STATE v. LANDRY (2026)

In this criminal case, Defendant contends that his sentences for guilty pleas to aggravated criminal damage to property and illegal use of a weapon in the commission of a crime of violence are constitutionally excessive. For the reasons that follow, we find Defendant's assignments of error, as they relate to the sentence imposed for his illegal use of a weapon, lack merit. However, as discussed in the context of our errors patent review, Defendant's thirteen-year sentence for aggravated criminal damage to property is indeterminate for failure of the trial court to specify the length of time Defendant would serve on supervised probation for the suspended sentence, we vacate that sentence, and remand the matter for resentencing.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On February 8, 2023, Defendant, Deshawn Tremaine Landry, was charged by bill of information in trial court docket number 3519-23 with aggravated criminal damage to property, a violation of La.R.S. 14:55; two counts of aggravated assault with a firearm, violations of La.R.S. 14:37.4; and illegal use of a weapon in the commission of a crime of violence, a violation of La.R.S. 14:94(F).

On November 4, 2024, Defendant pleaded guilty to aggravated criminal damage to property and illegal use of a weapon in the commission of a crime of violence.¹ In exchange for Defendant's plea, two charges were dismissed from the present trial court docket number, in addition to numerous charges in trial court docket number 12968-20, and five other docket numbers. When he entered his guilty pleas, Defendant admitted to the following factual basis presented by the State:

Judge, as it relates to docket number 3519-23, one count of aggravated criminal damage to property, one count illegal use of a weapon in the commission of a crime of violence, if called to trial the State would prove that on Sunday, October 2, 2022, officers with the Lake Charles Police Department were dispatched to 2444 Anita Drive, Lake Charles, Louisiana, here in Calcasieu Parish. Officers were dispatched in reference to a reported shooting. When officers arrived at the location -- while being dispatched out to the location officers were able to learn that the defendant, Mr. Deshawn Landry, was one of the individuals who was injured during the shooting and was being transported to the hospital. Upon their arrival to the location, officers were able to locate a 2005 Mercedes Benz in the intersection of 6th Street and Rosteet Street. Again, that's here in Lake Charles, Louisiana. That vehicle was observed by law enforcement to have multiple bullet holes in the driver's side and back window of the vehicle. Officers also located two individuals inside of the vehicle who had suffered apparent gunshot wounds. Officers were able to get a name of the suspect from those two individuals who gave -- that goes by the name of Papou. Detectives were able to recover surveillance footage which captured the incident. When presented with a photo lineup the victims in the incident were both able to accurately identify Mr. Deshawn Landry as the shooter in question. Officers were able to retrieve Instagram profile photos of the individual that they identified as Papou and were able to confirm that that was his Instagram profile associated with Deshawn Landry. All this, Judge, occurred within the confines of Calcasieu Parish.

The trial court then sentenced Defendant to serve seventeen years at hard labor without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence for illegal use of weapons in a crime of violence and thirteen years at hard labor for aggravated criminal damage to property. Next, the trial court ordered the sentences to run consecutively to each other but concurrently with the sentences in trial court docket number 12968-20, and suspended the thirteen-year sentence for aggravated criminal damage to property, subject to supervised probation. No objection was raised regarding the sentences imposed.

On November 26, 2024, Defendant filed a “Motion to Reconsider Sentence” in which he contended:

In 3519-23 defendant pled to illegal use of weapon in crime of violence and aggravated criminal damage to property and received 17 years [Department of Corrections] without benefit and 13 years on each consecutive to each other and to 12968-20 plus 5 years probation upon release[.]

Sentences imposed like this should normally be reserved for the worst offenders and the worst cases.

This is not the worst offender by any objective measure.

Sentence is excessive because it was made consecutive to 12968-20 and he was a 1st time offender.

The trial court denied Defendant's motion.

Defendant now appeals his sentences, asserting two assignments of error:

1. Under La. C.Cr.P. art. 894.1, trial judges must state for the record the considerations taken and the factual basis for imposing a certain sentence on a defendant. Here, there was no pre-sentence investigation and the trial judge did not list any art. 894.1 factors. The sentence imposed fails to show that the trial court gave due consideration to the Article 894.1 guidelines. Thus, the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing Landry without considering these factors; as a result, said sentence should be vacated.

2. Under Louisiana jurisprudence, maximum sentences are reserved for the most serious offenses and the worst offenders. Here, the trial court sentence [sic] Appellant to a sentence that falls in the higher range of the sentencing scale. The trial court imposed an unconstitutionally excessive sentence, and this Court should vacate it.

ERRORS PATENT

In accordance with La.Code Crim.P. art. 920, we review all appeals for errors patent on the face of the record. After reviewing the record, we find there is one error patent regarding the sentence imposed for aggravated criminal damage to property.

The trial court first imposed a seventeen-year sentence without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence on the charge of illegal use of weapons during a crime of violence. However, when the trial court imposed the sentence for aggravated criminal damage to property,  ² it stated:

On the aggravated criminal damage to property I'll sentence you to serve 13 years with the Department of Corrections, but I'll suspend that time.

․

[O]nce you're released from incarceration you will be on probation, supervised probation, through the Department of Public Safety and Corrections, Office of Probation and Parole.

The trial court then imposed general and special conditions of probation.

After carefully reviewing the trial transcript, we observe that the trial court failed to specify the length of time Defendant would serve on supervised probation for the suspended sentence imposed on aggravated criminal damage to property.³

Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure Article 879 requires the imposition of a determinate sentence. More specifically, La.Code Crim.P. art. 893(A)(1)(a) states that “the period of probation shall be specified and shall not be more than five years.”

In State v. Henry, 17-1141 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/3/18), 256 So.3d 1080, writ denied, 18-1795 (La. 9/6/19), 278 So.3d 373, this court found a sentence was indeterminate because the trial court failed to specify the period of probation. Thus, we vacated the indeterminate sentence and remanded the case for resentencing, instructing the trial court to specify the period of probation in accordance with La.Code Crim.P. art. 893.

For the foregoing reasons, we find the sentence for aggravated criminal damage to property is indeterminate and must be vacated. The case is remanded for resentencing, with the trial court being instructed to specify the period of probation on the sentence for aggravated criminal damage to property in accordance with La.Code Crim.P. art. 893, and record it in the court minutes.

We now turn our attention to Defendant's contention that his seventeen-year sentence without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence for illegal use of a weapon in the commission of a crime of violence is constitutionally excessive.

DEFENDANT'S ARGUMENT

Defendant contends that under La.Code Crim.P. art. 894.1, a sentencing court must state for the record the considerations taken and the factual basis for imposing a certain sentence on a defendant. In the present case, Defendant points out that no pre-sentence investigation was ordered and the court failed to list any factors enunciated in Article 894.1.

Next, Defendant argues that Louisiana jurisprudence has recognized that maximum sentences are reserved for the most serious offenses and the worst offenders. Because the trial court imposed a sentence on Defendant that falls in the higher range of the sentencing scale and failed to consider that he was only twenty-three years of age at the time of sentencing and was a first offender, Defendant further argues that we should vacate his sentence as being unconstitutionally excessive and remand the case for resentencing.

STATE'S POSITION

The State asserts that Defendant's sentence is not a maximum sentence for crimes to which he pleaded no contest and guilty. Even though he pleaded guilty to four charges, the State dismissed sixteen others. Considering that and that Defendant shot two individuals in a car in the commission of one of the crimes, the States urges us to find that Defendant's sentence is supported by the record and is not excessive.

ANALYSIS

From the outset, we note that under La.Code Crim.P. art. 881.1(E):

Failure to make or file a motion to reconsider sentence or to include a specific ground upon which a motion to reconsider sentence may be based, including a claim of excessiveness, shall preclude the state or the defendant from raising an objection to the sentence or from urging any ground not raised in the motion on appeal or review.

As noted above, Defendant failed to object to the sentences imposed upon him at the time of sentencing. Furthermore, in his “Motion to Reconsider Sentence” Defendant did not argue that the trial court failed to articulate what considerations of La.Code Crim.P. art. 894.1 that led to the sentences imposed. Accordingly, we find that under the provisions of La.Code Crim.P. art. 881.1(E), Defendant's first assignment of error was not properly preserved and cannot now be raised on appeal. See State v. Anderson, 24-677 (La.App. 3 Cir. 4/9/25), 408 So.3d 625; State v. Meaux, 21-522 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/23/22), 335 So.3d 309.

Defendant's remaining assignment of error relates to the constitutionality of his sentence for illegal use of a weapon during the commission of a violent crime.⁴

At the time of Defendant's plea, the following exchange occurred:

MR. SUTTERFIELD [the State's attorney]:

So, Judge, as it relates to the aggravated criminal damage to property and illegal use of a weapon in the commission of a crime of violence, State is going to recommend, as to the illegal use of a weapon in a crime of violence, the State is going to recommend 15 years Department of Corrections with that time being served without benefit per the statute.

As to the aggravated criminal damage to property, the State is going to recommend another 15 years Department of Corrections on that count with that time to be run consecutive for a total of 30 years. The State is going to recommend that of that 30 years he be ordered to serve 17 years Department of Corrections with the remaining time being suspended with Mr. Landry to be placed on five years supervised probation from the date of his release on parole. All that would be concurrent with docket number -- associated with Mr. [Landry's] charges.

MR. PICHON [Defendant's attorney]:

Your Honor, we would ask for 15 years in light of the fact that really he does have no criminal history and I believe the DA will -- other than these charges, and we would ask for 15 years instead of the 17 years, which would bring -- keep 15 years over his head if he screws up on the probation.

Regarding Defendant's seventeen-year sentence for illegal use of a weapon during the commission of a violent crime, Defendant asserted the following:

Landry was sentenced to seventeen years at hard labor without the benefit of probation or parole when the minimum sentence for illegal use of a weapon during a crime of violence required only ten years hard labor without the benefit of probation or parole. Here, Landry was a first-time offender. He is not the worst of offenders requiring a maximum sentence. Thus, the court should have sentenced him to a lesser sentence under the statute.

Appellate counsel's argument in this regard ignores that Defendant did not object to the State's recommendation that he serve a fifteen-year sentence on this very charge. Furthermore, Defendant's argument that he is not “the worst of offenders” is a clear reference to the long-standing maxim that “maximum sentences are usually reserved for the most egregious and blameworthy of offenders.” State v. Burnaman, 03-1647, p. 5 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/12/04), 872 So.2d 637, 641. Under La.R.S. 14:94(F):

Whoever commits the crime of illegal use of weapons or dangerous instrumentalities by discharging a firearm while committing, attempting to commit, conspiring to commit, or soliciting, coercing, or intimidating another person to commit a crime of violence or violation of the Uniform Controlled Dangerous Substances Law, shall be imprisoned at hard labor for not less [than] ten years nor more than twenty years, without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. If the firearm used in violation of this Subsection is a machine gun or is equipped with a firearm silencer or muffler, as defined by R.S. 40:1751 and R.S. 40:1781, respectively, the offender shall be sentenced to imprisonment for not less than twenty years nor more than thirty years, without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. Upon a second or subsequent conviction, under this Subsection, such offender shall be sentenced to imprisonment for not less than twenty years. If the violation of this Subsection, upon second or subsequent conviction, involves the use of a machine gun or a firearm equipped with a firearm silencer or muffler, such offender shall be sentenced to imprisonment for life without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

As there is no indication or claim in the record that the weapon was a machine gun or equipped with a silencer or muffler, Defendant was facing a sentencing range of “not less than ten years nor more than twenty years, without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.” La.R.S. 14:94(F). Clearly, Defendant's seventeen-year sentence is not the maximum sentence. Thus, we find Defendant's argument lacks merit.

Additionally, Defendant's plea agreement resulted in the dismissal of two charges of aggravated assault with a firearm each of which carried a sentencing range of up to a $10,000 fine and imprisonment “for not more than ten years, with or without hard labor, or both.” La.R.S. 14:37.4. Furthermore, five additional trial court docket numbers were dismissed as well as multiple charges in trial court docket number 12968-20. As noted by the State in brief, “the State dismissed sixteen charges in exchange for the defendant's plea. Had the defendant been convicted on all twenty charges, the defendant was looking at around 50-200 years.”

Simply put, we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion by giving Defendant seventeen years out of a possible twenty for illegal use of a weapon in the commission of a crime of violence when the Defendant had asked for fifteen years, received the total sentence he had requested of thirty years, and received the benefit of having sixteen additional charges dismissed.

DECREE

Defendant's sentence for illegal use of a weapon in the commission of a crime of violence is affirmed. The sentence imposed for aggravated criminal damage to property is indeterminate. Thus, we vacate the sentence imposed for aggravated criminal damage to property, remand the case for resentencing on this conviction, and instruct the trial court to specify the period of probation in accordance with La.Code Crim.P. art. 893, and record it in the court minutes.

SENTENCES AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED IN PART; REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.

FOOTNOTES

1.   At the same time, Defendant also entered best interest pleas under North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S.Ct. 160, 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970), to two charges in trial court docket number 12968-20, which is the subject of a separate appeal under docket number KA25-581. Defendant's two appeals were consolidated solely for briefing purposes.

2.   Louisiana Revised Statutes 14:55(B) states that “[w]however commits the crime of aggravated criminal damage to property shall be fined not more than ten thousand dollars, imprisoned with or without hard labor for not less than one nor more than fifteen years, or both.”

3.   Although the State's attorney said during the sentencing colloquy that “Mr. Landry [would be] placed on five years supervised probation from the date of his release on parole[,]” the trial court never orally pronounced that temporal element. We further observe that both the minutes of sentencing and the Uniform Sentencing Commitment Order (“USCO”) indicate the trial court ordered Defendant to serve five years of supervised probation. “[W]hen the minutes and the transcript conflict, the transcript prevails.” State v. Wommack, 00-137, p. 4 (La.App. 3 Cir. 6/7/00), 770 So.2d 365, 369, writ denied, 00-2051 (La. 9/21/01), 797 So.2d 62. As the trial transcript's sentencing colloquy differs from the minutes of sentencing and the USCO, the transcript of the sentencing controls.

4.   As previously noted, Defendant's sentence for aggravated criminal damage to property is indeterminate, has been vacated, and has been remanded for resentencing. As such, his complaint regarding that sentence is currently moot.

PERRY, Judge.