STATE v. FONTENOT (2026)

FACTS

On November 9, 2023, the defendant, Erron Ellis Fontenot, was charged by bill of indictment with the second degree murder of James Gregory Barrilleaux, in violation of La.R.S. 14:30.1. The homicide was alleged to have been committed on August 1, 2023. Trial in the matter began on May 28, 2024. On May 31, 2024, the jury unanimously found the defendant guilty as charged of second degree murder. On July 26, 2024, the defendant received a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment at hard labor, without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence.

The defendant filed a “Motion to Reconsider Sentence with Incorporated Memorandum” wherein he asserted his sentence was excessive as he was a first offender “and the incarceration sentence given was the most permitted by law for the offense of conviction.” That motion was denied without a hearing.

The defendant now appeals his conviction and sentence. Initially, counsel raised two assignments of error. Additionally, the defendant submitted a pro se brief which raises the same issues as counsel's brief.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

1. The trial court committed reversible error when it denied Erron Fontenot's challenge for cause seeking to excuse prospective juror Stacy Vennes.

2. Erron Fontenot is entitled to a new trial as the voir dire transcript does not provide a basis to decide whether the court abused its discretion in denying the challenge for cause.

PRO SE ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

1. The trial court committed reversible error when it denied Erron Fontenot's challenge for cause seeking to excuse prospective juror Stacy Vennes.

2. Erron Fontenot is entitled to a new trial as the supplemental record of the pertinent portion of the voir dire does provide a basis to decide that the trial court did indeed abuse its discretion in denying the challenge for cause.

ERRORS PATENT

In accordance with La.Code Crim.P. art. 920, all appeals are reviewed by this court for errors patent on the face of the record. After reviewing the record, we find there is one error patent, which is raised by the defendant.

The defendant was advised that he had “two years from the sentence becoming final to file for postconviction relief.” Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure Article 930.8(A) states, “No application for post-conviction relief, including applications which seek an out-of-time appeal, shall be considered if it is filed more than two years after the judgment of conviction and sentence has become final under the provisions of Article 914 or 922[.]” (emphasis added).

The defendant's proposed remedy is for this court to direct the trial court to send written notice of the time period provided for in La.Code Crim.P. art. 930.8. Because we are reversing the defendant's conviction and sentence on other grounds, this issue is moot.

DISCUSSION

As noted above, the defendant raised two assignments of error in both his counseled and pro se briefs, arguing the trial court erred in denying his challenge for cause regarding potential juror Stacy Vennes and the record was insufficient to allow review of the first assigned error. The original record submitted in this matter failed to include Ms. Vennes’ answer to a question about her ability to be fair to the defendant. After the defendant's brief was filed, the state filed a “Motion to Supplement the Record” with a corrected copy of the voir dire transcript. This court granted the motion on September 4, 2025. Thereafter, a supplemental record was lodged, and this error was cured. Thus, the defendant's second assignment of error is moot, leaving only the issue of the trial court's denial of the defendant's challenge for cause.

During voir dire, defense counsel, King Alexander, asked if anyone had hardships that would make being on the jury difficult. Ms. Vennes answered affirmatively. The following exchange then took place:

VENIREPERSON STACY VENNES:

I do Home Healthcare for dementia patients.

MR. ALEXANDER:

Yes. And I remember you saying that. And so is there some[one] taking your place?

VENIREPERSON STACY VENNES:

They're --

THE COURT:

Pass the microphone, please.

MR. ALEXANDER:

Yes.

THE COURT:

I'm sorry.

VENIREPERSON STACY VENNES:

They're trying to I don't know – green button -- Yeah. They're trying to find someone to cover my day on this. And I'm also going to be out of town June 7th, 8th, and 9th.

MR. ALEXANDER:

Okay. I don't think there's any way this goes that long. But as far as you missing work, a lot of people, if they work for a big plant or company, then there is a policy that people get paid their normal pay while they're doing this. But that might not apply to everybody. So that personal hardship is something I'm also asking about.

Are you concerned that -- you don't that they have a replacement for the person you care for?

VENIREPERSON STACY VENNES:

I care for three individuals.

MR. ALEXANDER:

Okay. I see.

VENIREPERSON STACY VENNES:

So they're trying -- the lady I work for, she's trying to make sure my three people are covered.

MR. ALEXANDER:

All right. And you're missing that compensation while you're here. Is that -- I mean, just as a separate question.

VENIREPERSON STACY VENNES:

Yes.

MR. ALEXANDER:

Is that a hardship to you?

VENIREPERSON STACY VENNES:

Yes.

MR. ALEXANDER:

Does either one of those situations rise to the level that you think it will plague your mind and prevent you from concentrating on the evidence in the case and being able to be fair to the defendant?

VENIREPERSON STACY VENNES:

I do.

MR. ALEXANDER:

Okay. Well, thank you for your honesty in that regard.

Defense counsel spoke with Ms. Vennes briefly on one other occasion during voir dire. That exchange is as follows:

MR. ALEXANDER:

Ms. Vennes, there was no answer. Well, I think I might've already covered this with you. Did I already mention you didn't answer the 14th question, “Is there any reason why you're not be -- may not be fit for jury service not covered by this form?”

I think that's what you answered. It was about the care situation -- was that about something else?

VENIREPERSON STACY VENNES:

No; the care giving.

MR. ALEXANDER:

Okay. All right. And pass it over to Mr. Goodly, if you will.

At the close of the defense counsel's questioning, the trial judge asked if there were any individuals on the venire who required further questioning. Both the prosecutor and defense counsel replied in the negative.

The attorneys then made their challenges. When the trial court asked the parties about for-cause challenges, the state challenged two jurors who expressed dissatisfaction with having to sit in judgment of another and who were unsure they could vote guilty where a life sentence was possible. Both jurors were removed. Defense counsel then challenged Ms. Vennes:

MR. ALEXANDER:1

Specifically, Your Honor, today, when Mr. Alexander was questioning about any type of hardships, Ms. Vennes did state that it would plague her mind. She would be unable to be fair to defendant due to exterior, I suppose, factors outside of this courtroom. But she was very clear that she stated that she believes that it would cause her to be unable to be fair, which, of course, is a major cause of concern, Your Honor.

MR. WILLIAMS:

If I may respond. I don't remember her saying that she couldn't be fair. I remember her saying that the job issue would affect her, but she was never asked if it would prevent her from being fair. I don't recall her being asked if it would ever be -- it would rise to the level that would prevent her from serving on this jury and doing what's asked of her and -- or would her [sic] prevent her from following the law, or, again, prevent her from being fair. I don't remember those comments. I just remember her saying it would affect her that, you know, work -- thinking about work, it would affect her but nothing that would rise to the level of preventing her from following the law or preventing her from being fair.

MR. ALEXANDER:

And I --

THE COURT:

I recall that her discussion regarding the work hardship, but it came out to me as more of a concern for the clients that she cares for. She indicated she had three that, evidently, she rotates or does more than one. I think that's more of an employer problem. I think she's a conscientious employee, and I think her concerns are more for her clients than anything.

MS. TRAUB:

Please note defense objection. And, Your Honor, just specifically, my recollection was that she did state that she would be unable to be fair. So I just would like that for the record.

THE COURT:

And of course, Liz, I [w]ouldn't argue the point with you.

THE COURT:

Sure.

THE COURT:

I -- and you probably -- I'm not suggesting you heard something that wasn't there, I just didn't hear that.

Defense counsel then used a peremptory challenge to remove Ms. Vennes from the jury. The defendant used all of his peremptory challenges during voir dire, with the final one being used to excuse Juror Melissa Malone.

The supreme court set forth the following in State v. Odenbaugh, 10-268, pp. 23-25 (La. 12/6/11), 82 So.3d 215, 236–37, cert. denied, 568 U.S. 829, 133 S.Ct. 410, 184 L.Ed.2d 51 (2012):

The United States Constitution's Sixth Amendment guarantees the accused the right to a trial by an impartial jury. The Louisiana Constitution Article I, Section 17(A) provides that a defendant has a right to challenge jurors peremptorily, with the number being fixed by law at twelve. LSA–C.Cr.P. art. 799. When a defendant uses all of his peremptory challenges, a trial judge's erroneous ruling depriving him of one of his peremptory challenges constitutes a substantial violation of his constitutional and statutory rights, requiring reversal of the conviction and sentence. State v. Jacobs, 99-1659, p. 5 (La. 6/29/01), 789 So.2d 1280, 1284; State v. Cross, 93-1189 (La. 6/30/95), 658 So.2d 683, 686; State v. Maxie, 93-2158 (La. 4/10/95), 653 So.2d 526, 534; State v. Robertson, 92-2660 (La. 1/14/94), 630 So.2d 1278, 1280. A trial court is vested with broad discretion in ruling on challenges for cause, and its rulings will be reversed only when a review of the entire voir dire reveals the trial judge abused its discretion. Robertson, 92–2660, 630 So.2d at p. 1281. Prejudice is presumed when a challenge for cause is erroneously denied by a trial court and the defendant has exhausted his peremptory challenges. Cross, 93-1189 at 1192, 658 So.2d at 686; State v. Robertson, 92-2660 at 3–4, 630 So.2d at 1280; State v. Ross, 623 So.2d 643, 644 (La.1993). An erroneous ruling depriving an accused of a peremptory challenge is a substantial violation of his constitutional and statutory rights and constitutes reversible error. Cross, 93-1189 at p. 6, 658 So.2d at 686; State v. Bourque, 622 So.2d 198, 225 (La.1993).

“A challenge for cause should be granted, even when a prospective juror declares his ability to remain impartial, if the juror's responses as a whole reveal facts from which bias, prejudice or inability to render judgment according to law may be reasonably implied.” State v. Jones, 474 So.2d 919, 926 (La.1985). However, a trial court does not abuse its discretion when it refuses to excuse a prospective juror on the ground he is not impartial where, after further inquiry or instruction, the potential juror has demonstrated a willingness and ability to decide the case impartially according to the law and evidence. Robertson, 92-2660 at p. 4, 630 So.2d at 1281. Thus, to establish reversible error warranting reversal of a conviction and sentence, defendant must demonstrate “(1) erroneous denial of a challenge for cause; and (2) the use of all his peremptory challenges.” Id. at 1281. In the instant case, it is undisputed that defense counsel exhausted his peremptory challenges, and, therefore, need only show that the trial court abused its discretion by denying a challenge for cause.

A defendant must object at the time of the ruling on the refusal to sustain a challenge for cause of a prospective juror. LSA–C.Cr.P. art. 800. According to LSA–C.Cr.P. art. 797(2) and (4), the State or the defendant may challenge a juror for cause on the ground that:

(2) The juror is not impartial, whatever the cause of his partiality. An opinion or impression as to the guilt or innocence of the defendant shall not of itself be sufficient ground of challenge to a juror, if he declares, and the court is satisfied, that he can render an impartial verdict according to the law and the evidence;

․

(4) The juror will not accept the law as given to him by the court[.]

As noted above, the defendant objected to the trial court's denial of his challenge for cause of Ms. Vennes, asserting she stated she would be unable to be fair to the defendant. Additionally, the defendant used a peremptory challenge to remove Ms. Vennes and subsequently used all of his peremptory challenges. Thus, according to Odenbaugh, he is entitled to a new trial if the trial court erroneously denied his challenge for cause. This issue comes down to an interpretation of Ms. Vennes's response, “I do,” as an answer to the question, “Does either one of those situations rise to the level that you think it will plague your mind and prevent you from concentrating on the evidence in the case and being able to be fair to the defendant?”

Defense counsel raised this as the ground for challenging her for cause. The trial court, in denying the challenge for cause, expressly stated it did not hear that. Additionally, defense counsel specifically objected on the ground that Ms. Vennes said she could not be fair.

The state suggests nothing in Ms. Vennes’ answers implied she could not be impartial and argues this case is akin to State v. Eason, 43,788 (La.App. 2 Cir. 2/25/09), 3 So.3d 685, writ denied, 09-725 (La. 12/11/09), 23 So.3d 913, cert. denied, 561 U.S. 1013, 130 S.Ct. 3472, 177 L.Ed.2d 1068 (2010). We disagree. In Eason, a potential juror noted she was a business owner, it was the busiest time of the year for the business, she was the only person who did billing for the company, and she would have to work nights to make up for the time she was in court:

When asked if her business concerns would interfere with her concentration and ability to devote time to the criminal case, she said that “it very well could.” However, she indicated that she understood the applicable law, that she could judge the witnesses’ credibility, and that apart from the concern about her business, she could be a fair and impartial juror.

The defendant challenged Ms. Fish for cause on the ground that her concern about her business and her work schedule would come into play in her deliberations. The prosecutor observed that Ms. Fish's answers “sounded more like a request for a hardship excuse than․ whether she was qualified and could sit as a juror.” The court stated:

Oh, there's—I'm sure it's a hardship for her. It's a hardship on everybody up there. But my perception of Ms. Fish is that she'd rather be at work and she doesn't want to be inconvenienced. Well, that's why we have excuses ahead of time for and I could have explored it, you know, more beforehand. I think she's got plenty of sense. I think she could certainly sit here for a day and a half or two and give the trial the attention that it needs without any problem.

Id. at 695.

The second circuit further noted that, “This is the type of situation where the trial court's impression of the juror's reasons and demeanor are critically important. It is possible that a juror's concern over work or home life is so great that the juror's ability to be fair and impartial is called into question.” Id. Ultimately, the second circuit found the totality of Ms. Fish's testimony indicated serving as a juror would be an inconvenience but she did not demonstrate an inability to be fair and impartial.

In State v. Hamilton, 16-587, p. 13 (La.App. 3 Cir. 4/5/17), 216 So.3d 367, 377–78, writ denied, 17-865 (La. 2/9/18), 236 So.3d 1260 (alteration in original), the defendant contested the trial court's denial of six challenges for cause, including prospective juror Lykeisha Marshall:

Ms. Marshall testified during voir dire that she had a two-month-old child at home. During questioning by defense counsel, Ms. Marshall explained that she was concerned because she had a doctor's appointment for her infant on the following Wednesday. She also stated that she worked five days a week and that, at the time, she shared a vehicle with her mother, and the vehicle was currently out of commission. Later, the trial court asked Ms. Marshall if she could make further arrangements for transportation if she were selected as a juror and Ms. Marshall answered, “I can try.”

Defense counsel based his challenge for cause on the reason that “she would be unable to concentrate fully upon deliberations given outside concerns and giving [sic] the youth of the child and the fact that she did not have what sounded like contingency plans available for her.” The trial court denied the challenge, stating that “[w]hen asked Ms․ when the Court asked Ms. Marshall about her child, she did say that she could make arrangements.” Id. While Ms. Marshall expressed concern about a doctor's appointment for her child the following week, nothing Ms. Marshall said indicated that she would not be able to deliberate because she would be too concerned about her child. Ms. Marshall's problem was transportation. Otherwise, Ms. Marshall did not indicate bias, prejudice, or an inability to follow the law.

The instant case presents a different scenario. Unlike Ms. Marshall in Hamilton, Ms. Vennes was uncertain if her employer could find someone to care for her patients. Furthermore, her answer to defense counsel's question can be interpreted to specifically indicate that she believed her outside concerns would affect her ability to be unbiased and impartial. After this statement, no effort was made by the state to rehabilitate Ms. Vennes on the issue, which distinguishes this case from Eason.

While the Louisiana Supreme Court has previously found that a juror need not be rehabilitated on the issue of impartiality if the answer is conditional or “immediately qualified by an expression of uncertainty,” that is not the case here. See State v. Dotson, 16-473, p. 11 (La. 10/18/17), 234 So.3d 34, 42. When a juror's response explicitly demonstrates bias or partiality, the juror must be rehabilitated or removed on a for-cause challenge. In State v. White, 574 So.2d 561 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1991), the defendant challenged the denial of his for-cause challenge of a juror who explicitly stated he was more likely to believe law enforcement than someone else. This court ultimately held that “[i]n light of Mr. Lyons’ statements, and in the absence of rehabilitation, it was not reasonable to conclude that Lyons was capable of serving as an impartial juror. As a result, the challenge for cause should have been sustained.” Id at 563.

In the instant case, there is nothing in the record to contradict Ms. Vennes’ answer to defense counsel's questions, which indicated she would be unable to concentrate on the case and be fair and impartial. Neither party attempted to rehabilitate Ms. Vennes following her statement. Both the state and the trial court stated that Ms. Vennes did not say she could not be fair. The transcript reveals she did, in fact, make that statement.

In summary, Ms. Vennes’ answer was an affirmative response to Mr. Alexander's question of whether her hardships would prevent her from being fair to the defendant. Accordingly, the defendant is entitled to a new trial under Odenbaugh since the basis of the challenge was valid, was preserved for appeal, and the trial court was clearly wrong when he stated he did not hear Ms. Vennes say that she could not be fair.

CONCLUSION

We find the trial court erroneously denied the defendant's challenge for cause of Ms. Vennes, which deprived him of a peremptory challenge and is therefore reversible error under State v. Odenbaugh, 10-268 (La. 12/6/11), 82 So.3d 215, cert. denied, 568 U.S. 829, 133 S.Ct. 410, 184 L.Ed.2d 51 (2012). The defendant's conviction and sentence are hereby vacated and the matter remanded to the trial court for a new trial.

CONVICTION AND SENTENCE VACATED. REMANDED FOR A NEW TRIAL.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The transcript says “MR. ALEXANDER;” however, it is clear from context that co-counsel, Elizabeth Traub, is actually the defense attorney speaking during the majority of this exchange.

PICKETT, Chief Judge.