STATE v. CHAISSON (2026)

On October 9, 2023, Defendant, Kerry Duane Chaisson, was charged by bill of information with armed robbery, in violation of La.R.S. 14:64; carjacking, in violation of La.R.S. 14:64.2; aggravated flight from an officer, in violation of La.R.S. 14:108.1(C); and resisting arrest, in violation of La.R.S. 14:108.

On January 27, 2025, the trial court granted the State's motion to sever the charges of armed robbery, carjacking, and resisting arrest, and Defendant proceeded to trial by jury solely on the charge of aggravated flight from an officer. On January 29, 2025, a jury unanimously found Defendant guilty as charged.

On April 3, 2025, Defendant was sentenced to five years at hard labor. That same day, the State filed a habitual offender bill of information, charging Defendant as a fourth felony offender, in violation of La.R.S. 15:529.1. Pursuant to a plea agreement, Defendant admitted his status as a fourth felony offender, and the State dismissed the previously severed charges of armed robbery, carjacking, and resisting arrest. Pursuant thereto, the trial court vacated Defendant's prior sentence and sentenced Defendant to twenty years at hard labor without the benefit of probation or suspension of sentence. The trial court also ordered Defendant's sentence to run concurrently to any other sentence being served and recommended Defendant participate in substance abuse treatment and any other programs offered by the Department of Corrections.

Defendant now appeals his conviction, raising one assignment of error: “The evidence presented at trial, when viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, was insufficient to find Kerry Duane Chaisson guilty of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt.”

For the reasons discussed below, we affirm Defendant's conviction and sentence.

FACTS

On August 31, 2023, Detective Andrew Brashear of the Lafayette Parish Sheriff's Office responded to a call regarding a stolen vehicle. Dispatch described the vehicle as a white 2018 Ford Escape with license plate number 867FJW and the driver as a “black male.” After locating the vehicle, Detective Brashear began pursuit. He did not immediately execute a traffic stop due to the nature of the call. Traffic stops involving a stolen vehicle require at least two units, so he followed the vehicle until another police unit joined the pursuit. Thereafter, he attempted to conduct a traffic stop by engaging his lights and siren. However, the vehicle did not stop. Instead, it sped off on Interstate-10 and headed east towards Lafayette, Louisiana. Due to the speed of the vehicle, which Detective Brashear estimated to be around 100 miles per hour, he halted pursuit and called for assistance. Protocol requires an officer to halt pursuit of a vehicle once the officer reaches twenty miles over the posted speed limit. Although his pursuit of the vehicle ended, Detective Brashear continued to travel in the same direction as the vehicle. Eventually, he received notification that the Lafayette Police Department engaged the vehicle after it crashed into a “cement coulee” near the intersection of Willow and Cora Street in Lafayette. Detective Brasher described the scene upon his arrival as follows:

Q. ․ Were -- when you arrived on scene, can you please describe what it was that you saw?

A. Initially, there [were] a large number of police cars, Lafayette Police Department, my agency, with lights on. I had to find a place to park, and then when I parked -- I was able to park, exited my unit, walked towards the coulee, there was a vehicle in the coulee.

Q. Okay. Was it the same vehicle that you initiated the pursuit on?

A. Yes.

Q. How were you able to tell?

A. It looked like the vehicle and the license plate on the back.

Q. Was the license plate the same?

A. Yes.

Q. What was the color of the vehicle in the coulee?

A. White.

Q. And what was the make and model?

A. 2018 Ford Escape.

Q. Okay. When you arrived on scene, was there anyone in the vehicle at that time?

A. Not that I remember. I didn't see anybody in the vehicle.

Q. Okay. Through the course of the investigation, were y'all able to identify any occupants in the vehicles?

A. Yes.

Q. Okay. How many did y'all identify?

A. Two.

Q. All right. Who was one of the occupants that you identified?

A. I -- the female --

Q. Yes, sir.

A. Heather [Guidry] and Mr. Chaisson.

Q. All right. When you arrived on scene, where were the two of them?

A. Heather was outside the vehicle in the coulee, and Mr. Chaisson was further west in the coulee.

Q. Okay. Were they moving around freely?

A. Yes -- no. I'm sorry.

Q. Were they in custody at that time -- by the time you got there?

A. I think they were trying to get her up the -- they were getting ready to move her up the embankment to get her out of there. Mr. Chaisson was apprehended further away from the scene by [the]Lafayette Police Department.

Both Defendant and Heather Guidry were subsequently placed into custody. Once in custody and read his Miranda rights, Defendant told Detective Brashear that he was “going fast” and claimed he did not stop the vehicle because he was “on parole” and “scared.” Defendant mentioned that he stole the vehicle after he, his girlfriend, the owner of the vehicle, and an unidentified female went to an undisclosed location to engage in sexual activity. Defendant said whenever they made it to the location, the owner and the unidentified female got out, but he and his girlfriend stayed in the vehicle. Thereafter, Defendant took the vehicle and left the owner and the unidentified female. Defendant claimed his girlfriend “did not do anything wrong” and that “it was all him.” After the interrogation, Defendant was transported to the hospital for medical treatment and then booked into jail.

Detective Brashear did not collect any tangible evidence, such as DNA or fingerprints, in this case because a suspect had already been identified. Detective Brashear noted that he did not directly ask Defendant whether he was driving the vehicle and could not state for certain whether Defendant was the driver of the vehicle.

Corporal Tyler Jackson of the Lafayette Police Department assisted the Lafayette Parish Sheriff's Office with the vehicle pursuit. His pursuit of the vehicle commenced once the vehicle entered the Lafayette city limits and exited Interstate-10. During the pursuit, the vehicle failed to stop at two red traffic lights and traveled at a high rate of speed. He drove at approximately eighty miles per hour in a fifty miles per hour speed zone to maintain pursuit of the vehicle. Ultimately, the chase ended after the vehicle lost control and crashed into a coulee. Thereafter, two individuals were apprehended: Defendant, who was apprehended under the bridge, and a female, who was detained coming out of the passenger seat. At the time of the pursuit, Corporal Jackson was not informed about the number of occupants in the vehicle or the identity of the driver. Yet, Corporal Jackson testified that when he arrived at the scene, he saw a female exit the vehicle and saw Defendant run away from the vehicle. He noted, however, that his view was obstructed, and he could not say for certain whether the female was inside of the vehicle at the scene. Corporal Jackson admitted that no one informed him that Defendant was driving the vehicle prior to the pursuit. Nevertheless, he said, based on his knowledge, skills, and experience, he inferred that Defendant was the driver because he saw Defendant running away on the driver's side, and no one else was in the vehicle other than Defendant and the passenger. All in all, he could not recall the specific locations of Defendant and the female at the scene and admitted he did not see Defendant driving the vehicle.

Corporeal Trent Mouton, a K-9 handler with the Lafayette Police Department, testified he also assisted the Lafayette Parish Sheriff's Office with the vehicle pursuit and that dispatch noted that the vehicle, which was described as a white 2018 Ford Escape, was traveling on Interstate-10 and heading into the Lafayette city limits. Corporal Mouton attempted to stop the vehicle once it exited Interstate-10 onto Ambassador Caffery Parkway by engaging his emergency lights and siren. However, the driver refused to stop and continued to flee at a high rate of speed. During the pursuit, the vehicle failed to stop at multiple red signal lights and entered the opposite lane of travel several times. The vehicle was traveling at such a high speed, Corporal Mouton had to drive 100 miles per hour to keep up with the vehicle. Eventually, the vehicle crashed into a coulee, and the chase ended. Corporal Mouton testified that when he arrived on scene, he saw a female exiting the “passenger side” of the vehicle and a “black male” with a “red shirt” fleeing from the “driver's side” of the vehicle. Detective Mouton identified Defendant as the male he saw running away from the vehicle in the coulee. He noted that he did not see Defendant driving the vehicle at any point during the pursuit or see Defendant exiting the vehicle at any point. Detective Mouton did state, nonetheless, that there was no evidence presented to suggest that Defendant and the female switched sides of the vehicle after the crash.

ERRORS PATENT

In accordance with La.Code Crim.P. art. 920, all appeals are reviewed by this court for errors patent on the face of the record. After reviewing the record, we find one error patent requiring correction by the Uniform Sentencing Commitment Order (USCO).

Defendant correctly claims that the record does not indicate that he was apprised of the time period for filing an application for post-conviction relief. He requests that this court to instruct the trial court to send written notice to him within ten days of the issuance of its opinion and to file written proof in the record that he received notice. In State v. Terry, 25-170, pp. 3-4 (La.App. 3 Cir. 11/19/25), 425 So.3d 188, this court discussed its recent jurisprudence adopting a different procedure to provide a defendant with notice of the correct time period for filing an application for post-conviction relief:

In State v. Terry, a majority of this court's judges have chosen to allow the appellate opinion to serve as notice of the time limitation for filing an application for post conviction relief. See State v. King, 24-367 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/19/25), 405 So.3d 1162, writ denied, 25-381 (La. 5/20/25), 409 So.3d 223; State v. Washington, 24-308 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/12/25), 406 So.3d 579; State v. Mason, 24-407 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/5/25), 407 So.3d 822, writ denied, 25-270 (La. 4/29/25), 407 So.3d 620.

In Washington, 406 So.3d at 583 (alterations in original), this court stated:

We agree with the first, second, and fifth circuits who have allowed their opinions to serve as notice to Defendant of the correct time limitation for filing an application for post-conviction relief:

Finally, after the trial court imposed the sentences herein, it failed to advise the defendant of the applicable time period to file an application for post-conviction relief․ At the time of sentencing, the trial court shall inform the defendant of the prescriptive period for applying for post-conviction relief. State v. LeBoeuf, 2006-0153 (La.App. 1st Cir. 9/15/06), 943 So.2d 1134, 1142, writ denied, 2006-2621 (La. 8/15/07), 961 So.2d 1158. Its failure to do so, however, has no bearing on the sentence and is not grounds to reverse the sentence or remand for resentencing. Further, the Article does not provide a remedy for an individual defendant who is not told of the limitations period. Id. at 1142-43.

Out of an abundance of caution and in the interest of judicial economy, we advise the defendant that La.Code Crim.P. art. 930.8 generally provides that no application for post-conviction relief, including applications which seek an out-of-time appeal, shall be considered if filed more than two years after the judgment of conviction and sentence has become final under the provisions of La.Code Crim.P. arts. 914 or 922. Id. at 1143.

State v. Folse, 23-1299, p. 11 (La.App. 1 Cir. 9/20/24), 405 So.3d 645, 654. Accordingly, Defendant is advised that pursuant to La.Code Crim.P. art. 930.8, no application for post-conviction relief, including applications seeking an out-of-time appeal, shall be considered if filed more than two years after the judgment of conviction and sentence has become final under La.Code Crim. P. arts. 914 or 922.

Thus, this opinion will serve as notice to Defendant of the proper time period for filing post conviction relief.

See also, State v. Dugas, 25-143, 25-144 (La.App.3 Cir. 10/15/25), 420 So.3d 321.

Accordingly, with this opinion, this court advises Defendant that pursuant to La.Code Crim.P. art. 930.8, no application for post-conviction relief, including applications seeking an out-of-time appeal, shall be considered if filed more than two years after the judgment of conviction and sentence becomes final under La.Code Crim. P. arts. 914 or 922.

Additionally, the USCO indicates Defendant's twenty-year sentence is to be served “without benefit.” The sentencing transcript, however, does not indicate that the trial court ordered Defendant's sentence to be served without the benefit of parole. “[W]hen the minutes and the transcript conflict, the transcript prevails.” State v. Wommack, 00-137, p. 4 (La.App. 3 Cir. 6/7/00), 770 So.2d 365, 369, writ denied, 00-2051 (La. 9/21/01), 797 So.2d 62. Although the sentencing minutes are correct in this case, this court also orders correction of the commitment order when it conflicts with the transcript. See State v. Barker, 24-379 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/5/25), 407 So.3d 776, writ denied, 25-257 (La. 4/23/25), 406 So.3d 1179.

Thus, the trial court is ordered to amend the USCO to delete the indication that the trial court ordered the sentence to be served without the benefit of parole.

DISCUSSION OF THE MERITS

In his sole assignment of error, Defendant claims the evidence presented at trial, when viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, was insufficient to find him guilty of aggravated flight from an officer beyond a reasonable doubt.

Standard of Review

When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, Louisiana appellate courts are controlled by the standard enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). See State v. Captville, 448 So.2d 676, 678 (La.1984). That standard dictates that to affirm the conviction the appellate court must determine that the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, was sufficient to convince a rational trier of fact that the State proved all elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Johnson, 03-1228, p. 4 (La. 4/14/04), 870 So.2d 995, 998; Captville, 448 So.2d at 678. Further, when the conviction is based on circumstantial evidence, La. R.S. 15:438 sets forth the rule that “assuming every fact to be proved that the evidence tends to prove, in order to convict, [the circumstantial evidence] must exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence.” However, La. R.S. 15:438 does not establish a stricter standard of review than the more general rational juror's reasonable doubt formula; rather it serves as a helpful evidentiary guide for jurors when evaluating circumstantial evidence. State v. Toups, 01-1875, p. 3 (La. 10/15/02), 833 So.2d 910, 912; State v. Chism, 436 So.2d 464, 470 (La.1983). When evaluating circumstantial evidence, the trier of fact must consider

the circumstantial evidence in light of the direct evidence, and vice versa, [and] the trier of fact must decide what reasonable inferences may be drawn from the circumstantial evidence, the manner in which competing inferences should be resolved, reconciled or compromised; and the weight and effect to be given to each permissible inference. From facts found from direct evidence and inferred from circumstantial evidence, the trier of fact should proceed, keeping in mind the relative strength and weakness of each inference and finding, to decide the ultimate question of whether this body of preliminary facts excludes every reasonable hypothesis of innocence.

Chism, 436 So.2d at 469.

Finally, constitutional law does not require the reviewing court to determine whether it believes the witnesses or whether it believes that the evidence establishes guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Mussall, 523 So.2d 1305, 1309 (La.1988). Rather, the fact finder is given much discretion in determinations of credibility and evidence, and the reviewing court will only impinge on this discretion to the extent necessary to guarantee the fundamental protection of due process of law. Johnson at pp. 4-5, 870 So.2d at 998; Toups at p. 3, 833 So.2d at 912.

State v. Major, 03-3522, pp. 5-7 (La. 12/1/04), 888 So.2d 798, 801–02 (alterations in original).

Furthermore, when the key issue is the defendant's identity as the perpetrator, rather than whether the crime was committed, the State is required to negate any reasonable probability of misidentification. State v. Weary, 03-3067 (La. 4/24/06), 931 So.2d 297; State v. Neal, 00-0674 (La. 6/29/01), 796 So.2d 649. Positive identification by only one witness is sufficient to support a conviction. Weary, 03-3067 at p. 18, 931 So.2d at 311; Neal, 00-0674 at p. 11, 796 So.2d at 658; State v. Mussall, 523 So.2d 1305, 1311 (La.1988). It is the factfinder who weighs the respective credibilities of the witnesses, and this court will generally not second-guess those determinations. State v. Bright, 98-0398, p. 22 (La. 4/11/00), 776 So.2d 1134, 1147.

State v. Hughes, 05-992, pp. 5-6 (La. 11/29/06), 943 So.2d 1047, 1051.

Conviction

In the instant case, Defendant was convicted of aggravated flight from an officer. Louisiana Revised Statutes 14:108.1 defines aggravated flight from an officer as:

C. ․ [T]he intentional refusal of a driver to bring a vehicle to a stop ․ under circumstances wherein human life is endangered, knowing that he has been given a visual and audible signal to stop by a police officer when the officer has reasonable grounds to believe that the driver or operator has committed an offense. The signal shall be given by an emergency light and a siren on a vehicle marked as a police vehicle ․

D. Circumstances wherein human life is endangered shall be any situation where the operator of the fleeing vehicle ․ commits at least two of the following acts:

(1) Leaves the roadway or forces another vehicle to leave the roadway.

(2) Collides with another vehicle or watercraft.

(3) Exceeds the posted speed limit by at least twenty-five miles per hour.

(4) Travels against the flow of traffic ․ in a reckless manner in violation of R.S. 14:99.

(5) Fails to obey a stop sign or a yield sign.

(6) Fails to obey a traffic control signal device.

Arguments in Brief

Defendant argues the evidence presented at trial, when viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, was insufficient to find him guilty of aggravated flight from an officer beyond a reasonable doubt. To support his assertion, Defendant insists the evidence failed to establish that he was the person driving the vehicle. Defendant notes that although he was seen running away from the vehicle, no one positively identified him as the driver or saw him exit from the driver's side of the vehicle. According to Defendant, his mere presence near the scene is not enough to prove that he committed the offense. State v. Pierre, 93-893 (La. 2/3/94), 631 So.2d 427. Additionally, Defendant claims the State failed to present any direct evidence demonstrating he was the driver of the vehicle, as no DNA evidence was collected during the investigation. Defendant further contends that even though he made incriminating statements to detectives, his statements do not indicate that he was the driver of the vehicle and were merely an attempt to be chivalrous. All in all, Defendant argues the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to prove that he is guilty of the crime charged, and thus, his conviction should be set aside.

Contrarily, the State contends that the evidence presented proved Defendant committed the crime of aggravated flight from an officer beyond a reasonable doubt. Particularly, the State argues that there was both circumstantial and direct evidence that proved Defendant's identity as the driver. The State asserts that there were two people found on the scene: a female passenger, who was witnessed climbing out of the passenger side of the vehicle immediately after the crash, and Defendant, who was witnessed running through the coulee. According to the State, testimony revealed that there were no indications that the two individuals found on the scene switched sides of the vehicle. Moreover, the State argues that Defendant admitted to operating the fleeing vehicle and explained that the female occupant had done nothing wrong. The State contends that Defendant's argument that his admissions to law enforcement were an attempt to be chivalrous lacks merit and is unsupported by the record. Altogether, the State maintains that there was sufficient evidence presented to find Defendant guilty of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt, and thus, Defendant's argument lacks merit.

Analysis

In the matter, the primary issue and focus of Defendant's appeal is whether Defendant was driving the reported stolen white 2018 Ford Escape.

Deputy Brashear testified that upon attempting a traffic stop the vehicle failed to stop, fleeing at a high rate of speed onto the interstate. At this point, Officer Jackson began pursuit, he testified that he attempted to stop the suspected stolen vehicle, and while in pursuit the vehicle was traveling at a high rate of speed, failed to obey traffic signals, traveled against the flow of traffic, and left the roadway crashing into a coulee. Officer Jackson's testimony was corroborated by his dashcam video. Therefore, other than the identity of the driver, this testimony and evidence alone established all the elements of the crime of aggravated flight from an officer. Thus, as stated above, whether Mr. Chaisson was driving was the sole focus on appeal.

In State v. Green, 54,267 (La.App. 2 Cir. 3/9/22), 334 So.3d 1107, the defendant appealed his conviction for aggravated flight from an officer, asserting that the evidence was insufficient to prove he was guilty of the offense. Particularly, the defendant claimed that the evidence failed to establish that he was the driver of the vehicle, as there was no direct evidence presented pertaining to the identity of the driver. To support his assertion, the defendant noted that, generally, cases upholding a conviction for aggravated flight include direct evidence that the defendant was the driver of the vehicle. The defendant argued that although his personal items were found inside the vehicle, the evidence presented against him was circumstantial. On the other hand, the State argued that there was sufficient evidence to uphold the conviction and that the evidence identified the defendant as the perpetrator. The State noted that the defendant's cell phone, driver's license, and jacket were found in the car and that the defendant mentioned the pursuit on his recorded jail calls. The second circuit affirmed the defendant's conviction, holding that the evidence proved the defendant's identity as the driver.

In State v. Ragsdale, 56,189 (La.App. 2 Cir. 4/9/25), 409 So.3d 433, 435–38, writ denied, 25-580 (La. 11/19/25), 420 So.3d 1179, the defendant appealed his conviction for aggravated flight from an officer, arguing that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction. Specifically, the defendant asserted that the State failed to prove that he was the person operating the vehicle at the time of the pursuit. To support his argument, the defendant relied on the fact that no eyewitnesses identified him as the driver of the vehicle. In affirming the conviction, the second circuit held that, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, it was reasonable for the jury to believe that the defendant was driving the vehicle because evidence showed that there was only one occupant in the vehicle, and the defendant was found inside of the vehicle at the scene.

Here, although Defendant argues that the State failed to prove his identity as the driver of the vehicle, Defendant admitted stealing the vehicle and driving at a high rate of speed when questioned by detectives at the scene because he was “on parole and scared.” Defendant also stated to detectives that his girlfriend, the only other occupant of that vehicle, was not involved in the act of stealing the vehicle or causing the pursuit. Additionally, Corporal Jackson testified he saw Defendant running away from the driver's side of the vehicle, along with several officers testifying that Defendant's girlfriend was standing on the passenger side. Further, Corporal Mouton testified that there was no evidence to suggest that Defendant and his girlfriend switched sides of the vehicle after the crash, and Detective Brashear testified that dispatch described the suspected driver as a black male. Therefore, and in viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, we find the jury received ample evidence, both direct and circumstantial, that Defendant operated that vehicle during the pursuit, and find the evidence presented was sufficient so that it was reasonable for the jury to find the State proved Defendant's identity as the driver of the vehicle and to sustain a conviction for aggravated flight from an officer beyond a reasonable doubt.

In sum, even though Defendant claims the evidence was circumstantial and no one specifically identified him as the driver of the vehicle, the evidence in totality was enough to exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence and negate any reasonable possibility of misidentification. Therefore, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, we find the State proved that Defendant committed aggravated flight from an officer beyond a reasonable doubt.

Accordingly, Defendant's assignment of error lacks merit.

DECREE

Defendant's conviction and sentence are affirmed. Furthermore, and by this opinion, Defendant is advised that pursuant to La.Code Crim.P. art. 930.8, no application for post-conviction relief, including applications seeking an out-of-time appeal, shall be considered if filed more than two years after the judgment of conviction and sentence becomes final under La.Code Crim.P. arts. 914 or 922. Additionally, the trial court is ordered to amend the USCO to delete the indication that the trial court ordered the sentence to be served without the benefit of parole.

AFFIRMED, WITH INSTRUCTIONS.

ORTEGO, Judge.