JOHN STONE OIL DISTRIBUTOR v. SUNOCO LP (2026)

In this suit concerning alleged theft of trade secrets and violations of the Louisiana Unfair Trade Secrets Act (La. R.S. 51:1431, et seq.) and the Louisiana Unfair Trade Practices Act (La. R.S. 51:1401, et seq.), plaintiff/appellant, John W. Stone Oil Distributor, L.L.C. (“Stone Oil”), appeals the trial court's judgment which granted its request for a preliminary injunction against defendants/appellees, Sunoco LP and Sunoco Marine Ltd. (collectively “Sunoco”), and Anthony Odak (Stone Oil's former chief operating officer), as being inadequate in scope in that all of the requested relief was not granted. For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On March 5, 2025, Stone Oil filed a Petition for Injunction, Theft of Trade Secrets, Breach of Contract, Breach of Fiduciary Duty, Conspiracy, and Unfair Trade Practices, seeking preliminary and permanent injunctions against Sunoco and Mr. Odak, alleging violations of the Louisiana Uniform Trade Secrets Act and the Louisiana Unfair Trade Practices Act. Stone Oil alleged a conspiracy between Sunoco and Mr. Odak to steal Stone Oil's data for unfair competition and business destruction.¹

Stone Oil is a family-run Louisiana-based company which for over 75 years has been supplying fuel, potable water, and lubricants to vessels on the lower Mississippi River from Venice to Baton Rouge, Louisiana, and along the Gulf Coast and the waters around Houston, Texas. Sunoco owns and operates fuel terminals across the United States (including parts of the upper Mississippi River and the Ohio River), and in Puerto Rico and Europe, and was alleged in the petition to be Stone Oil's competitor along the lower Mississippi River and the Gulf Coast. The petition alleges Sunoco conspired with Mr. Odak to steal Stone Oil's customers and destroy its business, and to sabotage its expansion up the Mississippi River to Cairo, Illinois.

The petition alleges that in August of 2024, Sunoco made overtures to purchase Stone Oil from the family, who declined. Thereafter, Mr. Odak, who had been employed with Stone Oil for 17 years, maintained contact with Sunoco, at first in hopes of developing a cooperative business relationship between Stone Oil and Sunoco, and later in hopes of obtaining employment with Sunoco, because he disagreed with Stone Oil's management about the business direction of Stone Oil. During the time he was in contact with Sunoco and before he received an employment offer from Sunoco, Mr. Odak supplied certain of Stone Oil's confidential and proprietary business information to Sunoco.

The parties consented to the entry of a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) on March 27, 2025, which contained the following provisions pertinent to this appeal:

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that defendants Stephen Smith, Kyle Burgess, Sunoco Marine Ltd, Sunoco LP, Anthony Odak and James Stapleton are enjoined, restrained and prohibited from:

1. Selling ultra low sulfur diesel or transmix ultra low sulfur diesel to Stone Oil customers directly, or through brokers or intermediaries, in the navigable waters of the Mississippi River from Venice, LA to Cairo, IL during the pendency of this Order;

2. Selling bunkers to Stone Oil customers directly, or through brokers or intermediaries, in the navigable waters of the Mississippi River from Venice, LA to Baton Rouge, LA during the pendency of this Order;

3. Selling ultra low sulphur diesel or transmix ultra low sulphur diesel to Stone Oil customers either directly, or through brokers or intermediaries, in the navigable waters of the Houston market during the pendency of this Order;

4. Disclosing, using, retaining, or relying on the data and property that was removed by Anthony Odak from John W. Stone Oil Distributor, LLC, including without limitation:

a) records containing pricing information;

b) records listing customers;

c) records identifying customer's products;

d) records specifying which bunker products are formulated for each customer's needs and the programs used; and

e) monthly reports on tank volumes and inventories, cost of goods purchased, with profit analysis and revenues for all bunker sales from November, 2023 through January, 2025.

Except that the parties to the litigation may use or rely, or otherwise discuss with their counsel, any documents that may be relevant to this litigation.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that in all other respects other than the circumstances identified in (1) through (3) above, defendants may carry on their business as they see fit in the identified markets or any other market.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendants affirmatively return all proprietary information of Stone Oil or data generated by Stone Oil since August 1, 2024 that is in the possession of the defendants, provided that defendants may simply preserve information that it deems non-proprietary or data that was not generated by Stone Oil, subject to in camera review by the Court as necessary.2

After a two-day bench trial on April 24–25, 2025, on April 29, 2025 in open court, the trial court granted a limited preliminary injunction requiring the return of certain data shared by Mr. Odak with Sunoco, and enjoined defendants from using that data. The preliminary injunction was limited to the return and non-use of the data, rejecting broader relief requested by Stone Oil that would have imposed a non-compete requirement on Sunoco and Mr. Odak, to prevent Sunoco and Mr. Odak from competing with Stone Oil in the marine fuel market, which the trial court apparently found to be overbroad and unsupported by the evidence. A written judgment was entered on May 6, 2025. Pertinent to this appeal, the judgment states:

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the Motion for Preliminary Injunction is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. The Court hereby enjoins, restrains and prohibits Sunoco, LP, Sunoco Marine, Ltd., and their employees, as well as Anthony Odak, from disclosing, using, retaining or relying on the data and property that was removed by Anthony Odak from John W. Stone Oil Distributor LLC, including but without limitation to records containing pricing information, records listing customers, records identifying customer's products, records specifying which bunker products are formulated for each customer's needs and programs used, as well as, any monthly reports on tank, volumes, and inventories, cost of goods purchased with profit analysis and revenues, for all bunker sales from November 2023 through January 2025. Any· and all additional relief requested by John W. Stone Oil Distributor, LLC as it relates to the present motion or the previously entered Temporary Restraining Order is hereby DENIED.

(Emphasis added.)

This devolutive appeal by Stone Oil followed.

On appeal, Stone Oil argues that the trial court erred in failing to enter a preliminary injunction prohibiting Sunoco from selling marine fuel to Stone Oil's customers, either directly or indirectly, or otherwise competing with Stone Oil, after Sunoco conspired with Mr. Odak to steal Stone Oil's confidential and proprietary trade secrets, including its customer list, through the final disposition of the trial of Stone Oil's request for a permanent injunction against Sunoco. Stone Oil argues it established that it is clearly entitled to such relief, and the denial of the preliminary injunction to prevent competition is inconsistent with the portion of the preliminary injunction that required Sunoco and Mr. Odak to return all of Stone Oil's confidential and proprietary information released to Sunoco by Mr. Odak. It appears that Stone Oil seeks injunctive relief corresponding to items 1–3 of the TRO, as listed above.

In response, Sunoco argues that Stone Oil failed to support its claim that it was entitled to a preliminary injunction regarding the non-compete aspect of its claims that had been previously granted in the TRO, namely the particular market territories involved herein and specific products sold therein. Sunoco argues in brief that while they both sell marine fuel, there are some differences in both the products they sell and the territories in which they sell them. For instance, Stone Oil sells Ultra Low Sulfur Diesel Fuel (“ULSD”), bunker fuel, and lubricants; Sunoco also sells fuels but not ULSD fuel. Sunoco also contends that it sells MGO, a blended fuel, in a different market from where Stone Oil sells MGO. Sunoco also argues that this proceeding is a backdoor attempt by Stone Oil to impose a non-compete agreement on Mr. Odak, which Stone Oil never required in Mr. Odak's seventeen years with Stone Oil, but which Stone Oil had requested of Mr. Odak shortly before he departed.

LAW AND ANALYSIS

An injunction is a harsh, drastic, and extraordinary remedy, and should only issue where the party seeking it is threatened with irreparable loss or injury without adequate remedy at law. Lafreniere Park Found. v. Friends of Lafreniere Park, Inc., 97-152 (La. App. 5 Cir. 7/29/97), 698 So.2d 449, 452, writ denied, 97-2196 (La. 11/21/97), 703 So.2d 1312. In order to obtain a preliminary injunction, a plaintiff must show that he will suffer irreparable harm if the injunction is not granted, that he is entitled to the relief sought, and he must make a prima facie showing that he will prevail on the merits. Id. A generally recognized purpose of a preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo during the pendency of further judicial proceedings. Saer v. New Orleans Reg'l Physician Hosp. Org., 14-856 (La. App. 5 Cir. 3/25/15), 169 So.3d 617, 620. Appellate courts review the denial of a preliminary injunction under the manifest error standard. Id.

Setting aside a trial court's findings of fact requires a determination that the findings are clearly wrong in light of the record viewed in its entirety. Jurado v. Phillips, 23-373 (La. App. 5 Cir. 3/28/24), 384 So.3d 1155, 1158. Thus, the issue before the appellate court is not whether the trier of fact was right or wrong, but whether the factfinder's conclusion was a reasonable one. Jones v. Mkt. Basket Stores, Inc., 22-841 (La. 3/17/23), 359 So.3d 452, 463. The appellate court must not reweigh the evidence or substitute its own factual findings because it would have decided the case differently. Aych v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 23-89 (La. App. 5 Cir. 10/31/23), 374 So.3d 1000, 1006.

Upon review, considering the entirety of the record, we conclude that the trial court did not manifestly err and was not clearly wrong in the scope of the preliminary injunction issued herein. Claudelle Vallette, Stone Oil's CFO and its own representative at trial, affirmatively testified that with the return of Stone Oil's confidential and proprietary information, which Sunoco/Mr. Odak had done prior to the preliminary injunction trial in compliance with the TRO, Stone Oil and Sunoco were on a “level playing field.” She also testified that by the time of the preliminary injunction trial, she had learned that Stone Oil and Sunoco were not direct competitors of each other in Stone Oil's regions, nor with respect to the products that were listed in the TRO, contrary to the information to which she had attested when Stone Oil sought the TRO. In light of this affirmative testimony that was also supported by other evidence and testimony at the preliminary injunction trial, Stone Oil has not shown that it is entitled to amend the preliminary injunction to include the entirety of the relief it originally sought. Stone Oil's assignment of error that the trial court erred by failing to enter a preliminary injunction against Sunoco prohibiting it from selling marine fuel to Stone Oil's customers or otherwise competing with Stone Oil through the final disposition of the trial on Stone Oil's request for a permanent injunction is without merit.

CONCLUSION AND DECREE

We are mindful that Stone Oil ultimately seeks a permanent injunction against Mr. Odak and Sunoco and that further proceedings are forthcoming. At this procedural juncture, however, we find no manifest error in the trial court's judgment of May 6, 2025 which granted the limited preliminary injunction in favor of Stone Oil. The judgment is hereby affirmed.

AFFIRMED

FOOTNOTES

1.   Also made defendants were James Stapleton, Kyle Burgess, and Stephen Smith, officers, employees, and agents of defendant Sunoco Marine Ltd. They filed declinatory exceptions of lack of personal jurisdiction and insufficiency of service of process. Stone Oil also filed a motion for contempt. These matters were heard on April 24–25, 2025, along with the preliminary injunction. The trial court denied the motion for contempt and sustained the exceptions in part and denied them in part. These rulings are not at issue in the instant appeal.Mr. Stapleton sought supervisory review of the ruling denying his exception of lack of personal jurisdiction. This Court denied the writ application. John W. Stone Oil Distributor, LLC v. Sunoco, LP, et al, 25-272 (La. App. 5 Cir. 6/26/25), 2025 WL 1768778 (unpublished writ disposition).

2.   The TRO also provided that Stone Oil would furnish security for the TRO, and that it would expire on April 25, 2025. The parties were ordered to appear for a show cause hearing on April 24, 2025 regarding a preliminary injunction. The TRO was later extended until April 29, 2025 at 1 p.m.

GRAVOIS, J.