ESTATE OF LUCAS v. CLARK MD MD MD APC CDP LLC LLC (2026)

The appellant, the estate of Wallace Lucas, Sr.,¹ seeks a review of the March 26, 2025 judgment that sustained the appellee's exception of no cause of action and dismissed their claims with prejudice. For the following reasons, we affirm the judgment.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Dr. Wesley Clark performed knee replacement surgery on Mr. Lucas on April 13, 2018 at West Jefferson Hospital (“West Jefferson”). Mr. Lucas was discharged from the hospital the following day. On April 15 and 16, 2018, personnel from Omni Home Care (“Omni”) visited Mr. Lucas to assist with his care. Mr. Lucas developed nausea, vomiting, and chills. His wife called an ambulance, and he was taken back to the hospital on April 17, 2018, where he died that same day. His death certificate lists “hypertensive and atherosclerotic cardiovascular disease” as his cause of death.

On April 15, 2019, the appellant filed a request to convene a medical review panel under the Louisiana Medical Malpractice Act (“the Act”).² Dr. Clark and his clinic, Omni, and West Jefferson are Qualified Health Care Providers (“QHCP”) under the Act. A medical review panel reviewed the parties’ submissions and found no breach of the standard of care.

On June 26, 2021, the appellant filed a lawsuit in the 24th Judicial District Court against Dr. Clark and his clinic, Omni, and West Jefferson. The appellant also named the Louisiana Patient Compensation Fund (“PCF”) as a defendant. On March 28, 2022, the appellant dismissed the PCF without prejudice. The appellant settled with West Jefferson and dismissed it from the lawsuit with prejudice on June 23, 2022. The appellant settled with Omni and dismissed it from the lawsuit with prejudice on October 17, 2022. On September 25, 2023, the trial court granted Dr. Clark and his clinic's motion for summary judgment and dismissed them from the lawsuit with prejudice.

On June 4, 2024, the appellant filed a “Petition to Demand Payment of Damages from the Louisiana Patient Compensation Fund.” The PCF filed an exception of no cause of action,³ arguing that the appellant failed to comply with the Act's mandatory provisions. The PCF elaborated that it is not considered a party defendant under the Act, nor is it a co-obligor of the QHCP's insurer. Instead, the PCF is a statutory intervenor that can only enter the case through a nominal defendant. The PCF asserted that the appellant had no cause of action against the PCF because once all the other defendant QHCPs were dismissed, there was no nominal defendant through which the PCF could appear in the suit. The appellant responded that the PCF waived the procedural requirements of the Act. After a hearing on the exception, the trial court took the matter under advisement, then granted the exception and dismissed the appellant's petition with prejudice on March 26, 2025. The appellant filed this timely appeal.

LAW AND DISCUSSION

On appeal, the appellant argues that the trial court erred in granting the exception, claiming that the PCF waived the procedural requirements under the Act based on documented discussions between the appellant's attorney and the PCF regarding the settlements between the QHCPs. The appellant argues that the March 28, 2022 dismissal of the PCF was without prejudice and that she reserved her right to proceed against the PCF in both settlements with the QHCPs. The appellant contends the trial court erred in excluding her exhibits documenting settlement discussions between her attorney and the PCF.

The PCF responds that the plaintiff failed to comply with the statutory requirements to petition the trial court for the authorization to settle, depriving the court and it of the statutorily mandated opportunity to hear explanations from the QHCPs and the appellant of the purpose and reason for entering into each settlement. The PCF further contends that there was no nominal defendant through which the PCF could appear because the appellant had dismissed all the QHCP before filing the petition against the PCF.

The QHCP is the only party defendant contemplated by the Medical Malpractice Act. Thus, a suit brought under the Act is against the health care provider only, not against the PCF. Stuka v. Fleming, 561 So.2d 1371, 1374 (La. 1990), cert. denied sub nom. La. Patient's Compensation Fund v. Stuka, 498 U.S. 982, 111 S.Ct. 513, 112 L.Ed.2d 525 (1990). The Act does not require joining the PCF as a defendant. It only requires serving the PCF administrator with the petition for approval of the settlement when a health care provider has agreed to settle with the malpractice claimant. Id. After a settlement between the claimant and a health care provider, the PCF is a statutory intervenor rather than a party defendant. Id. The PCF is not a negligent party and does not have the same status as a defendant under La. C.C. art. 2315. Williams v. Kushner, 549 So.2d 294, 296 (La. 1989). A QHCP's settlement with the claimant for $100,000.00 constitutes an admission of liability for at least that amount of damages. Bijou v. Alton Ochsner Med. Found., 95-3074 (La. 9/5/96), 679 So.2d 893, 896. The PCF can contest the QHCP's liability when the provider settles with the malpractice victim for less than $100,000. Russo v. Vasquez, 94-2407 (La. 1/17/95), 648 So.2d 879, 884.

Louisiana's Medical Malpractice Act (La. R.S. 40:1231.4(C)) explicitly provides that when a malpractice claimant settles with a qualified healthcare provider and seeks excess damages from the PCF, a petition for court approval of the settlement, with notice to the PCF and an opportunity to object, must be filed. At the same time, a QHCP remains in the suit. Although the claimant settles with the QHCP, at least one QHCP must be retained as a nominal defendant ⁴ to allow the claimant to seek excess damages from the PCF. See Jackson v. Farquhar, 50,902 (La. App. 2 Cir. 10/5/16), 207 So.3d 1112, 1115; Joshua v. Cmty. Care Ctr. of Heritage House, LLC, 22-1288 (La. App. 1 Cir. 9/5/23), 371 So.3d 1097, 1103.

The purpose of the peremptory exception of no cause of action is to test the legal sufficiency of the petition by determining whether the law affords a remedy for the facts alleged in the petition. 5301 Jefferson Hwy, L.L.C. v. A. Maloney Moving & Storage, Inc., 23-211 (La. App. 5 Cir. 5/29/24), 392 So.3d 337, 348. The exception raises a question of law, and the appellate court conducts a de novo review of a trial court's ruling based solely on the sufficiency of the petition. Id. This exception is triable on the face of the pleadings, and we must accept the well-pleaded facts in the petition as true to resolve issues raised by the exception. Par. of Jefferson v. Bankers Ins. Co., 11-590 (La. App. 5 Cir. 2/28/12), 88 So.3d 1082, 1085, writ denied, 12-691 (La. 5/4/12), 88 So.3d 466.

The question is whether, on the face of the petition, accepting all allegations as true, the petition states a valid cause of action for relief. Am. Rebel Arms, L.L.C. v. New Orleans Hamburger & Seafood Co., 15-599 (La. App. 5 Cir. 2/24/16), 186 So.3d 1220, 1222. The parties cannot introduce evidence to support or controvert an exception of no cause of action. La. C.C.P. art. 931. Thus, the only issue at the trial of the exception is whether, on the face of the petition, the plaintiff is legally entitled to the relief sought. Perere v. Louisiana Television Broadcasting Corp., 97-2873 (La. App. 1 Cir. 11/6/98), 721 So.2d 1075, 1077.

The mover has the burden of demonstrating that a petition fails to state a cause of action. Nicholson v. Brown, 56,114 (La. App. 2 Cir. 2/26/25), 408 So.3d 1060, 1068. A trial court correctly sustains an exception of no cause of action only when, conceding the correctness of the facts, the plaintiff has not stated a claim for which he or she can receive legal redress under the applicable substantive law. Id.

Our de novo review indicates that all QHCPs had been dismissed from the lawsuit with prejudice when the appellant filed the petition for excess damages against the PCF. Once all QHCP were dismissed from the lawsuit, there was no nominal defendant through which the PCF could appear. An exception of no cause of action is decided on the allegations stated in the petition, and the issue is whether the plaintiff is entitled to the relief sought. Because there were no remaining QHCPs when the appellant filed the lawsuit against the PCF, the appellant was not legally entitled to the relief sought. The trial court correctly denied the appellant's request to submit evidence of correspondence between appellant's attorneys and the PCF because the trial of an exception of no cause of action considers only the petition.

CONCLUSION

For the preceding reasons, we affirm the March 26, 2025 judgment sustaining the exception of no cause of action and dismissing the appellant's petition against the Louisiana Patient's Compensation Fund with prejudice.

AFFIRMED

FOOTNOTES

1.   The appellant is “the estate of Wallace Lucas, Sr., through his wife and administrator, Paulette Porter-Lucas.”

2.   The Louisiana Medical Malpractice Act was reorganized in 2015. The reorganization was a structural recodification that redesignated the Act from La. R.S. 40:1299.41 et seq. to La. R.S. 40:1231.1 et seq., without making any substantive changes to the law.

3.   The PCF also filed an exception of lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The trial court found this exception to be moot after granting the exception of no cause of action.

4.   A nominal party to an action is “one who has no control over it and no financial interest in its outcome; a party who has some immaterial interest in the subject matter of a lawsuit and who will not be affected by any judgment, but who is nonetheless joined in the lawsuit to avoid procedural defects.” Black's Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024)

MOLAISON, J.