FRANCIS v. STATE THROUGH DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND DEVELOPMENT (2026)

Plaintiffs in this wrongful death action appeal the judgment of the trial court granting the motion for summary judgment filed by Defendants, Craig Hebert, Triangle Farms Partnership, and American Reliable Insurance Company. For the reasons expressed below, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

I.

ISSUES

On appeal Plaintiffs assert the following assignments of error:

(1) The Trial Court erred when it granted defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgement despite the existence of genuine issues of material fact regarding Craig Hebert's negligence and application of the last clear chance doctrine;

(2) The Trial Court erred by improperly resolving disputed factual issues and credibility determinations that should have been left to the jury under Louisiana's comparative fault system;

(3) The Trial Court erred by failing to consider the testimony and expert evidence establishing that Craig Hebert observed Mariah Francis in peril and had sufficient time and opportunity to avoid the collision through reasonable evasive action;

(4) The Trial Court erred by granting summary judgment when the evidence established material factual disputes regarding the sequence of events, the parties’ respective duties, and the allocation of fault under Louisiana Civil Code article 2323; and

(5) The Trial Court erred by dismissing defendants when the evidence showed that Craig Hebert was operating oversized farm equipment on a narrow roadway without a shoulder in violation of his heightened duty of care to other motorists.

II.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On August 12, 2022, at approximately 4:16 p.m., a fatal collision occurred on Louisiana Highway 85 in Iberia Parish involving a 2011 Cadillac SRX and a Case Patriot 3240 sprayer. Highway 85 is a narrow two-lane rural road with no shoulder at the point of collision. At the time of the incident, Mariah Francis was driving a Cadillac owned by her mother, Dekisha Francis, who was in the front passenger seat. Mariah's brother, Amorr Francis, and her young nephew were in the backseat. The Francis vehicle was travelling in the southbound lane. At the same time, Craig Hebert was operating a large farm sprayer on behalf of his employer, Triangle Farms Partnership. The roadway was wet on the day of the accident. While attempting to navigate a curve, Mariah Francis lost control of her vehicle, hydroplaned, and crossed into the northbound lane. The collision occurred entirely within the northbound lane. Unfortunately, Mariah Francis died as a result of the collision.

Dekisha Francis and Nicholas Francis, Sr., individually and on behalf of Mariah Francis, as well as Amorr Francis, individually, brought suit against Craig Hebert, Triangle Farms Partnership, American Reliable Insurance Company, and the State of Louisiana through the Department of Transportation and Development. Mr. Hebert, Triangle Farms Partnerships, and American Reliable Insurance Company filed a motion for summary judgment. The trial court granted the motion and dismissed all claims against these defendants. The plaintiffs now appeal.

III.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Appellate courts review summary judgments de novo, applying the same criteria that govern the trial court's determination of whether summary judgment is appropriate. Schroeder v. Bd. of Supervisors of La. State Univ., 591 So.2d 342 (La.1991). A motion for summary judgment shall only be granted when the motion, memorandum, and supporting documents show there are no genuine issues of material fact, and the mover is entitled to judgement as a matter of law. La.Code Civ.P. art. 966(A)(3).

IV.

LAW AND DISCUSSION

The heart of Plaintiffs’ appeal is whether the trial court erred in granting Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. Plaintiffs argue that genuine issues of material fact exist regarding Craig Hebert's negligence and the last clear chance doctrine. They also assert that the trial court improperly resolved disputed factual issues that should have been left to a jury determination.

A motion for summary judgment shall only be granted when the motion, memorandum, and supporting documents show there are no genuine issues of material fact, and the mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. La.Code Civ.P. art. 966(A)(3). If the mover will not bear the burden of proof on the issue at trial, the mover's burden only requires the mover to “point out to the court the absence of factual support for one or more elements essential to the adverse party's claim[.]” La.Code Civ.P. art. 966(D)(1). Once the mover has successfully done this, the burden shifts to “the adverse party to produce factual support sufficient to establish the existence of a genuine issue of material fact or that the mover is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id. The courts have explained that “a ‘genuine issue’ is a ‘triable issue,’ an issue in which reasonable persons could disagree.” Champagne v. Ward, 03-3211, p. 5 (La. 1/19/05), 893 So.2d 773, 777. “A fact is ‘material’ when its existence or nonexistence may be essential to plaintiff's cause of action under the applicable theory of recovery.” Smith v. Our Lady of the Lake Hosp., Inc., 93-2512, p. 27 (La. 7/5/94), 639 So.2d 730, 751.

Under this state's duty/risk analysis, in an action for negligence the plaintiff must prove the following elements:

(1) the defendant had a duty to conform his or her conduct to a specific standard of care (the duty element); (2) the defendant failed to conform his or her conduct to the appropriate standard (the breach of duty element); (3) the defendant's substandard conduct was a cause-in-fact of the plaintiff's injuries (the cause-in-fact element); (4) the defendant's substandard conduct was a legal cause of the plaintiff's injuries (the scope of liability or scope of protection element); and, (5) actual damages (the damages element).

Rando v. Anco Insulations Inc., 08-1163, pp. 26-27 (La. 5/22/09), 16 So.3d 1065, 1086.

In their motion for summary judgment, Defendants assert that there is an absence of factual support for Plaintiffs’ claim that Mr. Hebert was at fault for the collision. Specifically, they point out that there is no factual support that Mr. Hebert's conduct breached the duty of care. In support of their motion, Defendants offered the petition for damages, the affidavit of Craig Hebert, and the depositions of Amorr and Dekisha Francis with attached exhibits. According to the affidavit of Mr. Hebert, he was operating his tractor in the northbound lane when he noticed the Cadillac travelling at a high rate of speed that would not allow it to make the curve. When he saw the vehicle begin to lose control, he attempted to stop the tractor but was unable to stop before the Cadillac crossed the center line and collided with the tractor. Both Amorr and Dekisha Francis testified that their vehicle lost control coming through the curve and skid or slid into the tractor. Both also testified that the entire event occurred in a matter of seconds and the collision occurred entirely in Mr. Hebert's lane of travel.

“A vehicle shall be driven as nearly as practicable entirely within a single lane and shall not be moved from such lane until the driver has first ascertained that such movement can be made with safety.” La.R.S. 32:79(1). Drivers are presumed to be negligent when they cross into another lane of travel and strike a vehicle traveling in its lane of travel. Thibodeaux v. Comeaux, 11-127 (La.App. 3 Cir. 6/15/11), 69 So.3d 674. It is undisputed that Mariah Francis lost control of her vehicle and entered Mr. Hebert's lane where the collision occurred. Thus, Mariah Francis is presumed to have been negligent in causing the accident.

Defendants demonstrated an absence of factual support that Mr. Hebert was negligent. Accordingly, the burden shifted to Plaintiffs to produce factual support sufficient to establish the existence of a genuine issue of material fact that Mr. Hebert was negligent and at fault for the collision.

Plaintiffs assert that the evidence creates genuine issues of material fact regarding whether Mr. Hebert had the last clear chance to avoid the collision and failed to meet the standard of care required under Louisiana law. In support of their opposition, plaintiffs offer the petition, the affidavit of their expert James Pittman, and the depositions of Craig Hebert, Amorr Francis, and Dekisha Francis.

Plaintiffs do not dispute that Mariah Francis was at fault for this accident. However, they argue that Mr. Hebert is also at fault under the last clear chance doctrine. Plaintiffs assert that Louisiana jurisprudence has long recognized the last clear chance doctrine, which provides that even when a plaintiff is initially negligent, a defendant may still be liable if the defendant had the last clear chance to avoid the accident through the exercise of reasonable care. Plaintiffs cite Patin v. State Farm Ins. Co., 395 So.2d 466 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1981), in support of this assertion. “Prior to the adoption of comparative fault in Louisiana, the doctrine of last clear chance was created to escape the harsh effects of the contributory negligence defense which, in its strict application, operated as an absolute bar to a plaintiff's recovery.” Gibson v. State Through Dep't of Transp. & Dev., 95-1418, 95-1419, p.10 (La.App. 1 Cir. 4/4/96), 674 So.2d 996, 1004, writs denied, 96-1862, 96-1895, 96-1902 (La. 10/25/96), 681 So.2d 374, 374.

In a comparative fault analysis, whether the plaintiff had the last clear chance to avoid an accident is a determination for the trier of fact. In Watson v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Ins. Co., 469 So.2d 967 (La.1985), the court explained the appropriate considerations for a comparative fault analysis, as follows:

In assessing the nature of the conduct of the parties, various factors may influence the degree of fault assigned, including: (1) whether the conduct resulted from inadvertence or involved an awareness of the danger, (2) how great a risk was created by the conduct, (3) the significance of what was sought by the conduct, (4) the capacities of the actor, whether superior or inferior, and (5) any extenuating circumstances which might require the actor to proceed in haste, without proper thought. And, of course, as evidenced by concepts such as last clear chance, the relationship between the fault/negligent conduct and the harm to the plaintiff are considerations in determining the relative fault of the parties.

Watson, 469 So.2d at 974. Thus, the principles considered in the application of the last clear chance doctrine are subsumed by the comparative fault analysis. The application of the last clear chance doctrine is not, therefore, a separate consideration for the trier of fact.

Id. Because last clear chance is now a factor to consider in allocating fault, negligent conduct/fault must first be established before considering whether a party had the last clear chance.

Plaintiffs argue that Mr. Hebert was negligent because he observed the Francis vehicle in distress and had both the time and opportunity to avoid the collision through reasonable, lawful evasive action. The burden was on Plaintiffs to put forth evidence of these purported facts sufficient to establish a genuine issue and defeat summary judgment. After reviewing the record, we find that the Plaintiffs failed to meet this burden.

It is undisputed that Mr. Hebert attempted to take evasive action and this action did not prevent the collision. In his affidavit, Mr. Hebert stated that “[w]hen [he] saw the Cadillac vehicle begin to lose control, [he] attempted to stop the tractor, but was unable to stop before the Cadillac vehicle crossed the center line and collided with the tractor that [he] was operating.” Additionally, in his deposition, Mr. Hebert stated:

A. It happened so quick I couldn't even tell you. She crossed the center line and we hit head on.

Q. When did you see that she was going to cross the center line?

A. I wouldn't know how to answer that. I - - it was a head-on collision. I mean, I know we slammed the brakes and we hit.

Attached photographs show that there were tire marks in the grass off the side of the road. Thus, it is clear from the evidence that Mr. Hebert did attempt to take evasive action.

Plaintiffs argue that Mr. Hebert should have acted sooner. Mr. Hebert testified that he saw the Francis vehicle a few seconds before impact operating at a high speed that would not allow it to make the curve safely. When he initially noticed the vehicle, he continued his path and focused on operating his tractor. He admits that he did not take any action in response to the vehicle until he realized it had lost control and was crossing the center line. Plaintiffs assert that Mr. Hebert should have taken evasive action the moment he noticed the speeding vehicle. We disagree with Plaintiffs’ assertion.

At the time that Mr. Hebert observed the Francis vehicle, he believed that it was travelling too fast to make the curve, but there is no evidence that the driver was not in control of the vehicle at that time or posed a danger to Mr. Hebert. Mr. Hebert had a duty to act as a reasonable and prudent driver under the circumstances. Cooke v. Travelers Ins. Co., 590 So.2d 657 (La.App. 1991), writ denied, 592 So.2d 414 (La.1992). Louisiana law does not require drivers to be clairvoyant, but only to be reasonable and prudent under the circumstances. Mr. Hebert may have felt that the Francis vehicle was going too fast to safely make the curve, but there was no way for him to know if or in what way the Francis vehicle would lose control. It could have slowed down to navigate the curve or driven off the side of the road away from traffic. “[T]he duty of an automobile driver, who is on the right side of the street, to stop or take other precautions to avoid a collision with an approaching vehicle, only arises when by due care he discovers that another on the wrong side of the street cannot or will not himself turn to the right to clear his way.” Patterson v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 173 So.2d 224, 227 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1965). Mr. Hebert had no duty to stop merely because a vehicle was speeding within its own lane. The evidence establishes that the moment Mr. Hebert observed the Francis vehicle lose control, he attempted to take evasive action but there was simply not enough time.

Plaintiffs further argue that if Mr. Hebert had acted sooner, the collision could have been avoided. Plaintiffs rely heavily on the affidavit of their expert, James Pittman. Mr. Pittman analyzed information from the Event Data Recorder of the Francis vehicle and established that the Cadillac came to a complete stop approximately one second before impact. They argue that this scientific evidence creates a genuine issue of material fact regarding the opportunity that existed for Mr. Hebert to avoid the collision. We disagree. All evidence establishes that this incident took place in a matter of mere seconds. Mr. Hebert specifically testified that he did not have time to avoid the collision. There is no evidence in the record contradicting this testimony. Even accepting as true the fact that the Francis vehicle came to a complete stop one second before impact, this does not establish that Mr. Hebert had time to avoid the collision. Nothing in the Pittman affidavit even alleges that Mr. Hebert had time to avoid the collision. Plaintiffs have not put forth any evidence quantifying the time and distance between the relevant events preceding the collision nor any data regarding the objective capabilities of the tractor and its ability to come to a stop.

Plaintiffs also failed to put forth evidence establishing what form of evasive action Mr. Hebert should have taken that would have avoided the collision. In their brief, Plaintiffs argue that several forms of evasive action were available to Mr. Hebert such as reducing his speed or coming to a complete stop, steering to the right, or using audible warnings to alert the other driver. However, none of the evidence submitted establishes that any of these measures would have prevented the collision if taken. “Summary judgment cannot be defeated by mere argument. Argument of counsel and briefs, no matter how artful, are not sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact.” Wilson v. Davis, 07-1929, p. 15 (La.App. 1 Cir. 5/28/08), 991 So.2d 1052, 1063, writ denied, 08-2011 (La. 11/10/08), 996 So.2d 1070, and writ denied, 08-2020 (La. 11/10/08), 996 So.2d 1071. An opponent to a motion for summary judgment has the burden to produce factual support sufficient to establish the existence of a genuine issue of material fact.

This burden is not satisfied with “some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts,” by “unsubstantiated assertions,” or by only a “scintilla” of evidence. We resolve factual controversies in favor of the nonmoving party, but only when there is an actual controversy, that is, when both parties have submitted evidence of contradictory facts. We do not, however, in the absence of any proof, assume that the nonmoving party could or would prove the necessary facts.

Smith v. Casino New Orleans Casino, 12-292, p. 10 (La.App. 4 Cir. 10/3/12), 101 So.3d 507, 513–14 (citing Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994). “Proof which establishes only possibility, speculation, or unsupported probability does not suffice to establish a claim.” Todd v. State Through Dep't of Soc. Servs., Office of Cmty. Servs., 96-3090, p. 16 (La. 9/9/97), 699 So.2d 35, 43.

Plaintiffs’ evidence only establishes that the Francis vehicle came to a stop one second before impact. Plaintiffs argue that this evidence supports the conclusion that avoidance was possible, but this evidence requires one to speculate as to that possibility and is not sufficient to establish that fact. Mr. Hebert was specifically asked about his ability to avoid the collision:

Q. And there - - there isn't anywhere for you to go except into somebody's front yard in order to avoid this type of collision; is that accurate?

A. If I wanted to completely try to avoid it, I would have to jump the ditch and go in their front yard, yes.

Q. Was that an option for you?

A. No. There wasn't enough time.

Plaintiffs presented no evidence to contradict Mr. Hebert's testimony or establish that he had sufficient time to avoid the crash. Even if Mr. Hebert had responded a few seconds sooner, Plaintiffs offer no evidence that this would have been sufficient time for Mr. Hebert to avoid collision. We find that Plaintiffs did not meet their burden to show the existence of a genuine issue of material fact and the trial court did not err in granting the motion for summary judgment.

Despite the allegation of Plaintiffs, the trial court did not improperly resolve disputed factual issues or make any credibility determinations. The trial court stated:

But given the totality of the circumstances that is described presented and the entirety of the record, I don't find that there's a genuine issue of material fact. And the facts indicate that there was a hydroplaning car driven by the plaintiff that crossed the center line and collided with an oncoming vehicle. I don't think there's a genuine issue material fact and I think summary judgment is appropriate.

Plaintiffs simply failed to establish, through competent summary judgment evidence, a genuine dispute of material fact to prevent summary judgment. Thus, this assignment of error lacks merit.

Plaintiffs also assert that the trial court erred by failing to consider the testimony and expert evidence establishing that Mr. Hebert observed Mariah Francis in peril and had sufficient time and opportunity to avoid the collision through reasonable evasive action. As previously stated, the trial court properly considered the evidence offered. This evidence, however, fails to establish that Mr. Hebert had sufficient time and opportunity to avoid the collision. Accordingly, this assignment of error lacks merit.

In their final assignment of error, Plaintiffs assert that the trial court erred in dismissing Defendants when the evidence showed that Mr. Hebert was operating oversized farm equipment on a narrow roadway without a shoulder in violation of his heightened duty of care to other motorists. They assert that La.R.S. 32: 298(A) requires farm equipment operators to exercise additional care when operating on public highways due to the inherent dangers posed by such equipment. Louisiana Revised Statutes 32:298(A) provides:

Except as otherwise prohibited by law, to allow for unrestricted flow of traffic, farm tractors and other types of farm equipment may operate on the shoulders of any publicly maintained highway with improved asphalt or concrete shoulders except an interstate highway. However, any farm equipment operating on the shoulders of a publicly maintained highway with improved asphalt on concrete shoulders except an interstate highway shall have in use hazard warning signals as provided in R.S. 32:320.1, or shall have displayed a slow-moving vehicle emblem as provided in R.S. 32:377 or any other hazard warning device which has been approved by the commissioner, or any combination thereof.

This statute specifically controls the use of farm equipment on shoulders. In this case, however, it is undisputed that there was no shoulder present and Mr. Hebert was operating on the roadway. Accordingly, this statute does not create a heightened duty of care for Mr. Hebert. While Mr. Hebert was operating oversized farm equipment on a roadway without a shoulder, La.R.S. 32:385 permits the tractor to legally be on the road.

Plaintiffs also point to Anding v. Southwestern Insurance Co., 358 So.2d 690 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1978), writ denied, 360 So.2d 1179 (La.1978), to establish a heightened duty of care for Mr. Hebert. This court found that the driver of a log truck which collided with plaintiff was negligent because he failed “to stop or slow his vehicle when he observed Mrs. Anding's perilous situation.” Id. at 696. In that case, the court found that the truck driver was under a legal duty to drive in his proper lane at a prudent speed and his breach of these duties created an emergency situation. He also had a duty to attempt to avoid an accident and the evidence showed that he had not done so. Therefore, his actions were not those of a reasonably prudent driver. This case did not provide any enhanced duty of care for operators of oversized vehicles but utilized the ordinary reasonably prudent driver standard. Although Mr. Hebert's tractor was oversized, there is no evidence that he was ever encroaching on oncoming traffic. Unlike the truck driver in Anding, Mr. Hebert did attempt to avoid the accident and there was no evidence that he was driving negligently in any manner. Consequently, this assignment of error also lacks merit.

V.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. Costs of this appeal are assessed to plaintiffs/appellants.

AFFIRMED.

WILSON, JUDGE