STATE v. BROOKS (2025)

Following a guilty plea to charges of introduction or possession of contraband in a parish jail and possession of a Schedule II Controlled Dangerous Substance under State v. Crosby ¹ , and imposition of sentence by the trial court, Defendant, Irvin Brooks, appeals the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence seized in a warrantless search. For the following reasons, we affirm the trial court's ruling on Defendant's motions to suppress and affirm the convictions. However, we vacate Defendant's sentence on count one and remand for imposition of a determinate sentence consistent with this opinion. Defendant's sentence on count three is affirmed.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On April 10, 2024, Jefferson Parish Sheriff's Office Deputy Martin responded to a 911 call regarding a robbery at the Labella Motel. Upon arrival on scene, the victim immediately identified Floyd Lee, who was standing outside a motel room door, as the robber. Deputy Martin then ran towards Lee in “hot pursuit.” As he approached, Lee entered Defendant's motel room, and the door was shut. Upon reaching the closed motel room door, Deputy Martin proceeded to kick the door open, causing it to open slightly, then close again. Deputy Martin testified in the suppression hearing that Defendant was attempting to block entry into the room using his bare arm. After a second push on the door, Deputy Martin entered. Inside the motel room, Lee was sitting on the bed, facing the door; Defendant was in the room to Deputy Martin's right side. Deputy Martin escorted Lee out of the room and placed him face down on the ground and into handcuffs.

After a second officer arrived on the scene to take custody of Lee, Deputy Martin re-entered Defendant's motel room to conduct a protective sweep. He testified that the re-entry was to secure the scene to ensure no one else was in the room and to search for the suspected firearm. As he entered, he heard the toilet flush and saw defendant standing in the bathroom. In his suppression hearing testimony, Deputy Martin opined that Defendant was not using the toilet in a typical manner.

Following Deputy Martin's instructions, Defendant walked out of the bathroom into an area of the room near the bed. Another officer on scene escorted Defendant out of the room while the sweep was performed. Deputy Martin then continued his protective sweep of the room. In Deputy Martin's body camera recording of the incident, admitted as State's Exhibit 1 at the suppression hearing, Defendant is next seen standing close to a Jefferson Parish Sheriff's Office marked unit, accompanied by another deputy sheriff.

During what Deputy Martin described in his testimony as a search incident to arrest performed by another officer, cocaine was found on Defendant's person. Defendant was transported to the Jefferson Parish Correctional Center. After arrival, Defendant underwent a full body scan search prior to his entry into the jail. The body scan led to the recovery of cocaine from inside Defendant's mouth.

On April 29, 2024, the Jefferson Parish District Attorney filed a joint bill of information against Defendant and Floyd Lee arising from the acts occurring on April 10, 2024, at the Labella Motel. The bill of information charged Defendant with introducing or possessing contraband (cocaine) in the Jefferson Parish Correctional Center in violation of La. R.S. 14:402 (count one), possession of cocaine weighing two grams or more but less than twenty-eight grams in violation of La. R.S. 40:967(C) (count three), and obstruction of justice in violation of La. R.S. 14:130.1 (count four). On April 30, 2024, Defendant pleaded not guilty to the charges.

On September 30, 2024, Defendant filed omnibus motions, including a motion to suppress evidence obtained in violation of his Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable searches and seizures. After presentation of evidence in the November 13, 2024 suppression hearing, the trial court denied Defendant's motion. On November 27, 2024, Defendant filed a second motion to suppress evidence of narcotics seized in connection with his arrest on grounds that the search and seizure were unlawful.

Trial was scheduled for December 2, 2024. Before trial commenced that day, the trial court took up Defendant's second motion to suppress. After argument for counsel, the trial court denied the motion, stating its denial of the previous motion encompassed all related evidence, not just body camera recordings.

After the trial court's ruling, Defendant accepted the State's plea offer. The State amended its bill of information to dismiss count four, obstruction of justice. In return, Defendant entered a Crosby guilty plea to count one and to count three of the bill of information, reserving the right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress.

The trial court sentenced Defendant to five years imprisonment on each count, to be served concurrently. Also pursuant to the plea agreement, Defendant stipulated to the State's multiple bill as a second-felony offender on count three, possession of cocaine weighing between two and twenty-eight grams. The trial court then vacated the original sentence and imposed an enhanced sentence of five years imprisonment at hard labor, without the benefit of probation or suspension of sentence.

This timely appeal follows.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

In his sole assignment of error, Defendant contends the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress.

DISCUSSION

Defendant argues that Deputy Martin lacked probable cause to question, search, or detain him, and that all evidence seized as a result of the warrantless search of his person outside his motel room and at the Jefferson Parish Correctional Center was unlawfully seized in violation of his constitutional rights.

Both the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 1, § 5 of the Louisiana Constitution prohibit unreasonable searches and seizures. State v. Abrego, 21-166 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/1/21), 334 So.3d 883, 888, writ denied, 21-1949 (La. 2/22/22), 333 So.3d 450. A defendant who is adversely affected may move to suppress evidence from use at the trial on the merits on the grounds that it was unconstitutionally obtained. La. C.Cr.P. art. 703(A); State v. Fuentes, 22-89 (La. App. 5 Cir. 11/2/22), 353 So.3d 911, 915. If evidence is derived from an unreasonable search or seizure, the proper remedy is to exclude the evidence from trial. State v. Bardell, 17-274 (La. App. 5 Cir. 11/15/17), 232 So.3d 82, 86.

Warrantless searches and seizures are per se unreasonable unless justified by one of the exceptions to the warrant requirement. Fuentes, 353 So.3d at 915. When the constitutionality of a warrantless search or seizure is placed at issue by a motion to suppress the evidence, the State bears the burden of proving that the search and seizure was justified under one of the exceptions to the warrant requirement. La. C.Cr.P. art. 703(D); State v. Joseph, 02-717 (La. App. 5 Cir. 6/27/03), 850 So.2d 1049, 1052, writ denied sub nom. State ex rel. Joseph v. State, 04-2404 (La. 6/17/05), 904 So.2d 686. Also, in a hearing challenging the constitutionality of a warrantless search and seizure, the State bears the burden of proving the arrest and coinciding search were justified pursuant to an exception to the warrant requirement. State v. London, 01-1015 (La. App. 5 Cir. /13/02), 815 So.2d 162, 164, writ denied, 02-1567 (La. 5/30/03), 845 So.2d 1067.

In an appeal of a trial court's denial of a motion to suppress, the reviewing court is to apply two distinct standards of review. The trial court's findings of fact are accorded substantial deference and will not be disturbed unless clearly erroneous, while the trial court's conclusions of law are reviewed under a de novo standard. State v. Wells, 08-2262 (La. 7/6/10), 45 So. 3d 577, 580–81. When a trial court denies a motion to suppress, factual and credibility determinations should not be reversed in the absence of a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Green, 94-0887 (La. 5/22/95), 655 So.2d 272, 280-81.

We begin our review with the trial court's ruling on the suppression of the law enforcement officer's body camera footage from inside the motel room and contraband recovered in the search of his person during the incident.² The record reflects that the trial court did not assign reasons or findings for denying Defendant's motion.

Exigent circumstances is a recognized exception to the warrant requirement for a lawful search and seizure. The possibility for evidence destruction by a defendant who discovers government surveillance of his activities is an accepted sufficient exigency to justify a warrantless entry. State v. Hills, 01-0723 (La. 11/8/02), 829 So. 2d 1027. Deputy Martin entered the motel room in pursuit of Lee based on information that he committed a robbery. The testimonial and body camera evidence demonstrated that Lee entered the motel room to evade an approaching law enforcement officer. Deputy Martin testified to believing evidence of the reported robbery was in Lee's possession, which led to his forced entry into the Defendant's motel room. After removing Lee from the motel room and securing his arrest, Deputy Martin reentered to conduct a protective sweep for others inside the motel room. Based on the record before us, the trial court's ruling is supported by the State's evidence of exigent circumstances and thus we find no error in its denial of the motion to suppress Deputy Martin's body camera recording.

Turning to the warrantless search of Defendant's person, a well-recognized exception to the warrant requirement is a search incident to a lawful arrest. Joseph, 850 So.2d at 1051 (citing Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969). A law enforcement officer may lawfully arrest a person without a warrant when he has reasonable cause to believe that the person to be arrested has committed an offense. La. C.Cr.P. art. 213. Reasonable cause, for purposes of Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure article 213, is equivalent to probable cause under the Fourth Amendment. State v. Conklin, 18-0718 (La. App. 1 Cir. 2/28/19), 274 So. 3d 675, 680, writ denied, 19-00665 (La. 10/8/19), 280 So. 3d 591. Probable cause to arrest exists when the facts and circumstances known to the arresting officer are sufficient to justify a man of ordinary caution in believing that the person to be arrested has committed a crime. State v. Brisban, 00-3437 (La. 2/26/02), 809 So.2d 923, 927. In a search incident to a lawful arrest, the officer may search the suspect's person and the area within his immediate control to remove weapons and prevent evidence from being destroyed. London, 815 So.2d at 166.

Determinations of whether probable cause existed at the time of arrest must be made without regard to results of the subsequent search. State v. Lumpkin, 01-1721 (La. App. 1st Cir. 3/28/02), 813 So.2d 640, 644, writ denied, 02-1124 (La. 9/26/03), 854 So.2d 342. In State v. Jordan, 369 So.2d 1347 (1979), the Louisiana Supreme Court found that when no probable cause existed for arrest, the search incident to arrest was also illegal, and any evidence produced must be excluded as tainted. The exclusionary rule extends to both primary evidence obtained directly from the illegal search and any derivative evidence discovered as a result of the initial illegality. State v. Nicholas, 06-903 (La. App. 5 Cir. 4/24/07), 958 So.2d 682.

Deputy Martin testified that he placed Defendant under arrest for being “the principle (sic) to aiding a felon, as far as letting Mr. Lee into his room.” In the body camera recording, Deputy Martin kicks the door, causing it to open slightly then close again. Deputy Martin then pushes the door open and enters the motel room. When the door opens and Deputy Martin steps inside, Lee is observed sitting on the bed and it appears Defendant is standing beside the door to Deputy Martin's right. Deputy Martin testified that Defendant had applied force behind the door in an attempt to block his initial entry.

Later, when Deputy Martin enters the motel room a second time to conduct a protective sweep for others who might be inside the motel room, the sound of a toilet flushing is heard, and Defendant is seen in the bathroom through an open doorway. The body camera captures Defendant being escorted from the motel room by another officer. Several minutes afterwards, Defendant appears in the recording, accompanied by an officer, standing near a police unit. On the hood of the unit are several unidentified items which officers recovered in a search incidental to arrest. Defendant was then transported to the Jefferson Parish Correctional Center, where cocaine, a Schedule II Controlled Dangerous Substance, was seized from inside his mouth in a search incidental to his entry into the jail.

As to the evidence seized from Defendant's person, it is the fact of a lawful arrest which authorizes law enforcement to perform a warrantless search. The trial court received live testimony from Deputy Martin and viewed the audio-visual recording of the incident created by his body camera. On review of the record, we find that the trial court's ruling that the warrantless search of the Defendant did not violate his constitutional rights was based upon factual and credibility determinations from the evidence presented, and as such, was not a clear abuse of discretion.

For the foregoing reasons, we do not find the trial court erred in denying Defendant's motion to suppress.

ERRORS PATENT

The record was reviewed for errors patent according to La. C.Cr.P. art. 920;16 State v. Oliveaux, 312 So.2d 337 (La. 1975); and State v. Weiland, 556 So.2d 175 (La. App. 5 Cir. 1990). Our review reveals the trial court did not specify whether the sentence on count one or the original sentence on count three were to be served with or without hard labor.

As to count one, under La.R.S. 14:402(G), the penalty for introducing contraband includes a fine of $500-$10,000 and imprisonment with or without hard labor for up to ten years. If the contraband is a controlled dangerous substance, the penalties under La. R.S. 40:961 et seq. apply. In this case, the contraband was cocaine, governed by La. R.S. 40:967, which provides two sentencing schemes based on weight: less than 28 grams allows for 1-10 years with or without hard labor and an optional fine up to $50,000, while 28 grams or more mandates hard labor for 1-20 years and an optional fine up to $50,000.

The bill of information does not specify the cocaine's weight in count one. The guilty plea form lists a maximum ten-year term and a $500 fine for count one, aligning with the general contraband statute's term range but not the correct mandatory fine range, and reflects a five-year sentence without specifying hard labor. During the plea colloquy, the trial judge stated a maximum of “no more than 10 years at hard labor and/or a fine of $500 or both” and pronounced five years in the Department of Corrections for each count but did not specify whether count one was to be served with or without hard labor. The minute entry and the uniform commitment order both indicate that the sentence was imposed at hard labor, but when there is a discrepancy between the transcript and the minute entry, the transcript prevails. State v. Lynch, 441 So.2d 732, 734 (La. 1983).

The five-year term fits within the ranges for either general contraband or distribution of cocaine regardless of weight. However, if the trial court sentenced Defendant under the general contraband or the lesser-weight distribution scheme, the trial court had discretion regarding hard labor, whereas the greater-weight distribution scheme mandates hard labor. When the applicable sentencing statute allows discretion, the sentencing court's failure to indicate whether the sentence is to be served with or without hard labor is an impermissible, indeterminate sentence. State v. Powell, 23-371 (La. App. 5 Cir. 2/28/24), 383 So.3d 1056, 1062. Here, the record is unclear whether hard labor was required; therefore, the sentence on count one is indeterminate. Accordingly, we vacate Defendant's sentence on count one and remand for imposition of a determinate sentence in accordance with La. C.Cr.P. art. 879. See State v. Rochefort, 23-344 (La. App. 5 Cir. 2/7/24), 383 So.3d 256; State v. Gilbert, 23-121 (La. App. 5 Cir. 11/8/23), 377 So.3d 378, writ denied, 23-1640 (La. 5/29/24), 385 So.3d 704.

As to count three, Defendant was charged with possession of a Schedule II controlled dangerous substance, cocaine, in an aggregate weight of two grams or more but less than twenty-eight grams, which by statute carries imprisonment with or without hard labor for one to five years and an optional fine of up to $5,000. The transcript shows that Defendant received five years’ imprisonment on count three without a specification of with or without hard labor. However, because Defendant's original sentence on count three was vacated during multiple bill proceedings and the enhanced sentence was ordered to be served at hard labor, we find any defect regarding the hard labor specification as to count three is moot.

DECREE

The trial court's decision denying the motions to suppress is affirmed. Defendant's convictions and sentences are affirmed. However, we vacate Defendant's sentence on count one and remand the matter to the trial court for imposition of a determinate sentence consistent with this opinion. As to Defendant's sentence on count three, any defect in the original sentence is moot; Defendant's enhanced sentence on count three is affirmed.

RULING ON MOTIONS TO SUPPRESS AFFIRMED; CONVICTIONS AFFIRMED; SENTENCE ON COUNT ONE VACATED; REMANDED; SENTENCE ON COUNT THREE AFFIRMED

FOOTNOTES

1.   State v. Crosby, 338 So.2d 584 (La. 1976).

2.   In the November 13, 2024 motion to suppress hearing, Defendant argued for the suppression of evidence obtained in the unlawful entry of the room. In reviewing the record, law enforcement officers did not seize contraband in their warrantless search of the room.

MARCEL, J.