GALVEZ BAQUEDANO v. MACHUCA USAA (2026)

Plaintiffs, Alan Galvez-Baquedano, Anyi Sanchez-Moreno, and Evelin Baquedano, appeal the trial court's March 10, 2025 judgment, which granted a motion for summary judgment filed by defendant, American Access Casualty Company (AACC), and dismissed plaintiffs’ lawsuit against AACC, with prejudice. For the following reasons, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This case arises from a motor vehicle accident that occurred in Kenner, Louisiana, on April 4, 2021. Alan Galvez-Baquedano was operating a 2014 Honda Civic owned by Evelin Baquedano. Anyi Sanchez-Moreno was a passenger in the vehicle. According to plaintiffs, Mr. Galvez-Baquedano was driving westbound on Vintage Drive when defendant, Alejandro Machuca, ran a stop sign at the intersection of Vintage and Medoc Drive and struck their vehicle. On April 4, 2022, plaintiffs filed this lawsuit seeking compensation for their personal injuries and other damages against Mr. Machuca and his insurer, as well as Evelin Baquedano's uninsured/underinsured motorist (UM) insurer, AACC.

On November 13, 2024, AACC filed a motion for summary judgment, seeking dismissal of plaintiffs’ claims against it on the grounds that Ms. Baquedano rejected UM coverage. AACC further argued that it issued the policy to Ms. Baquedano in Texas and that Texas law should apply in this matter. In support of its arguments, AACC provided an affidavit from its employee, David Richardson, which attached a copy of the insurance application electronically signed by Ms. Baquedano; a certified copy of her insurance policy; and a copy of the Texas – Uninsured/Underinsured Motorist Coverage Form also electronically signed by Ms. Baquedano. On the form, Ms. Baquedano checked the box indicating that she rejected uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage in its entirety.¹ In her insurance application, Ms. Baquedano provided a Texas mailing address and represented that the 2014 Honda Civic involved in the accident was garaged in Texas. In addition, the insurance agent listed on the policy was located in Texas. Mr. Richardson explained in his affidavit that the policy did not provide UM coverage and AACC did not charge Ms. Baquedano a premium for UM coverage. Based on these undisputed facts, AACC asserted that Texas law applied in this matter. AACC further argued that Texas law only requires a waiver of UM coverage to be in writing, and that Ms. Baquedano's rejection of UM coverage was valid, thus precluding coverage for plaintiffs’ UM claims.

Plaintiffs filed a memorandum in opposition to AACC's motion for summary judgment, asserting that Louisiana law should apply in this matter and that the UM rejection form signed by Ms. Baquedano is invalid under both Louisiana and Texas law. Plaintiffs specifically argued that Louisiana law should apply because the accident occurred in Louisiana and involved Louisiana residents, who obtained medical treatment in Louisiana. They further argued that even under Texas law, the UM rejection form is invalid because it is a separate document that was not made part of the insurance policy at issue. Plaintiffs also argued that AACC failed to satisfy its burden to prove the validity of Ms. Baquedano's electronic signature on the UM rejection form. Finally, plaintiffs asserted that AACC failed to serve co-defendant, Alejandro Machuca, with a copy of its summary judgment motion. The only evidence that plaintiffs attached in support of their opposition memorandum was certified copies of their medical bills.

In its reply memorandum, AACC argues that prior Louisiana courts have applied Texas law in similar circumstances based on the finding that Texas has a real and substantial interest in regulating its insurance industry and insurance contracts. Further, defendants argued that Texas law does not require a UM rejection form to be physically attached to an automobile insurance policy. Regardless, the date on the insurance application and UM rejection form indicate that Ms. Baquedano executed both of these documents on December 26, 2020. Further, AACC issued the policy on the following day, effective December 27, 2020.

Finally, AACC asserted that plaintiffs’ arguments contesting the validity of Ms. Baquedano's electronic signature on the UM rejection form are without merit because they did not provide an affidavit or other evidence indicating that she did not consent to or complete the electronic signature. AACC also pointed out that plaintiffs do not challenge the execution of the policy by means of electronic signature which would challenge the effectiveness of the entire policy. And AACC explained that it provided a copy of the summary judgment motion to counsel for Mr. Machuca and his insurer, after which they waived their appearance at the upcoming hearing.

The trial court heard AACC's motion for summary judgment on February 10, 2025. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court took the matter under advisement. On March 10, 2025, the trial court signed a judgment granting AACC's motion for summary judgment and dismissing plaintiffs’ claims against it with prejudice. In its reasons for judgment, the trial court found that Texas law applied in this matter, and that the UM coverage rejection form signed by Ms. Baquedano was sufficient to effect a valid rejection of UM coverage under Texas law.

On May 5, 2025, plaintiffs filed a timely motion for a devolutive appeal, which the trial court granted on May 15, 2025. This appeal followed.

LAW AND DISCUSSION

On appeal, plaintiffs assert that the trial court erred by granting AACC's motion for summary judgment on several grounds:

1) Plaintiffs contend the trial court erred when it applied Texas law instead of Louisiana law because under a conflict of laws analysis, Louisiana's policies are most seriously impaired if its laws are not applied in this matter.

2) Ms. Baquedano's rejection of UM coverage is invalid under both Louisiana and Texas law. With respect to Texas law, plaintiffs contend the UM rejection is invalid because: a) the UM rejection form is not part of the insurance policy; and b) AACC failed to meet its burden to establish that Ms. Baquedano consented to an electronic transaction and that she completed the UM rejection form.

3) The trial court erred by granting the summary judgment motion when AACC failed to serve co-defendant, Alejandro Machuca, an interested necessary party, with its motion.

The summary judgment procedure is favored and is designed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action. La. C.C.P. art. 966(A)(2). A motion for summary judgment shall be granted if the motion, memorandum, and supporting documents show that there is no genuine issue as to material fact and that the mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. La. C.C.P. art. 966(A)(3). The burden of proof rests with the mover. La. C.C.P. art. 966D(1). However, if the mover will not bear the burden of proof at trial on the issue before the trial court on the motion for summary judgment, the mover is not required to negate all essential elements of the plaintiff's claim, but is only required to point out the absence of factual support for one or more elements essential to the adverse party's claim. Id.

The burden then shifts to the adverse party to produce factual support sufficient to establish the existence of a genuine issue of material fact or that the mover is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law. La. C.C.P. art. 966(D)(1). An adverse party may not rest on mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or other permitted evidence, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. La. C.C.P. art. 967(B)(1). Once a motion for summary judgment has been properly supported by the moving party, the failure of the nonmoving party to produce evidence of a material factual dispute mandates the granting of the motion. Harvest Time Cmty. Dev. Corp. v. St. John the Baptist Par. Sch. Bd., 24-571 (La. App. 5 Cir. 3/19/25), 412 So.3d 235, 239, writ denied, 25-486 (La. 9/10/25), 415 So.3d 1272.

Appellate courts review the grant or denial of a motion for summary judgment de novo, using the same criteria that govern the trial court's consideration of whether summary judgment is appropriate. Garces-Rodriguez v. GEICO Indem. Co., 16-196 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/21/16), 209 So.3d 389, 391. On review of a motion for summary judgment, we must determine if there is any genuine issue of material fact and whether the mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. at 392. Whether an insurance policy provides or precludes coverage, as a matter of law, can be resolved within the framework of a motion for summary judgment. Id.

 Choice of Law Analysis

Plaintiffs argue that Louisiana law should apply, because Louisiana's interests in this matter are more substantial and outweigh those of Texas. Plaintiffs contend that the accident occurred in Louisiana, the collision occurred between Louisiana residents, and plaintiffs received all of their medical treatment in Louisiana. They argue that Louisiana has a strong public policy to protect its residents and others when an accident occurs on Louisiana roadways. Plaintiffs further contend that Louisiana has an interest in promoting full recovery for its residents injured on Louisiana highways by ensuring there is insurance coverage for the cost of medical care rendered to its residents. Plaintiffs recognize that Texas has an interest in regulating its insurance industry and contracts too. They argue, however, that it is foreseeable that Texas residents may be involved in an accident in a neighboring state, and therefore, the policy should provide coverage to its insured while the covered vehicle is driven in Louisiana.

In Champagne v. Ward, 03-3211 (La. 1/19/05), 893 So.2d 773, the Louisiana Supreme Court established a framework to analyze choice of law determinations in UM cases with insureds who are issued insurance policies outside of Louisiana and subsequently involved in accidents in Louisiana. The court recognized that Louisiana's UM law is applicable to policies “delivered or issued for delivery in this state,” and held that Louisiana law does not automatically apply to the interpretation of a foreign UM insurance policy in a multistate case where an accident occurs in Louisiana and involves a Louisiana resident. Id. at 779, 786. Rather, the Court stated that in a multistate case, the appropriate starting point is to determine if there is a difference between Louisiana's UM law and the UM law of the foreign state. Id. at 786. If so, the Court should conduct a choice of law analysis, as set forth in La. C.C. arts. 3515 and 3537, to determine the state whose policies would be most seriously impaired if its laws are not applied. Id.²

Thus, we must first determine whether there is a difference between Louisiana and Texas UM laws. Louisiana Revised Statute 22:1295 requires that all automobile liability policies delivered or issued for delivery in Louisiana include UM coverage up to the policy liability limits, unless the insured expressly rejects such coverage or chooses a lower limit by executing a specific UM selection/rejection form prescribed by the Louisiana Insurance Commissioner. In Texas, although rejection of UM coverage is required to be in writing, the applicable law does not require a special procedure or special language for the writing. See Tex. Ins. Code § 1952.101; Ortiz v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 955 S.W.2d 353, 357 (Tex. App.–San Antonio 1997, pet. denied).³ Execution of a satisfactory written rejection in Texas requires only minimal effort by the insured. Ortiz, 955 S.W.2d at 357. Given this difference between each state's UM laws regarding the rejection of UM coverage, we must conduct a choice of law analysis to ascertain which state's policies would be most seriously impaired to determine the validity of the UM rejection form in this case.

In Louisiana, there is a strong public interest in providing full recovery for automobile accident victims who suffer damages caused by a tortfeasor who is not covered by adequate liability insurance. Garces-Rodriguez, 209 So.3d at 393. However, the Louisiana Supreme Court has found that other states have an interest in the regulation of the insurance industry conducting business within their borders and in the contractual obligations that are inherent parts thereof. Champagne, 893 So.2d at 788; Garces-Rodriguez, 209 So.3d at 393. In Champagne, the court indicated that the integrity of the contract is a substantial and real interest. 893 So.2d at 788. The court further stated that “[t]he fact that Congress has allowed fifty states to have their own uniform system of regulations governing insurance strongly suggests this is a legitimate public purpose.” Id.

After considering similar circumstances involving an accident in Louisiana and plaintiffs who received medical treatment in Louisiana, as well as an automobile liability policy issued in Texas for a vehicle represented to be garaged in Texas, this Court ruled in Garces-Rodriguez, 209 So.3d at 395, that Texas law should apply to determine whether UM coverage exists:

In the present case, applying the facts before us to the factors for determining choice of law set forth in La. C.C. arts. 3515 and 3537, we find that Texas has a more substantial interest in having its laws applied in this case than Louisiana. While Louisiana has a strong interest in promoting full recovery for innocent automobile accident victims, Texas has a real and substantial interest in regulating its insurance industry and insurance contracts.

Further, in Collins v. Downes, 11-1124 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1/25/12), 83 So.3d 1177, the Fourth Circuit was called to determine whether Louisiana law or Ohio law applied to the interpretation of an insurance policy. In Collins, the accident occurred in Louisiana, the plaintiff and the tortfeasor resided in Louisiana, and the insured vehicle was primarily garaged in Louisiana. However, the insurance policy providing UM coverage was issued in Ohio, the insured provided the insurer with an Ohio address, and there was no evidence that the insured notified the insurer that the vehicle was no longer garaged in Ohio. Even though the accident occurred in Louisiana and involved Louisiana residents, the Fourth Circuit found that Ohio had a more substantial interest in the uniform application of its laws governing insurance contracts than Louisiana. Id. at 1183.

The record before us reflects that Ms. Baquedano completed a Texas Automobile Application with AACC. She listed a mailing address in Houston, Texas, and also represented that the vehicle at issue would be garaged at the same Texas address. AACC issued Ms. Baquedano a Texas personal automobile policy, and the insurance agent for the policy lists a Texas address. While the accident occurred in Louisiana and plaintiffs provide medical records indicating that they received medical treatment at a chiropractic clinic in Kenner, Louisiana, for a period of four to five months following the accident, they do not provide an affidavit or any other evidence to establish that they are Louisiana residents.

Considering the undisputed facts, along with the applicable law, we find that Texas's policies would be more seriously impaired if its laws were not applied to determine if the rejection of UM coverage is enforceable in this case. We recognize Louisiana's strong interest in promoting full recovery for automobile accident victims. But Texas has a real and substantial interest in regulating its insurance contracts. These circumstances do not warrant the application of Louisiana law, particularly when the plaintiffs involved in the accident were not named insureds, or otherwise named in the policy, and the insured represented that the vehicle was garaged in Texas. Accordingly, we conclude that Texas law applies in this matter.

 The UM Rejection is Valid Under Texas Law.

Plaintiffs first contend that the UM rejection form signed by Ms. Baquedano is invalid because defendants failed to establish that it was part of the policy at issue. Plaintiffs contend that Mr. Richardson attached a certified copy of the policy issued to Ms. Baquedano as Exhibit B to his affidavit and the UM rejection form separately as Exhibit C. As a result, plaintiffs argue that AACC failed to prove that the UM rejection form is a part of the relevant policy and thus, the form cannot be relied upon to determine the contractual rights of the parties with respect to UM coverage.

In Ortiz, 955 S.W.2d at 356-358, a Texas court considered and rejected this exact argument when it held that a written rejection of UM coverage does “not need to be attached to or incorporated into the policy to be valid.” The Ortiz court reasoned that although a UM rejection must be in writing, the Texas Insurance Code does not require any special procedures or language for the writing. Id. at 357.

To support their argument that the UM rejection form must be part of or incorporated into the policy, plaintiffs cite to Fredonia State Bank v. Gen. Am. Life Ins. Co., 881 S.W.2d 279 (Tex. 1994). However, this case involved a specific statute (now repealed) relating to representations in an application for a life insurance policy and is therefore irrelevant to the present matter. Id. at 285-88. Further, Mr. Richardson's affidavit and the attached documents establish that Ms. Baquedano applied for the policy on December 26, 2020, and e-signed the UM rejection form on the same date. Also, the UM rejection form references the same “App ID Number 33900071” listed at the end of her policy application and the same “Policy Number 42AU00086 1093” as listed on the automobile policy issued by AACC. Accordingly, we find that the UM rejection form is not invalid to the extent that it is not physically attached to the automobile policy at issue.

Plaintiffs next contend that the UM rejection form is invalid because genuine issues of material fact remain as to whether Ms. Baquedano consented to the “electronic completion” of the UM rejection form. They further contend that AACC failed to produce “evidence of a reliable and secure electronic signature procedure” to prove that the signature on the UM rejection form is attributable to Ms. Baquedano. However, plaintiffs failed to provide any evidence whatsoever to establish that Ms. Baquedano denies consenting to the electronic transaction or denies electronically signing the UM rejection form. Further, they provide no evidence to indicate that Ms. Baquedano intended to purchase or paid for UM coverage.

Instead, plaintiffs cite to Aerotek, Inc. v. Boyd, 624 S.W.3d 199 (Tex. 2021), and assert that it stands for the proposition that a defendant has the initial burden to produce evidence establishing that the electronic transaction security procedures were sufficient to establish the genuine nature of Ms. Baquedano's electronic signature on the UM rejection form. However, the Aerotek case is distinguishable from the present matter because the plaintiffs in that case submitted sworn declarations denying that they electronically signed an agreement to arbitrate their employment disputes with the defendant. The defendant then submitted valid evidence of the security procedures it employed to attribute the electronic signature to the alleged signatory. The plaintiffs did not present any evidence in response to establish that the security procedures lacked integrity or effectiveness. The Texas Supreme Court reasoned that the trial court erred by denying the defendant's motion to compel arbitration because once the defendant presented evidence of its security procedures, the plaintiffs could not rely on their mere denials that they did not sign the document to defeat the arbitration agreement. Id. at 209.

Tex. Bus. & Com. Code § 322.007(a) of the Texas Uniform Electronic Transactions Act provides that a “record or signature may not be denied legal effect or enforceability solely because it is in electronic form.” Sections 322.007(c) and (d) state respectively that “[i]f a law requires a record to be in writing, an electronic record satisfies the law,” and [i]f a law requires a signature, an electronic signature satisfies the law.” Further, Section 322.009(a) provides that an “electronic record or electronic signature is attributable to a person if it was the act of the person” and that the “act of the person may be shown in any manner, including a showing of the efficacy of any security procedure applied to determine the person to which the electronic record or electronic signature was attributable.” (Emphasis added). Thus, the plain language of the statute states that the electronic signature can be proven in “any manner” and thus, does not require an initial burden of “showing the efficacy of any security procedures.” Rather, security procedures are one of the means in which a party can prove an electronic record or signature. Section 322.009(b) also explains that the “effect of an electronic record or electronic signature attributed to a person under Subsection (a) is determined from the context and surrounding circumstances at the time of its creation, execution, or adoption, including the parties’ agreement, if any, and otherwise as provided by law.”

In Rapalo-Alfaro v. Lee, 15-209 (La. App. 4. Cir. 8/12/15), 173 So.3d 1174, 1181-1183, the Louisiana Fourth Circuit analyzed virtually identical provisions contained in the Louisiana Uniform Transactions Act when considering whether the trial court correctly determined that an electronic signature on a UM rejection form was attributable to the plaintiff.⁴ In Rapalo, the plaintiff argued that genuine issues of material fact existed because the insurer failed to establish that he agreed to complete his UM rejection form electronically and that the initials and signature on the form were attributable to him. However, just as in the present matter, the plaintiff failed to provide an affidavit or sworn testimony contesting these issues. In affirming the trial court's finding that no genuine issue of material existed as to the validity of the electronic signature on the UM form, the appellate court reasoned that the insurer had “no additional burden of proof with respect to [the plaintiff's] electronic signature unless [the plaintiff] specifically denies signing the uninsured motorist waiver form.” Id. at 1182.

We find that AACC satisfied its initial burden by providing an affidavit from its employee attesting to the accuracy of the electronically signed rejection form as part of its business records maintained for Ms. Baquedano's policy. The evidence establishes that Ms. Baquedano electronically signed both the insurance application and the UM rejection on the same day. The UM rejection form references both the application and policy numbers. Thus, the burden shifted to plaintiffs and they failed to provide any evidence to establish that a genuine issue of material fact exists regarding the validity of Ms. Baquedano's electronic signature on the UM rejection form. They have only presented arguments asserting that the electronic signature process was somehow defective and attempt to insinuate that Ms. Baquedano did not consent to an electronic transaction. As explained above, once the burden has shifted, a party may not rest on mere allegations or argument. The failure to produce evidence of a material factual dispute mandates the granting of the summary judgment motion. Harvest Time, 412 So.3d at 239.

Further, while plaintiffs seem to question the electronic signature on the UM rejection form, they do not contest Ms. Baquedano's electronic signature on the policy application she submitted at the same time to obtain the policy at issue. These positions are contradictory. In Rapalo, 173 So.3d at 1182 fn. 13, the appellate court recognized that if the insured denied the validity of his electronic signature on the UM rejection form, he would also be denying the same electronic signature on his insurance application, thereby leaving the insured without a policy.

Based on the foregoing, we find that Ms. Baquedano's rejection of UM coverage is valid pursuant to Texas law, and there is no UM coverage provided by the AACC policy to plaintiffs in this matter.

 Co-Defendant's Notice of Summary Judgment Motion

Plaintiffs finally argue that the trial court erred by granting the summary judgment motion because AACC failed to serve co-defendant, Alejandro Machuca, with the motion for summary judgment. However, in King v. Pontchartrain Mortg. Co., 13-633 (La. App. 5 Cir. 1/31/14), 134 So.3d 19, 23, writ denied, 14-430 (La. 4/11/14), 138 So.3d 610, this Court recognized that a plaintiff could not argue that a summary judgment was improper because the moving defendant failed to serve a co-defendant. Further, AACC contends that it provided a courtesy copy of the summary judgment motion to Mr. Machuca's counsel and that he waived his appearance at the hearing. Plaintiffs do not contest these representations. Thus, this assignment of error is without merit.

DECREE

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the summary judgment granted in favor of AACC, and the dismissal of plaintiffs’ claims against AACC, with prejudice.

AFFIRMED

FOOTNOTES

1.   In the insurance application, policy, and UM rejection form, Ms. Baquedano's full name is listed as “Evelin Antonia Baquedano Izaguirre.”

2.   La. C.C. art. 3515 provides as follows:Except as otherwise provided in this Book, an issue in a case having contacts with other states is governed by the law of the state whose policies would be most seriously impaired if its law were not applied to that issue.That state is determined by evaluating the strength and pertinence of the relevant policies of all involved states in light of: 1) the relationship of each state to the parties and the dispute; and 2) the policies and needs of the interstate and international systems, including the policies of upholding the justified expectations of parties and of minimizing the adverse consequences that might follow from subjecting a party to the law of more than one state.La. C.C. art. 3537, regarding conflict of laws within conventional obligations, provides:Except as otherwise provided in this Title, an issue of conventional obligations is governed by the law of the state whose policies would be most seriously impaired if its law were not applied to that issue.That state is determined by evaluating the strength and pertinence of the relevant policies of the involved states in light of: 1) the pertinent contacts of each state to the parties and the transaction, including the place of negotiation, formation, and performance of the contract, the location of the object of the contract, and the place of domicile, habitual residence, or business of the parties; 2) the nature, type, and purpose of the contract; and 3) the policies referred to in Article 3515, as well as the policies of facilitating the orderly planning of transactions, of promoting multistate commercial intercourse, and of protecting one party from undue imposition by the other.

3.   Tex. Ins. Code. § 1952.101(c) provides:The coverage required by this subchapter does not apply if any insured named in the insurance policy rejects the coverage in writing. Unless the named insured requests in writing the coverage required by this subchapter, the insurer is not required to provide that coverage in or supplemental to a reinstated insurance policy or renewal insurance policy if the named insured rejected the coverage in connection with that insurance policy or an insurance policy previously issued to the insured by the same insurer or by an affiliated insurer.

4.   La. R.S. 9:2607(A), (C), and (D) provide:A. A record or signature may not be denied legal effect or enforceability solely because it is in electronic form.* * *C. If a law requires a record to be in writing, an electronic record satisfies the law.D. If a law requires a signature, an electronic signature satisfies the law.La. R.S. 9:2609 provides:A. (1) An electronic record or electronic signature is attributable to a person if it was the act of the person.(2) The act of the person may be shown in any manner, including a showing of the efficacy of any security procedure applied to determine the person to which the electronic record or electronic signature was attributable.B. The effect of an electronic record or electronic signature attributed to a person under Subsection A of this Section is determined from the context and surrounding circumstances at the time of its creation, execution, or adoption, including the agreement of the parties, if any, and otherwise as provided by law.

SCHLEGEL, J.