STATE v. JUNIOR (2026)

Defendant, Larry Lamont Junior, appeals his convictions and sentences imposed for second degree murder and obstruction of justice by the 24th Judicial District Court. For the following reasons, we vacate Defendant's sentences and remand the matter for further proceedings.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On April 20, 2023, a Jefferson Parish Grand Jury (partially) returned a true indictment charging Defendant with second degree murder in violation of La. R.S. 14:30.1 (count one) for the killing of Shanon K. Young, Jr. and obstruction of justice in violation of La. R.S. 14:130.1 (count two). Defendant subsequently entered a plea of not guilty and trial began on July 8, 2024.

On July 11, 2024, the twelve-person jury found Defendant guilty on both counts. After the jury was polled, the trial court set a date for sentencing. On August 13, 2024, Defendant filed three separate motions: a Motion to Declare the Mandatory Life Sentence Constitutionally Excessive and To Impose a Lesser Sentence (“sentencing motion”), a Motion for New Trial, and a Motion for Post-Verdict Judgment of Acquittal. Defendant argued that he was entitled to a new trial because the jury convicted him despite his self-defense argument and that serious irregularities occurred during the trial (jury misconduct, the improper admission of hearsay testimony, and the jury's dismissal of critical exculpatory evidence). He moved for a post-verdict judgment of acquittal based on his claim that the State failed to provide sufficient evidence to refute his self-defense claim beyond a reasonable doubt.

At the hearing on the motions, defense counsel stated that he had filed three separate motions, that he knew the trial judge had time to read them, and that he would “take two of the motions to argue,” the first being the motion for new trial. He subsequently stated that if the trial judge denied his request for a new trial, then he would ask the trial judge to declare the life sentence excessive under State v. Dorthey, 623 So.2d 1276 (La. 1993).

After hearing arguments of the State and the defense, the trial judge denied the motion for new trial giving reasons regarding the allegations of jury misconduct and the jury disregarding exculpatory evidence. In denying the motion for new trial, the trial judge stated in pertinent part as follows:

Relative to the exculpatory evidence, it's not this Court's duty or job to disregard or vacate a jurors’ decision relative to a verdict and to substitute its own verdict for what the jurors have determined and the weight and credibility that they have given to the evidence in this case.

As such, the Court denies the motion for a new trial, based upon the jury disregarding exculpatory evidence.

Afterwards, the trial judge also denied Defendant's sentencing motion and proceeded to impose the mandatory sentence on count one of life imprisonment without benefits and five years on count two, to run concurrently.

On September 26, 2024, the trial court granted Defendant's motion for appeal.

LAW AND ANALYSIS

La. C.Cr.P. art. 821 provides that a defendant may move for a post-verdict judgment of acquittal following the verdict, and that such motion must be made and disposed of prior to sentencing. State v. Munson, 11-54 (La. App. 5 Cir. 11/15/11), 78 So.3d 290, 292.

The September 9, 2024 transcript does not reflect that the trial judge ruled on the Motion for Post-Verdict Judgment of Acquittal. The September 9, 2024 minute entry reflects that the trial judge only denied the motion for new trial and the sentencing motion. Further, the Motion for Post-Verdict Judgment of Acquittal contains an order setting a hearing on September 11, 2024, but there is no ruling attached to the motion. At the hearing, defense counsel announced he would argue two of the three motions, but he did not explicitly withdraw or waive his motion for post-verdict judgment of acquittal. Thus, the trial court erred when it failed to rule on Defendant's timely motion for post-verdict judgment of acquittal. See id. Such error is noticeable on the face of the record and reviewable as a patent error. Id., citing State v. Pettus, 10-742 (La. App. 5 Cir. 5/24/11), 66 So.3d 1192.

This Court has routinely held that a trial court's failure to rule on the merits of a motion for post-verdict judgment of acquittal prior to sentencing constitutes an error patent on the face of the record, requiring that the sentence be vacated and the case be remanded for a ruling on the motion. See State v. Perez-Espinosa, 18-576 (La. App. 5 Cir. 4/10/19), 269 So.3d 1119, 1121, n.2, citing State v. Aguliar-Benitez, 16-336 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/7/16), 206 So.3d 472, 473-74; See also, e.g., State v. Williams, 11-65 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/13/11), 81 So.3d 908, 909; State v. Common, 10-996 (La. App. 5 Cir. 11/15/11), 78 So.3d 237, writ denied, 11-2779 (La. 9/28/12), 98 So.3d 825. Further, because Defendant did not waive sentencing delays, and challenges the sufficiency of the evidence and argues his sentence is constitutionally excessive, we find that the trial court's failure to rule on the motion for post-verdict judgment of acquittal is not harmless. But see State v. Nguyen, 22-286 (La. App. 5 Cir. 2/27/23), 359 So.3d 108, 123 (finding failure to rule on post-verdict judgment of acquittal motion was harmless error because the trial court ruled on the motions during the same hearing it sentenced Defendant, and defendant waived delays and did not assert any errors on appeal with respect to his sentences).

DECREE

For the foregoing reasons, we vacate Defendant's sentences and remand the matter for the trial court to rule on the outstanding Motion for Post-Verdict Judgment of Aquittal.

SENTENCES VACATED; REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS

I respectfully dissent from the majority's opinion that defendant's sentences must be vacated due to the lack of a ruling on the motion for post-verdict judgment of acquittal (the “PVA motion”). I would address the merits.

First, in my opinion, defense counsel's actions amounted to a waiver of the PVA motion, especially considering the content of the PVA motion. At the hearing on the motions and subsequent sentencing, defense counsel stated there were three motions, but that he would only argue two of them: the motion for new trial, and the one for excessive sentence. Despite having acknowledged there was another motion (the PVA motion), he did not request the court's ruling on the motion, and he did not object when the court ruled on the other motions and moved on to sentencing.

Second, the PVA motion appears very much to be a form motion asserting only conclusory allegations with no support for the conclusions contained in the PVA motion. The PVA motion does not provide any specific examples from the evidence in support of the allegations or to show a deficiency thereof. There are also no references to the transcript or legal citations to support the alleged bases for acquittal.

Third, the PVA motion raises some overlapping issues that were presented to the trial court and argued relative to the motion for new trial. Both the PVA motion and the motion for new trial basically address sufficiency of evidence, and the trial court considered this issue in the context of the motion for new trial. It is clear from the trial judge's denial of the motion for new trial and his reasons that he was, a fortiori, rejecting entering an outright acquittal, as requested in the PVA motion.

Fourth, C.Cr.P. art. 821 B provides

A post verdict judgment of acquittal shall be granted only if the court finds that the evidence, viewed in a light most favorable to the state, does not reasonably permit a finding of guilty.

The PVA motion clearly does not allege or explain any deficiency of the evidence to support such a finding. On its face, the PVA motion contained nothing for defendant to present to the court.

Finally, defendant has not raised this issue in his appeal and has not asked for a ruling on the PVA motion, nor for re-sentencing. Even if this is a patent error and even if the defendant had not implicitly waived the motion, neither courts nor the law allow a party to fail to object or request a ruling and come back later to challenge a court's action (which he did not even do) based on the presence of an outstanding motion. Thus, the lack of a ruling on this defendant's PVA motion should be considered harmless error.

For these reasons, in my opinion, it was reasonable for the trial judge to consider the PVA motion waived. Even if the trial court was in error, it was certainly harmless. I see no justification or need for remand of this case, and would not vacate and order resentencing. Under these circumstances, ordering the sentence to be vacated because there was no stated ruling on a facially meritless motion which defendant expressly declined to argue, and was not assigned as error for consideration on appeal, serves no purpose.

JOHNSON, J.