LA PROPERTY TEAM LLC v. SMITH (2026)

The appellant, Melvin Smith, seeks review of the trial court's rulings that granted a default judgment in favor of the appellees and denied his motion for a new trial. For the reasons that follow, we reverse and remand the matter for further proceedings.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On March 31, 2025, appellees, LA Property Team LLC and Amy Scandaliato, filed a petition for specific performance and damages at the 24th Judicial District Court against appellant, Melvin Smith. The petition asserted that on October 25, 2024, Scandaliato, as Manager on behalf of LA Property Team, entered into a written Louisiana Residential Agreement to Buy or Sell with Smith to purchase multiple condominium units he owns in Jefferson Parish. The petition alleged that on March 28, 2025, Smith refused to execute the Act of Cash Sale as stipulated in the agreement. The appellees sought damages and attorney's fees resulting from Smith's alleged breach of contract. The record shows that Smith was personally served with the appellees’ petition on April 7, 2025.

On May 8, 2025, the appellees filed a motion and request for default judgment, which the trial court granted without a hearing on that same date. On May 15, 2025, Smith filed a motion for new trial, which the trial court denied after a hearing on June 23, 2025. This appeal follows.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

1. The trial court erred in rendering a default judgment when the plaintiffs did not present sufficient competent evidence to support all of the essential allegations of the petition.

2. The trial court erred in rendering a default judgment when the plaintiffs failed to present any evidence that defendant had signed the contract or that the printed name on the contract was his signature or that the signature was genuine.

3. The trial court erred in rendering a default judgment awarding damages when the plaintiffs presented no evidence to support the amount of the damages and when the contract itself provided different remedies in the event of a default.

4. The trial court erred in rendering a default judgment awarding attorney fees without plaintiffs producing any evidence to support the amount of the attorney fees and when the amount of the attorney fees are unreasonable.

5. The trial court erred in rendering a default judgment without a hearing when the plaintiffs did not provide the certifications required by La. C.C.P. Art. 1702.1

6. The trial court erred in rendering a default judgment when plaintiffs failed to give the defendant prior notice of their intent to obtain a default judgment.

7. The trial court erred in denying the motion for new trial when there were good grounds for doing so, and when denying the motion for new trial results in a miscarriage of justice and denies the defendant his day in court.

8. The trial court erred in rendering a default judgment in favor of Amy Scandaliato when she was not a named party on the alleged Agreement to Buy or Sell.

LAW AND ANALYSIS

La. C.C.P. art. 1702 outlines the procedural requirements for default judgments:

A. (1) If a defendant in the principal or incidental demand fails to answer or file other pleadings within the time prescribed by law or by the court, and the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case by competent and admissible evidence that is admitted on the record, a default judgment in favor of the plaintiff may be rendered, provided that notice that the plaintiff intends to obtain a default judgment is sent if required by this Paragraph, unless such notice is waived. The court may permit documentary evidence to be filed in the record in any electronically stored format authorized by the local rules of the district court or approved by the clerk of the district court for receipt of evidence.

Here, it is not contested that the appellant did not answer the appellees’ petition for specific performance and damages after being personally served.

La. C.C.P. art. 1702.1 details the procedure for taking a default judgment without the necessity of a hearing:

A. When the plaintiff seeks a default judgment without appearing for a hearing in open court as provided in Article 1702(B)(1) and (C), the plaintiff shall file a written request for default judgment containing a certification that the suit is on an open account, promissory note, or other negotiable instrument, on a conventional obligation, or on a check dishonored for nonsufficient funds, and that the necessary invoices and affidavit, note and affidavit, or check or certified reproduction thereof are attached, along with any proof required by law and a proposed default judgment. If attorney fees are sought under R.S. 9:2781 or 2782, the attorney shall certify that fact and the fact that the number of days required by R.S. 9:2781(A) or 2782(A), respectively, have elapsed since demand was made upon the defendant.

B. The certification shall indicate the type of service made on the defendant and the date of service and shall also include a certification by the clerk that the record was examined by the clerk, including therein the date of the examination and a statement that no answer or other pleading has been filed within the time prescribed by law or by the court.

The appellees’ Motion and Request for Default Judgment contained a copy of the Louisiana Residential Agreement to Buy or Sell and an Affidavit in Support of Default Judgment. Scandaliato's affidavit verifies the accuracy of the agreement to sell document and provides details surrounding the appellant's alleged refusal to sell the properties. The affidavit further alleges damages in the amount $11,752.00 for lost net rental income, $975.00 in non-refundable application fees for insurance, and further sought $30,000.00 in attorneys’ fees to enforce the Purchase Agreement against Smith. The motion for default judgment contained a Clerk of Court Certificate which certified that on May 8, 2025, the Clerk of Court examined the record in the trial court, and as of that date, Smith had not filed a motion for extension of time, an answer, or any other pleading or response in the proceedings in the trial court.

ISSUES RAISED IN THE MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL

La. C.C.P. art. 1972 provides in pertinent part, “A new trial shall be granted, upon contradictory motion of any party, in the following cases: (1) When the verdict or judgment appears clearly contrary to the law and the evidence.” “A new trial may be granted in any case if there is good ground therefor, except as otherwise provided by law.” La. C.C.P. art. 1973. In cases involving a motion for new trial after a default judgment, public policy considerations, weighing in the defendant's favor, dictate that every litigant should be allowed his day in court. Calhoun v. Deslattes, 94-578 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/14/94), 648 So.2d 993, 994. The standard of review for the denial of a motion for new trial is abuse of discretion. Riley v. Hollander, 19-520 (La. App. 5 Cir. 5/28/20), 296 So.3d 1248, 1258, writ denied, 20-833 (La. 10/14/20), 302 So.3d 1123.

In his motion for a new trial and reply memorandum in support of a new trial, Smith raised several issues that he argued merited a new trial on the default judgment. In summary, he contended that he was not served notice of the default and that the appellees had failed to introduce evidence supporting their claims for damages and attorney's fees. Finally, Smith asserted that he had never signed the purchase agreement to sell the appellees his properties.

Smith's electronic signature on the Purchase Agreement

In a default judgment for a conventional obligation, not all signatures appearing on the document need to be separately verified for the purpose of confirming the default judgment. Under Louisiana law, specifically La. C.C.P. art. 1702(B)(1), when a demand is based upon a conventional obligation, “affidavits and exhibits annexed thereto which contain facts sufficient to establish a prima facie case shall be admissible, self-authenticating, and sufficient proof of such demand.”

Electronic signatures have the same legal effect as traditional signatures. La. R.S. 9:2607; Rapalo-Alfaro v. Lee, 15-209 (La. App. 4 Cir. 8/12/15), 173 So.3d 1174, 1182. The Act provides specifically that an “electronic record or electronic signature is attributable to a person if it was the act of the person.” La. R.S. 9:2609 A(1). Therefore, whether “any particular record is ‘signed’ is a question of fact. Proof of that fact must be made under other applicable law. This Chapter simply assures that the signature may be accomplished through electronic means.” La. R.S. 9:2602, Official Comments—2001, 7(c).

The use and effect of electronic signatures is governed by the Louisiana Uniform Electronic Transactions Act (“ETA”), La. R.S. 9:2601, et seq. La. R.S. 9:2605 B(1) provides, “This Chapter applies only to transactions between parties, each of which has agreed to conduct transactions by electronic means.” La. R.S. 9:2605 B(2) provides, “The context and surrounding circumstances, including the conduct of the parties, shall determine whether the parties have agreed to conduct a transaction by electronic means.” One purpose of the ETA is to facilitate electronic transactions consistent with other applicable law. La. R.S. 9:2606 (1).

Smith, however, argues that he had no internet access and no e-mail capability at the facility ¹ he was housed in on the date of the Purchase Agreement, and therefore could not have provided an electronic signature. He also asserts that he did not authorize anyone to sign the contract on his behalf. Smith concluded that without proof he consented to the contract, a default judgment should not have been entered, and his motion for a new trial should have been granted.

When the default judgment was granted, the issue of the authenticity of Smith's signature on the Purchase Agreement was not before the trial court, and on the face of the petition, the requirements for a default judgment were met. However, as noted above, a new trial may be granted on good grounds. La. C.C.P. art. 1973.

Smith clearly denied electronically signing the Purchase Agreement. But in opposing Smith's motion for a new trial on this issue, the appellees offered no evidence to contradict Smith's claim. Nor is there any explanation in the record of how Smith's electronic signature came to appear on the Purchase Agreement. If the issue of the authenticity of Smith's signature had been raised prior to the default judgment, it would have been the appellees’ burden to show that Smith did in fact electronically sign the document. Pinnacle Sec. & Investigation Inc. v. Howard, 23-133 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/20/23), 378 So.3d 843, 858-60. Thus, after considering the strong public policy that every defendant deserves his day in court, we find that the trial court abused its discretion by denying the motion for new trial.

Unproven damages

In his motion for a new trial, Smith also asserted that the appellees had failed to produce any evidence to support their claim that he owed $11,752.00 in damages per month.

Plaintiffs have the burden of proving any damage suffered by them as a result of a breach of contract. Decuir v. Sam Broussard, Inc., 459 So.2d 1375, 1379 (La. App. 3 Cir. 1984). In Payphone Connection Plus, Inc. v. Wagners Chef, LLC, 19-181 (La. App. 4 Cir. 7/31/19), 276 So.3d 589, 598, the Fourth Circuit recited the factors used in other cases to determine whether a petition for a default judgment had adequately proved its damages.

“Actual damages arising from a breach of contract must be proven; they cannot be merely speculative or conjectural ․ It must appear reasonably certain that the amount of damages rest upon a certain basis ․ The sufficiency of proof of damages must be determined in relation to the particular contract at issue and the circumstances surrounding its breach. The question of the certainty of proof of damages becomes a matter for decision in each individual case ․” LeBlanc v. Gibbens Pools, Inc., 447 So.2d 1195, 1197 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1984), quoting Hall v. Arkansas-Louisiana Gas Co., 368 So.2d 984, 991 (La. 1979) (emphasis supplied).

Moreover, “a minimal degree of detail or specificity is required in fixing damages.” Id. See also Safeguard Storage Properties, L.L.C. v. Donahue Favret Contractors, Inc., 10-0673, p. 14 (La. App. 4 Cir. 3/31/11), 60 So.3d 110, 120, quoting Wasco, Inc. v. Econ. Dev. Unit, Inc., 461 So.2d 1055, 1057 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1984)(“Although the absence of independent corroborative evidence is not always fatal, the lack of even a minimal degree of detail and specificity in the plaintiff's testimony, regarding the issue of lost profits, would preclude recovery of this item of damages.”).

Appellate review of a default judgment is restricted to determining whether the record contains sufficient evidence to prove a prima facie case. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. Custer, 09-802 (La. App. 5 Cir. 2/9/10), 33 So.3d 303, 305. This determination is a factual one governed by the manifest error standard of review. Bank of America, N.A. v. Alexander, 19-290 (La. App. 5 Cir. 1/29/20), 289 So.3d 1200, 1203. Upon reviewing the record, we find that while the appellees claim damages of $11,752.00 in damages per month as a result of the alleged breach of contract, there is no explanation or documentation as to how the sum was calculated. Scandaliato's affidavit provides no “degree of detail and specificity” as to the issue of damages. This certainly falls well below the “minimal degree” required to support a lost profit claim. Because the appellees failed to establish a prima facie case for damages, the appellant's motion for a new trial should also have been granted on these grounds.

Unproven attorney's fees

As with the appellees’ claims for damages, Smith challenged the court's award of attorneys’ fees as being unproven. Counsel for the appellees has answered the appeal and asks this Court to increase the amount of attorneys’ fees awarded to the appellees to cover costs incurred in connection with the appellant's motion for a new trial and appeal.

In the section “Default of Agreement by Seller,” it provides in part that if the seller defaults “[t]he prevailing party to any litigation brought to enforce any portion of this Agreement shall be awarded their attorney fees and costs.” The petition prays for $30,000 in attorneys’ fees, in addition to any additional legal fees it might incur. Paragraph 3 in the prayer for relief seeks attorney's fees in the amount of $28,504.00.

Aside from Scandaliato's affidavit, the appellees presented no evidence which would have demonstrated the reasonableness of the claimed fee.² Appellees’ counsel's statements regarding the nature of his representation are contained only in the opposition to the motion for a new trial and the answer to the appeal, not in its motion for default judgment. Arguments and pleadings are not evidence. Law Offices of Robert M. Becnel v. Ancale, 00-295, (La. App. 5 Cir. 9/26/00), 769 So.2d 761, 766. Thus, there is insufficient evidence in the record to support the allegations of attorney's fees outlined in the petition. Because the appellees failed to establish a prima facie case for attorney's fees, the appellant's motion for a new trial on this issue should have also been granted.³

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated, the trial court's denial of Smith's motion for a new trial should is reversed. We pretermit discussion of the appellant's remaining assignments of error. The trial court's order granting a default judgment against Smith is vacated and we remand the matter for further proceedings.

REVERSED; JUDGMENT VACATED; REMANDED

FOOTNOTES

1.   Smith asserts that he was temporarily housed at the Southwest Louisiana Veterans Home in Jennings, Louisiana, after a stroke that left him partially paralyzed.

2.   In First Consumers Fin., LLC v. Frank, 07-342 (La. App. 3 Cir. 10/3/07), 966 So.2d 1199, 1202, the Third Circuit found a similar statement in an affidavit filed in support of a default judgment insufficient: “Rather than constituting relevant and competent evidence, Mr. Chedville's statement in this regard merely constitutes a conclusory claim.”

3.   See, for example, Gautreaux v. Stirgus, 24-284 (La. App. 5 Cir. 3/12/25), 411 So. 3d 47, 52, where this Court held that an award of attorney's fees was not supported where no evidence was authenticated, offered, or introduced into evidence at the hearing.

MOLAISON, J.