SOILEAU v. KHAN (2026)

Plaintiff, Alice Soileau, appeals the decision of the district court granting Our Lady of Lourdes Heart Hospital of Lafayette's exception of prematurity. For the reasons below, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Alice was an active seventy-year-old woman who was working and living independently before receiving treatment at Our Lady of Lourdes Heart Hospital of Lafayette. She underwent a cardiac procedure there in September 2020 under the care of brothers Drs. Azeem and Imtiaz Khan. All four of Alice's limbs had to be amputated before she left the hospital. Alice alleges the grossly negligent malpractice of Drs. Khan caused her injuries. She references other catastrophic injuries to patients the Khan brothers treated around the time of her treatment as evidence the doctors should not have been credentialed by Heart Hospital.

Heart Hospital granted privileges to Dr. Azeem Khan in 2017 and Dr. Imtiaz Khan in 2019. Alice alleges that prior to their initial credentialing, both surgeons were known to have:

• high complication rates;

• a history of performing questionable procedures;

• a history of failing to monitor patients post-operatively;

• a history of over-scheduling their surgical procedures making them unavailable post-operatively to respond to patient complications; and

• reputations for creating a culture that jeopardized patient safety.

Her petition goes on to state that the hospital failed to adhere to its own bylaws, rules, and polices and/or procedures for the credentialing of physicians to practice surgery on its campus. Alice links her injuries to the administrative negligence of Heart Hospital in credentialing the Khans.

LAW AND ANALYSIS

The Louisiana Medical Malpractice Act (MMA) requires that medical malpractice claims be submitted to a medical review panel before the patient can file suit in district court. La. R.S. 40:1231.8. At times, whether the MMA covers certain negligence is not clear. If the patient goes first to the district court and the court finds the claim is medical malpractice, the suit is premature and must be dismissed. Eldridge v Heritage Manor, L.L.C., 06-718 (La.App 3 Cir. 11/2/06), 942 So.2d 743. The district court decides whether the claim is ordinary negligence or medical malpractice. This is a question of law. Id. Therefore, we perform a de novo review.

This suit does not address medical malpractice claims against these doctors; Alice submitted those claims to a medical review panel. Our issue is the credentialing or granting of privileges to Drs. Azeem and Imtiaz Khan by Heart Hospital.

Alice argues that the district court erred in granting Heart Hospital's exception of prematurity. Heart Hospital argues that the district court was correct, and the issue is moot since Alice's medical review panel has concluded.

Louisiana Revised Statute 40:1231.1(A)(13) defines medical malpractice to include:

[A]ny unintentional tort or any breach of contract based on health care or professional services rendered, or which should have been rendered, by a health care provider, to a patient, including but not limited to ․ all legal responsibility of a health care provider arising from acts or omission ․ in the staffing, training, or supervision of health care providers[.]

The MMA does not include the initial credentialing of physicians in its definition of malpractice. Instead, the credentialing process is found in La. R.S. 40:2114 which says in part:

C. No individual shall be automatically entitled to membership on the medical ․ staff or to the exercise of any clinical privilege solely on the basis of his license to practice in any state, his membership in any professional organization, his certification by any clinical examining board, or his clinical privileges or staff membership at another hospital without meeting the reasonable criteria for membership established by the governing body of the respective hospital.

․

E. A hospital shall establish rules, regulations, and procedures setting forth the nature, extent, and type of staff membership and clinical privileges, as well as the limitations placed by the hospital on said staff membership and clinical privileges for all health care providers practicing therein.

Courts must be mindful of expanding the definition of medical malpractice. The MMA should be “strictly construed” because it is “in derogation of the rights of tort victims.” Williamson v. Hosp. Serv. Dist. No. 1 of Jefferson, 04-451, p. 8 (La. 12/1/04), 888 So.2d 782, 787–88.

The Louisiana Supreme Court found that a negligent credentialing claim did not fall under the MMA in Billeaudeau v. Opelousas General Hosp. Authority, 16-846 (La. 10/19/16), 218 So.3d 513. However, the supreme court revisited the issue in Thomas v. Regional Health System of Acadiana, LLC, 19-507 (La. 1/29/20), 347 So.3d 595. There, the physician had been credentialed thirty years prior to the plaintiff's injuries and had undergone multiple re-credentialing reviews over the years. The Louisiana Supreme Court found this “re-credentialing” was part of the training or supervision of a physician, acts covered by the MMA. Billeaudeau and Thomas analyzed whether the facts constituted medical malpractice under the six–factor test discussed in Coleman v. Deno, 01-1517 (La. 1/25/02), 813 So.2d 303. We need not repeat that analysis here, as the facts of this case are like those in Billeaudeau and fall outside the MMA.

Billeaudeau, involved a hospital's negligent credentialing of Dr. Zavala in 2009. In 2010, Dr. Zavala failed to diagnose a stroke, which the patient's family thought was an error. The family insisted that the patient be transferred to another hospital where the stroke diagnosis was confirmed. This led plaintiffs to question Dr. Zavala's credentialing.

The supreme court said:

[T]he decision to hire a physician in and of itself is administrative and does not directly relate to the treatment of any given patient or involve a dereliction of professional skill ․ a claim for negligent credentialing [is] separate and distinct from a claim for negligent supervision [and] weighs in favor of our finding general negligence more so than malpractice.

Id. at 523.

Billeaudeau also involved a breach of the hospital's by-laws and administrative procedures. The Court went on to say:

While a combination of fact and expert witnesses will most likely be necessary to aid the jury in understanding the hospital's policies and procedures in credentialing its physicians in order to determine whether the hospital breached the duties imposed therein—the specific wrong alleged in this case—, expert medical evidence is not necessary to establish the breach in this case. Therefore, this factor as well falls in favor of finding the claim sounds in general negligence.

Id. at 524.

Alice specifically alleged a negligent credentialing claim against the hospital. And like the Billeaudeau patient, Alice claims the hospital failed to follow its own bylaws and policies for credentialing physicians.

Here, Heart Hospital submitted evidence that each doctor was “subject to ongoing credentials review as part of his continued appointment to the Medical staff.” At first glance, this would appear to make the case more like Thomas. However, Heart Hospital presented no evidence that this was a peer-reviewed process, that the hospital made any re-credentialing decisions, or that any review ever took place. The use of “subject to” language suggests only a possibility. We find this evidence falls short of establishing Heart Hospital's efforts to train or supervise the doctors involved in Alice's claim.

In Thomas, the physician's credentialing took place thirty years before the alleged harm to the plaintiff. The doctor was re-credentialed every two years until she turned sixty-five and then every year until she retired. The record showed that other physicians reviewed her patient care as part of this process. The Court stressed that, unlike Billeaudeau, Thomas did not involve a hospital's failure to follow its own bylaws, confirm references, or review the doctor's compliance with education requirements before granting initial privileges.

The Thomas court explained, “In short, asserting claims of ‘credentialing’ or ‘re-credentialing’ against a healthcare provider cannot be a talismanic incantation that automatically excludes a plaintiff's claims from the strictures of the LMMA.” Id. at 604. Likewise, a lone, unsupported conclusory statement that the physicians were “subject to” a credentialing review does not convert Alice's administrative claims against the hospital into claims of medical malpractice.

Defendants argue that Alice's claim is moot since her case before the medical review panel, which included the negligent credentialing allegations, has concluded, and “she can now file her post-panel lawsuit, and this matter can appropriately proceed before the district court.” But considering the issue moot leaves the district court's erroneous ruling in place, and we must correct that error. Our reversal gives clarity to Alice's negligent credentialing claim and allows it to proceed as a general negligence action. It also gives the district court the necessary framework to correctly proceed with the negligent credentialing claim.

DECREE

The judgment of the trial court granting Our Lady of Lourdes Heart Hospital of Lafayette's exception of prematurity is reversed, and the matter is remanded to the trial court. Our Lady of Lourdes Heart Hospital of Lafayette shall bear the costs of appeal.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

DAVIS, Judge.