STATE v. BOUVIER (2025)

The defendant, Jasmine Bouvier, was charged by bill of information with two counts of second degree cruelty to juveniles, in violation of La. R.S. 14:93.2.3.¹ She pled not guilty and, following a jury trial, was convicted as charged. The trial court denied her motion for new trial, motion in arrest of judgment, and motion for post-verdict judgment of acquittal and sentenced the defendant to concurrent terms of forty years at hard labor on each count. The defendant subsequently filed a motion to reconsider sentence, which was denied. The defendant now appeals, designating two counseled assignments of error and two pro se assignments of error. For the following reasons, we affirm the defendant's convictions and sentences.

FACTS

On October 22, 2019, detectives with the Lafourche Parish Sheriff's Office (“LPSO”) were dispatched to respond to a report of suspected child abuse in Golden Meadow, Louisiana. The four-year-old child, B.N.,² had been airlifted to the University Medical Center (“UMC”) in New Orleans, Louisiana, suffering from multiple injuries consistent with repeated child abuse. B.N.’s injuries included a subdural hematoma, which required emergency brain surgery; malnourishment; bruising to the face, stomach, back, pelvis, genitals, arms, and legs; injuries to the back; swelling and bruising to the genitals; broken pelvic bones; and a broken arm, which also required surgery. A search was conducted at the residence where B.N. lived with his father, Dustin Naquin, and his father's girlfriend, the defendant, which revealed a makeshift paddle, a bloodstained blanket, and several pairs of bloodstained underwear. Naquin and the defendant were brought in for questioning and, following interviews with the detectives, were arrested.

COUNSELED ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR ONE AND PRO SE ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR ONE

In her first counseled assignment of error, the defendant argues the trial court erred in denying her post-trial motions, because there was insufficient evidence to support the jury's guilty verdicts.³ Similarly, in her first pro se assignment of error, she asserts the trial court erred in denying her post-trial motions, because “the physical and testimonial evidence supported” her “history of polyvictimization [which] reasonably justified her failure to act.”

A conviction based on insufficient evidence cannot stand, as it violates due process. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV; La. Const. art. I, § 2. The standard of review for sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction is whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found that the State proved the essential elements of the crime and the defendant's identity as the perpetrator of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); see also La. Code Crim. P. art. 821(B). In conducting this review, we also must be expressly mindful of Louisiana's circumstantial evidence test, which states in part, “assuming every fact to be proved that the evidence tends to prove, in order to convict,” every reasonable hypothesis of innocence is excluded. La. R.S. 15:438; State v. Coleman, 2021-0870 (La. App. 1st Cir. 4/8/22), 342 So.3d 7, 11, writ denied, 2022-00759 (La. 11/21/23), 373 So.3d 460.

When analyzing circumstantial evidence, La. R.S. 15:438 provides that the factfinder must be satisfied the overall evidence excludes every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. When a conviction is based on both direct and circumstantial evidence, the reviewing court must resolve any conflict in the direct evidence by viewing that evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution. When the direct evidence is thus viewed, the facts established by the direct evidence, and the facts reasonably inferred from the circumstantial evidence, must be sufficient for a rational juror to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was guilty of every essential element of the crime. La. R.S. 15:438; Coleman, 342 So.3d at 12.

Second degree cruelty to juveniles is “the intentional or criminally negligent mistreatment or neglect by anyone over the age of seventeen to any child under the age of seventeen which causes serious bodily injury or neurological impairment to that child.” La. R.S. 14:93.2.3(A)(1). General criminal intent is present whenever there is specific intent and also when circumstances indicate that the offender, in the ordinary course of human experience, must have adverted to the prescribed criminal consequences as reasonably certain to result from his act or failure to act. La. R.S. 14:10(2). Criminal negligence exists when there is “such disregard of the interest of others that the offender's conduct amounts to a gross deviation below the standard of care expected to be maintained by a reasonably careful man under like circumstances.” La. R.S. 14:12. “Mistreatment” as used in this statute is equated with abuse. State v. Henderson, 2013-0074 (La. App. 1st Cir. 9/13/13), 135 So.3d 36, 48, writ denied, 2013-2327 (La. 3/21/14), 135 So.3d 617. Serious bodily injury is defined as bodily injury which involves unconsciousness; extreme physical pain; protracted and obvious disfigurement; protracted loss or impairment of the function of a bodily member, organ, or mental faculty; or a substantial risk of death. See La. R.S. 14:2(C).

At trial, Mabeline Naquin,⁴ Naquin's mother and B.N.’s grandmother, testified B.N. lived with Naquin and the defendant between September and October 2019. Mabeline explained that she used to watch B.N. during the day, but when Naquin began working a new job, the defendant quit her job to stay home with B.N. Consequently, Mabeline had not seen B.N. in the two weeks prior to his hospitalization. Recalling October 22, 2019, Mabeline said she had just taken Naquin's older son ⁵ to school when Naquin called her in a panic saying “something was going on with [B.N.]” She testified she instructed Naquin to call 911 if the situation was serious. Mabeline went to Naquin's house after lunch and saw B.N. laying down in what she described as “bad shape.” Mabeline described B.N. as actively seizing; covered in bruises and knots on his face and body; one of his eyes was swollen shut; and he had a sore on his buttocks. According to Mabeline, B.N. was naked underneath a blanket, and he moved the blanket at one point, urinating on himself.

Mabeline instructed Naquin to immediately call 911 and, when the ambulance arrived, neither Naquin nor the defendant went with B.N. to the hospital. Mabeline testified the defendant told her that B.N. had gotten out of his car seat, fell out of the car, and hurt his arm, and the defendant claimed the bruises surrounding his pelvis were due to his car seat being too tight. On cross-examination, Mabeline agreed Naquin had whipped B.N. in the past and had admitted to her that he sometimes used a “makeshift paddle” to hit B.N. Mabeline testified B.N.’s injuries were not consistent with discipline and “[n]o child should be whipped” like B.N. had been whipped.

Heidi Martin, a forensics coordinator at the UMC, testified that on October 22, 2019, a four-year-old unidentified male was airlifted to the UMC from Our Lady of the Sea Hospital in unstable condition. Martin said before the child (later identified as B.N.) was rushed to the operating room for surgery, she photographed his injuries and prepared a photography log. Forty-five photographs were published to the jury and Martin identified the injuries documented on each photograph. B.N. had contusions, abrasions, erythema or redness, and burns on much of his body, and Martin testified his injuries “were in multiple stages of healing.”

Dr. Judith Dodd, accepted as an expert in child abuse pediatrics, testified she was a pediatric forensic nurse practitioner at the Audrey Hepburn CARE Center. After B.N.’s surgeries, Dr. Dodd examined and photographed B.N. on October 23, 2019, and then prepared a report to document his injuries. B.N. was unconscious, intubated and had a feeding tube through his nose at the time. Dr. Dodd testified B.N.’s pupils were not equal in size, and he had a “disconjugate gaze,” which meant his eyes were not working in coordination. One cause of a disconjugate gaze, according to Dr. Dodd, was a traumatic brain injury. Dr. Dodd noted bruises covered most of B.N.’s head and body. Regarding B.N.’s overall health condition, Dr. Dodd testified:

․ [H]is Glasgow Coma score was 3. So just a little primer, Glasgow Coma scores go from 1 to 15-15 is a healthy person. It's a scoring system that considers speaking, eye movement, and, I believe, the third is response to pain and you get points for each of those things. So a healthy person - normal person has a Glasgow Coma score of 15. You - for every one of those things that you cannot do, you lose points essentially. Anything under the score of 8 is considered, a coma.

So when the child presented to University Medical Center before they got to Children's Hospital, according to the charting done, the - the child's Glasgow Coma score at that point was a 7. So he was comatose by the time he presented to ․ University Hospital. By the time he presented to Children's Hospital, his Glasgow Coma score was a 3.

․ [R]esearch suggests that when individuals have a Glasgow Coma score of 3, long range prognosis for survival is about 13 percent. So very concerning for this child's ability to survive his injuries at that point in time.

So - so, yeah. At that point in time, the child couldn't breathe on his own; the child couldn't eat on his own and really was in bad shape.

Dr. Dodd testified B.N. had a fasciotomy to repair his broken humerus, explaining that the surgeons cut the muscle casing that had swollen as a result of the broken bone and that had been restricting blood flow. The surgery treated the compartment syndrome, which would have otherwise resulted in tissue loss and permanent damage. Dr. Dodd testified a craniectomy was performed to relieve pressure in B.N.’s brain from bleeding and swelling. Additionally, B.N. had chronic fractures to both pelvic bones, which Dr. Dodd said were at “different ages[.]” He also had pattern bruising on his thighs, which Dr. Dodd said was important because pattern injuries do not occur accidentally but are typically associated with blunt force trauma or excessive force. Dr. Dodd explained the arm fracture appeared to have been caused from a twisting motion due to the way the bones were misaligned. Dr. Dodd diagnosed B.N. with physical abuse, medical neglect, and an unconfirmed diagnosis of malnutrition.

Kendra Barnes, a detective with the LPSO in 2019, responded to the UMC and learned B.N. was in emergency brain surgery and was not expected to survive. According to Detective Barnes, Naquin and the defendant arrived at the UMC hours later and were then taken to the LPSO for questioning and for the detectives to execute a search of their phones.

Lieutenant Robert Mason with the LPSO testified he was certified to perform forensic cell phone extractions, and he performed a search of the defendant's phone on October 23, 2019. He narrowed his search to focus on the time frame of September to October 2019. Lieutenant Mason was tasked with compiling the relevant information extracted from the defendant's phone, including cell phone location data, call logs, contacts, photographs, videos, and messages, and he established a timeline of events.

The search revealed that on September 12, 2019 a photograph was taken of B.N.’s face, and the photograph showed he had a black eye. On September 25, 2019, a video was recorded that depicted B.N. holding an ice pack to his face while the defendant yelled at him for standing on a chair. B.N. was physically shaking in the video. Another video was recorded on October 4, 2019. In that video, the defendant said she found B.N. eating Goldfish crackers in bed that morning and she “whipped his f***ing a**.” A photograph was taken of sores on B.N.’s buttocks on October 10, 2019. On October 17, 2019, a few days prior to B.N.’s admission to the hospital, the defendant recorded a video wherein she expressed frustration about B.N. eating and drinking too quickly, and she recorded another video of B.N. playing outside with his arm in a sling. Additionally, the following searches were made on the defendant's phone that day: “how to make [s]ure a bone heals prop[e]rly without doc[tor;]” “how to treat a broken arm at home[;]” and “how to make your own sling at hom[e.]” In another video, the defendant said she found B.N. huddled between two chairs eating leftovers, and she told Naquin that he needed to handle him. The defendant then stated that she was “not trying to lose her cool” or “whip [B.N.]” On October 22, the day B.N. was admitted to the hospital, there was a search conducted on the defendant's phone around 6:30 a.m. to ask: “what does it mean if someone[’s] pupils are not reacting to the light.” Around 11:00 a.m. that day, another search was made regarding concussions. The 911 call was not made until 1:20 p.m.

Lieutenant Aaron Manuel of the LPSO, the lead investigator in the case, testified he and Captain Benjamin Dempster interviewed Naquin and the defendant at the Criminal Operations Center in Lockport. The defendant was advised of and waived her Miranda ⁶ rights, and she thereafter provided a statement to the police. The State published an audio recording of the defendant's interview. In the interview, the defendant said she had lived with Naquin and B.N. for the last three months and had recently quit her job to care for B.N. She claimed that on October 18, 2019, B.N. had fallen out of the car, hit his head, and broken his arm. However, the defendant said his injury “didn't seem like it was serious,” so she did not bring him to the doctor; rather, she purchased a sling from Walmart for B.N. to wear. According to the defendant, on October 22, 2019, B.N. stumbled, hit his head on the dryer around 11:30 a.m., and passed out. She claimed that fall caused B.N.’s head injury. At the end of the interview, the defendant admitted she did not plan to ever bring B.N. to the doctor because of the injuries on his buttocks, which were caused by a whipping from Naquin.

Erika Billiot, the defendant's childhood friend, recalled that a few days before B.N. was hospitalized, she went to a pumpkin patch with the defendant, B.N., the defendant's son, and others. When asked if B.N. had makeup on that day, Billiot testified she could not tell, but she acknowledged that she had told the police B.N. was wearing makeup to cover bruises on his face. Billiot said she had noticed bruises and injuries on B.N. before and had seen Naquin “verbally abuse” and whip him. According to Billiot, the defendant texted her that B.N. had a broken arm on October 18, 2019, and when Billiot asked if she had sought medical treatment, the defendant claimed she brought him to a doctor.

Jose Alfredo “Freddie” Chiquito, B.N.’s uncle by marriage, testified he and his wife, Naquin's half-sister, raised B.N. from the time he was two months old until his wife's death in 2017.⁷ After his wife died, B.N. lived with Naquin and Naquin's wife, Jennifer. Chiquito said when Naquin and Jennifer separated in June 2019, B.N. came to live with Chiquito again until Naquin took him in. Chiquito testified he met the defendant, and he knew Naquin and B.N. were living with her somewhere in Golden Meadow. Chiquito learned on October 22, 2019, that B.N. was being rushed to the hospital, and he immediately went to the UMC to see B.N. Chiquito said B.N. was in the hospital until December 14, 2019, and had been living with Chiquito since then.

At trial, the defense called Dustin Naquin, who was incarcerated at the time, to testify. Naquin claimed he only whipped B.N. once and did not see the defendant hit B.N. Naquin identified his work records during October 2019, which showed he worked twelve hours most of the days leading up to B.N.’s hospitalization. Naquin testified that while he was at work, the defendant was B.N.’s caregiver. On October 22, 2019, the defendant called him at lunch and said B.N. was “seizing out and was unresponsive.” Naquin testified he had pled guilty to two counts of second degree cruelty to juveniles and was set for sentencing. Naquin admitted he had an interest in minimizing his responsibility for B.N.’s injuries, because his testimony would be considered at his sentencing.

The defendant testified she was twenty-seven years old and a mother of two at the time of trial. The defendant claimed she had been a victim of physical, verbal, and sexual abuse throughout her life and, as a result, had troubles with her mental health. She testified that she was committed to a mental hospital after a suicide attempt when she was about twenty-one years old. The defendant said her relationship with Naquin was initially great but turned abusive, and she recalled an instance when he “pushed [her] up against the wall by [her] throat” when she threatened to leave him. The defendant testified she took care of B.N. when Naquin was at work in September and October 2019, having quit her job at Naquin's request. According to the defendant, she told Naquin about the sores on B.N.’s buttocks and treated the sores with a hot rag, Neosporin, peroxide, and band-aids. She also said she told Naquin that B.N.’s car seat was too small and asked him loosen the straps, but Naquin did not do so. The defendant testified she did not bring B.N. to the doctor because she was afraid of Naquin and she did not think she could legally bring him without Naquin's permission. The defendant admitted to spanking B.N. once because she was angry.

On appeal, the defendant argues the State's evidence proved Naquin was the sole perpetrator of the abuse inflicted on B.N. She contends her “failure to get B.N. medical help was negligent, but it was based on her ignorance of the law and her fear of [Naquin's] abuse and threats to kill her.” In her pro se brief, she similarly argues “the physical and testimonial evidence supported” her “history of polyvictiminzation [which] reasonably justified her failure to act.”

The perpetration of child abuse is not necessarily exclusive to one parent or caregiver. Although the defendant contended Naquin was solely responsible for the intentional injuries and she offered explanations for the alleged accidental injuries, B.N.’s deteriorated physical condition was readily apparent to anyone who observed him. At the time of his admission to the hospital, B.N. had a subdural hematoma; was suffering from malnourishment; bruising to the face, stomach, back, pelvis, genitals, arms, and legs; injuries to the back; swelling and bruising to the genitals; broken pelvic bones; and a broken arm. It was established during trial that Naquin worked twelve-hour shifts in the days leading to B.N.’s admission to the hospital, and during the time he was at work, B.N. was in the sole care of the defendant. The defendant admitted in her interview that she never planned on seeking medical treatment for the child, despite her having the opportunity to do so. Her claim that she did not believe she had the legal authority to bring B.N. to a doctor is wholly inexcusable. Even if Naquin inflicted the majority of the abuse as suggested, the defendant's failure to seek medical attention for the four-year-old amounted to criminally negligent mistreatment or neglect because she was aware of the abuse and took no action to protect B.N. See State v. Heard, 2016-0809 (La. App. 1st Cir. 12/2/16), 208 So.3d 535, 543, writ denied, 2017-0293 (La. 11/13/17), 229 So.3d 926 (finding the defendant guilty of second degree cruelty to a juvenile, wherein her own statements established she was aware her baby was being abused and took no action to protect her baby); see also State v. Staggs, 2019-0110 (La. App. 1st Cir. 9/27/19), 2019 WL 4739247, *4 (unpublished), writ denied, 2019-01797 (La. 7/17/20), 298 So.3d 174; State v. Stewart, 2024-0454 (La. App. 4th Cir. 5/14/25), ––– So.3d ––––, ––––, 2025 WL 1414856, *8. Based on the evidence presented in this case, the jury could have rationally concluded the defendant committed intentional, or at the very least, criminally negligent mistreatment or neglect of B.N.

We similarly reject the defendant's argument that her failure to protect B.N. was justified due to Naquin's alleged abuse. The fact that an offender's conduct is justifiable, although otherwise criminal, shall constitute a defense to prosecution for any crime based on that conduct. One such circumstance in which the defense of justification may be claimed is when any crime, except murder, is committed through the compulsion of threats by another of death or great bodily harm, and the offender reasonably believes the person making the threats is present and would immediately carry out the threats if the crime were not committed.⁸ La. R.S. 14:18(6). The defense of justification is an affirmative defense that must be proven by a preponderance of the evidence. See State v. Cheatwood, 458 So.2d 907, 910 (La. 1984); State in Interest of M.P., 2012-1535 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2/22/13), 2013 WL 674707, *2 (unpublished). In reviewing a conviction in which the defendant offered testimony that her criminal actions were justified, a reviewing court accords great deference to a jury's decision to accept or reject the testimony of a witness in whole or in part. State v. Morrison, 45,620 (La. App. 2d Cir. 11/24/10), 55 So.3d 856, 864.

We find the defendant failed to prove, by a preponderance of evidence, that she was justified in her failure to act, because her defense was based solely on self-serving testimony. The evidence adduced at trial failed to show she was acting under present or immediate threats. Rather, the evidence readily showed Naquin was at work for prolonged periods of time, during which she could have sought help for B.N. The defendant testified she had access to a vehicle while Naquin was at work, and she lived less than five miles from a hospital. We conclude the jury reasonably rejected the defendant's claim that she was justified in committing the offenses of second degree cruelty to juveniles.

An appellate court errs by substituting its appreciation of the evidence and credibility of witnesses for that of the factfinder and thereby overturning a verdict on the basis of an exculpatory hypothesis of innocence presented to, and rationally rejected by, the jury. See State v. Calloway, 2007-2306 (La. 1/21/09), 1 So.3d 417, 418 (per curiam). Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, we find that a rational trier of fact could have found the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt both counts of second degree cruelty to juveniles. Thus, these assignments of error are without merit.

COUNSELED ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR TWO AND PRO SE ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR TWO

In her second counseled assignment of error, the defendant asserts her forty-year sentences are unconstitutionally excessive under the circumstances. In her second pro se assignment of error, she argues the trial court failed to adequately consider the mitigating evidence prior to imposing the maximum sentence on each count.

Both the United States and Louisiana Constitutions prohibit the imposition of cruel or excessive punishment. U.S. Const. amend. VIII; La. Const. art. I, § 20. Although a sentence falls within statutory limits, it may be excessive. State v. Sepulvado, 367 So.2d 762, 767 (La. 1979). A sentence is unconstitutionally excessive if it is grossly disproportionate to the severity of the offense or constitutes nothing more than a purposeless and needless infliction of pain and suffering. A sentence is grossly disproportionate if, when the crime and punishment are considered in light of the harm done to society, it shocks one's sense of justice. State v. Livous, 2018-0016 (La. App. 1st Cir. 9/24/18), 259 So.3d 1036, 1044, writ denied, 2018-1788 (La. 4/15/19), 267 So.3d 1130. The trial court has great discretion in imposing a sentence within the statutory limits, and such a sentence will not be set aside as excessive in the absence of an abuse of discretion. State v. Scott, 2017-0209 (La. App. 1st Cir. 9/15/17), 228 So.3d 207, 211, writ denied, 2017-1743 (La. 8/31/18), 251 So.3d 410.

Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure article 894.1 sets forth the factors for the trial court to consider when imposing sentence. While the entire checklist of La. Code Crim. P. art. 894.1 need not be recited, the record must reflect the trial court adequately considered the criteria. Scott, 228 So.3d at 211. The articulation of the factual basis for a sentence is the goal of La. Code Crim. P. art. 894.1, not rigid or mechanical compliance with its provisions. The trial court should review the defendant's personal history, her prior criminal record, her family dependents, the seriousness of the offense, the likelihood that she will commit another crime, and her potential for rehabilitation through correctional services other than confinement. On appellate review of a sentence, the relevant question is whether the trial court abused its broad sentencing discretion, not whether another sentence might have been more appropriate. Scott, 228 So.3d at 211.

The factors guiding the decision of the trial court are necessary for an appellate court to adequately review a sentence for excessiveness and, therefore, should be in the record. Otherwise, a sentence may appear to be arbitrary or excessive and not individualized to the particular defendant. When the reasons for an apparently severe sentence in relation to the particular defendant and the actual offense committed do not appear in the record, a sentence may be vacated and remanded for resentencing. State v. Baker, 2023-0815 (La. App. 1st Cir. 4/19/24), 389 So.3d 839, 843. While the trial courts are afforded great discretion in sentencing, the appellate court still must review the sentences to ensure that there has been no abuse of that discretion. Id.

Whoever commits the crime of second degree cruelty to juveniles shall be imprisoned at hard labor for not more than forty years. La. R.S. 14:93.2.3(C). The defendant was sentenced to forty years at hard labor on each count; thus, the sentences imposed are the statutory maximum. Maximum sentences may be imposed for the most serious offenses and the worst offenders or when the offender poses an unusual risk to the public safety in light of his past repeated criminality. State v. Parker, 2012-1550 (La. App. 1st Cir. 4/26/13), 116 So.3d 744, 754, writ denied, 2013-1200 (La. 11/22/13), 126 So.3d 478.

At the sentencing hearing, the State requested the trial court impose the maximum forty-year sentence on each count and impose the sentences consecutively due to the heinous nature of the offenses. The defense presented evidence that showed since being incarcerated, the defendant completed several self-improvement classes, including impact anxiety, domestic abuse, risk management, anger management, and soft skills. Following arguments, the trial court provided extensive reasons for its sentences. Of the aggravating and mitigating factors delineated in La. Code Crim. P. art. 894.1, the trial court found the following applied: (1) the defendant's conduct during the commission of the offenses manifested deliberate cruelty to B.N.; (2) the defendant knew or should have known that B.N. was particularly vulnerable given his age; (3) the defendant used threats or actual violence in the commission of the offenses; and (4) the offenses resulted in significant permanent injury to B.N. The trial court considered that the defendant was a first time offender. Before imposing the maximum sentence on each count, the trial court reviewed the investigation reports, the bill of information, the testimony and exhibits introduced at trial, and the presentence investigation.

In her motion to reconsider sentence, the defendant argued the trial court failed to consider her “personal history and characteristics” in tailoring her sentences. She specifically discussed the history of abuse she suffered and resulting mental health issues. Finally, she opined the trial court's sentences were “purely aimed toward retribution” and failed to account for the goals of the judicial system.

On appeal, the defendant argues her forty-year sentences are not proportional to the severity of the offenses, asserting she is not one of the worst offenders and hers is not one of the worst offenses. The defendant contends the trial court erred by sentencing her to the maximum sentence on each count when Naquin “was by far more culpable for the injuries to B.N. and should have been given the harsher sentence.” In her pro se brief, the defendant argues the trial court failed to fully consider the mitigating circumstances, namely her history of polyvictimization.

Based on our review of the record, we find the defendant's forty-year sentences are not unconstitutionally excessive. The trial court, who was in the best position to consider the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, thoroughly reviewed the sentencing guidelines set forth in La. Code Crim. P. art. 894.1. There is no requirement that specific matters be given any particular weight at sentencing. State v. Brown, 51,352 (La. App. 2d Cir. 5/2/17), 223 So.3d 88, 103, writ denied, 2017-1154 (La. 5/11/18), 241 So.3d 1013. The trial court's statements indicate the sentences were based on the permanent, life-altering injuries suffered by B.N. The abuse perpetrated by the defendant and her failure to seek medical attention for the four-year-old who was in her care nearly resulted in B.N.’s death. Considering B.N.’s injuries and the lifelong physical and emotional scars, the forty-year sentences are not grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crimes and do not shock the sense of justice. Although a maximum sentence is generally reserved for the worst offenders and the worst offenses, the trial court's explanation of the sentences demonstrates the defendant is one of the worst offenders and the abuse suffered by B.N. is one of the worst offenses.

Considering the facts of the offenses, the nature and background of the defendant, and the trial court's reasons for imposing sentence, we find the sentences are not grossly disproportionate to the severity of the offenses. While the defendant argues lesser sentences are more appropriate, the question on review is whether the trial court abused its discretion, not whether another sentence might have been more appropriate. See Scott, 228 So.3d at 211. Therefore, we find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing the defendant to concurrent terms of forty years at hard labor, and these assignments of error lack merit.

PATENT ERROR

Pursuant to La. Code Crim. P. art. 920(2), this court routinely conducts a review of all appeals for error discoverable by mere inspection of the pleadings and proceedings and without inspection of the evidence. State v. Anthony, 2023-0117 (La. App. 1st Cir. 11/3/23), 378 So.3d 766, 775, writ denied, 2024-00027 (La. 5/21/24), 385 So.3d 242. After a careful review of the record, we have found one patent error.

The record reflects the trial court failed to advise the defendant of the prescriptive period for filing an application for post-conviction relief at sentencing. Though the transcript and the minutes state the trial court provided the defendant with a copy of La. Code Crim. P. art. 930.8 setting forth the post-conviction relief prescriptive period, the record does not contain a copy, if one was provided. Nevertheless, the trial court's failure to advise the defendant of the prescriptive period has no bearing on the sentences and is not grounds to reverse the sentences or remand for resentencing. State v. LeBoeuf, 2006-0153 (La. App. 1st Cir. 9/15/06), 943 So.2d 1134, 1142-43, writ denied, 2006-2621 (La. 8/15/07), 961 So.2d 1158. Out of an abundance of caution and in the interest of judicial economy, we advise the defendant that La. Code Crim. P. art. 930.8 generally provides that no application for post-conviction relief, including applications which seek an out-of-time appeal, shall be considered if filed more than two years after the judgment of conviction and sentence have become final under the provisions of La. Code Crim. P. arts. 914 or 922. LeBoeuf, 943 So.2d at 1143.

Accordingly, we affirm the defendant's convictions and sentences.

CONVICTIONS AND SENTENCES AFFIRMED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   In a separate trial court docket number, the defendant's co-participant, Dustin Naquin, was charged with two counts of second degree cruelty to juveniles. Naquin pled guilty as charged, and this court affirmed his convictions and sentences on appeal. See State v. Naquin, 2024-0832 (La. App. 1st Cir. 7/11/25), 2025 WL 1913567, *1 (unpublished).

2.   We use the victim's initials to protect his identity. See La. R.S. 46:1844(W).

3.   The defendant argues the trial court erred in denying her post-trial motions while ultimately objecting to the sufficiency of the evidence presented at trial. We note the question of the legal sufficiency of evidence is properly raised by a motion for post-verdict judgment of acquittal, not by a motion for new trial or a motion in arrest of judgment. See La. Code Crim. P. art. 821 and 859. An appellate court reviews a ruling on a motion for new trial only for errors of law. See La. Code Crim. P. art. 858; State v. Stalls, 2023-0829 (La. App. 1st Cir. 9/26/24), 405 So.3d 786, 790 n.3 (en banc), writ denied, 2024-01276 (La. 4/23/25), 406 So.3d 1177. Accordingly, the only issue reviewable in this assignment of error is the constitutional sufficiency of the evidence, which was raised in the defendant's motion for post-verdict judgment of acquittal. Id.

4.   As Mabeline Naquin and co-participant Dustin Naquin share the same last name, we will refer to Mabeline by her first name to avoid confusion.

5.   Mabeline testified she was raising Naquin's older son at the time.

6.   Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).

7.   B.N.’s biological mother was in jail at the time.

8.   The jury was instructed regarding the defendant's compulsion defense.

WOLFE, J.