STATE v. JONES (2026)

Defendant appeals his forty-year, hard-labor sentence after his guilty plea to a charge of manslaughter. For the reasons herein, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Defendant, Jordan Lee Jones, was indicted by a grand jury on April 25, 2024, for the March 2, 2024 second degree murder of Annette Dupre Touvell, alleged to have occurred in Calcasieu Parish while he was engaged in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of assault by drive-by shooting, in violation of La.R.S. 14:30.1(A)(2). The victim was killed when a bullet fired from outside of her home penetrated the house and struck her in the head. On December 3, 2024, the State orally amended the indictment to allege the responsive charge of manslaughter, a violation of La.R.S. 14:31. On March 17, 2025, Defendant entered a plea of guilty to the charge of manslaughter, with no agreement as to any potential sentence. The trial court ordered a pre-sentence investigation.

Defendant was sentenced on May 16, 2025. During the sentencing hearing, the State set forth the base facts underlying the crime, as amended, and its reason for the amendment to the lesser included offense of manslaughter:

Your Honor, as the Court is aware, on a manslaughter case, when the Defendant kills the victim by discharging a firearm, the sentencing range is 20 to 40.

This was a crime, while it was amended from assault by a drive-by shooting, underlying predicate conviction of manslaughter. The reason for that is the assault by a drive by [sic] shooting requires the offender to be targeting a specific person. There was not [sic] evidence that the offender was targeting a specific person.

However, I believe there's all the evidence in the world that the Defendant was intentionally shooting in the direction of these houses and, in fact, struck this house multiple times.

He was very familiar with the neighborhood. He knew that immediately preceding[,] his co-defendant, Lewis, fired in the direction of a field, some woods, where no one was living.

What Jones took the initiative to do is to get the firearm, lean out of the window, point in the opposite direction, which was toward homes, where the victim lived, and fired multiple rounds, striking her home multiple times.

So, while he was not targeting a specific individual, which is what's required for an assault by a drive-by shooting predicate murder, he was intentionally shooting at a house.

Now, unfortunately, aggravated criminal damage to property -- intentional aggravated criminal damage to property only results in manslaughter and not murder, and that's just the law. And that's the law that we have to deal with.

But this was not someone who fired into the sky. This was not someone who fired in -- onto the asphalt, and it ricocheted and killed someone. This is Mr. Jones, who chose to fire at an innocent person's home while she was sitting in her living room watching television. Chose to fire at that home multiple times and strike that home multiple times. And, unfortunately, one of those rounds that he fired at her home killed her and impacted all of this damage and all of this carnage on so many people.

The State also filed a written motion to invoke firearm enhancement pursuant to La.Code Crim.P. arts. 893.1 and 893.3(E), which raised the minimum statutory penalty for manslaughter to twenty years. The trial court accepted the State's motion and then sentenced Defendant to forty years in the custody of the Louisiana Department of Corrections, with credit for time served prior to sentencing. Defendant filed a motion to reconsider sentence, which was denied. He now appeals, arguing as his sole assignment of error that the sentence imposed is unconstitutionally excessive.

ERRORS PATENT REVIEW

All appeals are reviewed for errors patent on the face of the record, as per the provision of La.Code Crim.P. art. 920. On reviewing this record, we find there are no errors patent.

DISCUSSION

In State v. Dorthey, 623 So.2d 1276, 1280 (La. 1993) (alterations in original) (footnote omitted), our supreme court set forth the basis for appellate review of excessive sentences, as follows:

Louisiana's judiciary maintains the distinct responsibility of reviewing sentences imposed in criminal cases for constitutional excessiveness. State v. Sepulvado, 367 So.2d 762 (La. 1979). According to Sepulvado, the 1974 Louisiana Constitution, Article I, Section 20 “ ‘gives the courts, in the exercise of their judicial power, a basis for determining that sentences, whether fine, imprisonment or otherwise, though not cruel or unusual, are too severe as punishment for certain conduct and thus unconstitutional. It is a basis for extending the court's control over the entire sentencing process.’ ” Id. at 766, citing “The Declaration of Rights of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974”, 35 La.L.Rev. 1, 63 (1974). Thus, “[t]he imposition of a sentence, although within the statutory limit, may violate a defendant's constitutional right against excessive punishment ․” Id. at 767. Accordingly, under the 1974 Constitution “the excessiveness of a sentence becomes a question of law reviewable under the appellate jurisdiction of this court.” Id. at 764.

“A punishment is constitutionally excessive if it makes no measurable contribution to acceptable goals of punishment and is nothing more than the purposeless imposition of pain and suffering and is grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime.” State v. Scott, 593 So.2d 704, 710 (La.App. 4th Cir.1991); State v. Lobato, 603 So.2d 739, 751 (La. 1992).

“The trial judge is given wide discretion in the imposition of sentences within statutory limits[,]” and “[a]bsent a manifest abuse of that discretion the sentence imposed by a trial judge should not be set aside as excessive.” State v. Lanclos, 419 So.2d 475, 478 (La.1982). The supreme court added, “[t]his court has held that maximum sentences are appropriate only in cases involving the most serious violation of the relevant statute and the worst type of offender.” Id.

In addition, this court, in State v. Whatley, 03-1275, pp. 5-6 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/3/04), 867 So.2d 955, 958–59 (first and second alteration in original), expounded on our considerations in excessive-sentence reviews:

The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and La. Const. art. I, § 20 prohibit the imposition of cruel or excessive punishment. “ ‘[T]he excessiveness of a sentence becomes a question of law reviewable under the appellate jurisdiction of this court.’ ” State v. Dorthey, 623 So.2d 1276, 1280 (La. 1993) (quoting State v. Sepulvado, 367 So.2d 762, 764 (La. 1979)). Still, the trial court is given wide discretion in imposing a sentence, and, absent a manifest abuse of that discretion, we will not deem as excessive a sentence imposed within statutory limits. State v. Pyke, 95-919 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/6/96), 670 So.2d 713. However, “[m]aximum sentences are reserved for the most serious violations and the worst offenders.” State v. Farhood, 02-490, p. 11 (La.App. 5 Cir. 3/25/03), 844 So.2d 217, 225. The only relevant question for us to consider on review is not whether another sentence would be more appropriate, but whether the trial court abused its broad discretion in sentencing a defendant. State v. Cook, 95-2784 (La. 5/31/96), 674 So.2d 957, cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1043, 117 S.Ct. 615, 136 L.Ed.2d 539 (1996).

The fifth circuit, in [State v.] Lisotta, [98-646 (La.App. 5 Cir. 12/16/98)], 726 So.2d [57,] 58, stated that the reviewing court should consider three factors in reviewing the trial court's sentencing discretion:

1. The nature of the crime,

2. The nature and background of the offender, and

3. The sentence imposed for similar crimes by the same court and other courts.

In addition to considering the constitutional excessiveness of the sentence imposed, we also review whether the trial court adequately considered the guidelines established in La.Code Crim.P. art. 894.1. State v. Clues-Alexander, 24-95 (La.App. 3 Cir. 4/16/25), 409 So.3d 532, writ denied, 25-634 (La. 11/25/25), 421 So.3d 535.

The trial court received numerous victim impact statements from family members of the victim, and at the sentencing hearing, it heard the victim impact statements of Ronald Touvell, Marci Larocque, Gerad Touvell, and Heather Touvell, the victim's husband and three of her children. Additionally, the trial court received a letter supporting Defendant from Defendant's grandmother, Lisa Posada. After considering the statements, the trial court imposed the maximum forty-year sentence, setting forth the following reasons:

The matter before the Court is the sentencing of [Defendant]. We've previously called the case.

The Court is required to go through Article 894.1, which is the Code of Criminal Procedure's analysis with regard to sentencing.

Part A says, if the defendant has been convicted of a felony, the Court should impose a sentence of imprisonment if any of the following occur:

Is there an undue risk that during a period of a suspended sentence or probation, the defendant would commit another offense?

Just by the very facts of this case, and the facts with Article 893.3 and the enhancement, it's noted that that would be answered in the affirmative, and he would be required to serve some time of incarceration.

Is he in need of correctional treatment or a custodial environment that can be provided most effectively by commitment to an institution?

It is noted that the -- whatever that thought process was, the senseless act that occurred is such that the defendant will need correctional treatment.

Would any lesser sentence deprecate the seriousness of the defendant's crime?

Most significant in this is the actual loss that occurred and the indiscriminate nature of the way that it occurred. The Court would also answer that in the affirmative.

In determining the amount of time, we look at aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Some were enumerated by the State earlier, but obviously, the offender's conduct, during the commission of this offense, manifested deliberate cruelty to the victim, whether he knew the victim, specifically picked this victim, or not it still created that, as well as the cruelty now to the family that they must carry.

He created a risk of great bodily harm or death to more than one person. Random shooting toward residents and places where people reside and multiple shots could easily have taken the life of other or more individuals.

Actual violence was used. The actual shooting and the use of a firearm, which has been established, is also in place.

This offense has obviously resulted in significant permanent injury to the victims. The Court notes the numerous family members that have since lost, I think, as indicated, seventeen grandchildren, five children, and now more that are here will never know a grandmother, a mother, a sister, an aunt, a friend.

And a dangerous weapon was used, clearly for whatever thrill was appropriate, that asked to shoot the weapon and then handling it in that way, totally inappropriate and aggravating.

There was the use of either alcohol, or drugs, or some things that were mentioned during the riding around, and the fact that the Defendant here was a major with younger individuals may or may not -- technically, I think, were juveniles, the females and such.

And then, later on, the stopping and purchase [sic] of drugs. And then the attempting to remove themselves from the situation, hoping they would not be caught after knowing what they have done, all consist of aggravating [sic].

Primarily, the most aggravating factor is the thoughtless and discriminate act without knowing what was going on.

In looking at mitigating circumstances, one of the definitions is the defendant did not contemplate his conduct would cause serious harm, I find that more aggravating by its very action. And the facts that the co-defendants have indicated a shot out into an open field versus a shot out to a residential area.

He does have no history of delinquencies. He's basically led a law-abiding life. I do not have a juvenile record of the individual, but he is only 18, or he was 18 at the time of the offense, if I understood correctly. I believe he's 19 at this time. So there's not much to review with regard to that. But that start of adulthood leaves the Court astounded with the actions being taken.

Would the imprisonment entail excessive hardship?

I have not received any information to that. However, it does appear that his grandmother does care.

If matters were not mentioned, or if they were deemed, or talked about, they were either deemed insignificant or applicable [sic] to the application or the analysis of the defendant's activities.

The Court has dealt with a number of manslaughter cases throughout its history. Most of those happen with severe fights and reactions, love triangles, other matters in which there's somewhat of an understanding of someone's reactions, or a heat of passion, or not knowing what's going on. But the total senselessness of this and the indiscriminate actions cause the Court significant consternation.

And while the Court is limited, based on the statutory guidelines with regard to this, it is the Court's position that the Defendant has now been found guilty of Manslaughter.

And as a result, [Defendant] and the severity of his actions and such [sic] will be sentenced to the maximum sentence that is available to the Court. He will be ordered to serve 40 years at hard labor. He will be taken to a facility where he will spend that time.

It is an aggravated offense. DOC will make those appropriate considerations. There has been enhancement, or basically, I don't know that it would be considered, but Article 893.3 has been considered with regard to that consideration as far as a minimum/mandatory. But the Court does not believe that the minimum is appropriate based on this activity.

It is a crime of violence, as referenced previously. He is to get credit for time served for any time he's been incarcerated, as per 880 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

I do find it somewhat disconcerting that he did not have the courtesy -- I don't know him personally. I don't know anything. I haven't had many hearings with him at all. But Mr. Alexander, while he was somewhat eloquent with regard to the grief and the sorrow, I find it inappropriate that the Defendant himself could not look and say, I'm sorry for what I did. And that causes the Court some concern as well.

We find that the trial court adequately considered the factors set forth in La.Code Crim.P. art. 894.1, noting that “[w]hile the judge need not articulate every aggravating and mitigating circumstance, the record must adequately reflect that he considered these guidelines in particularizing the sentence to the defendant.” State v. Ray, 423 So.2d 1116, 1120 (La. 1982). Here, the reasons given by the trial court reflect detailed consideration of the relevant sentencing factors.

We next look to the nature of the crime, applying the first of the three factors as expounded in State v. Lisotta, 98-646 (La.App. 5 Cir. 12/16/98), 726 So.2d 57, writ denied, 99-433 (La. 6/25/99), 745 So.2d 1183. This court agrees with the assessment of the trial court that Defendant's actions were completely senseless and showed a total lack of regard for the life of others. He fired aimlessly at not one but several houses, not caring about or considering whether the residents of those houses were inside. Indeed, he did so at a time when multiple residents were likely to be home. He shot through the victim's home not once but multiple times, increasing the likelihood of causing death or great bodily harm to any occupant therein. Obviously, the crime involved the use of a deadly weapon and further involved the use of alcohol. While Defendant, in brief, described his activities with his friends at the time as being in a “celebratory mood,” firing a weapon indiscriminately into an occupied house is, in this court's judgment, anything but celebratory. This crime represents a total disregard for human life and the sanctity of one's home.

Additionally, while the State voluntarily reduced the original second degree murder charge to manslaughter due to a lack of evidence establishing the specific intent required for the underlying drive-by shooting predicate, we find that the evidence could very well have supported a second degree murder conviction. A similar factual situation was reviewed in State v. Compton, 24-113 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/2/24), 395 So.3d 368, writ denied, 24-1324 (La. 5/20/25), 409 So.3d 211. There, the defendant's conviction for second degree murder was affirmed where the predicate offense was assault by drive-by shooting, and the defendant, as the driver, was merely a principal to the crime rather than the shooter who actually fired the shot that struck and killed an innocent person inside the home fired upon. Another panel of this court analyzed the intent element for the underlying crime of assault by drive-by shooting, as follows:

Defendant was indicted for the offense either by virtue of specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm or by his actions as a principal to the assault by drive-by shooting, defined by La.R.S. 14:37.1 as, “an assault committed with a firearm when an offender uses a motor vehicle to facilitate the assault.” The statute further provides, “As used in this Section and in R.S. 14:30(A)(l) and 30.1(A)(2), the term ‘drive-by shooting’ means the discharge of a firearm from a motor vehicle on a public street, highway, or interstate highway with the intent either to kill, cause harm to, or frighten another person.” La.R.S. 14:37.1(C). An assault is an attempted battery or “the intentional placing of another in reasonable apprehension of receiving a battery.” La.R.S. 14:36. “All persons concerned in the commission of a crime, whether present or absent, and whether they directly commit the act constituting the offense, aid and abet in its commission, or directly or indirectly counsel or procure another to commit the crime, are principals.” La.R.S. 14:24. Assault and its related offenses are general-intent crimes, which means that the State must prove that the offender either 1) “actively desired the prescribed criminal consequences to follow his act” (specific intent) or 2) that the circumstances indicate that the prescribed criminal consequences were reasonably certain to result from his act. La.R.S. 14:10—11 [sic].

First, we note that intent to actually kill or even wound anyone in the house is not an essential element of the offense. To prove that an assault by drive-by shooting occurred, the State must prove the discharge of a firearm from a motor vehicle on a public street with intent to kill, harm, or frighten. Defendant clearly participated in the drive-by shooting. He discharged Milliman's gun from the car, which was being driven on a public street. He armed Mayo with the handgun that fired the fatal shot.

Defendant, though, challenges the intent element of the crime; if he did not know that anyone was home, Defendant asserts he could not have intended to frighten anyone in the home per La.R.S. 14:37.1 or place them “in reasonable apprehension of receiving a battery” per La.R.S. 14:36. Proof that he knew anyone was home is lacking, Defendant argues. Defendant argues that this contention is established by Smith's testimony that they did not realize anyone was actually in the house.

Whether a defendant formulated intent is a question of fact. State v. Harris, 15-485 (La.App. 5 Cir. 4/13/16), 190 So.3d 466, writ denied, 16-902 (La. 5/12/17), 220 So.3d 746. Proof of intent “may be inferred from the intentional use of a deadly weapon such as a knife or gun. The act of aiming a lethal weapon and discharging it in the direction of the victim supports a finding by the trier of fact that the defendant acted with specific intent to kill.” Id. at 475 (citations omitted). Similarly, the act of aiming a weapon at a home and discharging it can reasonably be interpreted by a jury as evidence of intent to at least frighten, if not actually injure or kill, those in the home.

Id. at 371–72.

In this instance, Defendant's act of firing multiple shots into the victim's home at a time when she was reasonably likely to be inside certainly indicates that the “prescribed criminal consequences were reasonably certain to result from his act.” Id. at 371. Thus, we disagree that the facts as presented could not support a conviction for the greater offense of second degree murder as originally charged. The nature of the crime committed was extremely serious and, in this case, deadly.

We next consider Defendant's background and circumstances. Lisotta, 726 So.2d 57. As the trial court recognized, Defendant was eighteen years old at the time of the offense and had no juvenile record or history of delinquencies while a minor. However, there was no evidence presented as to whether he was employed, caring for, or supporting any family members. Weighed against this is Defendant's lack of any expression of personal remorse, as recognized by the trial court.

Finally, we look to sentences imposed in similar cases. Id. Our courts have repeatedly upheld upper-range to maximum sentences imposed on defendants who were young, first-felony offenders, or both. In State v. Ross, 50,231, p. 2 (La.App. 2 Cir. 11/18/15), 182 So.3d 1035, 1036, a seventeen-year-old defendant went to the victim's neighborhood and killed the victim by shooting “multiple times through a gate and into a crowd of people.” He did so after leaving a party with a group of boys, similar to Defendant's actions in driving around while celebrating with his friends. Though indicted for second degree murder, the defendant in Ross pled guilty to manslaughter, for which he received the maximum forty-year sentence.¹ The defendant's young age and lack of a criminal record were factors the second circuit considered, but, nevertheless, it affirmed the defendant's sentence due to the severe danger created by his actions and the substantial leniency he received by pleading guilty to manslaughter.

In State v. Weatherspoon, 06-539 (La.App. 5 Cir. 12/12/06), 948 So.2d 215, 235–36, writ denied, 07-462 (La. 10/12/07), 965 So.2d 398, a sixteen-year-old defendant took part in a shooting which apparently occurred because an object hit the car in which he was riding. After the defendant exited the car, he fired into a crowd of people playing basketball, and a fourteen-year-old boy “sustained a single gunshot wound to the back base of his head that severed his spinal cord.” Id. at 219. The defendant was charged with second degree murder but was convicted of the responsive verdict of manslaughter. He was sentenced to the near maximum sentence of thirty-five years. Despite the defendant's youthful age, seventh-grade education, and low IQ, the fifth circuit affirmed the sentence, noting that the defendant also “had a criminal history consisting of a juvenile adjudication for aggravated assault involving an incident with a knife and his mother.” Id. at 236. The court noted that the defendant “fired several shots into a crowd of people with no regard for human life.” Id. at 235–36. In affirming the sentence, the fifth circuit concluded that “[t]he imposed sentence is neither grossly disproportionate to the severity of the offense nor shocking to our sense of justice.” Id. at 236.

In State v. Bowman, 95-667 (La.App. 4 Cir. 7/10/96), 677 So.2d 1094, writ denied, 96-2070 (La. 1/31/97), 687 So.2d 400, the fourth circuit affirmed a thirty-three-year sentence for manslaughter imposed on a defendant, who was sixteen at the time of the offense and a first-felony offender. The defendant was originally charged with being a principal to second degree murder, as he was not the shooter in the crime. Instead, the shooter was the defendant's friend, who was a passenger in the car the defendant was driving. From within the car, the friend was “ ‘fussing’ ” with a pedestrian he knew, and after passing the pedestrian, he asked the defendant to turn the car around. Id. at 1096. The defendant complied, and when they returned to the pedestrian's location, the friend fired his weapon. The defendant claimed that he was only the driver, and he did not know that his friend intended to shoot the victim. The jury found the defendant guilty of manslaughter. The fourth circuit affirmed the conviction and the sentence, noting the defendant's young age and lack of any prior criminal history. As stated by the court, “[m]aximum sentences for manslaughter convictions have been affirmed in several cases even where the defendant had no prior convictions.” Id. at 1102 (citing State v. Maxie, 594 So.2d 1072 (La.App. 3 Cir.), writ denied, 598 So.2d 372 (La.1992); State v. Smith, 520 So.2d 1252 (La.App. 5 Cir.), writ denied, 523 So.2d 1320 (La.1988); State v. King, 563 So.2d 449 (La.App. 1 Cir.), writ denied, 567 So.2d 610 (La.1990)).

Considering the nature of the crime, the circumstances and Defendant's background, and the penalties handed down for similar crimes, we do not find the sentence to be grossly disproportionate to the severity of the offense nor shocking to our sense of justice. An innocent life was taken by a senseless, thoughtless act, in total disregard to life or property by the intentional use of a dangerous weapon in an entirely indiscriminate manner. Many lives have been upended by Defendant's actions as evidenced by the victim impact statements of the victim's relatives and even that of Defendant's own grandmother. Defendant gave no thought to the potential victims of his actions when he fired multiple times into the houses while joyriding with his friends. Accordingly, we find that the trial court did not abuse its broad discretion in sentencing Defendant to forty-years at hard labor and affirm Defendant's sentence.

DECREE

Defendant's conviction and sentence for manslaughter are affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   We do take note of the fact that in Ross, the original second degree murder charge was reduced in accordance with a plea agreement, unlike in the present case where the State voluntarily amended the charge.

KYZAR, JUDGE