TUCKER v. TUCKER (2026)

In this appeal from a partition judgment, a wife challenges the trial court's allocation of certain assets and liabilities to her and her former husband, its resolution of her reimbursement claims, and its failure to designate a time frame within which the parties divide the allocated assets and liabilities. After review, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Richard Brian Tucker, Jr. and Jaclyn Tucker married on October 26, 2001. The couple had two children, Caroline and Christopher, born in 2004 and 2006. During most of their 21-year marriage, Mr. Tucker was employed as a financial advisor at Merrill Lynch, and Mrs. Tucker was not employed outside of their home. In 2020, Mr. Tucker changed employment from Merrill Lynch to UBS Financial Services, Inc. (UBS). On November 11, 2020, before his start date, Mr. Tucker and UBS executed a Letter of Understanding (Letter), which set forth a multi-faceted structure describing Mr. Tucker's “potential compensation and benefits package” as a UBS financial advisor. Under the Letter's terms, Mr. Tucker would: receive an Upfront Loan of $5,261,422.00 (Loan); execute a Promissory Note to repay the Loan over 12 years with interest (Promissory Note); execute a Transition Payment Award Agreement (Initial Transition Payment Award Agreement) entitling him to receive an Upfront Transition Payment Award (Initial Transition Award), payable to him annually for 12 years, in an amount approximately the same as his Promissory Note payments; execute five additional Transition Payment Award Agreements (Supplemental Transition Award Agreements) entitling him to receive five corresponding Supplemental Transition Awards after 24, 36, 48, 60, and 72 full months of continuous UBS employment (Supplemental Transition Awards); and, receive monthly Non-Recoverable Guarantee payments ranging from $17,794.21 down to $13,627.54 (Guarantee Payments) over 12 years. The Letter also provided Mr. Tucker's employment would be “at-will” and his receipt of any loans, awards, and guarantee payments was subject to multiple conditions.

Mr. Tucker began employment at UBS on December 17, 2020. It is undisputed that the $5,261,422.00 Loan proceeds were deposited into a Joint Resource Management Account (Joint RMA) about three to four weeks later, during the existence of the Tuckers’ community regime. It is also undisputed that Mr. Tucker immediately began paying Promissory Note payments on the Loan from the Joint RMA, and UBS began paying the Initial Transition Award and Supplemental Transition Awards (sometimes, collectively, Award(s)) into the Joint RMA.¹ Each Award is taxed as income in the year in which it is deposited into the Joint RMA.

On December 1, 2022, almost two years after Mr. Tucker began employment at UBS, he filed a petition for divorce; on December 21, 2022, Mrs. Tucker answered and reconvened. On February 15, 2023, the trial court signed a Stipulated Judgment, terminating the community regime retroactive to December 1, 2022, and outlining certain expenses that would be paid from the Joint RMA, pending partition of the community property. On April 17, 2023, the trial court signed a judgment of divorce, dissolving the parties’ marriage. After they were unable to agree as to the partition of community property, the trial court held a partition trial in April of 2024. The trial court thereafter signed Reasons for Judgment on August 9, 2024, and a Judgment of Partition on September 23, 2024.

Pertinently, the Judgment of Partition:

(1) awarded Mr. Tucker the Joint RMA with a community balance of $2,074,523;

(2) awarded Mr. and Mrs. Tucker one-half each of the present value of the community interest in future payments under the UBS Initial Transition Award Payment program with a net community interest after taxes of $589,570.96, and with each party to receive $294,785.48;

(3) awarded Mr. and Mrs. Tucker one-half each of the present value of the community interest in future payments under the UBS Supplemental Transition Award Payment program with a net community interest after taxes of $313,640.20, and with each party to receive $156,820.10;

(4) ordered that Mr. and Mrs. Tucker equally split the remaining debt owed on the Promissory Note;

(5) awarded Mrs. Tucker reimbursement of $19,250.99 for non-stipulated expenses and UBS Visa payments paid from the Joint RMA; and

(6) ordered that the Guarantee Payments were Mr. Tucker's salary with Mrs. Tucker having no claim to Mr. Tucker's post-termination salary.

On September 27, 2024, Mrs. Tucker filed a motion for new trial, which the trial court denied, except for one challenged value not at issue herein. Mrs. Tucker devolutively appeals from the September 23, 2024 judgment, asserting the following assignments of error:

(1) Not only did the trial court [err] in accepting the Melancon methodology for determination of community interest in [the Awards]; it also committed legal error when it failed to apply this principle of law consistently in the calculation of the Future Initial Transition Payment Award compared to the calculation of the Future Supplemental Transition [Payment Awards].

(2) The trial court committed legal error in finding that [Mrs. Tucker] had no interest in the [Guarantee Payments] from the [Letter] entered into during the marriage.

(3) The trial court committed legal error regarding the allocation of the [P]romissory [N]ote as a community debt. The trial court also erred in failing to consider the continued reduction of the debt in connection with the value of the transition awards.

(4) The trial court abused its discretion by ignoring the evidence presented consistent with the plain language of the Stipulated Judgment that mandated precise reimbursement claims due [to Mrs. Tucker], ․ which the trial court erroneously reduced.

(5) The trial court committed legal error in failing to designate a time frame in which to distribute and divide the assets allocated to each party to effectively carry out the ruling of the court.

APPLICABLE LAW

When spouses are unable to agree on the partition of community property or on the settlement of their claims arising either from the matrimonial regime, or from co-ownership of former community property, either spouse may institute a community property partition. La. R.S. 9:2801(A). The court shall value the assets as of the time of trial on the merits, determine the liabilities, and adjudicate the claims of the parties. La. R.S. 9:2801(A)(4)(a). The court shall divide the community assets and liabilities so that each spouse receives property of an equal net value. La. R.S. 9:2801(A)(4)(b). If the allocation of assets and liabilities results in an unequal net distribution, the court shall order the payment of an equalizing sum of money, either cash or deferred, secured or unsecured, upon such terms and conditions as the court shall direct. La. R.S. 9:2801(A)(4)(d); Berthelot v. Berthelot, 2017-1055 (La. App. 1 Cir. 7/18/18), 254 So.3d 800, 806.

Under Louisiana law, property of married persons is generally characterized as either community or separate. La. C.C. art. 2335. Community property includes property acquired during the existence of the legal regime through the effort, skill, or industry of either spouse. La. C.C. art. 2338. Property in the possession of a spouse during the existence of the community property regime is presumed to be community, but either spouse may rebut the presumption. See La. C.C. art. 2340. Conversely, property that comes into the possession of a spouse after the termination of the community is not presumed to be community. Lanza v. Lanza, 2004-1314 (La. 3/2/05), 898 So.2d 280, 290. See Carroll, A., Feldera, B., Moreno, R., 16 La. Civ. Law Treatise, Matrimonial Regimes, § 3.2 Compensation for Labor and Substitutes (5th ed.) (February 2025 Update).

A trial court has broad discretion in adjudicating issues raised by divorce and community property partitions and in arriving at an equitable distribution of assets and liabilities between spouses. Russell v. Russell, 2021-1043 (La. App. 1 Cir. 4/8/22), 341 So.3d 831, 832, writ denied, 2022-00939 (La. 10/4/22), 347 So.3d 894. This Court applies the manifest error standard of review to a trial court's factual findings made in the course of valuing and allocating assets and liabilities, including the nature of property as community or separate. Cosman v. Cosman, 2012-0694 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1/10/23), 360 So.3d 892, 896, writ denied, 2023-00299 (La. 5/2/23), 359 So.3d 1272; Berthelot, 254 So.3d at 807. However, we apply an abuse of discretion standard to the trial court's ultimate allocation of assets and liabilities. Cosman, 360 So.3d at 896; Berthelot, 254 So.3d at 808.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

Allocation of Initial Transition Payment Award and Supplemental Transition Payment Awards

In her first assignment of error, Mrs. Tucker contends the trial court erred in applying the methodology used in Melancon v. Melancon, 2004-2569 (La. App. 1 Cir. 12/22/05), 928 So.2d 10, writ denied, 2006-0150 (La. 5/5/06), 927 So.2d 310, to allocate the Initial Transition Payment Award and the Supplemental Transition Payment Awards. She contends that, under Louisiana Supreme Court jurisprudence, the defining factor in allocating the Awards should be determining the extent, if any, the Awards are attributable to Mr. Tucker's labor during the community. She further contends all of the Awards are based solely on Mr. Tucker's community labor while employed at Merrill Lynch and that he received the $5,261,422.00 Loan to transfer his “book of business” from Merrill Lynch to UBS. Lastly, she contends that, even if the Melancon methodology applies, the trial court erred in inconsistently applying that methodology in calculating the Initial Transition Payment Award compared to the Supplemental Transition Payment Awards. In opposition, Mr. Tucker contends the trial court properly used the Melancon methodology to allocate both Awards on a pro rata basis as community or separate, because the Awards are attributable to both his community and separate labor over a 12-year period.

We find the trial court did not manifestly err in using the Melancon methodology herein to allocate the Awards as partially community and partially separate. In Melancon, 928 So.2d at 14, this Court allocated stock options as community or separate property using a pro rata formula based on the length of community and separate employment between each stock option's “grant date” and “vesting date.” Although the property at issue herein is not comprised of stock options, we find the Awards are similar in that they serve the dual purpose of recognizing Mr. Tucker's past performance at Merrill Lynch and as compensation for his performance at UBS. See Melancon, 928 So.2d at 14, quoting Hansel v. Holyfield, 2000-0062 (La. App. 4 Cir. 12/27/00), 779 So.2d 939, writs denied, 2001-0279, 2001-0276 (La. 4/12/01), 789 So.2d 591. Mr. Tucker's right to receive the Awards occurred upon his UBS hire date, during the community (akin to a grant date) and their actual payment in the form of Award Payments (akin to a vesting date) occurred partially during the community and partially after termination of the community. We find Mr. Tucker proved that his labor to receive the Award payments did not all occur during the community regime. Rather, under the terms of the Letter, the Promissory Note, the Initial Transition Payment Award Agreement, and each Supplemental Payment Award Agreement, Mr. Tucker's continuing receipt of any loan, awards, or guarantee payments was subject to multiple conditions, including his continued employment at UBS; his continued maintenance of certain financial registrations; his continued satisfaction of performance targets set forth in each of the Agreements ² ; his continued fulfillment of all outstanding financial obligations owed to UBS; and, his continued compliance with all UBS rules/standards/policies.

Further, we find no manifest error in the trial court's application of the Melancon methodology to the calculation of the Future Initial Transition Payment Award compared to the calculation of the Future Supplemental Transition Payment Awards. Mr. Tucker's forensic accounting expert, Paul Tanguis, reasonably used December 17, 2020, Mr. Tucker's date of hire at UBS, as the “grant” date of the respective awards and the yearly anniversary payment date as the “vesting” date of the respective awards.³ The trial court prorated the Awards according to the number of “Community Days” and the number of “Separate Days” Mr. Tucker worked between the “grant” date and the “vesting” date of each Award. The trial court properly exercised its discretion by allocating the Awards as community or separate based on when Mr. Tucker's labor (i.e., exertion of “labor, skill, or industry”) to meet all of the conditions required to receive the Awards occurred. This assignment of error is meritless.

Guarantee Payments

In her second assignment of error, Mrs. Tucker contends the trial court erred in determining that UBS's Guarantee Payments to Mr. Tucker are salary and thus his separate property. According to Mrs. Tucker, the amounts of the Guarantee Payments were pre-set in the Letter Mr. Tucker signed during the community, were based on Mr. Tucker's performance at Merrill Lynch, not at UBS, and would be paid to him by UBS with “no strings attached.” Conversely, Mr. Tucker argues the trial court correctly allocated the Guarantee Payments as his salary. He argues that “strings” were definitely attached to his continuing receipt of the Guarantee Payments, including his continued employment at UBS. He points out that the Letter made clear that he was an “at-will” UBS employee and any UBS compensation, including these payments, would not be paid if his UBS employment ceased.

Section 3 of the Letter states that, subject to Mr. Tucker's continued employment with UBS, he would receive monthly $17,794.21 Guarantee Payments for the first 36 months of his active UBS employment and monthly $13,627.54 Guarantee Payments for the remaining 37-144 months of his active UBS employment. Section 3 further states, however, that Mr. Tucker's employment is “at-will” and that nothing in the Letter creates an express or implied employment contract for any definite period of time. At trial, Mr. Nicholas Randazzo, Jr., a UBS Market Director, explained various terms of the Letter, confirmed that Mr. Tucker could be fired for any reason, and characterized the Guarantee Payments as Mr. Tucker's salary. Mr. Tucker consistently testified that he did not know if he would stay at UBS for the entire 12 years referenced in the Letter and characterized the Guarantee Payments as his salary or as income UBS agreed to pay because he would have no commissions coming in when he first moved from Merrill Lynch to UBS.

Madison Field, Mrs. Tucker's expert, was accepted at trial as an expert in forensic accounting, financial statement analysis, and investment analysis. He characterized the Guarantee Payments as “pre-determined” amounts set forth in the Letter and stated that, in his understanding of the Letter, UBS would not be able to “call [those payments] back[.]” He testified that Mr. Tucker had received all Guarantee Payments owed by UBS as of the date of trial but also stated that Mr. Tucker's right to any “future payments” were based on several conditions, including his continued employment at UBS.

Salary earned by a spouse for work performed during the community is community property, regardless of when the salary is actually paid. See La. C.C. art. 2338; Ross v. Ross, 2002-2984 (La. 10/21/03), 857 So.2d 384, 390. Concomitantly, salary earned by a spouse for work performed after the community terminates is separate property. Statham v. Statham, 43,324 (La. App. 2 Cir. 6/11/08), 986 So.2d 894, 900, writ denied, 2008-1578 (La. 10/10/08), 993 So.2d 1288. Section 3 of the Letter conditions Mr. Tucker's receipt of Guarantee Payments on his continued active UBS employment. Section 4 of the Letter also conditions Mr. Tucker's receipt of Guarantee Payments upon Mr. Tucker not engaging in specified conduct UBS characterized as harmful to its interest. Reasonably interpreted, the requirement that Mr. Tucker maintain “continued active employment” infers that he will perform work on UBS's behalf during that employment in order to earn the Guarantee Payments. See La. C.C. art. 2047 (requiring that words of a contract be given their generally prevailing meaning). Thus, to the extent that Mr. Tucker was required to perform work after the termination of the community, we find the trial court did not manifestly err by characterizing the Guarantee Payments as salary and using the Melancon methodology to allocate Mr. Tucker's post-community Guarantee Payments as separate property. This assignment of error is meritless.

Promissory Note

In her third assignment of error, Mrs. Tucker contends the trial court erred in allocating the Promissory Note as a community debt and in failing to consider the continued reduction of the debt in connection with the value of the Awards. Mr. Tucker counters that the trial court properly found the Promissory Note was a debt of the community and allocated one-half of that debt to each party until paid in full.

An obligation incurred by a spouse may be either a community obligation or a separate obligation. La. C.C. art. 2359. An obligation incurred by a spouse during the community for the common interest of the spouses or for the interest of the other spouse is a community obligation. La. C.C. art. 2360. Except as provided in La. C.C. art. 2363, all obligations incurred by a spouse during the community are presumed to be community obligations. La. C.C. art. 2361. An obligation incurred during the community though not for the common interest of the spouses or for the interest of the other spouse is a separate obligation. La. C.C. art. 2363. An obligation incurred for the separate property of a spouse to the extent that it does not benefit the community, the family, or the other spouse, is likewise a separate obligation. La. C.C. art. 2363.

It is undisputed that Mr. Tucker executed the Promissory Note, i.e., incurred the debt, during the community – thus, it is presumed to be a community debt under La. C.C. art. 2361. To rebut this presumption, Mrs. Tucker had to prove the debt was not incurred for the benefit of the community. See Biondo v. Biondo, 1999-0890 (La. App. 1 Cir. 7/31/00), 769 So.2d 94, 108. After review, we conclude the trial court did not manifestly err in finding the Promissory Note was totally a community debt and in ordering Mr. and Mrs. Tucker to equally split the remaining debt owed on the Promissory Note. Upon his January 13, 2021 execution of the Promissory Note, Mr. Tucker became obligated to pay the full $5,261,422.00 Loan amount previously deposited into the RMA, over a period of 12 years. His obligation to pay that amount exists regardless of whether he maintains employment at UBS. And, in the event his UBS employment ends, the Promissory Note mandates that the balance “shall immediately become due and payable.” As confirmed by Mr. Randazzo, over the 12 years, if Mr. Tucker remains at UBS, his payments on the Promissory Note will approximately be the same as UBS's payment of the Awards. However, his continued employment at UBS and his receipt of Awards is not guaranteed, whereas his obligation for the full amount of the balance due on the Promissory Note became fixed when he executed the Promissory Note – during the community regime. Thus, just as the community received the full benefit of the $5,261,422.00 Loan during the community, the community must also bear the full obligation of the Promissory Note incurred during the community. This assignment of error is meritless.

Non-Stipulated Expenses

In her fourth assignment of error, Mrs. Tucker contends the trial court abused its discretion by ignoring a stipulated judgment listing certain expenses to be paid from the Joint RMA and by reducing her reimbursement claims for other expenses Mr. Tucker paid from the Joint RMA and to which she did not agree (Non-Stipulated Expenses). In response, Mr. Tucker argues the trial court did not err in reducing Mrs. Tucker's reimbursement claims, based on the court's credibility determination that the parties agreed to the Non-Stipulated Expenses being paid from the Joint RMA, albeit not in writing.

On February 15, 2023 (after Mr. Tucker filed the petition for divorce but before the trial court signed the divorce judgment), the trial court signed a Stipulated Judgment terminating the community property regime, effective December 1, 2022, and ordering, among other things, that Mr. Tucker pay spousal support and child support, certain healthcare expenses, and all mandatory school expenses for the parties’ son, Christopher (then still a minor). The Stipulated Judgment also ordered that the parties pay respective percentages (Mr. Tucker – 95%; Mrs. Tucker - 5%) of all “extracurricular activities” in which Christopher “historically participated” or of any new activities upon which the parties agreed. Additionally, the Stipulated Judgment ordered that 20 listed expenses continue to be paid from the Joint RMA through May 31, 2024 (20 Stipulated Expenses), and unless the parties agreed in writing, Mr. Tucker would owe Mrs. Tucker reimbursement for any other expenses that continued to be paid from the Joint RMA.

Specifically, the Stipulated Judgment provided:

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the following expenses shall ․ continue to be paid from the [Joint RMA] ․ through May 31, 2024[,] or upon partition of the former community property regime, whichever occurs first:

1. Line of Credit for Christopher's car;

2. AT&T family plan;

3. Multi-family plans for youtube, tv streamings, etc.;

4. Life insurance from John Hancock;

5. Property taxes for both residences;

6. HOA fees for Province residence;

7. Homeowners insurance for Province residence;

8. Insurance for Alys Beach residence;

9. Honda jet monthly costs (excluding fuel costs);

10. The community income taxes;

11. Cash to Caroline;

12. Lawn and pool expenses for Province residence;

13. Utilities for Province residence;

14. Internet and cable for Province residence;

15. JACLYN TUCKER'S car note (Mercedes);

16. RICHARD BRIAN TUCKER'S car note (Tesla);

17. Alys Beach mortgage;

18. Alys Beach loan;

19. Alys Beach Homeowners Dues;

20. Alys Beach pool service, concierge service and water service.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that should any other expenses continue to be paid or withdrawn from the [Joint RMA], RICHARD BRIAN TUCKER shall owe JACLYN TUCKER reimbursement for said expense(s) unless the parties otherwise agree in writing. (Some emphasis omitted.)

Between February 15, 2023, the date of the Stipulated Judgment, and the April 2024 partition trial, both parties paid expenses other than the 20 Stipulated Expenses from the Joint RMA. Although both reimbursed the Joint RMA or agreed to its use for some of the Non-Stipulated Expenses, they each continued to dispute the other's use of Joint RMA funds to pay other Non-Stipulated Expenses. As pointed out in the trial court's Reasons for Judgment, the parties’ primary dispute on this issue involved $150,563.00 in expenses for their children, including both children's credit card charges, Caroline's debutante charges, Caroline's TCU college tuition and expenses, Christopher's allowance, and Christopher's non-tuition Catholic High charges. At trial, both parties testified at length about the expenses. Thereafter, the trial court awarded Mrs. Tucker $19,250.99 as reimbursement for Non-Stipulated Expenses, based on its determination that the Non-Stipulated Expenses were either agreed upon by Mr. and Mrs. Tucker or were charges for the children that they had traditionally paid while together. The trial court agreed with Mr. Tucker that he should not be solely responsible for such charges.

A stipulated judgment between former spouses regarding community property or child support issues constitutes a binding compromise. Ponson v. Ponson, 17-469 (La. App. 5 Cir. 3/14/18), 241 So.3d 1213, 1221. A compromise is a contract whereby the parties, through concessions made by one or more of them, settle a dispute or an uncertainty concerning an obligation or other legal relationship. La. C.C. art. 3071. A stipulation binds the parties and the court when it is not in derogation of law. Ponson, 241 So.3d at 1221; Patrick by and through Patrick v. J. Patrick, Inc. Machine, Pump & Fabrication, 2017-0050 (La. App. 1 Cir. 11/1/17), 233 So.3d 82, 86, writ denied, 2017-2002 (La. 2/2/18), 233 So.3d 616. Because a stipulation is a contract between the parties, a court interprets it to determine the common intent of the parties. La. C.C. art. 2045. When the contract's words are clear and explicit and lead to no absurd consequences, a court may make no further interpretation in search of the parties’ intent. See La. C.C. art. 2046. In such cases, the court determines the parties’ intent within the contract's four corners without reference to parol evidence. See John M. Floyd & Associates, Inc. v. Ascension Credit Union, 2021-0560 (La. App. 1 Cir. 12/22/21), 340 So.3d 259, 267. Interpretation of a contract is a question of law, which this Court reviews de novo. Strachan v. Eichin, 2015-1431 (La. App. 1 Cir. 4/15/16), 195 So.3d 61, 64.

Upon de novo review of the four corners of the Stipulated Judgment, we find its words are clear and explicit – if any expenses other than the Stipulated 20 Expenses continued to be paid from the Joint RMA, Mr. Tucker would owe Mrs. Tucker reimbursement for those other expenses, unless the parties otherwise agreed in writing. Many of the Non-Stipulated Expenses are clearly not included in the Stipulated 20 expenses; nor is there evidence establishing the parties agreed in writing to share the Non-Stipulated Expenses.⁴ Thus, notwithstanding the parties’ testimony at trial, the trial court was bound by the Stipulated Judgment and legally erred by relying on parol evidence to find the parties agreed to anything outside of its four corners. This assignment of error has merit, and we reverse the Judgment of Partition insofar as it partially denied Mrs. Tucker's reimbursement claims. Because the record is unclear as to exactly which Non-Stipulated Expenses the trial court should have awarded to Mrs. Tucker as reimbursement, we will remand for the trial court to redetermine Mrs. Tucker's reimbursement claims and adjust the equalizing payment Mr. Tucker owes Mrs. Tucker accordingly. See Tanana v. Tanana, 2012-1013 (La. App. 1 Cir. 5/31/13), 140 So.3d 738,743 (vacating and remanding for completion of partition in accordance with La. R.S. 9:2801).

Timing of Asset Distribution and Equalizing Payment

In her fifth assignment of error, Mrs. Tucker contends the trial court legally erred in failing to designate a time frame within which the parties were to divide allocated assets and within which Mr. Tucker was required to pay Mrs. Tucker the $1,106,727.70 equalizing payment.

Under La. R.S. 9:2801(A)(4)(d), if the trial court's allocation of assets and liabilities results in an unequal net distribution, the court shall order an equalizing payment, either cash or deferred, secured or unsecured, upon such terms as the court shall direct. The statute does not mandate that the court designate a time frame within which allocated assets be divided nor within which an equalizing payment be made - nor has Mrs. Tucker pointed to any authority that would require such. This determination lies within the trial court's discretion. See Trahan, 43 So.3d at 224. Herein, we find, although such may be preferable, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to designate a time frame for allocation and payment. This assignment of error is meritless.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the September 23, 2024 Judgment of Partition insofar as it partially denied Jaclyn Tucker's reimbursement claims and awarded her reimbursement of $19,250.99 for non-stipulated expenses and UBS Visa payments paid from the Joint Resource Management Account. We remand this matter for the trial court to redetermine the reimbursement to which Jaclyn Tucker is entitled for these expenses, basing its redetermination solely on the parties’ agreement as evidenced by the February 15, 2023 Stipulated Judgment, and to then adjust the equalizing payment owed by Richard Brian Tucker, Jr. to Jaclyn Tucker. In all other respects, we affirm the September 23, 2024 Judgment of Partition. We assess costs of the appeal one-half to Richard Brian Tucker, Jr. and one-half to Jaclyn Tucker.

AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; REMANDED.

I disagree with the majority's decision affirming the trial court's allocation of the future Transition Award Payments. Further, in the interests of judicial efficiency, I would have amended the trial court's judgment to designate a deadline within which to make the equalization payment and to divide the assets. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent in part. In all other respects, I agree with the majority.

FOOTNOTES

1.   At the time of the April 2024 partition trial, Mr. Tucker: had made Promissory Note payments in 2022, 2023, and 2024, which were deducted from the Joint RMA; executed an Initial Transition Payment Award Agreement on January 13, 2021, and received an Initial Transition Award on or before January 31, 2022; executed a Supplemental Transition Award Agreement on January 12, 2023, and received a Supplemental Transition Award on or before January 31, 2023; and, executed another Supplemental Transition Award Agreement on January 8, 2024, and received a Supplemental Transition Award on or before January 31, 2024.

2.   We acknowledge that part of Mr. Tucker's UBS compensation package was based on his “trailing 12 month production” at Merrill Lynch, which was not less than $2,803,380 as of October 30, 2020, and on his Asset Base, which was not less than $421,977,425 as of October 30, 2020. However, as set forth in the Initial Transition Payment Award Agreement and the Supplemental Transition Award Agreements, Mr. Tucker had to continue to meet performance targets during his UBS employment to continue to receive Awards.

3.   Mrs. Tucker's expert, Madison Field, agreed that December 17, 2020, was appropriate as the “grant” date under the Melancon methodology. However, Mr. Field disagreed with some of Mr. Tanguis’ calculations. We find no error in the trial court's acceptance of Mr. Tanguis’ calculations. The trier of fact is not bound by the testimony of an expert, but such testimony is to be weighed the same as any other evidence. The trier of fact may accept or reject in whole or in part the opinion expressed by an expert. The effect and weight to be given expert testimony is within the broad discretion of the trial court. The decision reached by the trial court regarding expert testimony will not be disturbed on appeal absent a finding that the trial court abused its discretion. Trahan v. Trahan, 2010-0109 (La. App. 1 Cir. 6/11/10), 43 So.3d 218, 228-29, writ denied, 2010-2014 (La. 11/12/10), 49 So.3d 889.

4.   We specifically reject Mr. Tucker's argument that Mrs. Tucker agreed in writing to share additional charges in an April 10, 2023 email.

GREENE, J.

McClendon, C.J. dissents in part for reasons assigned.