievance Committee was a committee or subcommittee of the Southern University Board of Supervisors, the Grievance Committee was a public body as defined by the Open Meetings Law. Lewnau, 295 So.3d at 427.

3.   Documentation of these other courts’ proceedings was offered, filed, and introduced into evidence at the May 28, 2024 hearing on Plaintiffs’ request for preliminary injunction. See Pinegar v. Harris, 2006-2489 (La. App. 1 Cir. 5/4/07), 961 So.2d 1246, 1249. (“Although a court may take judicial notice of its own proceedings, [La. C.E. art.] 202 does not allow courts to take judicial notice of other courts’ proceedings. Documentation of other courts’ proceedings must be offered into evidence in the usual manner.”).

4.   Plaintiffs filed a motion for appeal on July 30, 2024. The trial court signed an order of appeal on August 5, 2024, notice of which was transmitted by the Clerk of Court to the parties on August 15, 2024.

5.   Any member of a public body who knowingly and willfully participates in a meeting conducted in violation of the Open Meetings Law shall be subject to a civil penalty not to exceed five hundred dollars per violation. The member shall be personally liable for the payment of such penalty. La. R.S. 42:28.

6.   We recognize that Dr. Salvatore did seek a TRO and preliminary injunction in federal district court; however, his arguments before that court centered on violations of his first amendment rights, due process rights, and violations of the Louisiana Administrative Procedures Act, La. R.S. 49:950 et seq., and the Louisiana Public Records Law, La. R.S. 41:1 et seq. There is nothing in the record on appeal showing that Plaintiffs filed any other lawsuits regarding alleged violations of the Open Meetings Law or La. Const. Art. 12 § 3 in connection with the April 8, 2024 due process hearing.

7.   Based on our ruling on Plaintiffs’ first three assignments of error, we decline to address Plaintiffs’ fifth assignment of error, whether the trial court erred in declining to award Plaintiffs reasonable attorney's fees and costs pursuant to La. R.S. 42:26(C).

8.   The purpose of the declaratory judgment articles of the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure is to settle and afford relief from uncertainty and insecurity with respect to rights, status, and other legal relations, and they are to be liberally construed and administered. La. C.C.P. arts. 1871, 1881; Singleton, 353 So.3d at 174 n.22. A declaratory judgment simply establishes the rights of the parties or expresses the opinion of the court on a question of law without ordering anything to be done. Singleton, 353 So.3d at 174 n.22. We review a trial court's decision to grant or deny a declaratory judgment under the “abuse of discretion” standard of review. Singleton, 353 So.3d at 174 n.22. The scope of appellate review under the “abuse of discretion” standard is confined to a determination of whether or not the trial court abused its discretion by granting or refusing to render a declaratory judgment. Singleton, 353 So.3d at 174 n.22.

9.   Generally, absent a stipulation between the parties agreeing to dispose of the entirety of the case during the preliminary injunction proceeding, a rule for a preliminary injunction cannot replace a trial on the merits. Vienne v. State Through Division of Administration, 2023-0983 (La. App. 1 Cir. 5/31/24), 2024 WL 27903 78, *6 (unpublished).

10.   The Board further argues that because Plaintiffs did not withdraw their request for declaratory judgment after the Board objected during the May 28, 2024 hearing, the issue has been waived, and as the appellants, Plaintiffs cannot now object to the procedure utilized by the trial court for the first time on appeal. Based on our ruling on Plaintiffs’ fourth assignment of error, we pretermit any discussion of this specific argument.

11.   Furthermore, the Open Meetings Law does not specifically reference preliminary and permanent injunctive relief. Rather, it allows the district court to issue injunctive relief “in a summary manner.” Parker, 423 So.3d at 269.

EDWARDS, J.

McClendon, C.J. concurs in the result. Theriot, J. concurs with reasons.