STATE OF LOUISIANA v. EDDIE OXNER (2026)

The State of Louisiana charged the defendant, Eddie Dwayne Oxner, by bill of information with possession of a schedule II controlled dangerous substance less than two grams (methamphetamine), in violation of La. R.S. 40:967(C)(1).¹ The defendant entered a plea of not guilty. Following a jury trial, a unanimous six-person jury found the defendant guilty as charged. The trial court sentenced the defendant to two years imprisonment, with the sentence being suspended and placed the defendant on two years of supervised probation. The trial court also ordered the defendant to pay a $500.00 fine plus court costs.

The defendant now appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in overruling the defense's objections to the State's closing argument and that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to uphold his conviction. We affirm the defendant's conviction and sentence.

FACTS

On April 27, 2021, at approximately 10:00 p.m., Washington Parish Sheriff's Office (“WPSO”) Sergeant Allen Dupuy stopped a red pickup truck travelling northbound on Highway 21 that did not have a visible license plate. The vehicle had been driven by the defendant, and his wife, Cindy L. Oxner, was a passenger in the front seat. Sgt. Dupuy approached the vehicle, shined a light inside, and saw a clear plastic baggie with white residue and the end of a glass pipe on the front driver's side floorboard, next to the defendant's leg. Sgt. Dupuy asked the defendant whether he had anything illegal on him or in the vehicle. The defendant said he possibly had a small amount of methamphetamine in the watch pocket of his pants.² Sgt. Dupuy arrested the defendant and his wife after Sgt. Dupuy found additional methamphetamine and an oxycodone pill in Mrs. Oxner's purse.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR TWO: SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

In his second assignment of error, the defendant argues the State failed to present sufficient evidence to uphold his conviction. When issues are raised on appeal both as to the sufficiency of the evidence and as to one or more trial errors, the reviewing court should first determine the sufficiency of the evidence. See State v. Hearold, 603 So.2d 731, 734 (La. 1992).

Law: Sufficiency of the Evidence

A conviction based on insufficient evidence cannot stand, as it violates due process. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1; La. Const. art. I, § 2. The standard of review for sufficiency of evidence to support a conviction is whether, viewing in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the State proved the essential elements of the crime and the defendant's identity as the perpetrator of that crime beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560, 573 (1979); La. C.Cr.P. art. 821(B); State v. Coleman, 2021-0870 (La. App. 1 Cir. 4/8/22), 342 So.3d 7, 11, writ denied, 2022-00759 (La. 11/21/23), 373 So.3d 460. The Jackson standard of review, incorporated in La. C.Cr.P. art. 821, is an objective standard for testing the overall evidence, both direct and circumstantial, for reasonable doubt. When analyzing circumstantial evidence, La. R.S. 15:438 provides that the factfinder must be satisfied the overall evidence excludes every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. State v. Patorno, 2001-2585 (La. App. 1 Cir. 6/21/02), 822 So.2d 141, 144. When a case involves circumstantial evidence and the jury reasonably rejects the hypothesis of innocence presented by the defense, that hypothesis fails, and the defendant is guilty unless there is another hypothesis that raises a reasonable doubt. State v. Bessie, 2021-1117 (La. App. 1 Cir. 4/8/22), 342 So.3d 17, 22, writ denied, 2022-00846 (La. 9/20/22), 346 So.3d 802.

Law: Possession of a Schedule II Controlled Dangerous Substance

It is unlawful for any person to knowingly or intentionally possess a controlled dangerous substance classified in Schedule II of the Uniform Controlled Dangerous Substances Law. La. R.S. 40:967(C). Methamphetamine is a controlled dangerous substance classified in Schedule II. La. R.S. 40:964, Schedule 11(C)(2). To support a conviction for possession, the State must prove the defendant knowingly or intentionally possessed methamphetamine. La. R.S. 40:967(C); State v. Ferguson, 2015-0427 (La. App. 1 Cir. 9/18/15), 181 So.3d 120, 129, writ denied, 2015-1919 (La. 11/18/16), 210 So.3d 282. Guilty knowledge is an essential element of the crime of possession of a controlled dangerous substance. Ferguson, 181 So.3d at 130. Whether an accused knows a substance he possesses is a narcotic may be proven by direct or circumstantial evidence. Ferguson, 181 So.3d at 129-30. A conviction for possession of a controlled dangerous substance may rest on the possession of mere traces or residue of the substance, even absent admissions by the defendant, which might constitute guilty knowledge. Ferguson, 181 So.3d at 130.

Evidence and Testimony Presented by the State at Trial

On April 27, 2021, around 10:00 p.m., WPSO Sgt. Dupuy stopped the defendant because Sgt. Dupuy did not observe a visible license plate on the vehicle being driven by the defendant. Sgt. Dupuy testified that when he approached the defendant's vehicle and shined his light into the truck, he observed “a clear plastic baggie with what appeared to be little white residue in it and the end of a glass pipe” on the front driver's side floorboard, next to the defendant's leg. After learning that the defendant was driving with a suspended license, Sgt. Dupuy asked the defendant whether he had anything illegal on his person or in his vehicle. In response, the defendant stated that he possibly had a small amount of methamphetamine in the watch pocket of his pants. Sgt. Dupuy collected the plastic bag from the defendant, along with the glass pipe. Sgt. Dupuy further testified the glass pipe was of the type commonly used to smoke drugs. He indicated the bottom of the pipe appeared to have been burned.

Jill Jennings with the St. Tammany Parish Sheriff's Office Crime Lab testified as an expert in drug analysis. Ms. Jennings wrote a scientific analysis report on the evidence recovered by police. Ms. Jennings tested two plastic bags and one pill. She determined the plastic bags contained methamphetamine, and the pill contained oxycodone. One of the clear plastic bags contained 0.371 grams of methamphetamine and was labeled as “[w]atch pocket of Mr. Eddie's jeans[.]”

Testimony Presented by the Defense at Trial

The defendant, a Foxworth, Mississippi resident, testified that he and his wife, Mrs. Oxner, were travelling in Washington Parish, Louisiana to attend his sister's wake. The defendant stopped at a service station on his way home to check the oil in his truck. According to the defendant, once Sgt. Dupuy pulled over their vehicle, Mrs. Oxner handed the defendant a “baggie and a pipe.” On cross-examination, the defendant admitted that he did not tell the police officer that the drugs in his pocket came from Mrs. Oxner. The defendant testified that he did not know what Mrs. Oxner had handed him; however, he testified that he took it from her anyway because Mrs. Oxner had brain cancer and lung cancer. The defendant stated that he did not want to get his wife “in trouble.” The defendant admitted that even though he was not sure what was in the baggie, he did tell police it was “[p]ossibly” methamphetamine.

Analysis and Discussion

The defendant argues the State failed to prove “he intended to possess the drug or that he unequivocally knew the substance inside the plastic baggie was methamphetamine.” The defendant contends he did not know what was in the plastic baggie, figuring it was a drug his wife was taking.

A person is considered to be in constructive possession of a controlled dangerous substance if it is subject to his dominion and control, regardless of whether or not it is in his physical possession. State v. Steiner, 2021-1337 (La. App. 1 Cir. 6/3/22), 2022 WL 1830834, *2 (unpublished). A person may be in joint possession of a drug if he willfully and knowingly shares with another the right to control the drug. The mere presence in the area where narcotics are discovered or mere association with the person who does control the drug or the area where it is located is insufficient to support a finding of constructive possession. Steiner, 2022 WL 1830834 at *2.

A determination of whether or not there is “possession” sufficient to convict depends on the facts of each case. Factors to be considered in determining whether a defendant exercised dominion and control to constitute possession include his knowledge that drugs were in the area, his relationship with the person found to be in actual possession, his access to the area where the drugs were found, evidence of recent drug use, and his physical proximity to the drugs. Steiner, 2022 WL 1830834 at *2.

Sgt. Dupuy testified that the defendant admitted he “possibly” had methamphetamine in his watch pocket. Sgt. Dupuy recovered a plastic baggie and a glass pipe from the defendant's person. Ms. Jennings testified that the plastic baggie recovered from the defendant's watch pocket contained 0.371 grams of methamphetamine. The other baggie recovered contained 0.572 grams of methamphetamine.

After a thorough review of the record, we are convinced that a rational trier of fact, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, could find that the evidence proved beyond a reasonable doubt, and to the exclusion of every reasonable hypothesis of innocence, all the elements of possession of a schedule II controlled dangerous substance less than two grams. The evidence supported the jury's determination that the defendant exercised dominion and control sufficient to constitute possession in this case. Furthermore, the verdict indicates the jury rejected the defendant's claim of lack of knowledge that he possessed drugs. Even accepting the defendant's theory that the drugs and pipe belonged to his wife, Mrs. Oxner, he had a close enough relationship to Mrs. Oxner, had access to the area where the drugs were found (i.e., his truck), and he was in close proximity to the methamphetamine, which would have been on Mrs. Oxner, who was sitting in the passenger seat.³ Thus, the evidence provided a basis for the jury to rationally conclude the defendant was in possession of methamphetamine.

An appellate court errs by substituting its appreciation of the evidence and credibility of witnesses for that of the fact finder and thereby overturning a verdict on the basis of an exculpatory hypothesis of innocence presented to, and rationally rejected by, the jury. State v. Calloway, 2007-2306 (La. 1/21/09), 1 So.3d 417, 418 (per curiam). Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, we find based on the record before us, a rational trier of fact could have found that the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt all the elements of possession of a schedule II controlled dangerous substance less than two grams.

Accordingly, this assignment of error is without merit.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR ONE: IMPROPER CLOSING ARGUMENT

In his first assignment of error, the defendant argues the trial court erred in overruling the defense's objections to the State's closing argument.

Law; Closing Arguments

Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure article 774 provides that closing arguments in criminal cases should be restricted to the evidence admitted, to the lack of evidence, to conclusions of fact that may be drawn therefrom, and to the law applicable to the case. The argument shall not appeal to prejudice, and the State's rebuttal shall be confined to answering the argument of the defendant. La. C.Cr.P. art. 774. A trial judge has broad discretion in controlling the scope of closing argument. State v. Draughn, 2005-1825 (La. 1/17/07), 950 So.2d 583, 614, cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1012, 128 S.Ct. 537, 169 L.Ed.2d 377 (2007). Although prosecutors are allowed wide latitude in choosing closing argument tactics, they should not misstate the evidence. However, even if the prosecutor exceeds the bounds of closing argument, this court will not reverse a conviction unless thoroughly convinced that the argument influenced the jury and contributed to the verdict. Draughn, 950 So.2d at 614.

The defendant argues that the State made improper comments during rebuttal closing arguments that influenced the jury and contributed to the defendant's guilty verdict. The defendant avers that had the jury only considered the actual evidence presented and not the State's emotional basis for the conviction, the verdict would not have been guilty.

Analysis and Discussion

The record reflects both parties appealed to the jurors’ emotions during closing arguments. Notably, the State initially argued it was “demeaning to the memory of Cindy Oxner” for the defendant to blame the possession of the methamphetamine on his wife. Defense counsel countered, stating the State had not a “shred of sympathy” for the defendant's situation. Defense counsel further argued that the existence of residue does not equal methamphetamine possession. During rebuttal, the State argued, “[t]o say that there is no meth in [the defendant's] pocket is ignoring reality. Meth is poison. Meth is death.” Defense counsel objected on the grounds the statement was irrelevant and argumentative. The trial court overruled defense counsel's objection, determining it was a legitimate argument. Later, the State analogized methamphetamine to a bullet in a gun and argued, “[w]hat the [S]tate is asking you to do is take the bullet out of the gun and take the gun away from this man. In a way, finding him guilty very well might save his life.” In lodging those objections, defense counsel neither moved for a mistrial nor asked the trial court to admonish the jury.⁴

After a careful review of the prosecutor's closing and rebuttal closing arguments, we find no extremely inflammatory nor prejudicial remarks that would require a reversal under the circumstances presented herein. Likewise, we find no abuse of discretion by the trial court in finding that the remarks to which the defendant objected were within the proper scope of closing argument. The record shows that the trial as a whole was conducted fairly, and there was abundant evidence of the defendant's guilt. Moreover, we note that the trial court instructed the jury that opening statements and closing arguments were not to be considered as evidence. Finally, we note that much credit should be accorded to the good sense and fairmindedness of jurors who have seen the evidence, heard the arguments, and have been instructed by the trial judge that the arguments of counsel are not evidence. See State v. Lee, 2024-0468 (La. App. 1 Cir. 7/11/25), 2025 WL 1913565, *9 (unpublished). We do not find that the prosecutor's statements at issue deprived the defendant of a fair trial.

Accordingly, we find this assignment of error to be without merit.

PATENT ERROR

Pursuant to La. C.Cr.P. art. 920(2), this court routinely conducts a review of all appeals for error discoverable by mere inspection of the pleadings and proceedings and without inspection of the evidence. See State v. Anthony, 2023-0117 (La. App. 1 Cir. 11/3/23), 378 So.3d 766, 775, writ denied, 2024-00027 (La. 5/21/24), 385 So.3d 242. After a careful review of the record, we have found two patent errors.

The record reflects that prior to ordering the defendant to pay a $500.00 fine plus court costs, the trial court did not conduct a hearing pursuant to La. C.Cr.P. art. 875.1, to determine whether the aggregate amount of the financial obligations would cause substantial financial hardship to the defendant or his dependents, nor did the trial court waive judicial determination of such. Furthermore, the defendant did not explicitly waive his right to such a hearing.

We note that not all errors discoverable on the face of the proceedings are reversible errors. Whether a patent error, like other statutory error, requires reversal must be evaluated in light of the potential impact on the fairness of the proceedings. State v. Evans, 2023-1223 (La. App. 1 Cir. 7/2/24), 395 So.3d 886, 893. Here, the only financial obligations placed upon the defendant were a one-time fee of $500.00 plus costs of prosecuting the case. The defendant did not raise this issue on appeal. Additionally, the record reflects the defendant's sentence was tailored towards probation, allowing him to return to Mississippi and undergo treatment for substance abuse. Thus, we find the defendant was not prejudiced by the lack of a financial hardship hearing or waiver thereof in this case. See State v. Burke, 2024-0326 (La. App. 1 Cir. 2/28/25), 406 So.3d 1273, 1278, writ denied, 2025-00407 (La. 6/3/25), 410 So.3d 785. Accordingly, any error in the trial court's failure to conduct a hearing or waive the judicial determination in accordance with La. C.Cr.P. art. 875.1 is harmless in this case and does not require a remand for resentencing. Although the trial court did not conduct a hearing prior to ordering the $500.00 fine pursuant to La. C.Cr.P. art. 875.1 (C)(1), the Article provides other downstream opportunities for the defendant to raise the issue of his ability to pay. See La. C.Cr.P. art. 875.1(D)(3), (F), and (H).

Additionally, the trial court incorrectly advised the defendant that the time period for filing an application for post-conviction relief was two years. However, a defendant generally has two years “after the judgment of conviction and sentence has become final” to seek post-conviction relief. La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.8(A). See also State v. LeBoeuf, 2006-0153 (La. App. 1 Cir. 9/15/06), 943 So.2d 1134, 1142-43, writ denied, 2006-2621 (La. 8/15/07), 961 So.2d 1158. Out of an abundance of caution and in the interest of judicial economy, we advise the defendant that La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.8 generally provides that no application for post-conviction relief, including applications which seek an out-of-time appeal, shall be considered if filed more than two years after the judgment of conviction and sentence have become final under the provisions of La. C.Cr.P. arts. 914 or 922. LeBoeuf, 943 So.2d at 1143.

DECREE

For the above and foregoing reasons, we affirm the defendant's conviction and sentence.

CONVICTION AND SENTENCE AFFIRMED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Cindy L. Oxner, the co-defendant, was also charged with two counts of possession of a schedule II controlled dangerous substance less than two grams. Mrs. Oxner died prior to trial.

2.   A watch pocket refers to the small pocket below the front waistband of a pair of pants.

3.   The record reflects the trial court instructed the jury regarding actual possession and constructive possession.

4.   Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure articles 770 and 771 govern improper comments made during closing arguments and authorize the trial court to correct a prosecutor's prejudicial remarks by ordering a mistrial or admonishing the jury, at the defendant's request.

EDWARDS, J.