IN RE: MARKSVILLE MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES CIVIL SERVICE SYSTEM (2026)

The City of Marksville (City) appeals the trial court's judgment denying its motion to remand and affirming the Marksville Municipal Employees Civil Service System's (MMECSS/the Board) reinstatement of police officer, Wesley Lachney. The City alleges due process violations because the City's attorney was not present at the hearing to determine if just cause existed to terminate Lachney. For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The Marksville Sheriff's Department fired Lachney for failing a drug test. Lachney filed a grievance with the MMECSS on November 28, 2024. Following a hearing on February 10, 2025, the Board found just cause did not exist to terminate Lachney. The City filed a notice of appeal with the district court on February 20, 2025. The City filed a motion to remand in district court in April 2025, urging that it was unable to attend the hearing and present evidence in support of the termination, which it advised the board of via email, because it was scheduled during criminal jury week. The City asked for a continuance, but the Board said the hearing would proceed.

Following an April 2025 hearing on the motion to remand, the trial court rendered an amended judgment on September 15, 2025, finding that the decision of the MMECSS to reinstate Lachney was made with just cause. The judgment denied the City's motion to remand. The City appealed the Board's decision to reinstate Lachney, in part, claiming it was deprived of due process. The notice of appeal to the district court further stated that the decision was not made for just cause as required by the MMECSS. However, in its brief on appeal to this court, the City only assigned as error:

1. The Civil Service Board violated the Marksville Municipal Employee Civil Service Act in denying Marksville the opportunity to appear before the board represented by counsel.

2. The Civil Service Board violated the due process rights of Marksville in denying the request for a continuance of the February 10, 2025 hearing.

3. The trial court violated the due process rights of Marksville in denying the Motion to Remand.

DISCUSSION

Louisiana Constitution Article 1, § 2 ensures that litigants are afforded due process under the law; procedural due process includes notice and the opportunity to be heard. Carter v. State, Crime Victims Reparation Bd. & Fund, 03-2728 (La.App. 1 Cir. 10/29/04), 897 So.2d 149. “An appellate court reviews the findings and decisions of the administrative agency, not the decision of the district court.” Parish of Jefferson v. Fayard, 24-432, p. 5 (La.App. 5 Cir. 2/26/25), 407 So.3d 879, 884. However, the City has not appealed the Board's decision to reinstate Lachney; it has only appealed the Board's decision not to grant a continuance and the trial court's denial of its motion to remand.

Thus, our review is limited to whether the Board's refusal of the City's request for a continuance “was unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious or amounted to an abuse of discretion.” Montalbano v. La. State Bd. of Med. Exam'rs, 560 So.2d 1009, 1011 (La.App. 4th Cir.1990); see also Alexander v. La. State Bd. of Med. Exam'rs, 94-101 (La.App. 4 Cir. 9/29/94), 644 So.2d 238, writ denied, 94-3075 (La. 2/9/95), 649 So.2d 423, cert. denied, 516 U.S. 813, 116 S.Ct. 64, 133 L.Ed.2d 26 (1995). Further, we review the trial court's denial of the City's motion for remand for an abuse of discretion. Schielder v. La. Office of Emp't Sec., 399 So.2d 1291 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1981).

Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 1601 provides that “[a] continuance may be granted in any case if there is good ground therefor.” In Value Import, Inc. v. La. Used Motor Vehicle Comm'n, 12-1592, p. 3 (La.App. 1 Cir. 8/9/13), 2013 WL 4039947 (unpublished opinion), the appellate court stated:

In judicial review over administrative action or adjudication, a court of appeal owes no deference to either the factual findings or legal conclusions of the district court, just as the Louisiana Supreme Court owes no deference to the factual findings or legal conclusions of the state's courts of appeal. Survey America, Inc. v. Louisiana Professional Engineering, 09-0286 (La.App. 1st Cir. 2/10/10), 35 So.3d 305, 308 n. 5.; Maraist v. Alton Ochsner Med. Found., 02-2677 (La.App. 1st Cir 5/26/04), 879 So.2d 815, 817–18.

The court further found that an administrative board:

must consider the particular facts of a case when deciding whether to grant or deny a continuance. The agency should consider the diligence and good faith of the party seeking the continuance and other reasonable grounds. Absent a clear abuse of discretion in granting or denying a continuance, the ruling of the agency should not be disturbed on appeal. See St. Tammany Parish Hosp. v. Burris, 00-2639 (La.App. 1st Cir. 12/28/01), 804 So.2d 960, 963.

Id. at p. 5; See also Toussaint v. Union Tank Car Co., 04-1461 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/2/05), 896 So.2d 308.

MMECSS's regulations pertaining to appeals by employees to the Board state in part (emphasis added):

If either the appointing authority or the employee fails to appear at the place and on the day and at the hour fixed for such hearing, the board may, at its discretion, decide the issue involved on the basis of the evidence adduced and confined to the question of whether the action taken against the employee was or was not for just cause as set forth in this Act. At the hearing, both the employee and the appointing authority shall be afforded an opportunity to appear before the board, whether in person or by counsel, and present evidence to show that such action was or was not taken for just cause as set forth in this Act. The board shall have complete charge of any such hearing and investigation and may conduct it in any manner it deems advisable, without prejudice to any person or party thereto; provided, however, that the procedure followed shall be informal and not necessarily bound by the legal rules of evidence.

MMECSS notes in brief that “[n]o written motion for continuance was filed nor was one orally requested at the hearing despite an appearance being made at the hearing by the City of Marksville[,]” nor were any emails placed into evidence. It states that “no affirmative evidence in the record demonstrates that a continuance was actually requested.” MMECSS further cites La.Code Civ.P. art. 1603, which states that “A motion for a continuance shall set forth the grounds upon which it is based, and if in writing shall comply with the provisions of Article 863.”

The MMECSS operates under its own set of rules that allow for “informal” procedure. However, it is true that there is no evidence in the record pertaining to the request for continuance. At the hearing on the motion to remand, the City established that it emailed the Director of the Board, Suzonne Alford. Alford testified that she prepared the notice of a hearing scheduled for February 10, 2025, and delivered it on January 28, 2025:

Q. ․ do you recall me sending an e-mail concerning the fact that I would not be able to be present on that day?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Do you recall the substance of that email?

A. You detailed that you had criminal jury week.

Q. And what was your response to that request?

A. That I'm sorry you can't be there, and two other hearings that I held, there were attorneys present who never spoke.

Q. What two other hearings?

A. Prior to this one. Two other employee hearings.

․

Q. O.K. And what was your reasoning for not granting the postponement?

A. I had that I was out of time and you have to give the notice and at least ten days before the meeting date. So Jan․ and then another thing the other three members we had a conflicting schedule the week before and the first date we could agree on February 10th, 2025 at 5:15 p.m.

On direct examination, Alford testified that the Chief of Police was present at the hearing but did not object, request a continuance, or provide any evidence or testimony. Alford was also questioned by the trial court:

Q. So when Mr. Gaspard requested via email the postponement, did you respond via email?

A. Yes I did.

Q. And you told him ․

A. That the hearing would go on.

The trial court then had the following colloquy with the City attorney:

BY THE COURT:

Well not evidence but just pointing out that the ․ and that's what I want to find the thing that says make demand to the board for a hearing and investigation by the board, the words investigation by the board to determine the reasonableness of the action, the words in the handbook that's giving be cause. But if you made a request for a continuance and she said no, and the chief appeared. Didn't present evidence, said he presented the alleged positive drug test or whatever the evidence was, that would be different. But that changes the due process aspect of it for the City is you knew that it wasn't going to go. I mean your continuance wasn't going to be granted.

BY [THE CITY ATTORNEY]:

But Judge, just because the chief appeared, I as the attorney for the city of Marksville had the right to be there and present evidence. The chief, yes he did appear but he didn't ․ he wasn't appearing on behalf of the city of Marksville, he was appearing there yes he as the chief of police. But I as the attorney for the City of Marksville asked for the continuance which was denied.

BY THE COURT:

So you knew it was denied so it was going on and there was an appearance made. So under that scenario since you've admitted that you knew that ․ I didn't know that there was an email saying I want a continuance, an email saying no. So you knew that there it was going ․ you knew that it was going to happen.

By [THE CITY ATTORNEY]:

I did Your Honor, but I had no choice at that point.

By THE COURT:

That's correct, when you were here in court the only other choice you would have had to send somebody else or appeal the denial of your continuance.

By [THE CITY ATTORNEY]:

Right.

BY THE COURT:

But unfortunately since there was a ․ since there was notice given that the request for continuance was denied, I cannot order a remand. So the Motion or [sic] Remand is denied.

We find no abuse of discretion in either the Board's or the trial court's findings. There is no evidence of the electronic communications in the record. As the trial court noted, the positive drug test and any other documentation supporting the termination could have been submitted to the Board by the City in lieu of its presence at the hearing. The Chief of Police was also present at the hearing and could have provided the Board with information surrounding the positive drug screen and the reason for termination. The notice provided by the Board afforded the City a meaningful opportunity to be heard. After the City received notice that the hearing would proceed as scheduled, it did not avail itself of the appellate process between the notice that the hearing would not be continued and the hearing in the district court. Although we may have granted the continuance as a professional courtesy, particularly since the City attorney was performing other duties on behalf of the State, neither the Board nor the trial court violated the City's due process rights. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to remand.

CONCLUSION

The judgment of the trial court denying the City of Marksville's motion for remand is affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

GREMILLION, Judge.