ANDREW BRADLEY TOWBIN v. JOHN FULLER AND DARREN LOMBARD IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS CLERK OF COURT FOR CRIMINAL DISTRICT COURT FOR THE PARISH OF ORLEANS (2026)

This election matter concerns whether Appellant, defendant John T. Fuller, should be disqualified as a judicial candidate for Criminal District Court, Section J, Orleans Parish. Appellant seeks review of the February 25, 2026 district court judgment, granting Appellee's, plaintiff Andrew Bradley Towbin's, petition to disqualify Mr. Fuller as a judicial candidate in an upcoming May 2026 election. After a review of the law, applicable facts and the judgment granting Mr. Towbin's petition to disqualify, we affirm the district court's judgment.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Mr. Fuller executed and filed a notarized Louisiana Secretary of State Notice of Candidacy form on February 13, 2026. The form included a certification that Mr. Fuller filed his federal and state income tax returns “for each of the previous five tax years.”

Thereafter, on February 20, 2026, Mr. Towbin—a resident of and registered voter in Orleans Parish—filed a petition objecting to Mr. Fuller's candidacy, pursuant to La. Rev. Stat. 18:492. Mr. Towbin alleged Mr. Fuller falsely certified that he filed his state taxes for one or more of tax years from 2020 to 2024. Mr. Towbin alleged that the Louisiana Department of Revenue's (“LDR”) response to a public records request indicates Mr. Fuller had not filed the required state tax forms for one or more of the tax years from 2020 to 2024 at the time he filed his Notice of Candidacy. Thus, Mr. Towbin contends Mr. Fuller's certification was false. Mr. Fuller did not file a brief or memorandum in opposition to Mr. Towbin's petition in the trial court.

Trial on the objection to candidacy was held on February 25, 2026. At trial, both parties testified as well as Mr. Fuller's accountant, Tracy Madison, and his secretary, Danielle Taylor.

Testimony

Mr. Towbin testified that he is an Orleans Parish registered voter. He explained that he challenged Mr. Fuller's candidacy because Mr. Fuller did not file his 2020 taxes, which Mr. Towbin confirmed by submitting a public records request to the LDR. He explained that the LDR's response indicated Mr. Fuller did not file his taxes “in the year of 2020,” but that his state returns from 2021 through 2024 were filed. Therefore, he believed Mr. Fuller should be disqualified from the judicial race on that basis. Mr. Towbin offered three exhibits into evidence, and they were admitted: his Secretary of State voter identification information; LDR custodian Brandea P. Averett's affidavit in response to his public records request; and Mr. Fuller's Notice of Candidacy.

Mr. Madison testified that to the best of his knowledge Mr. Fuller's 2020 state tax returns were submitted and filed on Mr. Fuller's behalf, but that Ms. Taylor actually mailed Mr. Fuller's returns. He explained that his practice was to submit the completed returns with instructions for filing to Mr. Fuller. He stated that he was never notified by the LDR that Mr. Fuller's 2020 returns were not filed, nor was he notified of any liabilities or delinquent tax returns of Mr. Fuller for tax year 2020. He further testified that normally the LDR would make contact if there were delinquent tax returns and tax liability was owed. He also testified that he did not receive notification that the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) and State tax submissions were not received by the IRS and State, respectively.

Mr. Madison explained that he did not take any affirmative steps to verify whether Mr. Fuller's 2020 taxes were filed. He further testified that because there were no 1099s for that year, it was unlikely that he would have received notice from the LDR. He transmitted the prepared filings to Mr. Fuller's office via email.

Mr. Madison and Ms. Taylor testified that in 2020, as well as other years, Mr. Fuller's annual tax filing routine involved Ms. Taylor gathering Mr. Fuller's financial documents for submission to Mr. Madison. They further corroborated that Mr. Madison prepared Mr. Fuller's federal and state tax returns and submitted them to Ms. Taylor, who gave Mr. Fuller the prepared tax returns for signing. Ms. Taylor testified that she then prepared the signed returns for mailing. She testified that she dropped off the returns in United States Post Office's mailroom in the office building where Mr. Fuller's office is located.

Mr. Fuller explained that he attempted to ensure the delivery of his 2020 Louisiana state tax returns to the Department of Revenue by making sure Ms. Taylor gave Mr. Madison the materials needed to prepare Mr. Fuller's returns, and he ensured that Ms. Taylor postmarked the prepared returns and mailed them. Mr. Fuller testified that Mr. Madison billed him for preparing his 2020 federal and state returns. He recounted paying Mr. Madison for this work. Mr. Fuller further recalled giving Ms. Taylor his 2020 federal and state returns to mail and observing her prepare the returns to be mailed. He clarified that he did not watch her actually mailing the returns in the office building's mailroom. He explained that he had no reason to believe that Ms. Taylor did not mail his 2020 state tax return. Mr. Fuller further explained that from January 1, 2020, until the day of trial he had not received any notices or mailings from the LDR regarding delinquent or un-filed tax returns for the 2020 tax year. He testified that he maintained a consistent mailing address with the State of Louisiana from 2020 through 2024 and that Mr. Madison served as his accountant and tax preparer for those same years.

On cross-examination, Mr. Fuller testified that his 2020 Louisiana tax return was not mailed certified but was handled through regular mail. Mr. Fuller further explained that between the time he was served with Mr. Towbin's petition and the day of trial, he did not request a stamped copy of his 2020 Louisiana state return from the LDR nor did he request anyone go to Baton Rouge to request a stamped copy of his 2020 Louisiana state tax returns. He stated that it was his practice to have both his federal and state returns prepared at the same time by Mr. Madison. He never received information from the IRS that his 2020 tax return was not received nor did he receive notification that either of his 2020 tax filings did not make it to their desired destination.

On re-direct examination, Mr. Fuller testified to being paranoid about ensuring his taxes were filed and checking with Mr. Madison via text prior to executing the Notice of Candidacy. Upon receiving Mr. Madison's response confirming that all of Mr. Fuller's filings had been submitted, with the exception of an amended filing for 2022, Mr. Fuller signed the Notice of Candidacy. He conveyed that it was his honest belief at the time his Notice of Candidacy was filed that his tax returns for the five proceeding years have been filed.

Lastly, he recalled getting a refund from the IRS and the State for the 2020 tax year, which was rare for him to receive. However, Mr. Fuller was unable to produce any documentation showing he received a credit or refund from the State for the 2020 tax year when questioned by the district court. Mr. Fuller's exhibits introduced at trial were a copy of his 2020 tax return prepared by Mr. Madison, Mr. Madison's invoice to Mr. Fuller for his 2019 and 2020 tax services; a screenshot of a text exchange between Mr. Madison and Mr. Fuller regarding Mr. Fuller's tax filings on date the Notice of Candidacy was filed; and a July 2, 2024 email from Mr. Madison to Mr. Fuller stating that his 2020 taxes were filed.

At the conclusion of the trial, the district court granted Mr. Towbin's petition and disqualified Mr. Fuller, reasoning:

Considering the law and evidence, the Court must disqualify Mr. Fuller as a candidate for Criminal District Court Judge, Section C -Section J. Election laws must be interpreted to give the electorate the widest possible choice of candidates. Therefore, the plaintiff objecting to candidacy bears the burden of proving that the candidate is disqualified.

In this case the Court finds that the plaintiff has met his burden of proof and made a prima facie case, which Defendant has not rebutted.

Ms. Danielle Taylor, secretary to Defendant, testified that she put the returns in the US mail. However, there was no evidence that the returns were received by LDR as required by Russo versus Burns, a Louisiana Supreme Court case, which is on point with the facts in this case.

Defendant has no documentation that the defendant ever received a credit or refund for the tax year 2020, which would have been indicated in the defendant's tax returns. And it also would have indicated that the 2020 taxes had actually been filed.

The district court rendered judgment the same day. This timely appeal followed.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

Appellant raises five assignments of error on appeal:

1. The district court erred as a matter of law in determining that tax year 2020 falls within “the previous five tax years” for a candidate who qualified on February 13, 2026.

2. The district court erred in finding that Mr. Towbin established a prima facie case under La. Rev. Stat. 18:492(A)(7) and in shifting the burden to Appellant.

3. Alternatively, assuming arguendo that 2020 falls within the statutory period, the district court erred as a matter of law and committed manifest error by finding that Mr. Fuller falsely certified his tax compliance.

4. The district court misapplied the governing legal standard by treating the LDR's actual receipt as indispensable, rather than evaluating the objective evidence of mailing, routine office practice, and justified belief reflected in this record.

5. The district court's factual findings and oral reasons were clearly erroneous because they overlooked admitted documentary evidence and disregarded the controlling rule that doubts must be resolved in favor of candidacy.

STANDARD OF REVIEW AND APPLICABLE LAW

A district court's findings of fact are reviewed under a manifest error standard of review, while issues of law are reviewed for determination of whether the interpretive decision is legally correct. Jefferson Fin. Fed. Credit Union v. New Orleans Libations & Distilling Co., LLC, 2022-0123, p. 3 (La. App. 4 Cir. 10/31/22), 351 So. 3d 783, 785 (citing Smith v. Charbonnet, 2017-0634, p. 5 (La. App. 4 Cir. 8/2/17), 224 So. 3d 1055, 1059). “[I]f the decision of the [district] court is based upon an erroneous application of law rather than on a valid exercise of discretion, the decision is not entitled to deference by the reviewing court.” Henry v. Bell, 2023-00543, p. 4 (La. App. 4 Cir. 8/25/23), 371 So. 3d 566, 569 (citation omitted).

“Because election laws must be interpreted to give the electorate the widest possible choice of candidates, a person objecting to candidacy bears the burden of proving that the candidate is disqualified.” Landiak v. Richmond, 2005-0758, pp. 6-7 (La. 3/24/05), 899 So. 2d 535, 541 (citing Becker v. Dean, 2003-2493, p. 7 (La. 9/18/03), 854 So. 2d 864, 869; Russell v. Goldsby, 2000-2595, p. 4 (La. 9/22/00), 780 So.2d 1048, 1051; Dixon v. Hughes, 587 So .2d 679, 680 (La. 1991); Messer v. London, 438 So.2d 546 (La.1983)). When determining “whether the person objecting to candidacy has carried his burden of proof,” courts “must liberally construe the laws governing the conduct of elections ‘so as to promote rather than defeat candidacy.’ ” Id., 2005-0758, p. 7, 899 So. 2d at 541 (quoting Becker, 03-2493, p. 7, 854 So.2d at 869; Russell, 2000-2595, p. 4, 780 So. 2d at 1051; Dixon, 587 So.2d at 680). The burden of proof shifts to the challenged candidate after the objecting party has established a prima facie case. Thomas v. Griffin-Clark, 2025-0449, p. 5 (La. App. 4 Cir. 7/25/25), 417 So. 3d 1250, 1254.

DISCUSSION

In his first assignment of error, Mr. Fuller contends that the 2020 tax year does not fall within “the previous five tax years” for a candidate who qualified on February 13, 2026. We disagree.

Firstly, we are precluded from considering an issue raised for the first time on appeal. “Appellate courts generally find it inappropriate to consider an issue raised for the first time on appeal that was not plead, urged, or addressed in the court below.” Graubarth v. French Mkt. Corp., 2007-0416, p. 5 (La. App. 4 Cir. 10/24/07), 970 So. 2d 660, 664 (citing Johnson v. State, 2002-2382, p. 4 (La. 5/20/03), 851 So. 2d 918, 921). Mr. Fuller did not challenge the inclusion of the 2020 tax filing year when Mr. Towbin offered Ms. Averett's affidavit into evidence at trial. Mr. Fuller also did not challenge Ms. Averett's affidavit when it was admitted into evidence. Hence, this Court will not consider this argument.

Even if this were an issue warranting our de novo review, we do not find that there was a legal error in counting the 2020 tax year as part of the “previous five tax years” from when Mr. Towbin requested the records on February 19, 2026. There is no legal support for Mr. Fuller's interpretation that “tax year” means “calendar year.”

We defer to the LDR, the taxing authority, in its interpretation of “tax year.” In support of his challenge to Mr. Fuller's candidacy, Mr. Towbin produced and entered into evidence an affidavit ¹ of LDR custodian Brandea P. Averett. The affidavit states that “[o]n February 19, 2026, [LDR] received a public records request seeking confirmation of whether [Mr. Fuller] has filed tax returns with [LDR] for the preceding five (5) years.” Included in this affidavit is a table generated by the LDR featuring the tax filing years 2020-2024 and confirming receipt of Mr. Fuller's tax filings for each year besides 2020.

Mr. Fuller's argument that 2020 should not be included in the “previous five tax years” from the February 19, 2026 date insinuates that Mr. Towbin specifically requested Mr. Fuller's tax records from the years 2020-2024. The record does not show what wording Mr. Towbin used in making his request. However, the language of Ms. Averett's affidavit makes clear that Mr. Towbin simply requested records “for the preceding five (5) years.” The LDR determined that 2020 was within the “previous five tax years” from the February 19, 2026 date. We defer to the LDR's interpretation of “previous five tax years.” For this Court to determine that the 2020 tax year should not have been included would be to challenge the LDR's routine method for calculating “the previous five tax years,” which we do not feel is proper. Mr. Fuller's first assignment of error lacks merit.

In his second assignment of error, Mr. Fuller argues that Mr. Towbin did not establish a prima facie case under La. Rev. Stat. 18:492(A)(7). We disagree.

Louisiana Revised Statutes 18:492 sets forth the exclusive grounds for disqualification of an election candidate. In this matter, Mr. Towbin's challenge is based on La. R.S. 18:492(A)(7), which provides:

A. An action objecting to the candidacy of a person who qualified as a candidate in a primary election shall be based on one or more of the following grounds:

* * *

(7) The defendant falsely certified on his notice of candidacy that for each of the previous five tax years he has filed his federal and state income tax returns, has filed for an extension of time for filing either his federal or state income tax return or both as provided in R.S. 18:463(A)(2), or was not required to file either a federal or state income tax return or both.

According to Mr. Fuller's filed Notice of Candidacy, he attested to filing his federal and state tax returns for the previous five years. The LDR affidavit offered by Mr. Towbin serves as prima facie evidence that Mr. Fuller had not filed his Louisiana state tax returns for 2020. See Collins v. Chambers, 2024-01005, p. 4 (La. 8/20/24), 390 So. 3d 1282, 1285 (finding that a sworn affidavit from an LDR employee “established a prima facie case under La. R.S. 18:492(A)(7).”). At that point, the burden shifted to Mr. Fuller to prove that he did not falsely certify that he filed his Louisiana taxes for the previous five tax years.

To rebut Mr. Towbin's prima facie showing, Mr. Fuller presented at trial: testimony from Mr. Madison, Ms. Taylor, and himself, each of whom attested to believing that the 2020 tax return was filed; copies of his 2020 Louisiana tax returns; an email from Mr. Madison transmitting the invoice for preparing the 2020 tax return; a text message exchange between Mr. Fuller and Mr. Madison from the day of qualification, wherein Mr. Madison stated that filings were current except for a 2022 amended State return needing a signature; and a July 2, 2024 email from Mr. Madison stating that the last tax return he did was 2020, identifying only 2021 through 2023 as potentially outstanding.

The district court found that Mr. Fuller's evidence was insufficient to rebut Mr. Towbin's prima facie case. We agree.

Mr. Fuller failed to present any documentary evidence proving his tax returns were transmitted, filed, or received by the LDR. The aforementioned circumstantial evidence submitted by Mr. Fuller at trial simply shows Mr. Fuller believed that the 2020 Louisiana tax return was filed. This Court has previously found that a candidate's belief that he filed his tax returns is insufficient to rebut a plaintiff's prima facie case showing that he in fact did not. For instance, in Smith v. Charbonnet, this Court concluded that it was an error of law for the trial court to consider the defendant's state of mind in deciding whether he made a false certification. 2017-0634, p. 7 (La. App. 4 Cir. 8/2/17), 224 So. 3d 1055, 1059-60.

In Smith, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendant falsely certified in his Notice of Candidacy form that he had filed his state income tax returns for the previous five years. Id., 2017-0634, p. 2, 224 So. 3d at 1057. A representative of the LDR testified at trial that the LDR's computer system could not confirm that defendant filed his state tax returns in 2012 and 2016. Id., 2017-0634, p. 3, 224 So. 3d at 1058. The defendant averred that his CPA's employee confirmed his 2012 tax returns had been filed and that extensions had been filed for his 2016 returns. Therefore, “when he signed the Notice of Candidacy form, he was ‘very confident’ that his 2012-2016 taxes had been paid based on his reliance on assurances from his CPA.” Id. The defendant's wife testified at trial that she personally dropped the defendant's 2012 tax returns in the mail box at the post office. Id., 2017-0634, p. 4, 224 So. 3d at 1058. However, the defendant admitted that he had no evidence the returns were ever delivered to the LDR. Id. 2017-0634, p. 3, 224 So. 3d at 1058.

This Court reasoned that the Smith defendant's “lack of intent to deceive based on his good faith reliance on assurances from his CPA that his tax returns had, in fact, been filed, is irrelevant.” Id., 2017-0634, p. 6, 224 So. 3d at 1059. Instead, the Court relied on Louisiana Supreme Court jurisprudence establishing that in order for a candidate to rebut a prima facie showing that income tax returns were not filed, the candidate must satisfy the LDR's regulations regarding the filing of income tax returns set forth in La. Admin. Code tit. 61, pt. I, § 4911(B)(1): “ ‘Delivery by the United States Postal Service. A return, report or other document in a properly addressed envelope with sufficient postage delivered by the United States Postal Service is deemed filed on the date postmarked by the United States Postal Service.’ ” Id., 2017-0634, p. 6, 224 So. 3d at 1059 (quoting Russo v. Burns, 2014-1963, p. 4 (La. 9/24/14), 147 So. 3d 1111, 1114). Accordingly, this Court reasoned that “[r]eturns which have not been delivered to LDR by the United States Postal Service have not been filed pursuant to this clear language.” Id. (citing Russo, 2014-1963, p. 4, 147 So. 3d at 1114). Because the Smith defendant could not prove that his tax returns were mailed or delivered to the LDR, meaning they were “not filed” per La. Admin. Code tit. 61, pt. I, § 4911(B)(1), he failed to overcome the plaintiff's prima facie showing. Id.

So too here. Mr. Fuller did not present documentary evidence demonstrating that his 2020 Louisiana tax returns were transmitted, filed, or received by the LDR. Like the defendant in Smith, Mr. Fuller's evidence only illustrated through circumstantial evidence his personal belief that the 2020 tax returns were filed. Mr. Fuller's belief was rooted solely in representations by Mr. Madison, his accountant, and Ms. Taylor, his secretary. Such personal belief is ultimately irrelevant to this analysis.

At trial, Ms. Taylor could only testify that she dropped the returns off in the USPS mailroom of Mr. Fuller's office building. Mr. Fuller offered no evidence, such as a certificate of mailing, proving that the returns were indeed mailed. A similar circumstance existed in Smith, wherein the defendant's wife testified that she personally dropped the defendant's 2012 tax returns in the mail box at the post office. 2017-0634, p. 4, 224 So. 3d at 1058. This Court in Smith echoed the Louisiana Supreme Court's view that mailing tax returns via certified mail is one way to ensure their delivery to the LDR and is thus sufficient to demonstrate their filing. Id., 2017-0634, p. 6, 224 So. 3d at 1059 (quoting Russo, 2014-1963, p. 4, 147 So. 3d at 1114). Neither the defendant's wife in Smith nor Ms. Taylor, in the case at hand, mailed the tax returns via certified mail. The Smith Court found that the wife's testimony did not sufficiently evince filing of the defendant's 2012 tax returns. Id., 2017-0634, p. 6, 224 So. 3d at 1059. Accordingly, here, Ms. Taylor's testimony is insufficient to rebut Mr. Towbin's prima facie showing that Mr. Fuller did not file his 2020 Louisiana tax returns.

Mr. Fuller has likewise produced no proof that the LDR actually received the 2020 tax return. Seeing as Mr. Towbin filed this suit on February 22, 2026, and trial took place on February 25, 2026, Mr. Fuller had the opportunity to contact the LDR or could have driven to Baton Rouge to obtain confirmation of receipt from the LDR prior to trial. However, he failed to obtain this necessary proof to rebut Mr. Towbin's prima facie showing.

We pretermit discussion of Mr. Fuller's remaining assignments of error because our foregoing discussion is dispositive of this appeal.

In sum, per Louisiana jurisprudence, Mr. Fuller's evidence was insufficient to rebut Mr. Towbin's prima facie showing that Mr. Fuller's 2020 Louisiana tax returns were not filed at the time he signed his Notice of Candidacy on February 13, 2026. We find no manifest error in the district court's determination that Mr. Fuller's state tax return for 2020 had not been filed when he signed his Notice of Candidacy.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court's February 25, 2026 district court judgment disqualifying Mr. Fuller as candidate for the office of Judge, Criminal District Court, Section J, Orleans Parish.

AFFIRMED

I respectfully dissent from the for the reasons that follow.

In this case, we are called upon to determine whether or not the Appellant meets the qualifications to remain in the contest for a district judgeship.

The requirements for a district judgeship are few and are set forth in La. Const. art. V, § 24:

Section 24. (A) A judge of the supreme court, a court of appeal, district court, family court, parish court, or court having solely juvenile jurisdiction shall have been domiciled in the respective district, circuit, or parish for one year preceding election and shall have been admitted to the practice of law in the state for at least the number of years specified as follows:

․

(2) For a district court, ․ eight years.

(B) He shall not practice law.

If this same question were posed relative to a federal election, the answer would be simple. The U. S. Supreme Court has held, “we reaffirm that the qualifications for service in Congress set forth in the text of the Constitution are “fixed,” at least in the sense that they may not be supplemented by Congress.” U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 798, 115 S. Ct. 1842, 1852, 131 L. Ed. 2d 881 (1995). In short, the federal legislative branch is not permitted to add any requirements for candidacy beyond those set forth in the U. S. Constitution.

In our state, we have never addressed whether our legislative branch may impose constraints on candidacy beyond those of our constitution.¹

There is, however, a universally accepted principle that, “election laws must be interpreted to give the electorate the widest possible choice of candidates.” Collins v. Chambers, 2024-01005, p. 3 (La. 8/20/24), 390 So. 3d 1282, 1285. This principle must guide us to interpret La. R.S. 18:463(A)(2)(iv) as strictly as possible so that it is not used to narrow the choice of candidates. The portion of the statute on which Appellee's petition is based provides that:

(iv) Except for a candidate for United States senator or representative in congress, that for each of the previous five tax years, he has filed his federal and state income tax returns, has filed for an extension of time for filing either his federal or state income tax return or both, or was not required to file either a federal or state income tax return or both.

La. R.S. 18:463(A)(2)(iv)(emphasis added).

Appellant signed the certification as required, but Appellee contends that the certification is false because Appellant did not file a tax return for the tax year 2020. In support of that assertion, Appellee introduced, at trial, an affidavit from Brandea P. Averett, Public Records Custodian of the Louisiana Department of Revenue. The affidavit states, in pertinent part, that:

On February 19, 2026, the Department received a public records request seeking confirmation of whether Taxpayer has filed tax returns with the Department for the preceding five (5) years ․ In response to that request, the Department issued a written response, a true and correct copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit A and incorporated herein by reference.

․

As reflected in Exhibit A, the status of the Taxpayer's Louisiana individual income tax account with the Department for the five years listed below is as follows:

Tabular or graphical material not displayable at this time.

The record does not contain the written request made on Appellee's behalf. The wording of that request is critical because it may have played a part in shaping LDR's response. In any event, it is clear that the affidavit does not attempt to define the word, “previous,” as it is used in La. R.S. 18:463 nor would such a request fall within the ambit of LDR's duties. LDR deals with collecting the funds due from citizens based on provisions of tax law. The affidavit in question is not a legal opinion formed after the study of the laws involved in this electoral dispute. The interpretation of laws is the province of the courts, not the un-elected bureaucrats or computers who serve the needs of a tax collection agency. The extent of the information requested by Appellee is unknown from the record and there is no opinion from the LDR to which our court system might defer.

The question addressed to us on this appeal is whether the previous five tax years include 2020. La. R.S. 1:3 is the guide for interpretation of statutes. It provides, in pertinent part, that:

Words and phrases shall be read with their context and shall be construed according to the common and approved usage of the language. Technical words and phrases, and such others as may have acquired a peculiar and appropriate meaning in the law, shall be construed and understood according to such peculiar and appropriate meaning.

The operative word in the statute, as it pertains to this dispute, is “previous.” It is not a term of art in the law to which a “peculiar” meaning is assigned. Therefore, we look to ordinary dictionary definitions. In three widely respected dictionaries, the following definitions are ascribed:

[G]oing before in time or order ․ Merriam-Webster;2 [H]happening or existing before something or someone else ․ Cambridge Dictionary;3and

[H]appening or existing before the event or object that you are talking about ․ Oxford Dictionary 4

Appellant's tax return shows that his tax year is consistent with the calendar year. Therefore, his current tax year is 2026. The five years “going before in time order” are 2021 through 2025. To find otherwise would be to stress the definition of previous as it is customarily understood.

It is undisputed that Appellant filed tax returns for the years 2021, 2022, 2023 and 2024. The record does not reflect whether he filed a return for his 2025 tax year. Whether Appellant filed a return for 2025 or not is irrelevant because he is not required to file a return to the LDR until May 15, 2026. La. R.S. 18:463(A)(2)(iv) demands that a candidate certify that “he has filed his federal and state income tax returns, has filed for an extension of time for filing either his federal or state income tax return or both, or was not required to file either a federal or state income tax return or both.”

The fact that Appellant was not yet required to file a tax return for 2025 does not alter the definition of the phrase “previous years.” Appellant's notice of candidacy was filed on February 13, 2026. This date is not in dispute. Under the commonly understood words of the applicable statutes, Appellant's five previous tax years do not include 2020.

The statute that gives Appellee the right to file his challenge to Appellant's candidacy provides in pertinent part:

An action objecting to the candidacy of a person who qualified as a candidate in a primary election shall be based on one or more of the following grounds:

․

(7) The defendant falsely certified on his notice of candidacy that for each of the previous five tax years he has filed his federal and state income tax returns, has filed for an extension of time for filing either his federal or state income tax return or both as provided in R.S. 18:463(A)(2), or was not required to file either a federal or state income tax return or both.

It is well settled that the plaintiff in an election challenge bears the burden of proving that the candidate did not comply with La. R.S. 18:463. Landiak v. Richmond, 2005-0758, pp. 6-7 (La. 3/24/05), 899 So. 2d 535, 541. A fair reading of La. R.S. 18:463 and La. R.S. 18:492 and a review of the record as a whole shows that the trial court was manifestly erroneous in finding that Appellee met his burden of proof. I would reverse the trial court and reinstate Appellant's candidacy.

I respectfully dissent. Although the parties did not directly litigate the meaning of “the previous five tax years” in the district court, this issue presents a pure question of statutory interpretation. It requires no additional fact-finding and rests entirely on the undisputed date of qualification and the plain language of La. R.S. 18:463(A)(2)(a)(iv) and La. R.S. 18:492(A)(7). Questions of law are reviewed de novo, and an appellate court is obligated to apply the correct law to the record before it. Where a judgment rests upon an incorrect interpretation of a statute, this Court may correct that legal error even if the precise statutory argument was not fully articulated at the district court. See Thompson v. Winn-Dixie Montgomery, Inc., 15-0477, p. 11 (La. 10/14/15), 181 So.3d 656, 665 (citing La. C.C.P. art. 2164 and Uniform Rules Courts of Appeal, Rule 1-3).

The statute requires certification “for each of the previous five tax years.” See La. R.S. 18:492(A)(7). Mr. Fuller qualified on February 13, 2026. Measured by calendar tax years, on that date, the previous five tax years are 2025, 2024, 2023, 2022, and 2021. Tax year 2020 is the sixth year back. The Legislature did not qualify the phrase “previous five tax years” by adding “for which returns were previously due,” nor did it condition the five-year window upon filing deadlines. When the Legislature intends to reference obligations that are “previously due,” it does so expressly elsewhere in the same statutory scheme. See, e.g., La. R.S. 18:463(A)(2)(a)(vi) (requiring candidate to certify that he has filed each report required to be filed by the Campaign Finance Disclosure Act, “if any were previously due”). Courts may not insert words that the Legislature omitted.

Even if one were to conclude that the phrase “previous five tax years” is susceptible to more than one interpretation, disqualification statutes are strictly construed in favor of candidacy and the electorate's right to choose. At minimum, any ambiguity must be resolved against removal of a candidate from the ballot. Landiak v. Richmond, 05-0758, p. 7 (La. 3/24/05), 899 So.2d 535, 541.

Because the only year litigated below was 2020, and because that year does not fall within the plain, five-year statutory window for a 2026 qualification, the objection fails as a matter of law. I would reverse the judgment sustaining the objection to candidacy and dismiss the petition.

Although the five-year certification requirement resolves this appeal, I am compelled to address the substance of the majority opinion. In doing so, I return to the framework I articulated in my concurrence in Nixon v. Hughes, 15-1036 (La. App. 4 Cir. 9/29/15), 176 So.3d 1135 (Lobrano, J., concurring). There, I explained that false certification includes certifying facts of which the candidate lacks “sufficient knowledge” at the time the Notice of Candidacy is executed. The inquiry is temporal and objective. It asks whether, at the moment of signing, the candidate possessed a sufficient and reasonable basis to attest to compliance. In other words, did Mr. Fuller have sufficient knowledge, considering the surrounding circumstances over the ensuing years, that his 2020 state taxes had been filed?

The jurisprudence in Russo v. Burns, 14-1963 (La. 9/24/14), 147 So.3d 1111, and its progeny requires that candidates ensure delivery so that they may truthfully certify filing. However, those cases do not impose a categorical certified-mail requirement, nor do they equate the present absence of a processed entry in LDR's records with a lack of sufficient knowledge. The operative principle is not administrative confirmation. It is whether the candidate had a reasonable factual basis, at the time of certification, to attest to compliance.

The record reflects that Mr. Fuller's 2020 return was prepared by his accountant in the ordinary course, transmitted to his office for execution, signed, and placed in the mail pursuant to established office routine. Importantly, nearly five years passed without any communication from LDR or his accountant suggesting non-filing. That prolonged administrative and professional silence is not dispositive, but it forms part of the factual context available to Mr. Fuller when he executed the Notice of Candidacy.

Moreover, the law does not require a candidate to conduct a pre-qualification audit of agency records in the absence of any notice or reason to suspect non-compliance. The “sufficient knowledge” standard does not demand retrospective verification where routine professional preparation, mailing in the ordinary course, and years without notice of non-filing reasonably support the fact that filing occurred. The majority's reasoning effectively transforms the certification requirement into a rule under which a candidate must affirmatively secure documentary confirmation from LDR before qualifying, even when no circumstance suggests non-filing. That is not what Burns requires.

Under the “sufficient knowledge” framework, the proper question is whether these surrounding facts spanning over five years provided a reasonable basis for Mr. Fuller's certification at the time he signed. The record demonstrates that he relied on routine professional preparation, established office practice, corroborating communications, and nearly five years without notice of deficiency or non-filing from the LDR or his accountant. These circumstances bear directly on whether he lacked sufficient knowledge to certify compliance.

The majority's reliance on Smith v. Charbonnet does not resolve this case. My analysis today is consistent with the approach I took in Smith v. Charbonnet, 17-0634 (La. App. 4 Cir. 8/2/17), 224 So.3d 1055 (Lobrano, J., concurring). There, applying the same “sufficient knowledge” framework articulated in Nixon, I concluded that the candidate lacked sufficient knowledge at the time he signed his Notice of Candidacy because he had not reasonably ensured delivery of the return and possessed no objective basis to confirm filing. Id., 17-0634, p. 8, 224 So.3d at 1060. I expressly recognized that good faith alone was insufficient. Id., 17-0634, pp. 8-9, 224 So.3d at 1060. In Smith, the surrounding facts did not provide a reasonable foundation for certification. The question remains whether the candidate possessed sufficient knowledge at the time of signing. What differs in the case sub judice is the evidentiary context. Unlike in Smith, this record reflects documented preparation of the return, corroborating communications contemporaneous with qualification, established office mailing practices, and nearly five years without notice of non-filing. Applying the same sufficient knowledge analysis I applied in Smith, I conclude that the surrounding circumstances here provided a reasonable basis for certification at the time it was made.

Even assuming arguendo that tax year 2020 fell within the relevant statutory window, I would conclude that the record does not establish, with the clarity required by our jurisprudence, that Mr. Fuller falsely certified his tax compliance at the time of qualification.

I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion. I write separately, however, to address the majority's reliance on Smith v. Charbonnet, 2017-0634 (La. App. 4 Cir. 8/2/17), 224 So.3d 1055 and to clarify why that decision is materially distinguishable from the evidentiary record presented before us in this matter.

The evidence adduced at trial in this matter differs in significant respects from the record that was before this Court in Smith. In Smith, the objectors introduced correspondence from the LDR indicating it could not confirm the filing of the candidate's returns for the years 2012 and 2016, and an LDR representative testified at trial that the agency's records reflected no filing. The candidate admitted he had no evidence demonstrating delivery of the returns to LDR prior to executing his Notice of Candidacy. The only stamped copy of a return was received after qualification. Thus, the record in Smith affirmatively established the absence of filing at the time of certification, and the candidate possessed no contemporaneous documentation or objective corroboration supporting delivery before he signed.

On the contrary, the evidentiary context here reflects substantially different circumstances. Mr. Fuller's 2020 return was prepared by his accountant, Tracy Madison, in the ordinary course of practice, and an invoice documenting preparation of the 2019 and 2020 returns was introduced into evidence. Testimony from both Mr. Madison and Mr. Fuller's secretary, Danielle Taylor, established a consistent annual routine: financial documents were gathered, returns were prepared, signed, and placed in the United States mail pursuant to established office practice, and the process was repeated year after year. Mr. Fuller also introduced corroborating communications, including a text message exchange confirming his filings at the time he qualified and a July 2, 2024 email from his accountant stating that his 2020 taxes were filed.

Importantly, nearly five years elapsed without any notice from LDR of delinquency, non-filing, or liability, and Mr. Fuller maintained the same address and accountant throughout that period. Unlike in Smith, the record here contains documentary support, corroborated testimony regarding routine mailing practices, and a prolonged absence of administrative notice.

Moreover, in Smith the objector's prima facie case was strengthened by testimony from an LDR representative subject to cross-examination. In this case, the objector relied solely upon an LDR custodian affidavit in response to a public records request. While such evidence may establish a prima facie showing, it does not carry the same qualitative evidentiary weight as live agency testimony confirming non-filing. When the issue turns on whether a potential candidate lacked a reasonable factual basis to certify compliance at the time of signing, the evidentiary context matters.

I find that the proper inquiry is temporal and objective: whether, at the moment he executed his Notice of Candidacy, Mr. Fuller possessed a reasonable factual basis to certify that his returns had been filed. The record reflects that he relied on routine professional preparation, established office mailing practice, corroborating communications, and nearly five years without any notice suggesting non-compliance. Those circumstances materially distinguish this matter from Smith and undermine the conclusion that Mr. Fuller's certification of tax compliance was false. “[E]lection laws must be interpreted to give the electorate the widest possible choice of candidates.” Collins v. Chambers, 2024-01005, p. 3 (La. 8/20/24), 390 So. 3d 1282, 1285 (citing Landiak v. Richmond, 2005-0758 (La. 3/24/05), 899 So. 2d 535, 541).

I respectfully dissent from the Majority Opinion for the following reasons.

The threshold question this Court must resolve, in my opinion, is whether the five-year tax period at issue in this case spans 2020-2024 or 2021-2025. Insofar as the Majority concludes Mr. Fuller's argument that the 2020 tax year does not fall within “the previous five tax years” is not properly before the Court because he did not challenge Ms. Averett's affidavit, I disagree. Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 2164 provides that “[t]he appellate court shall render any judgment which is just, legal, and proper upon the record on appeal.” Official Revision Comment (a) (1960) to La. C.C.P. art. 2164 states that “[t]he purpose of this article is to give the appellate court complete freedom to do justice on the record irrespective of whether a particular legal point or theory was made, argued, or passed on by the court below.” In discussing La. C.C.P. art. 2164, this Court has held, “the appellate court may consider an issue that is raised for the first time on appeal if its resolution is necessary to render a just, legal and proper judgment.” Keeping Our Legacy Alive, Inc. v. Cent. St. Matthew United Church of Christ, 2017-1060, p. 13 (La. App. 4 Cir. 10/31/18), 318 So.3d 130, 138 (quoting Lonzo v. Lonzo, 17-0549, p. 9 (La. App. 4 Cir. 11/15/17), 231 So.3d 957, 964). In fact, the Louisiana Supreme Court has held that “[w]ithout doubt, an appellate court has the authority to raise an issue sua sponte on appeal.” Wooley v. Lucksinger, 2009-0571, p. 62 (La. 4/1/11), 61 So.3d 507, 562. Moreover, Rule 1-3 of the Uniform Rules of the Courts of Appeal states that “[t]he Courts of Appeal shall review issues that were submitted to the trial court and that are contained in specifications or assignments of error, unless the interest of justice requires otherwise.” (Emphasis added.) Based on the foregoing, this Court could consider whether 2020 falls within the previous five tax years regardless of whether Mr. Fuller argued this before the trial court, this Court, or neither. I believe these principles are particularly important in a matter like this one in which the trial court committed a legal error. See Walker v. Brown, 2024-0198, p. 4 (La. App. 4 Cir. 5/17/24), 390 So.3d 427, 430. In particular and for the reasons discussed below, I find the trial court legally erred in its interpretation of the relevant election law statutes. Thus, while the Majority is correct that Mr. Fuller did not specifically argue before the trial court that the 2020 tax year does not fall within “the previous five tax years,” I find this Court can and should resolve whether it does.

Resolving the question of whether the five-year tax period spans 2020-2024 or 2021-2025 is a matter of statutory interpretation. As an appellate court, we “review[ ] a question of law, including the proper interpretation of a statute ․, under the de novo standard of review, thereby giving no deference to the trial court's interpretation of same.” Hurel v. Nat'l Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 2025-0049, p. 5 (La. App. 4 Cir. 3/11/25), 414 So.3d 778, 782 (quoting 225 Baronne Complex, LLC v. Roy Anderson Corp., 2024-0401, p. 10 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1/31/25), 408 So.3d 291, 299). Additionally, as an appellate court, we are to review the “trial court's application of a statute ․ to the facts of a case ․ under the de novo standard of review” because this also “presents a question of law.” Id. (citing State v. Crowther, 2024-0625, p. 7 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1/31/25), 408 So.3d 277, 283-84).

One of the relevant statutes in the matter sub judice is La. R.S. 18:463, which provides, in pertinent part:

(2)(a) The notice of candidacy also shall include a certificate, signed by the candidate, certifying all of the following:

․

(iv) Except for a candidate for United States senator or representative in congress, that for each of the previous five tax years, he has filed his federal and state income tax returns, has filed for an extension of time for filing either his federal or state income tax return or both, or was not required to file either a federal or state income tax return or both.

La. R.S. 18:463(A)(2)(a)(iv) (emphasis added). Similarly, La. R.S. 18:492(A)(7) provides one of the “[g]rounds for an objection to candidacy” as:

The defendant falsely certified on his notice of candidacy that for each of the previous five tax years he has filed his federal and state income tax returns, has filed for an extension of time for filing either his federal or state income tax return or both as provided in [La.] R.S. 18:463(A)(2), or was not required to file either a federal or state income tax return or both.

(Emphasis added.) Importantly, both of the above-quoted statutes—La. R.S. 18:463(A)(2)(a)(iv) and La. R.S. 18:492(A)(7)—use the language “for each of the previous five tax years.”

One must read the above-quoted Louisiana Revised Statutes in pari materia with how Louisiana and the federal government define a tax year. As defined in La. R.S. 47:98(1), for an individual, “ ‘Taxable year’ means the calendar year ․ upon the basis of which the net income is computed under” the “Income Tax” chapter of the Revised Statutes (Title 47, Subtitle II, Chapter 1). The statute distinguishes a “taxable year” from a “fiscal year.” See La. R.S. 47:98(2) (defining “fiscal year”). By implication, a calendar year under La. R.S. 47:98(1)—and thus a taxable year—is the standard twelve-month period running from January 1 through December 31.¹ In Louisiana, state tax “[r]eturns other than corporation and partnership returns made on the basis of the calendar year shall be made and filed with the secretary at Baton Rouge, Louisiana, on or before the fifteenth day of May, following the close of the calendar year.” La. R.S. 47:103(A)(3). For example, Louisiana state income tax filings for the 2025 calendar year are due on May 15, 2026. Correspondingly, the federal government distinguishes between a “calendar year” and a “fiscal year” for certain types of taxpayers, defining the former as “12 consecutive months beginning January 1 and ending December 31.” “Tax Years,” IRS, https://www.irs.gov/businesses/small-businesses-self-employed/tax-years (last updated Jan. 27, 2026). Like Louisiana, the federal government calculates individual income taxes based on the preceding calendar year, and the deadline for an individual to file his federal income taxes is April 15 following the close of the calendar year. “When to File,” IRS, https://www.irs.gov/filing/individuals/when-to-file (last updated Jan. 20, 2026). Thus, federal state income tax filings for the 2025 calendar year are due on April 15, 2026.

In a prior election appeal decided by this Court, the focus, in part, was on whether taxes were actually due for one year in particular. Though the facts of that case differ from this one, I nonetheless find it analogous. In Ellison v. Romero, Leslie A. Ellison (“Ms. Ellison”) objected to the candidacy of Jancarlo Jose Romero (“Mr. Romero”) for candidacy for the Orleans Parish School Board, District 4. 2020-00376, p. 1 (La. App. 4. Cir. 8/11/20), 365 So.3d 1, 3. In pertinent part, Ms. Ellison contended “Mr. Romero did not file federal and state tax returns, or extensions of time for filing these returns, as required by La. R.S. 18:463A(2)(a)(iv),” such that his Notice of Candidacy “contain[ed] a false certification that his tax returns were filed timely.” Id. Mr. Romero signed his Notice of Candidacy on July 24, 2020, and “[t]here [was] no dispute that Mr. Romero did not file a tax return with the state of Louisiana in 2017.” Id. at p. 5, 365 So.3d at 4. This Court considered whether “Mr. Romero was required to file a tax return in Louisiana for 2017, such that his certification under La. R.S. 18:463[(]A[)](2)(a)(iv) was false.’ ” Id. at p. 6, 365 So.3d at 5. Ultimately, this Court held that Mr. Romero was not required to file a tax return for 2017 because “there [was] no evidence in the record that he resided in Louisiana in 2017 or earned any income in Louisiana for which a tax return was required,” such that his “certification [did] not falsely certify that he filed the required tax returns.” Id. at pp. 6-7, 365 So.3d at 5. Having determined that Mr. Romero was not required to file a Louisiana tax return for 2017, this Court did not inquire as to whether he had filed his tax returns for the previous five tax years that were actually due, e.g., by reaching back further in time to another year in which Mr. Romero was required to file. If this Court had done so, the Court would have been reading language into the statute that it simply does not contain. That is, to do so would require La. R.S. 18:463(A)(2)(a)(iv) to state that the Notice of Candidacy must certify “that for each of the previous five tax years that were previously due, [the candidate] has filed his federal and state income tax returns” (emphasized language added). Instead, this Court considered only the five preceding tax years and, within that time period, whether Mr. Romero filed for the years he had to do so based on the attendant circumstances. See also Ellison v. Whitten, 2020-0377, p. 5 (La. App. 4 Cir. 8/11/20), 365 So.3d 107, 110.

Because Louisiana and the federal government define a tax year as the calendar year and the Louisiana election statutes focus on the “previous five tax years,” this necessarily means that come January 1 of a new calendar year, the Louisiana election statutes are concerned with the five prior calendar years. In this case, in reverse chronological order, that would be 2025, 2024, 2023, 2022, and 2021. By logical extension, this means that a candidate qualifying for office before the federal and state tax filing deadlines certifies that has filed for the five prior calendar years or that his return is not yet due for the immediately preceding calendar year. This is exactly the situation applicable to Mr. Fuller. Because the record establishes that Mr. Fuller filed his returns for 2021-2024 and the record does not establish whether Mr. Fuller has filed his 2025 returns already, he did not falsely certify his Notice of Candidacy.

I recognize that this interpretation essentially results in a “loophole” of sorts whereby a candidate qualifying in the first quarter of a calendar year (i.e., prior to the federal and state tax filing deadlines) need only establish that he filed his tax returns for four of the five preceding tax years because the fifth tax year is not yet due, whereas a candidate qualifying after the tax filing deadlines in that same year must prove that he filed his tax returns for all five preceding tax years. One naturally wonders whether this was the intent of the Legislature: most elections in this state are regularly scheduled and occur later in the calendar year when this issue would not arise because the qualification deadline for those elections is after the tax filing deadlines. This election, however, is a special election to fill a vacant seat.

Nonetheless, I find this position buoyed by the principles of statutory interpretation that bind this Court. As this Court has explained, “The legislature is presumed to mean what it plainly says in the text of a statute․ ‘Courts must presume that a legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there.’ ” State in Interest of K.B., 2023-0409, p. 15 (La. App. 4 Cir. 9/26/23), 372 So.3d 864, 876 (emphasis added) (quoting State in Interest of A.S., 2017-0028, p. 4 (La. App. 4 Cir. 5/10/17), 220 So.3d 179, 183). Further, while interpreting a statute, a court must “presume[ ] the Legislature's actions in crafting a law were knowing and intentional ․” Crowther, 2024-0625, p. 8, 408 So.3d at 284 (alteration in original) (quoting Richards Clearview City Ctr., LLC v. Starr Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 2024-104, p. 7 (La. App. 5 Cir. 6/5/24), 391 So.3d 101, 107). To look at the years 2020-2024 instead of 2021-2025 in this case, as the Majority does, is to read La. R.S. 18:463(A)(2)(a)(iv) as stating that the Notice of Candidacy must certify “that for each of the previous five tax years that were previously due, [the candidate] has filed his federal and state income tax returns” (emphasized language added). Because the Legislature did not include the words “previously due” (or like verbiage) in La. R.S. 18:463(A)(2)(a)(iv) and La. R.S. 18:492(A)(7), this Court should not read such words into those statutes. Doing so violates statutory interpretation principles. The Legislature included the phrase “previous five tax years,” and elsewhere defined “taxable year” as “the calendar year,” so it is axiomatic that we are to look at the “previous five calendar years.” La. R.S. 47:98(1). The judicial branch's job is to interpret and apply the laws written by the Legislature, not rewrite them. If the Legislature had intended for us to look only at the previously due tax returns, the legislators would have phrased the statutes differently. In fact, as Mr. Fuller observes, in La. R.S. 18:463(A)(2)(a)(vi), the Legislature did specify that it is only concerned with a candidate for “a major or district office” certifying that he “has filed each report he has been required to file by the Campaign Finance Disclosure Act, if any were previously due.” The Legislature could have chosen to include similar language regarding the candidate's tax returns but chose not to do so.

I find further support for this outcome under the facts and circumstances of this case in some of the general principles enunciated in candidacy challenge jurisprudence. Specifically, the Louisiana Supreme Court (“Supreme Court”) has instructed that “election laws must be interpreted to give the electorate the widest possible choice of candidates.” Landiak v. Richmond, 2005-0758, p. 6 (La. 3/24/05), 899 So.2d 535, 541 (citations omitted). This is because both “[t]he interests of the state and its citizens are best served” if courts “interpret[ ] [election laws] so as to give the electorate the widest possible choice of candidates.” Schindler v. Russ, 2022-0533, pp. 13-14 (La. App. 4 Cir. 8/8/22), 346 So.3d 309, 318 (quoting Ellsworth-Fletcher v. Boyd-Robertson, 2021-0455, p. 5 (La. App. 4 Cir. 8/2/21), 366 So.3d 105, 108). Moreover, as a democratic society, “[t]here is nothing more fundamental ․ than the ability of our electorate to choose its leaders.” Id. at p. 13, 346 So.3d at 318 (quoting Becker v. Dean, 2003-2493, p. 6 (La. 9/18/03), 854 So.2d 864, 869). Accordingly, “a court determining whether the person objecting to candidacy has carried his burden of proof must liberally construe the laws governing the conduct of elections so as to promote rather than defeat candidacy.” Landiak, 2005-0758, p. 7, 899 So.2d at 541 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citations omitted). If there exists “[a]ny doubt concerning the qualifications of a candidate,” the reviewing court should resolve it “in favor of allowing the candidate to run for public office.” Id. (citations omitted). At a minimum, this case establishes ambiguity as to what the phrase “each of the previous five tax years” means in La. R.S. 18:463(A)(2)(a)(iv) and La. R.S. 18:492(A)(7) as evidenced by the parties’ arguments. Because there is doubt about whether Mr. Fuller had to certify that he filed his tax returns for 2020-2024 versus 2021-2025, we should resolve this matter in favor of allowing Mr. Fuller to run by looking at the tax years 2021-2025 per the Supreme Court's language in Landiak.

I find it important to note that, based on the record before this Court, I agree with the Majority's position that Mr. Fuller failed to prove that he filed his taxes for 2020 after Mr. Towbin established his prima facie case. However, unlike the majority, I find Mr. Fuller did not have to prove he filed his 2020 taxes. That is, my resolution of this matter, as delineated above, focuses instead on the 2021-2025 tax years. For the years 2021-2024, no one debates that Mr. Fuller filed his tax returns. For the year 2025, Mr. Fuller was not yet required to file his federal and state tax returns prior to executing his Notice of Candidacy on February 13, 2026. Therefore, Mr. Fuller did not falsify his Notice of Candidacy.

Further, I note that my Dissent today in no way constitutes my belief that a candidate qualifying in the first quarter of this calendar year should get a “pass” (so to speak) in that he only has to have filed four of his five preceding tax returns to avoid disqualification, while a candidate qualifying later in this calendar year has to have filed five of his five preceding tax returns. Instead, I have reached this conclusion and feel compelled to do so because the law—as written—calls for same. Unless and until the Supreme Court instructs otherwise regarding the interpretation of La. R.S. 18:463(A)(2)(a)(iv) and La. R.S. 18:492(A)(7) and/or the Louisiana Legislature amends those statutes, I find my above analysis to be the proper outcome.

For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent from the Majority and would reverse the trial court's February 25, 2026 judgment.

FOOTNOTES

1.   According to La. R.S. 47:1508(A)(4)(b), “[i]n lieu of live testimony, a properly executed affidavit issued by the secretary of the Department of Revenue or his designee shall serve as sufficient confirmation as to the accuracy of the records and files of the secretary of the Department of Revenue for such purposes.”

1.   We are constrained from examining that issue here as neither party has pled a constitutional challenge to the statute at issue.

2.   https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/previous

3.   https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/previous

4.   https://www.oxfordlearnersdictionaries.com/us/definition/american_english/previous

1.   Merriam-Webster defines “calendar year” as “a period of time equal in length to that of the year in the calendar conventionally in use.” The calendar conventionally used in the United States, including the state of Louisiana, runs from January 1 through December 31.

Judge Rachael D. Johnson

BELSOME, C.J. DISSENTS AND ASSIGNS REASONS. LOBRANO. J., DISSENTS AND ASSIGNS REASONS JENKINS, J., DISSENTS AND ASSIGNS REASONS ATKINS, J., DISSENTS WITH REASONS.