STATE v. ALONSO LLERENA (2026)

The defendant, Ernesto Alonso-Llerena, was charged by grand jury indictment with two counts of first degree murder, violations of La. R.S. 14:30 ¹ . The defendant pled not guilty on each count.² After a trial by jury, he was found guilty as charged on each count. The trial court sentenced the defendant to life imprisonment at hard labor without the benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence on each count, to be served consecutively. The defendant now appeals, raising two assignments of error: 1) challenging the sufficiency of the evidence and 2) the constitutional excessiveness of the consecutive sentences. For the following reasons, we affirm the convictions and sentences.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

On the evening of October 19, 2015, during the night hours, Lisa Duplantier (“Lisa”) contacted Kevin Heinz, then a sergeant with the Baton Rouge City Police Department (“BRPD”), after failed attempts to reach her parents, seventy-one-year-old Denis Duplanter (“Denis”) and seventy-year-old Suzanne Duplantier (“Suzanne”), the deceased victims in this case. Sergeant Heinz met Lisa and her sister Terri Duplantier (“Terri”) at their parents’ residence, and followed them inside. Denis and Suzanne were not at home, and one of their vehicles, a red Chevrolet pickup truck, was gone. There were signs of an unplanned departure, as their cell phones, Denis's wallet, and Suzanne's purse remained in the home. Additionally, a safe where Denis kept a large sum of cash was open, and the money was gone.

Sergeant Heinz secured the residence, and called backup units and homicide detectives to the residence. Detective Jordan Lear with the BRPD responded to the residence, contacted OnStar tracking services, and received a report advising Duplantiers’ truck was located north of West Club Deluxe Road in the southwest corner of the Petro Truck Stop in Hammond, Louisiana. Detective Lear relayed the location of the truck to the Hammond Police Department (“HPD”). HPD officers located Duplantiers’ truck, saw two bodies lying on the rear seat (later identified as the Duplantiers), secured the area, and called supervisors to the scene.

Personnel of the Louisiana State Police Crime Laboratory (“LSPCL”) processed Duplantiers’ truck, and the bodies were transported to the Tangipahoa Parish Coroner's Office. Surveillance footage obtained by the HPD showed a white long-bed truck entering the Petro Truck Stop right after the Duplantiers’ truck and parked in the same area. Police determined the white truck belonged to the defendant. The defendant was the Duplantiers’ groundskeeper who lived in a warehouse located on the Duplantiers’ property and had access to the gated property enclosing the main house. Based on additional surveillance footage, phone records, license plate reader hits, and evidence recovered during searches of the Duplantiers’ main residence and warehouse in which the defendant lived, the defendant and his cousin, Frank Garcia (“Garcia”),³ were considered persons of interest in the murders. They were ultimately found in Hollywood, Florida, and arrested.

SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE

In assignment of error number one, the defendant contends the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions. He argues the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he had the specific intent to kill the Duplantiers or that he was a principal to the murders. He further argues the State failed to negate the reasonable hypothesis that he acted under duress due to threats and orders made by Garcia at the time of the murders.

A conviction based on insufficient evidence cannot stand, as it violates due process. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV, La. Const. art. I, § 2. The standard of review for sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction is whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the State proved the essential elements of the crime and the defendant's identity as the perpetrator of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); State v. Goudy, 2023-0991 (La. App. 1 Cir. 04/19/24), 389 So. 3d 854, 856, writ denied, 2024-00637 (La. 11/14/24), 395 So. 3d 1186, State v. Coleman, 2021-0870 (La. App. 1 Cir. 04/08/22), 342 So. 3d 7, 11, writ denied, 2022-00759 (La. 11/21/23), 373 So. 3d 460; see also La. Code Crim. P. art. 821(B).

When a conviction is based on both direct and circumstantial evidence, the reviewing court must resolve any conflict in the direct evidence by viewing that evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution. When the direct evidence is thus viewed, the facts established by the direct evidence and the facts reasonably inferred from the circumstantial evidence must be sufficient for a rational juror to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was guilty of every essential element of the crime. State v. Currie, 2020-0467 (La. App. 1 Cir. 02/22/21), 321 So. 3d 978, 982.

When analyzing circumstantial evidence, La. R.S. 15:438 provides that the factfinder must be satisfied the overall evidence excludes every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. When a case involves circumstantial evidence, and the jury reasonably rejects the hypothesis of innocence presented by the defendant's own testimony, that hypothesis falls, and the defendant is guilty unless there is another hypothesis which raises a reasonable doubt. State v. King, 2023-1192 (La. App. 1 Cir. 09/20/24), 405 So. 3d 678, 686.

To convict the defendant of first-degree murder, the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt: 1) the defendant had the specific intent to kill or to inflict bodily harm while engaged in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of simple robbery; or 2) the defendant had the specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm upon more than one person; or 3) the defendant had the specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm upon a victim who was sixty-five years of age or older. See La. R.S. 14:30(A)(l), (3), and (5). Specific intent is “that state of mind which exists when the circumstances indicate that the offender actively desired the prescribed criminal consequences to follow his act or failure to act.” La. R.S. 14:10(1). Because it is a state of mind, specific intent need not be proven as a fact, but may be inferred from the circumstances and the defendant's actions. State v. Cabellero, 2022-0441 (La. App. 1 Cir. 11/04/22), 356 So. 3d 389, 394-95, writ denied, 2022-01777 (La. 04/25/23), 359 So. 3d 982.

Simple robbery is defined as the taking of anything of value belonging to another from the person of another or that is in the immediate control of another by use of force or intimidation but not armed with a dangerous weapon. La. R.S. 14:65(A). Simple robbery is a general intent crime. State v. Davis, 2012-03 86 (La. App. 1 Cir. 11/02/12), 111 So. 3d 100, 103. In general intent crimes, the criminal intent necessary to sustain a conviction is shown by the very doing of the acts which have been declared criminal. See La. R.S. 14:10(2); State v. Martinez, 2024-0134 (La. App. 1 Cir. 12/30/24), 403 So. 3d 1146, 1154, writ denied, 2025-00123 (La. 05/29/25), 409 So. 3d 752. Any person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object is guilty of an attempt to commit the offense intended; and it shall be immaterial whether, under the circumstances, he would have actually accomplished his purpose. La. R.S. 14:27(A).

Pursuant to La. R.S. 14:24, “[a]ll persons concerned in the commission of a crime, whether present or absent, and whether they directly commit the act constituting the offense, aid and abet in its commission, or directly or indirectly counsel or procure another to commit the crime, are principals.” Only those persons who knowingly participate in the planning or execution of a crime are principals. An individual may be convicted as a principal only for those crimes for which he personally has the requisite mental state. State v. Dupre, 2022-1228 (La. App. 1sCir. 04/14/23), 367 So. 3d 81, 86. Under the law of principals, all persons involved in the commission of a crime are equally culpable. See State v. Posey, 2008-0746 (La. App. 1 Cir. 09/26/08), 2008 WL 4376811, *3 (unpublished).

The State may prove a defendant guilty by showing that he served as a principal to the crime by aiding and abetting another. Moreover, when two or more persons embark on a concerted course of action, each person becomes responsible for not only his own acts but also for the acts of the other. Dupre, 367 So. 3d at 86. Likewise, a person may be convicted as a principal to murder even if he did not personally commit the act resulting in the victim's death. See State v. Cabellero, 2022-0441 (La. App. 1 Cir. 11/04/22), 356 So. 3d 389, writ denied, State v. Caballero, 2022-01777 (La. 04/25/23), 359 So. 3d 982. In the instant case, after the Duplantiers were reported missing on October 19, 2015, Officer Darcy Taylor, formerly of the BRPD, and Sergeant Kevin Adcock of the BRPD began processing the scene of the Duplantiers’ residence. Officer Taylor processed the outside of the safe, located in the utility room, and other areas and items in the home for fingerprints, DNA, and suspected blood, including doorway floors and the utility areas. As the evening progressed, the officers processing the residence were informed the Duplantiers were found deceased in Hammond, and thus, the incident went from a missing-persons investigation to a potential homicide investigation.

Lyle Newell, a former detective with the HPD, responded to the scene at the Petro Truck Stop on Highway 51 in Hammond, Louisiana. The Duplantiers’ truck was parked between two eighteen wheelers, and their bodies were found inside of the truck. Detective Newell drafted an application for a search warrant for the Duplantiers’ truck and obtained surveillance footage showing the Duplantiers’ truck entered the Petro Gas Station at 7:52 p.m., on October 18, 2015.

On the surveillance footage, Detective Newell viewed the Duplantiers’ truck as it appeared to have exited I-12, entered the Petro Truck Stop parking lot, passed the front door, stalled, then pulled around to the right side of the building. A white long-bed truck pulled in not long after the Duplantiers’ truck and went in the same direction. Both trucks parked on the right side of Petro Truck Stop for approximately two minutes then proceeded to the back where eighteen-wheeler trucks were located. The white truck left at 7:57 p.m., entered back on I-12, and left the area. The Duplantiers’ truck never left.

Detective Chase Zaffuto with the HPD recovered additional surveillance footage from a snowball stand next door to the Petro Track Stop showing the defendant's white long-bed track leaving the Petro Track Stop going northbound towards I-12 at 7:55 p.m. Detective Zaffuto also reviewed the defendant's cell phone records to determine his whereabouts on the night in question and the days before. He noticed a phone number with an area code that stood out that had been repeatedly called, tracked the provider information for the phone number, and discovered it belonged to someone from Hollywood, Florida. The detective further learned the defendant was located in Hollywood, Florida at the time and shared that information with the BRPD.

After the bodies were removed, the LSPCL took photographs of the areas of the truck where the bodies were located, showing the area was clean underneath, with no suspected blood found on the floorboard. Michelle Cazes Olinde, a crime scene investigator with the LSPCL, testified at trial that the Duplantiers were killed somewhere else prior to their bodies being placed inside of the vehicle. The LSPCL initially processed the vehicle for fingerprints but no patent prints (fingerprints visible to the naked eye) were found. They then used fingerprint powder to look for latent prints and did not find any prints of value. They also swabbed smudges, door handles, the steering wheel, the gearshift, and the zip ties on the victims, and submitted the swabs to the LSPCL for analysis.

After their truck was processed, the Duplantiers’ bodies were transported to the Tangipahoa Parish Coroner's Office for autopsies, attended by Detective Ronney Domiano with the HPD. Detective Domiano photographed the bodies of the decedents at the autopsy and collected the zip ties, duct tape, DNA swabs from the bodies, and the victims’ clothing and submitted the items to the LSPCL for testing.

Dr. William Beau Clark, the East Baton Rouge Parish Coroner, an expert witness in the field of emergency medicine, testified at trial. Dr. Clark reviewed the autopsies in this case and testified the Duplantiers both died from asphyxia by neck ligature, and the manner of death as to each was determined to be homicide. Dr. Clark further testified that each of them would have taken forty-five seconds to a couple of minutes to die from expending the oxygen in their blood, considering factors such as age and health.⁴

Lisa, the Duplantiers’ eldest daughter, testified that the family's home on Highland Road was surrounded by a gated fence and set back from the road but visible from the road. Lisa had last communicated with her father on Thursday, October 15th, and with her mother on Sunday afternoon, October 18th. Lisa and her mother routinely texted each other Sunday nights, but Suzanne did not call or text her that night. Further, her parents did not respond to her text message the next morning or subsequent calls and text messages during the day. Lisa contacted her sister Terri who indicated she had not heard from their parents more recently than Lisa. Thus, Lisa contacted a friend with the BRPD, Sergeant Heinz, and asked him to meet her and Terri at the Highland Road residence.

Lisa testified that when they arrived, her father's truck was gone and furniture was out of place in the home. In addition to seeing Suzanne's purse, she noted Denis's wallet was on his dresser, but did not contain any cash, which she stated was unusual. Further, the cash he kept in a safe that was normally locked was missing.

Lisa further testified that “Ernie” (the defendant), whom her dad met after Hurricane Katrina, did landscaping work for her father for about ten years and lived in an office located on the Duplantiers’ property, about half of a mile from the main house if accessed by a shortcut on the property. The next day, after they had been informed their parents bodies had been located, Lisa and Terri were allowed back into the Duplantiers’ home. They saw tiny multi-colored beads on the floor throughout the house. When asked if anyone had access to the property, Lisa informed the police that the defendant lived in the warehouse on the property and had access to all of the gates on the property.

Sergeant Robert Hunt with the BRPD, formerly a detective in the digital forensic section; Lieutenant William Moragne with the Louisiana State Police, assigned to the technology and business unit; and David Lindsey, a criminal intelligence analyst, introduced reports generated on queries of the license plate number for the defendant's white long-bed truck (C287533) and another vehicle identified as belonging to Frank Garcia (license plate number 535TJY), captured by roadway license plate readers, for the dates of October 17th though October 19th of 2015. On October 17, at 5:15 p.m., Garcia's vehicle was travelling westbound at the Hammond off-ramp at I-12, towards Baton Rouge. On October 18th, at 7:41 p.m., the defendant's truck was travelling eastbound in Hammond on I-12, and at 8:00 p.m., westbound on I-12 in Hammond, towards Baton Rouge. Later that night, at 11:36 p.m., Garcia's vehicle was timestamped as travelling east, outside of Baton Rouge, and at 11:58 p.m., the defendant's truck was travelling on I-12, eastbound in Covington, away from Baton Rouge. Both vehicles travelled into Mississippi on October 19, 2015, at 12:25 a.m., within two seconds of each other, indicating one vehicle was following the other.

Michael Pezzelle testified as an expert in cell phone mapping and analysis. Pezzelle performed mapping and cell phone analysis in the instant case, and received phone records for the defendant, Garcia, and the Duplantiers. Around September of 2021, after he completed the process of analyzing the phone records through a software system, Pezzelle received other known information such as addresses, license plate reader hits, and OnStar location information. He concluded the defendant and Garcia were in Florida around October 4, but the defendant's phone returned to the Baton Rouge area on October 4 and remained in that area through October 16. Garcia's phone moved from Florida to northern Florida, across I-10, and then arrived in Baton Rouge sometime around October 17, consistent with a license plate reader hit for his vehicle at 6:02 p.m. Pezzelle noticed that the defendant's phone and Garcia's phone then moved together throughout the south Baton Rouge area. Then at one point, both of the phones left the Baton Rouge area, and the defendant's phone travelled back to south Florida.

Pezzelle testified that Suzanne's phone was last used for an outgoing event on October 18 at approximately 1:44 p.m., and he confirmed that Denis's phone was not used after that date and time. On that date, October 18 at 4:22 p.m., the defendant's phone was in the area of the Duplantiers’ property. Garcia's last two phone transactions on October 18, at 9:07 p.m. and 10:02 p.m., were with a phone number ending with 8-2-2-5, the phone number most frequently communicated with by Garcia's phone, believed to belong to his wife or significant other. After the 10:02 p.m. transaction on October 18, there was no additional phone activity for Garcia's phone, though license plate reader hits for his vehicle continued.

The defendant's phone had contact with the phone ending with the number 8-2-2-5 at 11:09 p.m., as the defendant's phone was moving from Baton Rouge, eastbound. The defendant's phone had further contact with that phone number seven times on October 18 and five times on October 19, as it was moving from Louisiana to Florida. The defendant's cell phone arrived in Hollywood, Florida at approximately 5:00 p.m. on October 19. The defendant's phone activity increased with the phone ending in 8-2-2-5 until about 11:45 a.m. on October 21, the date of the defendant's arrest.

The defendant's phone communicated with Garcia's phone fifty-two times between October 3 and October 18 (a fifteen-day span), forty-five incoming calls to Garcia from the defendant, and seven incoming calls from Garcia to the defendant. The frequency of communication between the defendant's phone and Garcia's phone increased on October 16 and stayed at a heightened level of communication through October 18. Pezzelle determined that on the afternoon of the October 18, phone records for the four individuals, including the defendant, Garcia, and the Duplantiers, were consistent with them all being on the Duplantiers’ property at the same time.⁵

Sergeant Adcock, Sergeant Congolona Kersh, Sergeant Aleesha Kuhn, and Lieutenant Mindy Stewart, all with the BRPD, were sent to the Duplantiers’ residence on October 20th to continue the processing which began the night the Duplantiers were reported missing. In addition to taking additional photographs, and collecting suspected blood and DNA samples, they collected a zip tie found outside in front of the residence and tiny beads that were found all over some of the floors in the house.⁶ Sergeant Adcock, Sergeant Kersh, and Lieutenant Stewart testified they also processed the warehouse residence on the Duplantiers’ property, where the defendant lived.

Detective Ross Williams with the BRPD and other BRPD detectives went to Hollywood, Florida, after an arrest warrant was obtained for the defendant. License plate reader data led them to a house in Hollywood, Florida, which was identified as Garcia's rental home. On October 21, the defendant was arrested and transported to the Hollywood Florida Police Department (“HFPD”) where the police interviewed him. Search warrants for the Hollywood residence and the defendant's truck, located at the residence, were obtained and executed.

Prior to the interview with Detective Williams, the defendant was advised of his Miranda ⁷ rights in Spanish by a Spanish speaking detective, Detective Orlando Laso with the HFPD. A waiver of rights form was executed, and the defendant gave a statement with Detective Laso acting as the translator.⁸ Detective Williams testified at trial and explained that, during the interview, the defendant confirmed he worked for the Duplantiers and lived on their property. The defendant stated, during the interview, he last saw Denis on October 17th. The defendant said he passed through Hammond on his way to Florida, and he stopped at the Petro Truck Stop to get gas and was by himself.

According to Detective Williams, the defendant's appearance and demeanor did not change throughout the interview; he remained calm, including the point at which he was told the Duplantiers’ deceased bodies had been found. The defendant indicated he did not have any knowledge as to what happened to them. When asked if someone else was involved, the defendant did not provide any information. Sergeant Belford Johnson of the BRPD executed a search warrant for the defendant's DNA, collecting a swab from the defendant. Sergeant Johnson testified the defendant's DNA profile was a match for DNA located on the steering wheel and gear shift of Denis's truck.⁹

Formerly with the HFPD; Detective Steven Sparkman testified regarding the evidence recovered during the search of the Hollywood residence and the defendant's truck. The evidence included wads of cash (some in pillowcases found in the master bedroom believed to be used by Garcia and his significant other) with bank wrappings around them, wads of cash with rubber bands around them, additional sets of cash with paper clips on them, and a blue bank bag containing fifty-cent pieces and other old coins. Some of the cash was in a black zipper bag, located on the coffee table in the living room, that also contained the defendant's checkbook. A red suitcase filled with cash was also located in the master bedroom closet. A black fanny pack located on a table on the patio (where the defendant was arrested) contained several items including the defendant's driver's license, passport, permanent resident ID card, and pieces of jewelry.¹⁰

Sergeant Kuhn testified that he took possession of the money recovered in the search of the Hollywood, Florida residence, and packaged the money in evidence bags. She further testified regarding the denominations of the cash, noting that one evidence bag contained twenty-dollar bills and one-hundred-dollar bills, totaling $22,000, which had been removed from the black zipper bag. Another evidence bag contained one-hundred-dollar bills that totaled $58,000 in cash, and others contained waded one-dollar bills. Several additional evidence bags contained $20,000 each. The cash recovered in the search of the Hollywood residence totaled $159,752.¹¹

Lisa Duplantier, at trial, identified some of the evidence recovered in the search of the Hollywood residence. She agreed that the recovered money, including the suitcase filled with a large amount of one-dollar bills and other wads of cash, was packaged in the same manner as her father's cash. Lisa also positively identified several items recovered from the fanny pack that contained the defendant's identification, including watches, a bracelet, a belt buckle with the initials “D-A-D,” and old coins that appeared to have belonged to Denis. She identified additional items recovered from the fanny pack, including an LSU charm bracelet, a pair of earrings, and an engagement ring that belonged to Suzanne.

John Christopher Mai, Ashley Cook, and Philip Simmers, DNA analysts with the LSPCL, testified as experts in DNA screening and analysis. The lab examined swabs from the vehicles and residences involved in this case, and evidence removed from the Duplantiers’ bodies and compared them to the reference samples collected.¹² After reference samples were obtained from the defendant and Garcia and submitted to the lab, it was determined that the defendant could not be excluded from the DNA profile collected from the steering wheel and gear shift of the Duplantiers’ truck.

The defendant testified at trial. He stated he met Denis, whom he referred to as “Bobby,” in 2007 or 2008, and moved onto the Duplantiers’ property in 2009 as their groundskeeper.¹³ The defendant admitted he knew Denis kept money in his safe. However, he denied killing the Duplantiers and further denied stealing from them. The defendant testified Garcia acted alone in killing the Duplantiers and stealing Denis's money. The defendant said he introduced Garcia to Denis for the purposes of beginning the cultivation of marijuana, in which Garcia had previous experience, at which point Garcia unexpectedly committed the robbery and murders. The defendant testified Garcia first attacked Denis then Suzanne, stating he approached them while holding a rifle in his hand, and began hitting them. The defendant testified he immediately questioned Garcia, and asked him if he was crazy. The defendant stated Garcia told him to shut up and pointed the rifle towards him. The defendant further testified Garcia ordered Denis put the zip ties on himself and denied assisting Garcia.¹⁴

According to the defendant, Garcia placed zip ties on the defendant's hands and duct tape on his feet to restrain him, as he continued the attack and robbery. The defendant testified Garcia threatened to kill him in the midst of committing the offenses. The defendant also testified that Garcia demanded Denis to open the safe and then stole the items from the safe. He noted Suzanne had zip ties and duct tape on her feet at the time. The defendant confirmed he was wearing a beaded bracelet at the time of the attacks, stating his bracelet broke when he fell as he stumbled over Suzanne's feet. He confirmed that the photographed beads found on the floor of the home came from his bracelet. According to the defendant, Garcia lifted Suzanne and dragged her to the bedroom, while the defendant remained in the room with Denis. Minutes later, Garcia returned and removed the zip ties and tape from the defendant's hands and feet, but remained armed with the rifle.

The defendant testified that after his restraints were removed, he helped Denis walk to a chair in the living room. The defendant ultimately admitted that he subsequently held Denis's feet, noting that when Garcia put zip ties around Denis's neck, Denis began kicking his feet. The defendant testified he was traumatized, as Denis then died in front of his eyes.¹⁵ According to the defendant, Garcia then commanded him to help him carry the bodies to the truck. The defendant testified Garcia placed Denis in the truck first, followed by Suzanne. The defendant confirmed that he drove Denis's truck to the gas station, while Garcia drove the defendant's truck. The defendant testified that just before he and Garcia drove off in the defendant's truck, Garcia used a t-shirt to remove the defendant's fingerprints from the steering wheel and shift gear in the Duplantiers’ truck. The defendant claimed Garcia commanded him to pack everything and leave with him, and further told him he would have to return to Cuba, never come back, and could not talk about what happened.¹⁶

Regarding some of the cash located in the Hollywood residence, the defendant testified he received a $50,000 settlement from an accident, which he deposited into his account with Chase Bank. He further testified he withdrew $26,000 from his account, delivered to him in wads of $5,000, that he placed underneath his bedside table. The defendant further claimed he rejected Garcia's offer to give him some of the money stolen from the Duplantiers. The defendant testified he lied during his first police interview because his life was threatened by Garcia. The defendant noted Garcia was approximately five or six years older than him, and stated Garcia had connections to a gang. He testified he believed that if he would have implicated Garcia, he would have been killed and members of his family in Cuba would have be killed.

In his appellate brief, the defendant admitted that he was present at the time the Duplantiers were killed. However, he contends he was surprised and traumatized by Garcia's actions and had no opportunity to extricate himself from the situation. He further claims that he did not receive any benefit from the attacks. Finally, the defendant argues that based on the circumstances and facts, he established the defense of justification by a preponderance of the evidence.

Pursuant to La. R.S. 14:18(6), the defense of justification can be claimed “[w]hen any crime, except murder, is committed through the compulsion of threats by another of ․ great bodily harm, and the offender reasonably believes the person making the threats is present and would immediately carry out the threats if the crime were not committed․” (Emphasis added). This doctrine has been recognized as providing a defense if it is not expressly prohibited. See State v. Felton, 2013-1029 (La. App. 4th Cir. 08/13/14), 2014 WL 3955004, *14 (unpublished), writ denied, 2014-1922 (La. 06/01/15), 171 So. 3d 266. It is well settled that the defense of justification by compulsion is unavailable to a defendant accused of murder. See State v. Glass, 455 So. 2d 659, 663-64 (La. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1080, 105 S.Ct. 2159, 85 L.Ed.2d 514 (1985).¹⁷ See also State v. McCartney, 96-58 (La. App. 3d Cir. 10/09/96), 684 So. 2d 416, 425, writ denied, 1997-0508 (La. 09/05/97), 700 So. 2d 503, cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1002, 118 S.Ct. 573, 139 L.Ed.2d 412 (1997) (defendant convicted of second degree murder sought to prove he was threatened into assisting a murder); State v. Joseph, 573 So. 2d 1248, 1253 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 577 So. 2d 31 (La. 1991) (defendant convicted of first degree murder asserted defense of compulsion as to the underlying crime of armed robbery).

The trier of fact is free to accept or reject, in whole or in part, the testimony of any witness. State v. Williams, 2001-0944 (La. App. 1 Cir. 12/28/01), 804 So. 2d 932, 939, writ denied, 2002-0399 (La. 02/14/03), 836 So. 2d 135. The reviewing court does not determine whether another possible hypothesis has been suggested by the defendant which could explain the events in an exculpatory fashion; rather, the reviewing court evaluates the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and determines whether the alternative hypothesis is sufficiently reasonable that a rational factfinder could not have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Jones, 2016-1502 (La. 01/30/18), 318 So. 3d 678, 682 (per curiam). The record is clear that the defendant's assertion that he was threatened into committing the offenses is not supported by any evidence other than his own self-serving testimony. In the instant case, after hearing the defendant's testimony at trial, the jury rejected the justification defense.

Based on our review of the record, we find the jury could have rationally concluded the defendant was an active participant in the robbery and the murders. The defendant communicated with Garcia by phone over fifty times during the days leading to the murders. The defendant used his position of trust to gain access and entry into the Duplantiers’ residence. The defendant admittedly knew that Denis kept cash in his safe. Further, the defendant admitted to holding Denis's feet as he was being strangled to death with zip ties around his neck. The defendant claims he was surprised and traumatized by the murders; however, the defendant did not report the offenses to the police, drove away from the scene with the deceased victims’ bodies in the vehicle, abandoned the bodies, left the state, and made plans to depart to Cuba. At the home in which the defendant was located at the time of his Florida arrest, the police recovered money and property taken in the robbery. Several items, including unique pieces of jewelry that belonged to the Duplantiers, were located in the defendant's fanny pack. Additionally, the defendant lied to the police after he was apprehended.

Flight and attempt to avoid apprehension indicate consciousness of guilt, and therefore, are circumstances from which a juror may infer guilt. State v. Southall, 2022-0746 (La. App. 1 Cir. 06/02/23), 369 So. 3d 925, 933. Lying or purposeful misrepresentations reasonably raise the inference of a “guilty mind” and has been recognized as indicative of an awareness of wrongdoing. State v. Dyson, 2016-1571 (La. App. 1 Cir. 06/02/17), 222 So. 3d 220, 234, writ denied, 2017-1399 (La. 06/15/18), 257 So. 3d 685.

Under the facts and circumstances presented in this case, we cannot say that the jury was irrational in determining the defendant had the specific intent to kill the Duplantiers, more than one person, both of whom were over sixty-five years of age, while engaged in the perpetration of simple robbery. See La. R.S. 14:30(A)(1), (3), and (5); State v. Ordodi, 2006-0207 (La. 11/29/06), 946 So. 2d 654, 662. Thus, we find the jury rationally rejected the defendant's hypothesis of innocence. An appellate court errs by substituting its appreciation of the evidence and credibility of witnesses for that of the factfinder and thereby overturning a verdict on the basis of an exculpatory hypothesis of innocence presented to, and rationally rejected by, the jury. See State v. Calloway, 2007-2306 (La. 01/21/09), 1 So. 3d 417, 418 (per curiam). Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational trier of fact could have found the evidence proved beyond a reasonable doubt, and to the exclusion of every reasonable hypothesis of innocence, the elements of both counts of first degree murder and the defendant's identity as the perpetrator of the offenses. Accordingly, we find no merit in assignment of error number one.

EXCESSIVE SENTENCE

In assignment of error number two, the defendant argues the sentences are excessive because they were imposed consecutively. He argues the trial court failed to individualize the sentences and consider mitigating circumstances.

A thorough review of the record indicates that the defendant did not file a written motion to reconsider sentence after the sentences were imposed. Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure article 881.1, section E, provides that the failure to file or make a motion to reconsider sentence precludes a defendant from raising an excessive sentence argument on appeal. In this case, we note the defendant did, however, orally object on the ground now raised on appeal, that the sentences are excessive due to them being imposed consecutively, as the “only grounds for reconsideration.” The trial court noted the objection and reiterated its reasons for the sentences. We find the defendant's oral objection was sufficient to meet the requirements for an oral motion to reconsider sentence under La. Code Crim. P. art. 881.1(B). See State v. Augustine, 2024-0420 (La. App. 1 Cir. 05/23/25), 417 So. 3d 826, 844.

Both the United States and Louisiana Constitutions prohibit the imposition of excessive or cruel punishment. U.S. Const. amend. VIII; La. Const. art. I, § 20. Although a sentence falls within statutory limits, it may be excessive. State v. Sepulvado, 367 So. 2d 762, 767 (La. 1979). A sentence is considered constitutionally excessive if it is grossly disproportionate to the seriousness of the offense or is nothing more than a purposeless and needless infliction of pain and suffering. A sentence is considered grossly disproportionate if, when the crime and punishment are considered in light of the harm done to society, it shocks the sense of justice. The trial court has great discretion in imposing a sentence within the statutory limits, and this court will not set aside such a sentence as excessive in the absence of a manifest abuse of discretion. Augustine, 417 So. 3d at 844. Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure article 894.1 sets forth the factors for the trial court to consider when imposing sentence. While the entire checklist of Article 894.1 need not be recited, the record must reflect the trial court adequately considered the criteria. The articulation of the factual basis for a sentence is the goal of Article 894.1, not rigid or mechanical compliance with its provisions. Where the record clearly shows an adequate factual basis for the sentence imposed, remand is unnecessary even when there has not been full compliance with Article 894.1. Augustine, 417 So. 3d at 844. As the State did not seek the death penalty in this case, the life sentences imposed on each count of first-degree murder are mandatory. See La. R.S. 14:30(C)(2). Courts are charged with applying a statutorily mandated punishment unless it is unconstitutional. State v. Dorthey, 623 So. 2d 1276, 1278 (La. 1993). It is incumbent on the defendant to rebut the presumption that a mandatory sentence is constitutional by “clearly and convincingly” showing that: “[he] is exceptional, which in this context means that because of unusual circumstances this defendant is a victim of the legislature's failure to assign sentences that are meaningfully tailored to the culpability of the offender, the gravity of the offense, and the circumstances of the case.” State v. Johnson, 1997-1906 (La. 03/04/98), 709 So. 2d 672, 676 citing State v. Young, 1994-1636 (La. App. 4 Cir. 10/26/95), 663 So. 2d 525, 528, writ denied, 1995-3010 (La. 03/22/96), 669 So. 2d 1223; State v. Alexander, 2021-1346 (La. App. 1 Cir. 07/13/22), 344 So. 3d 705, 725, writ denied, 2022-01262 (La. 11/08/23), 373 So. 3d 62.¹⁸

If the defendant is convicted of two or more offenses based on the same act or transaction, or constituting parts of a common scheme or plan, the terms of imprisonment shall be served concurrently unless the court expressly directs that some or all be served consecutively. La. Code Crim. P. art. 883. Thus, La. Code Crim. P. art. 883 specifically excludes from its scope sentences which the court expressly directs to be served consecutively. A trial judge retains discretion to impose consecutive penalties based on the offender's past criminality, violence in the charged crimes, or the risk he poses to the safety of the community. State v. Thomas, 1998-1144 (La. 10/09/98), 719 So. 2d 49 (per curiam).

Louisiana courts have upheld consecutive sentences for homicide convictions arising from a single episode, course of conduct, or common scheme. In State v. Miller, 2020-182 (La. App. 5th Cir. 12/23/20), 308 So. 3d 1246, 1258-59, writ denied, 2021-00233 (La. 04/27/21), 314 So. 3d 838, the appellate court affirmed consecutive life sentences on two counts of second degree murder where the defendant executed two individuals, took their car, and drove it around for days, as the victims’ bodies were decomposing at their home. See also Alexander, 344 So. 3d at 726-27; State v. Alexander, 2020-1337 (La. App. 1 Cir. 10/18/21), 2021 WL 4851320, *6 (unpublished); State v. Funes, 2011-120 (La. App. 5th Cir. 12/28/11), 88 So. 3d 490, 509, writ denied, 2012-0290 (La. 05/25/12), 90 So. 3d 408.

Herein, prior to imposing the sentences, the trial court heard victim impact statements by the Duplantiers’ daughters, Lisa, Terri, and Dee Duplantier-Kagle. They expressed the defendant scarred their family in brutally murdering their parents for money, despite all of the things their parents did to help the defendant. The trial court noted greed was at the heart of the murders. The trial court also considered the status of the Duplantiers as parents and grandparents. Moreover, the trial court specifically noted the Duplantiers trusted the defendant and were very good to him, as they allowed him to live on their property rent free for six years and bought him a vehicle. The trial court further stated:

This is by far one of the most heinous of crimes that our community has encountered. It's almost unheard of to find out that there is a person who could put zip ties around someone's neck and pull them tight enough until they die by asphyxiation. Then take their bodies, pile them up on top of one another, and leave them in an abandoned car before fleeing.

We find the that the defendant has not proven, and the record is devoid of clear and convincing evidence, that the defendant is exceptional. The defendant has not shown that because of unusual circumstances he was a victim of the legislature's failure to assign a sentence that was meaningfully tailored to his culpability, the gravity of the offenses, and the circumstances of the case. Accordingly, there was no reason for the trial court to deviate from the mandatory sentence provided for the instant offenses by La. R.S. 14:30(C)(2). The defendant has not shown that his sentences were excessive and would have changed, either in the trial court or on appeal, had counsel sought such a deviation. See State v. Miller, 2015-1031 (La. App. 1 Cir. 12/23/15), 185 So. 3d 811, 817, writ denied, 2016-0152 (La. 01/23/17), 215 So. 3d 681.

Furthermore, we find the trial court gave adequate reasons for imposing consecutive sentences in this case. This case involves two elderly victims who were viciously murdered. The defendant abused his position of trust in committing the murders. Finally, the record shows no expression of remorse or accountability by the defendant, as evidenced by him placing all of the blame on Garcia for the murders. Any lesser sentence would depreciate the seriousness of the defendant's crimes, which ended two lives. The imposed sentences are not grossly disproportionate to the severity of the offenses or shocking to the conscience and, thus, are not unconstitutionally excessive. Accordingly, assignment of error number two lacks merit.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the convictions and sentences of the defendant, Ernesto Alonso-Llerena.

CONVICTIONS AND SENTENCES AFFIRMED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The indictment in this case also charged Frank Garcia with two counts of first degree murder. The defendants were each charged as a principal. The defendants moved for a severance and for a change of venue, both of which the trial court granted. In each of the severed cases, the State appealed the trial court's ruling on the motion for change of venue, and this court reversed the ruling in each case. State v. Alonso-Llerena, 2019-0921 (La. App. 1 Cir. 05/11/20), 303 So. 3d 330; State v. Garcia, 2019-0920 (La. App. 1 Cir. 03/04/20), 300 So. 3d 406. Garcia subsequently pled guilty to manslaughter.

2.   The State did not seek the death penalty in this case.

3.   According to the defendant's trial testimony, Garcia's full name is Frank Garcia-Llerena.

4.   Dr. Clark testified Denis's toxicology was positive for cocaine metabolites, however it did not contribute to his death.

5.   On October 19, 20, and 21, as Pezzelle further noted, the defendant's phone communicated with an 8-8-8 number for a company called Hola America, an internet company that primarily provides a platform for making international calls to Cuba.

6.   Lieutenant Stewart testified that bank bags were recovered and collected from the victims’ home, including a Chase Bank bag and a City National Bank bag, both found in the laundry room near the safe. Sergeant Kuhn testified she photographed and collected seven ounces of cocaine recovered during the search of the safe.

7.   Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).

8.   The interview was transcribed in English.

9.   As later discussed herein, the State also presented expert testimony of DNA analysts regarding the results of the DNA testing in this case.

10.   In addition to being searched at the Hollywood residence, the defendant's truck was impounded, inventoried, and processed for fingerprints and DNA.

11.   Police executed warrants for Garcia's arrest and his DNA on December 8, 2015, in Hollywood, Florida.

12.   Some of the samples did not contain amplifiable or reportable DNA results and others consisted of expected results such as the Duplantiers not being excluded as donors of profiles from samples located in the Duplantiers’ residence, their truck, and items removed from their bodies. Suzanne Duplantier could not be excluded as a donor and/or the DNA profile obtained from her reference sample was consistent with the DN A profile obtained from swabs of suspected blood from the southeast interior entry doorway floor, suspected blood from a wad of paper towels, and suspected blood taken from a piece of carpet.

13.   The defendant claimed he paid a portion of the cost of his truck but confirmed Denis paid the majority of the cost.

14.   The defendant testified Garcia also ordered Suzanne to put zip ties on her own wrists. According to the defendant, Garcia tightened the Duplantiers’ zip ties after they placed them on their own wrists. The defendant repeatedly denied assisting Garcia, and indicated that Garcia was holding the rifle in his hand while tightening the restraints.

15.   On September 11, 2018, the defendant participated in an unrecorded interview conducted by an FBI agent, Joe D. Serrano, during which he made disclosures similar to his trial testimony. However, according to Agent Serrano's testimony, the defendant did not claim that Garcia put duct tape around his feet or the Duplantiers’ feet. During cross-examination at trial, the defendant was questioned regarding disclosures he made to Agent Serrano, at which point he testified he held Denis's feet, as Garcia put the zip tie around his neck and strangled him.

16.   When asked to demonstrate (with a rifle replica made of foam, zip ties, duct tape, and a roll of paper towels) how Garcia could have held the rifle while tightening the zip tie around Denis's neck, the defendant indicated Garcia sat the rifle down in order to do so. When further asked to demonstrate how Garcia could have held the rifle while putting duct tape around his and the Duplantiers’ feet, the defendant was unable to hold the items steadily but reiterated his claim that Garcia was able to do so.

17.   In Glass, the defendant therein was convicted of two counts of first degree murder and argued he was compelled to kill the victims when his accomplice held a gun to his head and ordered him to kill the couple. The defendant argued that the killing of a human being while under the compulsion of an imminent and imperative threat of death negates the requirement of proof of specific intent in a prosecution for first degree murder. The Louisiana Supreme Court held that the defendant's assertion did not comport with the law. The Court, in pertinent part, stated, “[w]hile coercion, or threats by Glass’ accomplice (which we will accept as true for purpose of this argument), may in large part have affected Glass’ motivation, i.e., to save his own life, this factor has no bearing on whether defendant had specific intent as required by the first degree murder statute.” Glass, 455 So.2d at 663 (footnote omitted).

18.   While both Dorthey and Johnson involve mandatory minimum sentences imposed under the Habitual Offender Law, the Louisiana Supreme Court has held that the sentencing review principles espoused in Dorthey are not restricted to the penalties provided by the Habitual Offender Law. See State v. Fobbs, 1999-1024 (La. 09/24/99), 744 So. 2d 1274, 1275 (per curiam).

BALFOUR, J.