STATE v. LAGARS (2026)

Defendant, Cameron Seth Lagars, pleaded guilty to one count of second degree kidnapping, a violation of La.R.S. 14:44.1. He was sentenced to twenty years at hard labor; however, fifteen of those years were suspended, and two years were to be served without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence. He was also ordered on supervised probation for five years following his release from incarceration. Defendant appeals his sentence as excessive. We affirm Defendant's sentence.

FACTS

On September 15, 2023, Defendant, age sixteen, was a resident at Boys Village, a juvenile corrections facility in Lake Charles, Louisiana. Belinda Ledoux was a corrections officer at Boys Village. Defendant and two other juveniles refused to follow Ms. Ledoux's instructions. One of the other juveniles (Juvenile 1) told Defendant to kill Ms. Ledoux, the failure of which would result in Defendant being beaten and Ms. Ledoux being killed by Juvenile 1. Defendant then seized Ms. Ledoux. He battered her, causing her to fall to the floor. Ms. Ledoux suffered a torn right rotator cuff in the fall and subsequently underwent surgery to repair it.

Defendant then sat on Ms. Ledoux. She feared that the three juveniles would rape her. As she cried for help, Ms. Ledoux saw Juvenile 1 run outside to shut off power to the building. Defendant began to choke Ms. Ledoux. When Defendant relaxed his choke hold, Ms. Ledoux begged him for her life because her son's wife was expecting a baby, and she wanted to live to see the baby. Defendant expressed his utter indifference for her life or the baby's.

The third miscreant (Juvenile 2) whispered to Defendant that if he killed Ms. Ledoux, all three of them could go to prison for life. Juvenile 1 returned and took Ms. Ledoux's iPad and demanded the passcode, which Ms. Ledoux gave him.

Ms. Ledoux seized an opportunity to escape and ran outside. Defendant and Juvenile 2 chased and caught her. Defendant struck Ms. Ledoux from behind. She fell, and Defendant and Juvenile 2 picked her up and forced her back into the building.

Because of her injuries, including a concussion, Ms. Ledoux was still experiencing difficulties at the time of Defendant's sentencing, June 18, 2025. The functions of her dominant hand have been significantly impaired because of the rotator cuff injury. A second surgery has been recommended, but Ms. Ledoux is reluctant to undergo another. She has experienced psychological trauma. She is concerned that the concussion may result in long-term memory issues.

Defendant argued that he was being held at Boys Village on charges of simple battery and disturbing the peace. That incident involved Defendant's twin brother, who was “the ringleader” according to Defendant's counsel. Defendant's lack of leadership was a factor in his participation in the kidnapping of Ms. Ledoux. When Defendant's counsel showed him the video recording of the incident, he openly cried and claimed that he did not remember the incident in that way. Defendant acted out of fear of Juvenile 1, whom he did not know. Defense counsel stressed the potential for Defendant's rehabilitation.

Defendant spoke at his sentencing and acknowledged his wrongdoing. He apologized to “Ms. B.” His counsel argued for Defendant's admission to Adult and Teen Challenge.

The trial court expressed its belief that Defendant had much to learn and much to offer but declined to refer Defendant to Adult and Teen Challenge. In imposing sentence, the trial court stated:

I'm not going to go through each one of these 33 guideline conditions. I think the statements made by the State and by Ms. Traub hit on nearly all of these points.

At this time I am going to sentence Mr. Lagars -- I'm going to sentence him 20 years Department of Corrections [sic]. I'm going to suspend all but five years, two of those to be without benefit. I'm going to hold 15 over his head and place him on five years supervised probation. That'll begin once he's released from jail.

General conditions under Article 895, special conditions being as follows: $60 a month and $11 a month supervision fee, obviously the standard random drug screens, substance abuse studies assessment, anger management. I do want him to get his GED. He can start that at the jail. And I will be -- I will approve any type of programs or anything at the jail that he's allowed to do.

Defendant filed a motion to reconsider his sentence, which was denied. As noted, it is from this sentence that Defendant appeals, arguing that the sentence is excessive.

ANALYSIS

Errors Patent

All appeals are reviewed for errors that are patent on the face of the record. La.Code Crim.P. art. 920. We find one error patent pertinent to the analysis of whether Defendant's sentence is excessive.

Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure Article 890.3(C)(12) designates second degree kidnapping a crime of violence. Pursuant to La.Code Crim.P. art. 893(A)(2):

The court shall not suspend the sentence of a conviction for an offense that is designated in the court minutes as a crime of violence pursuant to Article 890.3, except a first conviction for an offense with a maximum prison sentence of ten years or less that was not committed against a family member or household member as defined by R.S. 14:35.3, or dating partner as defined by R.S. 46:2151. The period of probation shall be specified and shall not be more than five years.

Thus, Defendant's sentence was illegally lenient. The trial court lacked authority to suspend any portion of Defendant's sentence because his was a crime of violence punishable by up to forty years’ imprisonment. However, we are not taking action on the illegally lenient sentence.

Another error requires correction by the trial court. The Uniform Sentencing Commitment Order (USCO) submitted in this matter provides that Defendant's sentence “shall be concurrent with any or every sentence the offender is now serving.” The transcript, however, does not indicate that the trial court ordered Defendant's sentence to be served concurrently with any other sentence. “[W]hen the minutes and the transcript conflict, the transcript prevails.” State v. Wommack, 00-137, p. 4 (La.App. 3 Cir. 6/7/00), 770 So.2d 365, 369, writ denied, 00-2051 (La. 9/21/01), 797 So.2d 62. Although the sentencing minutes are correct in this case, this court also orders correction of the commitment order when it conflicts with the transcript. See State v. Barker, 24-379 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/5/25), 407 So.3d 776, writ denied, 25-257 (La. 4/23/25), 406 So.3d 1179. Thus, the trial court is directed to amend the USCO to delete the indication that the sentence is to be served concurrently with any or every sentence Defendant is now serving.

Excessive Sentence

Defendant argues that the court failed to adequately consider the guidelines set out in La.Code Crim.P. art. 894.1, and no presentence investigation was ordered. Defendant argues that meaningful mitigating evidence, such as his young age, placed him at a level of mental and emotional immaturity as compared to an adult, that he was not beyond rehabilitation as many testified, and he was not the instigator nor ringleader in this incident.

Both the United States Constitution (Eighth Amendment) and the Louisiana Constitution (Article I, § 20) prohibit cruel or excessive sentences. Whether a sentence is excessive represents a question of law that appellate courts review. State v. Sepulvado, 367 So.2d 762 (La.1979). Given the trial court's broad discretion in sentencing a defendant, our task is to determine whether the trial court abused that discretion in imposing a given sentence. State v. Cook, 95-2784 (La. 5/31/96), 674 So.2d 957, cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1043, 117 S.Ct. 615, 136 L.Ed.2d 539 (1996).

In State v. Whatley, 03-1275 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/3/04), 867 So.2d 955, we approved the fifth circuit's three-factor test for reviewing the trial court's discretion in sentencing enunciated in State v. Lisotta, 98-648, p. 4 (La.App. 5 Cir. 12/16/98), 726 So.2d 57, 58, writ denied, 99-433 (La. 6/25/99), 745 So.2d 1183:

The court should consider three factors in reviewing a judge's sentencing discretion:

1. the nature of the crime,

2. the nature and background of the offender, and

3. the sentence imposed for similar crimes by the same court and other courts.

The sentencing range for a conviction of second degree kidnapping is not less than five years and not more than forty years. La.R.S. 14:44.1(C). At least two years “shall be without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.” Id.

Defendant perpetrated a crime of violence within a juvenile correctional facility. Ms. Ledoux was traumatized and terrorized. She was threatened with death. Defendant choked her. He pummeled her. He struck her from behind as she fled. Ms. Ledoux sustained a concussion and a torn rotator cuff, and those injuries cause her problems to this day.

Defendant was sixteen years old at the time of the offense. The trial court specifically indicated that it considered his age in imposing the sentence. The trial court also considered the fact that Defendant was not the leader of the group. And the trial court considered that Defendant did have a hope of rehabilitation.

In State v. Butler, 07-1034 (La. App. 5 Cir. 10/28/08), 997 So.2d 631, writ denied, sub nom. State ex rel. Butler v. State, 09-212 (La. 10/30/09), 21 So.3d 276, the court upheld a twenty-year, mid-range sentence. In imposing the twenty-year sentence, the trial judge referenced La.Code Crim.P. art. 894.1. Immediately after sentencing, the defendant moved for reconsideration of his sentence as excessive considering his young age, lack of criminal history, and minimal participation in the offenses. The trial court denied his motion. The defendant was sixteen years old and a first offender just like the present Defendant. In upholding the sentence, the fifth circuit stated:

Defendant's 20-year sentence for second degree kidnapping is likewise within the jurisprudentially accepted range. See State v. Mathieu, 06-946, pp. 21-23 (La.App. 5 Cir. 5/29/07), 960 So.2d 296, 309-10, writ denied, 07-1424 (La. 2/1/08), 976 So.2d 714, (this Court upheld a first-time offender's 30-year sentence for second degree kidnapping); ․and, State v. Brown, 41,883 (La.App. 2 Cir. 4/4/07), 956 So.2d 53, (a 19-year-old first felony offender's 20-year sentence for second degree kidnapping was found not to be excessive where the defendant had used a gun and threatened the lives of three victims).

Id. at 641.

Defendant's sentence is not excessive. His sentence of twenty years with fifteen years suspended is mid-range, and he faced up to forty years. Defendant benefited from an illegally lenient sentence because none of this sentence should have been suspended. Courts in Louisiana routinely have upheld sentences of twenty years or more for similar offenses. Considering the nature of Defendant and the offense and the Butler case discussed herein, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Defendant to a total of twenty years with fifteen years suspended. This assignment of error lacks merit.

DECREE

The trial court is directed to amend the Uniform Sentencing Commitment Order to delete the indication that the sentence is to be served concurrently with any or every sentence Defendant is now serving. In all other respects, Defendant's sentence is affirmed.

SENTENCE AFFIRMED AS AMENDED.

GREMILLION, Judge