FORD v. MICHOT (2026)

The primary issue in this case is whether the summary judgment granted in favor of a homeowner's insurer properly dismissed all claims brought against it because the homeowner's policy excluded intentional acts perpetrated by one of the insureds. An additional matter to be decided is a peremptory exception of no cause of action raised for the first time at the appellate level by one of the homeowners for any tort committed by her adult-major child who resided in her home. We grant the homeowner's peremptory exception of no cause of action, in part; affirm the trial court judgment and remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

David Michot and his wife, Tricia, live in Woodworth in a house insured by Louisiana Farm Bureau Insurance Company (“Farm Bureau”). Living with the Michots on November 26, 2021, were their thirteen-year-old daughter, HM, and their nineteen-year-old son, Jacob. On that date, the Michots hosted a sleepover for HM and five of her girlfriends,¹ all approximately thirteen years of age.

Steven and Jill Ford (“the Fords”) are the parents of Jane Doe, one of the thirteen-year-old girls who attended the sleepover. In the Fords’ petition against the Michots and Farm Bureau, it is alleged that Jacob sexually assaulted and raped Jane Doe.² It was alleged that the Michots provided an unsafe environment, failed to properly supervise, failed to know the propensity of their adult son to commit a sexual assault, and allowed alcohol to be served to the girls. Later, the Fords amended their petition to add claims for punitive damages against Jacob. Initially, Farm Bureau declined to provide a defense or indemnity to Jacob and his parents based upon the intentional acts exclusions contained in its policy. However, Farm Bureau eventually provided a defense to the Michots under a reservation of rights.

After answers were filed and discovery proceeded, Farm Bureau filed a motion for summary judgment seeking to deny coverage and withdraw its defense of the Michots. It based its motion on two exclusions in its policy; one involved damages coming from an insured's intentional act and the other specifically addressed damages arising from an insured's sexual or physical molestation. In support of its motion, Farm Bureau attached the Fords’ petition for damages, Farm Bureau's answer, a certified copy of the Farm Bureau policy issued to the Michots that included an exclusion of coverage for an intentional tort, and copies of the criminal proceedings filed against Jacob. Farm Bureau further filed a memorandum in support of its summary judgment motion.

The Michots filed a memorandum opposing Farm Bureau's motion for summary judgment on the issue of coverage. In addition to urging an objection to Farm Bureau's unsworn and/or unverified attachment of Jacob's criminal proceedings, the Michots attached their interrogatory responses, their depositions, their answer to the Fords’ petition, and Jacob's answer to the Fords’ petition.

The Fords also filed a memorandum opposing the motion for summary judgment sought by Farm Bureau on coverage. In support of their opposition, the Fords attached the depositions of: Jane Doe; Jacob; HM; Tricia; JM; CM; and David.

After conducting a hearing on Farm Bureau's motion, the trial court granted summary judgment, dismissing all the claims brought against it by the Fords.  ³

The Fords and Tricia appealed ⁴ the trial court judgment that dismissed all claims against Farm Bureau.⁵ After the trial court record was filed in this court, Tricia filed a peremptory exception of no cause of action contending that Louisiana law specifically provides she cannot be held liable for the tortious acts of Jacob, her adult-major child.

TRICIA'S ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

1. The trial court judgment does not contain any decretal language on insurance coverage.

2. The trial court erred in granting Farm Bureau's Motion for Summary Judgment because multiple issues of genuine fact exist.

3. The trial court erred in imposing vicarious liability for the acts of an adult child, to the parents, absent a special relationship, to decide coverage.

4. The trial court erred in granting Farm Bureau's Motion for Summary Judgment as Farm Bureau did not prove an explicit exclusion applicable to Tricia.

THE FORDS’ ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

1. The trial court erred in granting Farm Bureau's Motion for Summary Judgment because multiple genuine issues of material fact exists;

2. The trial court erred in granting Farm Bureau's Motion for Summary Judgment by ruling that there can only be one cause to a subject incident.

3. The trial court erred in granting Farm Bureau's Motion for Summary Judgment because Farm Bureau failed to carry its burden that a specific exclusion in their policy applies.

4. The trial court erred in granting Farm Bureau's Motion for Summary Judgment by treating all claims as allegations of intentional torts when plaintiffs’ claims against Tricia (and Louisiana Farm Bureau) are rooted in negligence.

JURISDICTION

As an insured of Farm Bureau, Tricia contends that the trial court judgment is deficient because it neither declares there is no coverage under the policy at issue nor that Farm Bureau has no duty to defend her.

A trial court's jurisdiction over matters on appeal is governed by La.Code Civ.P. art. 2088(A) that sets forth the following general rule that “[t]he jurisdiction of the trial court over all matters in the case reviewable under the appeal is divested, and that of the appellate court attaches, ․ on the granting of the order of appeal, in the case of a devolutive appeal.”

In Richard v. Quality Construction & Production, LLC, 19-567, pp. 3–4 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/28/20), 306 So.3d 516, 520, writ denied, 20-1378 (La. 1/26/21), 309 So.3d 344, this court stated:

It is well settled that a final judgment must be precise, definite, and certain. A final judgment must also contain decretal language. Conley v. Plantation Mgmt. Co., L.L.C., 12-1510 (La.App. 1 Cir. 5/6/13), 117 So.3d 542, writ denied, 13-1300 (La. 9/20/13), 123 So.3d 178. “Generally, it must name the party in favor of whom the ruling is ordered, the party against whom the ruling is ordered, and the relief that is granted or denied.” Id. at 547. “The decree alone indicates the decision․ The result decreed must be spelled out in lucid, unmistakable language[, and] ․ [t]he quality of definiteness is essential to a proper judgment.” Input/Output Marine Sys., Inc. v. Wilson Greatbatch, Tech., Inc., 10-477, p. 13 (La.App. 5 Cir. 10/29/10), 52 So.3d 909, 916 (citations omitted). The specific relief granted should be determinable from the judgment without reference to other documents. Vanderbrook v. Coachmen Indus., Inc., 01-0809 (La.App. 1 Cir. 5/10/02), 818 So.2d 906, overruled on other grounds sub nom., Advanced Leveling & Concrete Solutions v. Lathan Co., Inc., 17-1250 (La.App. 1 Cir. 12/20/18), 268 So.3d 1044.

In the present case, the trial court judgment granted Farm Bureau's motion for summary judgment and dismissed the Fords’ demands, individually and on behalf of Jane Doe, with prejudice. The judgment further states that “this dismissal of [Farm Bureau] disposes all of plaintiff[s’] claims against [Farm Bureau], and as such, the Judgment is considered a final appealable Judgment in accordance with La.C.C.P. Art. 1915.”

In McCann v. ABC Insurance Company, 93-1789, p. 5 (La.App. 4 Cir. 7/14/94), 640 So.2d 865, 868, the court stated:

The primary objective of an appeal is to give an aggrieved party recourse to a superior tribunal for the correction [of] a judgment of an inferior court. A party to the litigation has an unqualified right to appeal from an adverse final judgment and need not allege or show a direct pecuniary interest to be entitled to appeal. Andrade v. Shiers, 516 So.2d 1192, 1193 (La.App. 2 Cir.1987), Delanzo v. ABC Corp., 572 So.2d 648 (La.App. 5th Cir.1990).

From the outset, we note that although Tricia is not named in the trial court judgment, she and Farm Bureau, her insurer, are parties-defendants in the litigation. More importantly, she is aggrieved by the judgment that implicitly decrees that Farm Bureau does not have to pay part of the judgment if she is cast in judgment. Clearly, Tricia has an actual interest in this appeal and the correctness of the summary judgment dismissing Farm Bureau from this suit. See Andrade v. Shiers, 516 So.2d 1192. Moreover, it is likewise evident that Tricia can benefit by a reversal or change in the judgment. See Collette v. Allen 16-846 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/28/16), 210 So.3d 373.

After admitting in brief that the summary judgment does contain decretal language and it dismisses all the Fords’ claims against Farm Bureau, Tricia still contends the judgment is not appealable because it neither declares there is no coverage under the policy at issue nor that Farm Bureau has no duty to defend her.

We find no merit to Tricia's contention. First, she admits that the appealed judgment contains decretal language. Second, Farm Bureau's memorandum in support of its motion for summary judgment specifically states that coverage under the insurance policy was the centerpiece of the motion, that Jacob intentionally molested a juvenile at the Michots’ home, and that intentional acts are specifically excluded under the insurance policy. Third, the issue of lack of coverage under the insurance policy was implicit in the judgment. And fourth, Farm Bureau's duty to defend Tricia was not an issue in the motion for summary judgment as she was provided independent counsel by Farm Bureau. For these reasons, we find that we have appellate jurisdiction to address the judgment now before us.

NO CAUSE OF ACTION

In the present case, Tricia filed a peremptory exception of no cause of action in this court just prior to oral argument. She contends that Louisiana law specifically provides that she cannot be held liable for the tortious acts of Jacob, her adult-major child. Tricia and the other litigants argued this issue at oral argument. As further briefing was requested by the panel of judges, Tricia filed a supplemental memorandum in support of her peremptory exception of no cause of action; no other party filed a supplemental memorandum.

“Pursuant to La.Code Civ.P. art. 927(B), an exception of no cause of action may be raised by the court of appeal sua sponte, and La.Code Civ.P. art. 2163 allows a party to raise a peremptory exception for the first time on appeal.” Cajun AC & Heating, LLC v. Mirus Lake Charles, LLC, 24-128, p. 4 (La.App. 3 Cir. 11/6/24), 396 So.3d 1020, 1024.

In Crooks v. Department of Natural Resources, 19-160, pp. 16–17 (La. 1/29/20), 340 So.3d 574, 584–85, the court stated:

As used in the context of a peremptory exception, a “cause of action” refers to the operative facts which give rise to the plaintiff's right to judicially assert an action against the defendant. MAW Enterprises, L.L.C. v. City of Marksville, 2014-0090, p. 6 (La. 9/3/14), 149 So. 3d 210, 215, citing Scheffler v. Adams and Reese, LLP, 2006-1774, p. 4 (La. 2/22/07), 950 So. 2d 641, 646; Everything on Wheels Subaru, Inc. v. Subaru South, Inc., 616 So. 2d 1234, 1238 (La. 1993). The peremptory exception of no cause of action is designed to test the legal sufficiency of the petition by determining whether the plaintiff is afforded a remedy in law based on the facts alleged in the pleading. Fink v. Bryant, 01-0987, pp. 4-6 (La. 11/28/01), 801 So. 2d 346, 349-50; Louisiana Paddlewheels v. Louisiana Riverboat Gaming Commission, 94-2015 (La. 11/30/94), 646 So.2d 885. The exception is triable on the face of the pleadings and for the purposes of determining the issues raised by the exception, the well-pleaded facts in the petition must be accepted as true. Vince v. Metro Rediscount Company, Inc., 2018-2056 (La. 2/25/19), 264 So. 3d 440; City of New Orleans v. Board of Commissioners, 93-0690 (La. 7/5/94), 640 So.2d 237. All reasonable inferences are made in favor of the nonmoving party in determining whether the law affords any remedy to the plaintiff. La. C.C.P. arts. 927, 931; Mayer v. Valentine Sugars, Inc., 444 So.2d 618 (La. 1984). The burden of showing that the plaintiff has stated no cause of action is upon the exceptor. City of New Orleans v. Bd. of Directors of Louisiana State Museum, 98-1170, pp. 9-10 (La. 3/2/99), 739 So. 2d 748, 755-56.

Generally, under La.C.C.P. art. 931, no evidence may be introduced to support or controvert the exception of no cause of action. MAW Enterprises, L.L.C., 2014-0090 at 7, 149 So. 3d at 215. However, an exception to this rule has been recognized by the jurisprudence, and a court may consider evidence admitted without objection to enlarge the pleadings. Id., citing City of New Orleans, 98-1170 at 10, 739 So. 2d at 756․ A court appropriately sustains the peremptory exception of no cause of action only when, conceding the correctness of the facts, the plaintiff has not stated a claim for which he or she can receive legal remedy under the applicable substantive law. Id.; Industrial Companies, Inc. v. Durbin, 2002-0665, p. 7 (La. 1/28/03), 837 So. 2d 1207, 1213.

Tricia argues that, absent a “special relationship,” parents of adult-major children are not responsible for the negligent or intentional acts of the adult-majors, even if an adult-major resides in the home of the parents.

“Louisiana law is clear that no duty to protect against or control the actions of a third party exists unless a special relationship exists to give rise to such a duty.” Beck v. Schrum, 41,647, p. 6 (La.App. 2 Cir. 11/1/06), 942 So.2d 669, 672. “Courts traditionally have found such relationships to exist between parent and child; employer and employee; carrier and passenger; innkeeper and guest; shopkeeper and business visitor; restaurateur and patron; jailer and prisoner; and teacher and pupil.” Carroll v. Allstate Ins., 51,591, p. 8 (La.App. 2 Cir. 9/27/17), 244 So.3d 772, 777. One such special relationship is that between a parent and child. However, this responsibility of the father and mother is limited to damage caused by their minor child who lives with them. La.Civ.Code arts 2317 and 2318. As observed in Turner v. Bucher, 308 So.2d 270, 277 (La.1975):

We conclude that although a child of tender years may be incapable of committing a legal delict because of his lack of capacity to discern the consequences of his act, nevertheless, if the act of a child would be delictual except for this disability, the parent with whom he resides is legally at fault and, therefore, liable for the damage occasioned by the child's act. This legal fault is determined without regard to whether the parent could or could not have prevented the act of the child, I.e., without regard to the parent's negligence. It is legally imposed strict liability.

This strict liability exists because parents have the legal authority to control their minor child. La.Civ.Code art. 221. On the other hand, the parents’ strict liability ends when a child reaches eighteen years of age ⁶ when the parents no longer have the legal authority to control the child. La.Civ.Code art. 235; Corley v. Delaney, 629 So.2d 1255 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1993), writs denied, 94-481, 94-636 (La. 4/22/94), 637 So.2d 156.

We have reviewed the factual allegations made by the Fords in their petition, and we conclude that they failed to state a cause of action against Tricia for Jacob's intentional acts. In reaching that conclusion we have presumed that the Fords’ allegations are true, and we have made all reasonable inferences in their favor. The fact that Jacob, as alleged in the Fords’ petition, was a person of the full age of majority and lived with his parents is insufficient to constitute such a special relationship that would make Tricia liable for his actions. Even though the Fords allege that Jacob committed sexual assaults on two unspecified occasions prior to the assault involving Jane Doe, the allegations describing those assaults indicate that Jacob's arrest in these two matters on January 22, 2022, and May 29, 2022, occurred after Jane Doe's assault. Moreover, the petition is devoid of any allegation that Tricia was aware of Jacob's prior criminal activity at the time Jane Doe was invited and attended the sleepover. See Mayeux v. Madden, 520 So.2d 1005 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1987) (holding that negligence liability cannot exist unless it is alleged that the child has dangerous propensities that the parent could foresee). Therefore, we sustain Tricia's peremptory exception of no cause of action to the extent that the Fords’ petition seeks to impose vicarious liability upon Tricia for Jacob's acts as an adult-major child.

Louisiana Acts 2025, No. 250, § 3, effective August 1, 2025, amended La.Code Civ.P. art. 927 to allow a partial peremptory exception of no cause of action. Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 927 in pertinent part, states:

A. The objections that may be raised through the peremptory exception include but are not limited to the following:

․

(5) No cause of action, including an objection of no cause of action in part, as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims, demands, issues, or theories against a p[arty, whether in an original demand, reconventional demand, cross-claim, third party claim, or intervention.

In the Official Revision Comments—2025, it is stated:

Subparagraph (A)(5) of this Article was amended to clarify that a partial judgment sustaining an exception raising the objection of no cause of action may be appropriate when two or more actions based on the same operative facts of a single transaction or occurrence are cumulated. This changes the result reached by the Louisiana Supreme Court in Everything on Wheels Subaru, Inc. v. Subaru South., Inc., 616 So.2d 1234 (La.1993).

Notwithstanding our decision to grant Tricia's peremptory exception of no cause of action, “[i]t is well-settled that parents have a duty to supervise a child to prevent injury to the child and others.” Arceneaux v. Arceneaux, 13-511, p. 6 (La.App. 3 Cir. 11/6/13) 127 So3d 61, 65; Mahlum v. Baker, 25,876 (La.App. 2 Cir. 6/24/94), 639 So.2d 820; Ryals v. Home Ins. Co., 410 So.2d 827 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1982), writs denied, 414 So.2d 375 and 376 (La.1982). More particularly, even though the Louisiana Supreme Court rejected absolute liability for social hosts who provide alcohol to minors in Gresham v. Davenport, 537 So.2d 1144 (La.1989), the liability of the social host is based upon negligence and, “[t]he imposition of a duty depends on a case by case analysis.” Spears v. Bradford, 94-892, p. 7 (La.App. 1 Cir. 3/3/95), 652 So.2d 628, 632.

Our review of the Fords’ allegations shows that distinct from the allegations regarding Tricia's vicarious liability for Jacob's intentional acts as an adult-major child, the Fords’ petition further alleges that: (1) Tricia was to provide adult supervision to the invited guests who were minor female children; and (2) the Fords, individually and on behalf of Jane Doe, suffered damages due to the negligence and/or fault of Tricia in the following particulars:

a. In failing to properly supervise the minor children who [she] had invited to [her] home;

b. In failing to provide a safe environment to the minor children who [she] had invited to [her] home for a “sleep-over;”

․

d. In providing, or allowing, alcohol to be served to the minor children, including the victim, Jane Doe;

e. In a lack of parental supervision, and in further negligent supervision of [Jacob], as well as the minor children, who were invitees to their home[.]

Considering the jurisprudence and the allegations of their petition, we find the Fords have stated a separate cause of action based upon Tricia's alleged lack of supervision. Therefore, even though we grant Tricia's peremptory exception of no cause of action, in part, we deny Tricia's peremptory exception of no cause of action relating to the negligence claim raised by the Fords against her.

We now turn our attention to Farm Bureau's motion for summary judgment.

INTRODUCTION TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT

In its motion for summary judgment, Farm Bureau urged that its policy excludes coverage for the intentional acts of Jacob and any lack of supervision by Tricia. Because we granted Tricia's peremptory exception of no cause of action regarding her alleged vicarious liability, we do not need to review Farm Bureau's motion as it relates to Jacob's intentional acts and Tricia's alleged liability as the parent of an adult-major child. Nonetheless, we still must review Farm Bureau's motion for summary judgment as it relates to the Fords’ negligence allegations made against Tricia for her lack of supervision.

FARM BUREAU'S ARGUMENT

Relying on its policy exclusions for intentional acts, sexual molestation, and this court's holdings in Lemaire v. Blanchard, 13-942 (La.App. 3 Cir. 4/2/14) (unpublished opinion), writ denied, 14-941 (La. 8/25/14), 147 So.3d 1118, and Perkins v. Shaheen, 03-1254 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/3/04), 867 So.2d 135, Farm Bureau argues that allegations of negligence by an insured does not escape the application of these exclusions in its homeowner's insurance policy. Therefore, Farm Bureau argues that it is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law regarding the negligence claims brought against Tricia.

TRICIA'S ARGUMENT

If this court finds that the petition of the Fords alleged negligence cause of action against her, Tricia argues that there is no assertion or evidence of any acts allegedly committed by her that would bring her within the policy exclusions of Farm Bureau's policy. She contends that because she is not vicariously liable for the acts of an adult-major child, whether those acts have their origin in negligence or as intentional torts, Farm Bureau owes her a defense and indemnity. Thus, as a matter of law, she argues that Farm Bureau is not entitled to summary judgment.

THE FORDS’ ARGUMENT

The Fords argue that there are genuine issues of material fact regarding Tricia's supervision of the sleepover guests specifically regarding their consumption of alcohol and how that alcohol was acquired. Finally, they argue that it is well accepted that there may be multiple causes for the damage suffered by the Fords, individually and on behalf of their minor daughter, because Jacob's intentional acts during the sleepover are but one of those causes—Tricia's negligent supervision is the other.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Appellate courts review summary judgments de novo, using the same criteria applied by trial courts to determine whether summary judgment is appropriate. Succession of Holbrook, 13-1181 (La. 1/28/14), 144 So.3d 845. Summary judgment procedure is favored and shall be construed “to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action.” La.Code Civ.P. art. 966(A)(2); Cupit o/b/o Cupit v. Twin City Fire Ins. Co., 17-918 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/14/18), 240 So.3d 993. A motion for summary judgment will be granted “if the motion, memorandum, and supporting documents show that there is no genuine issue as to material fact and that the mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” La.Code Civ.P. art. 966(A)(3).

The party seeking summary judgment must show that no genuine issue of material fact exists. La.Code Civ.P. art. 966(D)(1). “[I]f the mover will not bear the burden of proof at trial,” he need not “negate all essential elements of the adverse party's claim,” but he must show “that there is an absence of factual support for one or more elements essential to the adverse party's claim.” La.Code Civ.P. art. 966(D)(1). If the movant meets his initial burden of proof, the burden shifts to the adverse party “to produce factual support sufficient to establish the existence of a genuine issue of material fact or that the mover is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id.

In George v. Coca-Cola Bottling Company United, Inc. 22-207, pp. 4–5 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1/25/23), 355 So.3d 1193, 1198, we stated:

[S]ummary judgment procedure has established specific rules for the presentation of supporting and opposing documents, as well as a specified method of objecting to those documents. Such a provision meets the “just” element of such a procedure, helps secure that such issues do not blindside litigants at the last moment, and allows the court to truly assess the proof to see whether there is a genuine need for trial.

Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 966(D)(2) (emphasis added) further provides that “[t]he court may consider only those documents filed in support of or in opposition to the motion for summary judgment and shall consider any documents to which no objection is made.”

INTERPRETATION OF INSURANCE POLICIES

In Piligra v. America's Best Value Inn, 10-254, pp. 3–4 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/6/10), 49 So.3d 479, 482–83, we stated:

An insurance policy is interpreted like any other contract, i.e., by using ordinary contract principles. Ledbetter v. Concord Gen. Corp., 95-809 (La.1/6/96), 665 So.2d 1166. The extent of the coverage is determined by the parties’ intent. Id. The agreement of the parties must be enforced as written as long as the policy wording is clear and unambiguous. Id. Moreover, “[e]xclusionary provisions in insurance contracts are strictly construed against the insurer, and any ambiguity is construed in favor of the insured.” Id. at 1169. Insurance companies are permitted to limit coverage through policy exclusions as “long as the limitations do not conflict with statutory provisions or public policy.” Id.

Moreover, “[i]nterpretation of an insurance contract is usually a legal question which can be properly resolved in the framework of a motion for summary judgment.” Madden v. Bourgeois, 95-2354, p. 3 (La.App. 1 Cir.6/28/96), 676 So.2d 790, 792. However, “summary judgment may not be rendered declaring lack of coverage unless there is no reasonable interpretation of the policy, when applied to the undisputed material facts shown by the evidence supporting the motion, under which coverage could be afforded.” Westerfield v. LaFleur, 493 So.2d 600, 605 (La.1986).

SUMMARY JUDGMENT: ANALYSIS

From the outset, Tricia argues that to show there were no genuine issues of material fact, Farm Bureau admitted, only for purposes of summary judgment, the facts the Fords alleged in their petition, even though Farm Bureau denied those same facts in its answer.  ⁷ And, thus, she contends that these “admitted” facts were erroneously relied upon by the trial court in granting Farm Bureau's motion for summary judgment. We disagree.

When a motion for summary judgment raises purely legal questions, the moving party may accept the opposing party's factual allegations as true for purposes of the motion.⁸ See e.g., P.D. v. S.W.L., 07-2534 (La.App. 1 Cir. 7/21/08), 993 So.2d 240, writ denied, 08-2770 (La. 2/13/09), 999 So.2d 1146; Eichelberger v. Sidney, 34,040 (La.App. 2 Cir. 11/3/00), 771 So.2d 863, writ denied, 00-3476 (La. 2/9/01), 785 So.2d 827; and Young v. Brown, 27,018 (La.App. 2 Cir. 6/21/95), 658 So.2d 750, writ denied, 95-1811 (La. 10/27/95), 662 So.2d 1.

To interpret its insurance contract with Tricia, Farm Bureau's motion for summary judgment stated that “for the purpose of its Motion for Summary Judgment only, [Farm Bureau] admits the following allegations of facts contained in the Plaintiffs’ ․ Petition[.]” In particular, Farm Bureau accepted the allegation that: (1) Tricia and her husband own a home in Woodworth, Louisiana, and Farm Bureau provided a homeowner's policy to them; (2) living in their home was Jacob, their nineteen-year-old son, and their thirteen-year-old daughter; (3) Tricia sponsored a sleepover for their minor daughter with several of her minor female friends and was to provide supervision of them; (4) one of these friends was Jane Doe, the minor daughter of the Fords; (5) Jacob committed a sexual assault and rape against Jane Doe; (6) Jacob purchased alcoholic beverages and provided those purchases to the minor children; (7) Tricia failed to properly supervise the minor children, and she was additionally negligent because she provided or allowed alcohol to be provided to the minor girls at the sleepover; (8) Tricia failed to discover that the minor children had been provided alcoholic beverages; (9) Tricia showed lack of parental supervision or negligent supervision to Jacob; and (10) Jacob was arrested and charged with criminal offenses against Jane Doe.

Coverage of the Fords’ Claims Under the Farm Bureau Policy

The policy issued by Farm Bureau contains the following exclusions:

1. Coverage E – Personal Liability and Coverage F – Medical Payments to Others do not apply to bodily injury or property damage:

(a) resulting from intentional acts or directions by you or any insured. The expected or unexpected results or these acts or directions are not covered.

․

(i) arising out of any acts, attempts, coercion or threats of sexual or physical molestation, abuse, assault or harassment caused, instigated or directed by any insured.

“Insured” is defined in the homeowner's policy as “you and residents of your household who are: a. your relatives; or b. other persons under the age of 21 and in the care of any person named above.” The unambiguous language of Farm Bureau's policy excludes coverage for bodily injury which results from the intentional acts of any insured. Therefore, Jane Doe's injuries and damage suffered by her, individually and by the Fords, which resulted from Jacob's intentional acts are excluded under Farm Bureau's policy.

Beyond that, the Fords asserted that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to Farm Bureau even though they made allegations of negligence against Tricia, independent of Jacob's intentional acts, and Farm Bureau's policy should provide coverage. And, on de novo review, they urge us to deny Farm Bureau's motion for summary judgment. Likewise, Tricia argues that should we find the Fords alleged a cause of action based on negligence against her, the exclusions in Farm Bureau's policy of insurance should not exclude coverage for her independent negligence. In response, Farm Bureau calls the court's attention to prior appellate decisions where allegations of negligence by an insured did not avoid the application of a homeowner's insurance policy intentional acts exclusion or its sexual molestation exclusion.

In Perkins v. Shaheen, 03-1254 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/3/04), 867 So.2d 135, a suit to recover damages for personal injuries caused by the intentional acts of a minor, the perpetrator's homeowner's policy and farm policy were written by Farm Bureau.⁹ The plaintiff and Farm Bureau filed cross-motions for summary judgment on the issue of coverage. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff, finding that Farm Bureau's policies provided coverage for plaintiff's injuries arising out of the negligent supervision by the perpetrator's father. This court reversed the trial court's judgment and granted summary judgment in favor of Farm Bureau, finding that Farm Bureau's homeowner's and farm liability policies excluded coverage for bodily injury which resulted from intentional acts by any insured.

Additionally, the Perkins court addressed the issue of whether a different result ensued because the plaintiff further alleged that Shaheen negligently supervised his minor child. Rejecting that argument, the court stated:

Mr. Perkins next argues that Mr. Shaheen's negligent supervision of Hank is not addressed by Farm Bureau's exclusions. The same argument was made in Neuman v. Mauffray, 99-2297 (La.App. 1 Cir. 11/8/00), 771 So.2d 283, where similar exclusionary language was at issue. The court rejected the plaintiff's contention that the parents’ negligent supervision did not fall within the exclusion, explaining:

The language of the exclusionary clause is not restricted to intentional acts of the particular insured sought to be held liable, but it is broad enough to exclude coverage for any loss intentionally caused, or at the direction of, an insured person, i.e., John Mauffray. Notwithstanding the existence and classification of a cause of action based on negligent supervision of the child by Mr. or Mrs. Welsh, any and all losses arising out of an intentional act of John Mauffray would fall within the exclusionary provisions pursuant to the language in the insurance policy.

Id. at 285. See also Hewitt v. Allstate Insurance Co., 98–221, pp. 9–10 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1/27/99), 726 So.2d 1120, 1124–25, where the court clarified the purpose of the exclusion:

The focus of the policy exclusion is on the cause of the damages, not the cause of action alleged. All damages caused by intentional acts are excluded, regardless of the classification of the cause of action against the individual defendants. [The plaintiff] cannot avoid the consequences of the policy language by attempting to couch her allegations against the [defendant parents] as negligent, rather than intentional.

This analysis is applicable here. Accordingly, this argument is without merit.

Perkins, 867 So.2d at 138–39. E.g., Lemaire v. Blanchard, 13-942 (La.App. 3 Cir. 4/2/14) (unpublished opinion), writ denied, 14-941 (La. 8/25/14), 147 So.3d 1118. See also Piligra v. Am. Best Value Inn, 10-254 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/610), 49 So.3d 479; Sanchez v. Callegan, 99-137 (La.App. 1 Cir. 2/18/00), 753 So.2d 403.

Based upon the analysis outlined in Perkins and Lemaire, we find that the arguments raised by the Fords and Tricia in the present case are without merit.

In making that determination, we comment further on an argument made by the Fords. They contend that Perkins and Lemaire are distinguishable because, unlike the present case, they involved the vicarious liability of parents for the intentional torts of their minor children. Although we acknowledge that is a factual distinction, we do not find it changes our ultimate determination. Whether a minor child or an adult-major child is considered, the exclusion stated in the Farm Bureau policy makes no such distinction. Rather, it is the intentional act of the perpetrator, whether it be a minor child or an adult-major child, which triggers the exclusion.

Accordingly, we find that no genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether the policy exclusions apply to the Fords’ independent claims of negligence alleged with regard to Tricia. The trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor of Farm Bureau and properly held that no coverage exists for the injuries suffered by Jane Doe and her parents under the Farm Bureau policy of insurance.

DECREE

For the foregoing reasons, we grant the peremptory exception of no cause of action brought by Tricia Michot as it relates to any claim made against her based on vicarious liability and deny it as it relates to the negligent supervision allegation brought against her. Nevertheless, for the reasons assigned, we affirm the summary judgment of the trial court. For the foregoing reasons, we remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings. Costs of this appeal are assessed equally to Tricia Michot and the Fords.

PEREMPTORY EXCEPTION OF NO CAUSE OF ACTION, GRANTED IN PART. TRIAL COURT JUDGMENT AFFIRMED. CASE REMANDED TO THE TRIAL COURT FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The other five girls HM invited were Jane Doe; EC; OB; and the twins, JM and CM.

2.   In State v. Michot, 23-621 (La.App. 3 Cir. 4/17/24), 387 So.3d 729, this court addressed Jacob's actions and detailed his criminal proceedings after he entered a guilty plea. This court affirmed the following sentence: the trial court sentenced Jacob to twenty-five years at hard labor, without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence for the crime of third-degree rape; for each count of indecent behavior with juveniles, seven years at hard labor; and for the crime of pornography with juveniles, five years at hard labor without benefits—all sentences set to run concurrently. Additionally, Jacob was required to register as a sex offender.

3.   Furthermore, relying on the exhibits attached in opposition to Farm Bureau's motion for summary judgment, the Michots also filed their own motion for summary judgment, seeking the dismissal of the Fords’ lawsuit on various grounds. After conducting a hearing, the trial court granted the Michots’ motion, in part, dismissing all claims against David but denied the motion regarding Tricia. Because no one appealed the ruling that dismissed David from these proceedings, this judgment is final as to him. Tricia did not file a supervisory writ with this court seeking review of the trial court's rejection of her motion for summary judgment.

4.   The record shows that David also joined in the current appeal. However, as noted earlier, David was dismissed in a separate summary judgment and no one appealed that judgment.

5.   Although Jacob did not appeal, he filed a brief in this court in support of his parents. We note that Uniform Rules—Courts of Appeal, Rule 2-12.11 mandates that amicus curiae briefs “may be filed only upon motion by the applicant and order of the court.” No motion was filed by Jacob seeking to file an Amicus curiae brief.

6.   Though not applicable in the present case, parental authority also terminates “upon the child's emancipation, or upon termination of the marriage of the parents of the child.” La.Civ.Code art. 235.

7.   Tricia also objected to Farm Bureau's attachment of Exhibit D to its motion for summary judgment; contained in that exhibit were six different documents dated between March 22, 2022, through May 10, 2023–each bore docket number 354429 and related to Jacob's indictment and ultimate guilty plea. In her objection, Tricia argued, without elaboration, that these public documents were not properly authenticated. Although Exhibit D consisted of six different documents, our review of the record shows a stamped certificate at the end of the last document contained in the exhibit. The the Deputy Clerk of Court signed the certificate, attesting “that the above and foregoing is a true and correct copy of the original on file and of record in this office.”We find no merit to Tricia's contention that this exhibit should not be considered. Applying La.Code Evid. art. 902(1) and the interpretive jurisprudence, we find this exhibit was properly certified. See e.g., State v. Donald, 99-3612 (La. 12/8/00), 775 So.2d 1054.

8.   For purposes of analysis, this is similar to the peremptory exception of no cause of action where the exception “is triable on the face of the pleadings, and, for purposes of resolving issues raised by the exception, the well-pleaded facts in the petition must be accepted as true.” Scheffler v. Adams and Reese, LLP, 06-1774, p. 5 (La. 2/22/07), 950 So.2d 641, 647. This is so because, like the peremptory exception of no cause of action, the issue in the present matter raises a question of law. See Fink v. Bryant, 01-987 (La. 11/28/01), 801 So.2d 346.

9.   The Farm Bureau policy at issue in Perkins involved the same policy exclusion involved in the present case, namely 1 (E) (a).

PERRY, Judge.