STATE OF LOUISIANA v. DARRILL HENRY (2025)

This is a wrongful conviction compensation case pursuant to La. R.S. 15:572.8. Appellant, the State through the Louisiana Attorney General (“the State”), appeals the trial court's November 14, 2024 decision, which granted the petition for compensation for wrongful conviction and imprisonment filed by Appellee, Darrill Henry (“Henry”). For the following reasons, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

This Court in State v. Henry, 2013-0059, p. 1 (La. App. 4 Cir. 8/6/14), 147 So.3d 1143, 1146 (Henry I), summarized the facts leading to Henry's conviction as follows:

On June 15, 2004, at approximately 1:30 p.m., eighty-nine year old Durelli Watts and her sixty-seven year old daughter, Ina Gex, were brutally murdered in Ms. Watts’[s] Gentilly home at 1930 Duels Street. After stabbing Ms. Watts fourteen times, the perpetrator set her body and the house on fire. Before he could leave the house, Ms. Gex arrived to check on her mother. The perpetrator shot Ms. Gex three times as she stood on the porch and, after rummaging through her purse, shot her a fourth time in the head. He then walked away from the house and down the street. Three of Ms. Watts’[s] neighbors witnessed the shooting. They removed Ms. Gex from the porch but were unable to assist Ms. Watts because the residence was engulfed in flames.

Henry was indicted and charged with two counts of first-degree murder on September 2, 2004.

Trial commenced on August 23, 2011. At trial, there was no forensic evidence implicating Henry. See Henry I, 2013-0059, p. 4, 147 So.3d at 1147. The DNA recovered from the scene belonged to one or both victims. Id. at pp. 14, 147 So.3d at 1152. Only eyewitness testimony from Ms. Watts's neighbors was presented to establish Henry's guilt. Id. at p. 4, 147 So.3d at 1147.

The jury convicted Henry of both counts on August 31, 2011. The trial judge sentenced Henry to life imprisonment without benefit of parole, probation or suspension of sentence on both counts.

This Court affirmed Henry's conviction and sentence, finding the evidence was constitutionally sufficient to support his conviction.¹ Henry I, 2013-0059, p. 16, 147 So.3d at 1153.

Henry sought a writ in the Louisiana Supreme Court, which was subsequently denied. State v. Henry, 2014-1869 (La. 4/10/15), 164 So.3d 831. Henry further sought a writ of certiorari with the United States Supreme Court, which was also denied. Henry v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 969 (2015).

In 2016, Henry filed an application for post-conviction relief, which requested permission to conduct DNA testing on a number of evidentiary items, including Ms. Watts's fingernails and a wallet. The trial court granted Henry's request to conduct DNA testing on March 31, 2017.

A post-conviction evidentiary hearing occurred on September 9 and 10, 2019. The parties filed post-hearing memoranda, and the trial court held oral arguments on March 5, 2020. On March 11, 2020, the trial court vacated Henry's conviction and granted him a new trial based on the DNA evidence.² The State thereafter sought a writ in this Court in May 2020.

On July 22, 2020, this Court granted the State's writ application and vacated the trial court's ruling, finding it applied the standard for a motion for new trial set forth in La. C.Cr.P. art. 851(B)(3), not a post-conviction claim of innocence pursuant to La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.3(7). State v. Henry, 2020-0233, pp. 4-5 (La. App. 4 Cir. 7/22/20) 302 So.3d 1167, 1170. This Court thus found that the trial court erred by granting the application and ordering a new trial. Id. This Court then remanded the case to the trial court to address whether the results of the DNA tests met the “more stringent standard required by La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.3(7).” Id., 2020-0233, p. 5, 302 So.3d at 1170. On remand, on July 29, 2020, the trial court stated that, while it did not specifically reference La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.3(7), it was aware that the clear and convincing standard was applicable and again granted Henry's post-conviction application, vacated the conviction, and ordered a new trial.³ The State then sought a writ again in July 2020.

On October 29, 2020, this Court granted the State's writ application but denied relief, finding the trial court did not abuse its discretion. State v. Henry, 2020-0412, p. 16 (La. App. 4 Cir. 10/29/20), 307 So.3d 249, 258 (“Henry II”). The Court stated:

Given that the only forensic evidence available tends to show Respondent's innocence—and certainly does not inculpate him—we do not find that the district court abused its discretion in ruling that Respondent had demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that he is factually innocent of the murders of Ms. Watts and Ms. Gex.

We are mindful of the standard of La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.3(7), which does not require that the DNA test results here conclusively exonerate Respondent, or even that Respondent's innocence be established beyond a reasonable doubt, in order for Respondent to be entitled to relief. Rather, La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.3(7) requires that Respondent prove by clear and convincing evidence that he is factually innocent of these crimes. The record supports the district court's finding that Respondent met that burden of proof. Accordingly, we do not find that the trial court abused its discretion in granting Respondent's application for post-conviction relief, vacating his convictions, and ordering a new trial.

Id., at pp. 15-16, 307 So.3d at 258.

The State declined to go forward with a new trial and dismissed the charges against Henry on January 20, 2023.

On July 14, 2023, Henry filed a petition for compensation for wrongful conviction and imprisonment pursuant to La. R.S. 15:572.8.

The wrongful conviction compensation hearing occurred on August 20 and August 22, 2024. At the hearing, Henry called Dr. Nancy Franklin (“Dr. Franklin”), and the State called Henry to testify.⁴

Henry offered and introduced Dr. Franklin's curriculum vitae (“CV”) and expert report as exhibits. The parties also stipulated to the following exhibits, including: the August 2011 trial transcripts and exhibits; the March 2017 order granting DNA testing; the September 2019 post-conviction transcripts and exhibits, including: the CV for Alan Keel (“Mr. Keel”), an expert in DNA analysis; the 2018 Forensic Analytical Crime Lab (“FACL”) DNA report conducted by Mr. Keel; the 2019 supplemental FACL report; the CV of Anne Montgomery (“Ms. Montgomery”), a DNA expert; the 2019 report conducted by Ms. Montgomery; the 2005 DNA report by Ms. Montgomery; the first electropherograms from the right fingernail; the second set of electropherograms in the second DNA extraction. The parties further stipulated to the July 29, 2020 transcript of the post-conviction ruling on remand; the January 20, 2023 nolle prosequi minute entry; and Henry's docket master record.

After hearing the testimony and the evidence, the trial court took the matter under advisement and on November 14, 2024, granted the wrongful conviction compensation petition. The trial court stated in part:⁵

In this instant case, which is similar in the Court's opinion to Jones 6 and Ruano,7 R-U-A-N-O, expert testimony was given in support of the petitioner's factual innocence․ Louisiana Revised Statute 15:752.8, subsection “D”, reads in pertinent part, “The Court shall render a final decision on all petitions for compensation filed in accordance with the provisions of this section, and it shall be tried by the judge alone. The Court may consider any relevant evidence, regardless of whether it was admissible in or excluded from the criminal trial in which the petitioner was convicted.”

Recognizing the significance of the DNA evidence, and the expert testimony, and the State's decision to enter a nolle prosequi in this case on January 1st of 2022, ․ this Court finds that there was no evidence presented at the contradictory hearing proceedings on both August 20th and August 22nd for this Court to find a different result.

Therefore, it is the ruling of this Court that petitioner having been found factually innocent on March 11, 2020 by Judge Waldron, and that ruling having been upheld by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal and the Louisiana Supreme Court,8 the Court finds that in considering the petition for compensation for wrongful conviction, this Court has acutely been aware of the profound responsibility inherent in this Court's decision. The tragic consequences of a wrongful conviction extend beyond mere years lost. They encompass the immeasurable impacts on one's life, dignity, and future. After an exhaustive review of all evidence, arguments, and testimony presented, and with careful reflection on the standards and principals of justice, this Court concludes that the granting of the petition is both appropriate and necessary to meet the ends of justice. Accordingly, the petitioner's petition for compensation for wrongful conviction is hereby granted.9

The State's appeal followed.

Wrongful Conviction Compensation Hearing

Dr. Franklin,¹⁰ whom the trial court accepted as a qualified expert in eyewitness identification,¹¹ testified that she reviewed the following materials in preparation for the hearing and in preparing her report:¹² the police reports; the statements of the witnesses, Mr. Steven Dominick, Ms. Linda Davis and Ms. Cecilia Garcia; the composite sketches of the perpetrator created by the descriptions of Mr. Dominick and Ms. Garcia; the preliminary hearing transcript; the suppression hearing transcript; trial testimony; photographs of the scene of the crime; photo arrays presented to the witnesses; Henry's booking photograph; and a televised photograph of Henry broadcasted on the news.

Dr. Franklin testified about how memory is flawed and that stranger identification has been found to be the most challenging, especially as time progresses. Dr. Franklin testified regarding a number of factors that could increase misidentification, including: the distance between the witness and the event; the duration of view of the event; any stress experienced by the witness during the event; the presence of a weapon; any obstructions in the witness's viewing of the event; a perpetrator's use of a partial disguise; and the age of the witness.

With respect to distance, Dr. Franklin stated that after about 25 feet the quality of information that the witness is able to process from the face, the details that would let a witness uniquely identify the perpetrator, becomes compromised.

She stated that with regard to obstruction, if a witness is not able to see the complete face there tends to be an increase in the risk of misidentification, particularly if the suspect is made to stand out in an identification procedure. Relatedly, Dr. Franklin stated that a partial disguise, like a hat, hood, or sunglasses, increases misidentifications.

Dr. Franklin testified that stress also impacts eyewitness identification. She noted that if there is a presence of a threat, the face is remembered “more poorly than a face seen under non-stressful circumstances.” She stated that high-stress situations impair the ability to encode memories because a person's attention is drawn toward the threatening element of the scene. For example, Dr. Franklin noted that if there is a weapon, a person's attention is directed at a gun and they have reduced resources for processing the face. Dr. Franklin stated the presence of a weapon in a scene leads to higher error rates in identifying the perpetrator's face.

As to the age of a witness, Dr. Franklin stated that humans are at a cognitive peak at 29 years old but that it declines from mid-30s onward with an accelerated decline in the 50s. She said older witnesses are more suggestible because their memories are weaker and are easier to steer toward identifying a particular suspect.

Dr. Franklin also discussed factors that could contaminate memory after an incident, including: the introduction of new information that is incorporated into the memory; leading questions by a police officer; exposure to composite sketches; the length of time before identifications; non-blind administrators in identification procedures; “filler quality” or “filler fairness” (which relates to people included in a photo array or line-up with the suspect); positive or negative feedback received in the identification procedures; exposure to the suspect; commitment effects; identification of a non-suspect; confidence malleability and hindsight bias; and in-court identification procedures.

She stated that studies show that when people try to form a composite of a stranger's face and then attempt an identification procedure, they do worse than if they had not engaged in the composite task.

With regard to filler fairness, Dr. Franklin stated that in identification procedures the suspect should not unduly standout. She testified if a witness recalls that the suspect is wearing a plaid jacket or a red shirt, the witness is more likely to identify a subject wearing similar clothing.

As to feedback, Dr. Franklin explained that if a witness was unable to make an identification but later discovered in the news that a person is a suspect, this is negative feedback about the non-identification and will make the witness more inclined to identify that suspect. With regard to positive feedback, Dr. Franklin stated that when a witness makes an identification and is told that they identified the suspect, it spikes the witness's confidence and increases the likelihood they would identify that same person in another identification procedure. She also stated that positive feedback also distorts the witness's memory of the perpetrator and the event: “so you may remember a better view than you actually got.”

Dr. Franklin testified that exposure to the suspect may produce misidentification. She explained that in a criminal investigation, a witness may view a lineup, a photo array, or view a suspect on the news. Dr. Franklin stated that this exposure to the suspect makes a witness more likely to identify that person as a perpetrator just because the witness has seen the face before.

She stated that in addition to exposure, there are “commitment effects.” Dr. Franklin indicated if a witness initially makes an identification, the witnesses tends to stick with the first identification at later lineups. She said psychology journals advise against presenting a witness with more than one identification procedure because of “the risk of this artificially produced sincere ․ feeling of ․ that must be him because his face is ringing a bell.”

Dr. Franklin stated that another factor that may affect memory after an incident includes the identification of a non-suspect or non-identification of a suspect. She testified both of these factors are “diagnostic that the suspect is not the actual perpetrator.” For example, Dr. Franklin noted that “a witness can be given a photo array, in that same photo array they may both not identify the actual suspect, and they may also point to someone else and say, this face, you know, is popping out at me. Each of those is independent diagnostic of non-involvement.”

With regard to confidence malleability, Dr. Franklin noted that confidence is easily manipulated. She stated studies have shown that in most DNA exoneration cases the “witnesses start with some form of equivocation or they pick someone else or they don't pick the suspect,” but by the time of trial, the witnesses are “a hundred percent confident it's the suspect.” Dr. Franklin stated that confidence tends to rise over the course of the investigation leading to trial because of the rehearsal of the memory over and over again.

Hindsight bias relates to the phenomenon where a witness has inflated confidence for a memory and believes that they “always felt [that] way.” Dr. Franklin states that people go back and rewrite their memory to make it consistent with what they believe now.

Dr. Franklin testified that scientific research shows that in-court identification procedures are highly suggestive. She stated that it presents the suspect without the protection of fillers surrounding him. Often the suspect is in hand-cuffs, in a prison uniform, and/or sitting with counsel behind a table, suggesting that he is the obvious guy to pick. Dr. Franklin stated that experts in her field consider it a “moment of theater” that does not provide valuable information regarding the identification of the suspect.

The State did not cross-examine Dr. Franklin.

The State called Henry to testify. Henry testified that in June of 2004, he did not know the victims, Ms. Gex or Ms. Watts. He denied ever being present at 1930 Duels Street. He also denied doing any manual labor for Ms. Gex or Ms. Watts. He testified that he did not know the witnesses, Ms. Davis or Ms. Garcia other than from observing them at trial. Henry stated that he had seen the witness, Mr. Dominick in jail.

He stated that on the day of the crime, June 15, 2004, at approximately 1:00 p.m., he was applying to work at several restaurants, including Hotel Monteleone, Redfish Grill, Sheraton Hotel, Rally's, and Burger King. He stated that he was filling out applications from approximately 9:30 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. that night. He did not have a car or a bike; he testified he walked to each business to apply for a job.

Henry testified that he lived in the 2100 block of Law Street in 2004 but said he was staying at his mom's place in the Calliope Projects the day of the incident. Henry stated he was living at his mom's apartment for about two weeks.¹³

APPPLICABLE LAW

This Court in Ballard v. State, 2024-0606, pp. 18-19, --- So.3d ---- 2025 WL 815225, at *9 (La. App. 4 Cir. 3/14/25), writ denied, 2025-00450 (La. 6/3/25) 410 So.3d 789, summarized the law on wrongful conviction compensation, stating as follows:

La. R.S. 15:572.8, “[t]he Wrongful Conviction Compensation Statute[,] ‘is sui generis, and governs a unique situation’ such that it is ‘the only relevant authority governing’ petitions for compensation for wrongful conviction and imprisonment.” Jones v. State, 2022-01455, p. 5 (La. 5/5/23), 362 So.3d 341, 344 (quoting Burge v. State, 2010-2229, p. 6 (La. 2/11/11), 54 So.3d 1110, 1113).

La. R.S. 15:572.8 provides, in pertinent part:

A. A petitioner is entitled to compensation in accordance with this Section if he has served in whole or in part a sentence of imprisonment under the laws of this state for a crime for which he was convicted and:

(1) The conviction of the petitioner has been reversed or vacated; and

(2) The petitioner has proven by clear and convincing scientific or non-scientific evidence that he is factually innocent of the crime for which he was convicted.

B. For the purposes of this Section, “factual innocence” means that the petitioner did not commit the crime for which he was convicted and incarcerated nor did he commit any crime based upon the same set of facts used in his original conviction.

․

D. ․ The court may consider any relevant evidence regardless of whether it was admissible in, or excluded from, the criminal trial in which the petitioner was convicted.

Thus, La. R.S. 15:572.8[ ] “requires proof of factual innocence by clear and convincing evidence.” Jones, 2022-01455, p. 5, 362 So.3d at 345 (citing La. R.S. 15:572.8(A)(2)). “To meet the clear and convincing evidence standard, the petitioner must ‘prove the existence of a contested fact is highly probable, or much more probable than its non-existence.’ ” Id., pp. 5-6, 362 So.3d at 345 (quoting Talbot v. Talbot, 2003-0814, pp. 9-10 (La. 12/12/03), 864 So.2d 590, 598).

In reviewing an application for compensation for wrongful conviction and imprisonment pursuant to La. R.S. 15:572.8, an appellate court “must afford great weight to the findings of the trier of fact and apply the manifest error standard.” State v. Ruano, 2019-0709, p. 4 (La. App. 4 Cir. 3/4/19), 294 So.3d 44, 46 (citing State v. Ford, 50,525, p. 5 (La. App. 2 Cir. 5/18/16), 193 So.3d 1242, 1247). “Further, ‘[t]he issue is not whether the trial court's findings are right or wrong, but whether they are reasonable on the record as a whole.’ ” Id.14

In examining La. R.S. 15:572.8, the Fifth Circuit in State v. Alexander, 2022-2012, pp. 18-20 (La. App. 5 Cir. 6/21/23), 367 So.3d 867, 881–82, writ denied, 2023-01017 (La. 11/8/23), 373 So.3d 46, outlined three methods by which a petitioner may prove that he is factually innocent:

First, the petitioner may produce probative, affirmative evidence that another person perpetrated the crime. Such evidence may be direct, e.g., when another person has confessed to or been convicted of the crime at issue, or circumstantial, e.g., photographs of a man who better fits the description of the perpetrator. See State v. Ruano, [20]19-709 [p. 8-9] (La. App. 4 Cir. 3/4/19), 294 So.3d 44, 49. [ ]

․

Second, the petitioner may point out the absence of evidence establishing him as the perpetrator of the crime or attempt to cast into doubt the prosecution's evidence. Because of the shifted burdens of production and persuasion, the petitioner may not rely on an absence of prosecutorial evidence alone to satisfy his burden of proving factual innocence as may be done by the accused in a criminal proceeding. It is nevertheless incumbent on the petitioner to call to the factfinder's attention the quantity and quality of the evidence presented that established his conviction since both factors are directly relevant to a determination of his factual innocence. This may be particularly important in cases where there is little and/or poor evidence linking the petitioner to the crime. Evidence regarding the investigation, trial, and subsequent proceedings may be pertinent under this consideration.

․

An[ ] example of evidence introduced to cast doubt on the evidence linking the petitioner to the crime may be found in Jones. In that case, where the State's prosecution rested entirely upon the victim's identification, Mr. Jones introduced the testimony of an expert witness in eyewitness identification who testified as to various factors that indicate the potential for inaccuracies, such as the presence of a weapon, prolonged delay between the crime and the identification, and low-confidence identifications. Jones, 362 So.3d 341. Such expert testimony was recognized as undermining the evidentiary value of the victim's identification. Id.

Third, the petitioner may provide evidence of absence or evidence that excludes him as the perpetrator of the crime. Such evidence, as contemplated by the statute, may be scientific such as DNA evidence, forensic bite marks or fingerprints, or non-scientific evidence, such as alibi testimony from the petitioner or another witness, or some other kind of physical evidence, that may directly or circumstantially exclude the petitioner as the perpetrator of the crime.

See also State v. Walter, 2024-0420, p. 8 (La. App. 4 Cir. 4/29/25) --- So.3d ----, ---, 2025 WL 1232618, at *4. This case concerns the second and third methods.

DISCUSSION

The State asserts two assignments of error: (1) the trial court erred in granting Henry's petition for wrongful conviction compensation on the grounds that it was based on factual inaccuracy and a legally erroneous burden; and (2) that the trial court erred in denying the State the “ability to present a fair defense to the petition.”

Assignment of Error No. 1: Granting the Compensation Petition

Factual Inaccuracy

The State contends that the trial court erred in granting the petition because it was based on factual inaccuracy.

As noted above, in its reasons for granting the petition, the trial court noted that Judge Waldron determined that Henry was factually innocent and “that ruling [was] upheld by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal and the Louisiana Supreme Court.” This Court in Henry II did find that the record supported the trial court's finding that Henry proved he is factually innocent of the crimes. Id., 2020-0412, p. 16, 307 So.3d at 258. However, it does not appear that the State applied for writs with the Louisiana Supreme Court and thus the Louisiana Supreme Court did not address the issue of factual innocence post-conviction, contrary to the trial court's remarks.

The State also notes that in denying its request to stay the proceedings pending the adjudication of this appeal, the trial court stated: “[T]his Court is going to deny your request for a stay. This gentleman has been found to be factually innocent since 2020. We are now in 2024, about to enter 2025. I am not granting the stay.”

Nevertheless, as will be discussed below, the trial court's misstatement of the procedural history regarding the Louisiana Supreme Court was not the reason behind the trial court's conclusion that wrongful conviction compensation was warranted. Additionally, with regard to the trial court's statement that Henry was found factually innocent in 2020, it is apparent that the trial court was referring to the trial court's earlier finding of factual innocence in post-conviction proceedings. See La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.3(7) (granting post-conviction relief when “[t]he results of DNA testing performed pursuant to an application granted under Article 926.1 proves by clear and convincing evidence that the petitioner is factually innocent of the crime for which he was convicted”); Henry II, 2020-0412, p. 12, 307 So.3d at 256 (quoting the trial court's statements in 2020 that: “I believe that it's highly probable, based on the evidence that has been newly discovered and presented ․ that the defendant is factually innocent of the crime for which he was convicted” under La. C.C.P. art. 930.3(7)). We do not find the State's arguments in this regard persuasive.

Legally Erroneous Evidentiary Burden

The State further notes that in its ruling granting the petition, the trial court stated that there was “no evidence presented at the contradictory hearing proceedings on both August 20th and August 22nd [compensation hearing] for this Court to find a different result” and emphasized that “petitioner [was] found factually innocent on March 11, 2020 by Judge Waldron.” The State argues that these statements show that the trial court improperly shifted the burden of proof to the State and erroneously determined Henry was factually innocent based on Judge Waldron's findings.

However, a review of the entire reasons for judgment shows that the trial court applied the appropriate evidentiary burden.¹⁵ The trial court acknowledged that under La. R.S. 15:572.8(A), Henry had the burden of proving “by clear and convincing scientific or non-scientific evidence that he is factually innocent of the crime for which he was convicted.” The trial court noted that factual innocence under La. R.S. 15:572.8(B) means that Henry “did not commit the crime for which he was convicted and incarcerated, nor did he commit any crime based upon the same set of facts used in his original conviction.” The trial court also recognized that it was the legislature's intent that “compensation will not be awardable in every matter in which post-conviction relief has been granted”  ¹⁶ and emphasized again that an “applicant must prove by clear and convincing evidence that he did not commit the crime.” It further cited jurisprudence providing that to meet this burden of proof under La. R.S. 15:572.8 the petitioner must prove “it was highly probable or much more probable than not that he did not commit” the crime of which he was convicted “so as to be entitled to compensation.” See Jones, 2022-01455, p. 5, 362 So.3d at 344. The trial court then discussed two cases, Jones and Ruano, wherein the petitioner was found to have met his burden. The trial court opined that the two cases were similar to the present case in that expert testimony was given to support the petitioner's factual innocence. The trial court also noted the DNA evidence and the fact that the State chose to dismiss the charges rather than proceed with a new trial. The trial court further stated that it reviewed “the totality of evidence presented” - which included the joint and stipulated exhibits, evidence offered at the compensation hearing, the prior proceedings, and other evidence and exhibits presented therein - before reaching the determination that Henry is entitled to compensation.

While the trial court discussed the failure of the State to offer refuting evidence and noted Judge Waldron's findings in the post-conviction proceedings, taking into account the evidence considered and the legal principles outlined in its reasons for judgment, we find that the trial court understood and applied the correct clear and convincing burden of proof to Henry's claim for compensation. See Ballard, 2024-0606, pp. 20-21, 2025 WL 815225, at *10 (finding that the trial court's statement in its reasons that the petitioner “began the hearing before this Court․actually innocent” did not establish that the trial court improperly presumed the petitioner's innocence in reaching its conclusion, where in its reasons for judgment the trial court acknowledged that the petitioner was required to prove “by clear and convincing evidence” that he was “factually innocent of the crime for which he was convicted”). The State's argument in this regard lacks merit.

Additionally, considering the evidence in the record and the vast deference bestowed upon the trial court in findings of fact, we cannot find that the trial court manifestly erred in concluding Henry met his burden of proving factual innocence.

Evidence of Factual Innocence

The testimony and report of the defense's DNA expert, Mr. Keel, offered at the post-conviction proceedings, show that Henry was eliminated as a contributor from the DNA recovered from both Ms. Watts's fingernails and the wallet collected at the scene of the crime.¹⁷ Specifically, Keel stated that the FACL testing of the victim's fingernails ultimately revealed a mixture of only two contributors: one female, which was determined to be the victim, and one male. He testified that the male DNA recovered from the fingernails likely originated from the assailant and that Defendant was “absolutely excluded as the source of that DNA.” As to the wallet, Keel stated that male DNA was detected on the wallet and that Henry's DNA profile was eliminated.

The trial court also considered the testimony of Anne Montgomery, the State's DNA analysis expert. At trial, she stated that the DNA evidence recovered at that time did not implicate or exculpate anyone. See Henry I, 2013-0059, p. 14, 147 So.3d at 1152 (“Ms. Montgomery stated that the DNA in this case proved to be nothing of evidentiary value—nothing implicated or exculpated anyone in the murders”).¹⁸

In the post-conviction hearing, Ms. Montgomery acknowledged that the FACL results excluded Henry as a contributor but did not believe that the DNA profiles extracted from the fingernails or wallet were “necessarily that of the perpetrator.” See also Henry II, 2020-0412, p. 8, 307 So.3d at 254. In fact, Ms. Montgomery took issue with both the DNA profiles recovered from Ms. Watt's fingernails and the wallet. Ms. Montgomery described the DNA sample obtained from the fingernails scrapings as minute and degraded. Id. Ms. Montgomery further noted that Ms. Watt's nails in the coroner's report were depicted as long and dirty, suggesting that Ms. Watts did not regularly clean her fingernails and could contain trace amounts of foreign DNA. As a result, Ms. Montgomery testified it was possible that the DNA could be from “casual contact” from another individual other than the perpetrator as there were no defensive wounds. Id. at p. 9, 307 So.3d at 254. Further, she noted that if the DNA evidence from the fingernails had belonged to the perpetrator, she would have expected to “see a fuller profile and less degradation.” Id. Additionally, with regard to the DNA recovered from the wallet, Ms. Montgomery noted that a wallet is “not a sterile item” and “easily susceptible to transfer DNA.” Id., at p. 9, 307 So.3d at 255. She further testified that when FACL received the wallet it was described “as open and not sealed,” creating issues of possible contamination. Ms. Montgomery stated that she found it odd that the DNA profile recovered from the wallet excluded both of the victims. The trial court was nevertheless persuaded by the FACL results and Mr. Keel's analysis. Moreover, as noted above, Ms. Montgomery did concede that the FACL testing did not implicate Henry. See Henry II, 2020-0412, p. 8, 307 So.3d at 254 (noting that “Ms. Montgomery testified that the results of the FACL's DNA testing did not exonerate or inculpate [Henry]”).

Further, as noted by the trial court below and this Court in Henry II, Henry's conviction was based solely on eyewitness testimony. See Henry II, 2020-0412, pp. 14-15, 307 So.3d at 257 (noting “no forensic evidence was presented at trial ․ that links [Henry] to either victim or to the crimes” and “[o]nly eyewitness testimony was presented at trial to establish [Henry's] guilt”). At the compensation hearing, Henry offered the testimony and report of Dr. Franklin who provided numerous influences and factors that impair eyewitness identification, including: distance and duration of view; stress and the presence of a weapon; obstruction of view or partial disguise; age of witness; post-event suggestion; non-blind administrators of identification procedures; non-identification or identification of someone else; the use of poor quality fillers in photo identification arrays; exposure effect; commitment effect; prior false identification; confidence malleability; hindsight bias; and the general unreliability of in-court identification.

The trial testimony of the witnesses, Ms. Davis, Ms. Garcia, and Mr. Dominick, show that their attention was drawn to the scene of the crime after they had heard gun shots. One witness, Ms. Davis, was approximately 60 years old at the time of the incident. There was testimony that the perpetrator was wearing a hat, and Ms. Garcia indicated that the perpetrator was wearing sunglasses, suggesting that the perpetrator was using a partial disguise and her view was obstructed. Additionally, the record shows that the eyewitnesses described the perpetrator of the crime as wearing a red shirt. In the photo array presented to Ms. Garcia and Ms. Davis, wherein they identified Henry as the perpetrator, Henry was the only person wearing a red shirt. Also, the photographic lineups were not conducted until weeks after the murders. There was also evidence that Ms. Davis saw a photograph of Henry on the news prior to her identification. Mr. Dominick did not initially identify Henry from the photo array and instead identified another person as the perpetrator. Mr. Dominick identified Henry as the perpetrator after seeing him in jail on pending charges. Further, all three witnesses were exposed to Henry a number of times via photo arrays and pre-trial proceedings prior to making their in-court identifications of Henry.

As addressed above, “[a]ppellate courts review a wrongful conviction compensation case for manifest error.” Walter, 2024-0420, p. 7, 2025 WL 1232618 at *3 (citing Ruano, 2019-0709, p. 4, 294 So.3d at 46). As a result, an appellate court affords great weight to the factual findings of the trial court. Id. (citing Rosell v. ESCO, 549 So.2d 840, 845 (La. 1989); Stobart v. State, Dep't of Transp. & Dev., 617 So.2d 880, 882 (La. 1993)). An appellate court's “role is not to decide whether we would have reached the same conclusion, but rather to determine whether the trial court's judgment was reasonable based on the record as a whole.” See Walter, 2024-0420, p. 11, 2025 WL 1232618 at *5 (citing Ruano, 2019-0709, p. 4, 294 So.3d at 46); see also Ballard, 2024-0606, p. 19, 2025 WL 815225 at 9 (on review of the trial court's decision on a petition for wrongful conviction compensation, the “issue is not whether the trial court's findings are right or wrong, but whether they are reasonable on the record as a whole”).

Considering the factors outlined by Dr. Franklin (i.e., the stress and presence of a weapon, view obstruction, the suggestive quality of the fillers in the photo arrays, the witnesses’ exposure to Henry's face); the fact that the State's case rested entirely upon the identification of Henry by the eyewitnesses; and that there was no physical evidence linking Henry to the crimes, we cannot say that the trial court was unreasonable in concluding that it is highly probable or much more probable than not that Henry did not commit the murders of Ms. Watts and Ms. Gex. As such, the trial court did not commit manifest error in granting Henry's petition of compensation.

Assignment of Error No. 2: The State's Ability to Present a Defense

Prior Crimes Impeachment of Henry

As to the State's second assignment of error, the State first argues that the trial court denied the State's ability to present a defense by unlawfully limiting its ability to impeach Henry.

“[A] trial court's ruling[ ] on evidentiary issues will not be disturbed absent a clear abuse of discretion.” State v. Armstead, 2014-0036, p. 21 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1/28/15), 159 So.3d 502, 517 (citing State v. Mosby, 595 So.2d 1135, 1138–39 (La. 1992)); see also State v Clark, 2023-0717, p. 10 (La. App. 4 Cir. 6/10/24), 401 So.3d 171, 178 (a “trial judge is vested with wide discretion in determining the relevancy of evidence, and his ruling will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of a clear showing of abuse of discretion”).

As noted earlier, the State called Henry as a witness. During his testimony, the State asked Henry if he was previously convicted of any other crimes (besides the two counts of first-degree murder underlying the instant case).

The transcript provides:

BY MR. GRAY [Counsel for the State]:

․

And before we get into the case at hand, I would like to ask you a couple of questions about your background. Obviously, you had previously been convicted of the two counts of murder which were later reversed. Have you previously been convicted of any other crimes?

MS. DIGIULIO [Counsel for Henry]: Objection, Judge, relevance.

MR. GRAY: Ultimately —

THE COURT: Sustained.

MS. DIGIULIO: This is a —

THE COURT: Sustained. I sustained it.

MS. DIGIULIO: Thank you.

MR. GRAY: Your Honor, please note the state's objection. I think the witness's credibility is relevant to his claims.19

Later, the State contends that the trial court also declined to permit the State to proffer evidence of Henry's criminal history at the conclusion of its questioning of Henry. The transcript provides:

MR. GRAY: And, Your Honor, at this point I believe the last questions I have for petitioner are items that I'm going to offer as a proffer, if I may. It will relate to any criminal history or arrest.

․

I intend to ask, ask the petitioner about any prior convictions or prior arrests he has. Your Honor sustained an objection to those questions.

․

And I intend to proffer that testimony.

THE COURT: Oh, I thought you to intended to proffer some exhibits to that effect.

MR. GRAY: No, Your Honor. I intend to ask him pointedly about a criminal history as a proffer and his answer as a proffer.

THE COURT: And I'm sorry, Ms. DiGiulio, what is your objection?

MS. DIGIULIO: My objection. Your Honor, is that the questions Mr. Gray would like to ask are completely irrelevant to this wrongful conviction compensation hearing. Mr. Henry is not his witness, and so it's not as if he's proffering testimony in the way of a witness of his own. And if he wants to -- if he had, if he had come prepared with the documents about the priors to proffer, that would be something. But he can't proffer my client's testimony, particularly since he does have a right to self -- the privilege against self-incrimination about criminal matters which are completely irrelevant to this wrongful compensation.

THE COURT: Sustained.

․

And I am sustaining an objection to the way in which you are trying to proffer it by questions and answers, and I'm sustaining it, and it is not allowed. Next question.

․

MR. GRAY: I would lastly like to note for the Record, the petitioner does not have a Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination here. This is not a criminal proceeding.

THE COURT: I didn't sustain it for that. Let me interrupt and be clear.

․

I'm sustaining it because it is irrelevant to the purposes of this hearing.

The State notes that La. R.S. 15:572.8(E) states: “[u]nless otherwise provided herein, the Louisiana rules of evidence shall apply.” The State further notes that the Code of Evidence allows the credibility of a witness to be attacked by any party and permits a witness to be impeached by evidence of prior convictions. See La. C.E. art. 607(A) (stating “[t]he credibility of a witness may be attacked by any party, including the party calling him”); see also La. C.E. art. 609 (providing the manner in which a criminal conviction could be used to impeach a witness in civil proceedings); La. C.E. art. 609.1 (providing the manner in which a criminal conviction could be used to impeach a witness in criminal proceedings). The State thus argues that Henry's prior convictions are relevant in this proceeding as a means to impeach his credibility.

Henry, on the other hand, argues that the State failed to establish the relevance of his prior crimes and failed to provide a foundation to impeach him on his prior convictions. Henry's arguments have merit.

At the compensation hearing, the State questioned Henry about his whereabouts during the crime at issue and whether he knew the victims and witnesses of the crime. Thereafter, the State sought to elicit evidence of Henry's criminal record but did not assert why it was relevant, or how Henry's testimony relate to his alleged prior crimes. See La. C.E. art. 613 (which provides that “extrinsic evidence of bias, interest, or corruption, prior inconsistent statements, conviction of crime, or defects of capacity is admissible after the proponent has first fairly directed the witness’ attention to the statement, act, or matter alleged, and the witness has been given the opportunity to admit the fact and has failed distinctly to do so”). Additionally, the State indicated that it sought to question Henry about his prior arrests, which are generally not admissible. See La. C.E. art. 609 (F) (providing that “[e]vidence of the arrest, indictment, or prosecution of a witness is not admissible for the purpose of attacking his credibility”).

Moreover, not all criminal convictions are admissible to impeach a witness's credibility. While La. C.E. arts. 609 and 609.1 allows impeachment by prior convictions, there are limits. La. C.E. art. 609 provides in part:

A. General civil rule. For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness in civil cases, no evidence of the details of the crime of which he was convicted is admissible. However, evidence of the name of the crime of which he was convicted and the date of conviction is admissible if the crime:

(1) Was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of six months under the law under which he was convicted, and the court determines that the probative value of admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to a party; or

(2) Involved dishonesty or false statement, regardless of the punishment.

B. Time limit. Evidence of a conviction under this Article is not admissible if a period of more than ten years has elapsed since the date of the conviction.

C. Effect of pardon or annulment. Evidence of a conviction is not admissible under this Article if the conviction has been the subject of a pardon, annulment, or other equivalent procedure explicitly based on a finding of innocence.

At the hearing, the State stated that it intended to question Henry about his prior convictions without limiting the timeframe as required by La. C.E. art. 609(B). The State also did not assert that the crime was punishable by imprisonment in excess of six months or involved dishonestly under La. C.E. 609(A). Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to permit the State to question Henry about his prior convictions.

Furthermore, to the extent that the trial court erred in refusing to allow the State to proffer or admit Henry's testimony of other crimes, such error is harmless. Considering the FACL testing results excluding Henry's DNA from the underlying crimes and Dr. Franklin's testimony regarding inaccuracies in identifications, any evidence of Henry's prior crimes would have no bearing on the proof of factual innocence in the matter at hand. This assignment of error lacks merit.

Testimony of Ms. Davis and Ms. Garcia

The State also argues that the trial court prejudiced its ability to present witness testimony in denying its request for a recess in order to provide testimony from two witnesses who were unavailable. The record shows that the State wanted to call Ms. Davis and Ms. Garcia at the compensation hearing, but due to age, schedules, and alleged safety concerns, they could not be present during the proceeding.²⁰ The State, as a result, requested that the hearing be “held open” until it could produce its witnesses. The trial court declined.²¹

The trial court is “vested with considerable discretion in ruling on a motion for continuance, and the reviewing court will not disturb the trial court's ruling absent a clear abuse of that discretion.” State v. Turner, 2019-0777, pp. 17-18 (La. App. 4 Cir. 5/27/20), 301 So.3d 545, 555 (citing State v. Brown, 2012-0626, pp. 16-17 (La. App. 4 Cir. 4/10/13), 115 So.3d 564, 575). Moreover, the trial court has the authority to manage its own docket. See generally State v. Hayes, 2010-1538, pp. 8-9 (La. App. 4 Cir. 9/1/11), 75 So.3d 8, 14 (citing State v. King, 2010-2638, p. 6 (La. 5/6/11), 60 So.3d 615, 619).

The transcript of the compensation proceeding shows that the trial court was not made aware of the issue of Ms. Davis and Ms. Garcia's unavailability until the day of the hearing. Additionally, the trial court continued the matter until Thursday, August 22, 2024, to give the State the opportunity to procure the witnesses, but the State was still unable to do so. The trial court refused to delay the wrongful convictions proceeding any further. Furthermore, the trial transcript contains testimony of Ms. Davis and Ms. Garcia, wherein they identified Henry as the perpetrator. The record also reflects that defense counsel would not be able to practice in state court at the end of that week. We find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining the State's request for a continuance. This assignment of error also lacks merit.

CONCLUSION

For the above stated reasons, we cannot find that the trial court manifestly erred in finding that Henry proved he is factually innocent and entitled to compensation under La. R.S. 15:572.8. As such, the trial court's granting of Henry's petition for wrongful conviction compensation is affirmed.

AFFIRMED

FOOTNOTES

1.   The Court reasoned in part:[T]here is no dispute that the victims were over the age of sixty-five and that the house was set on fire by the perpetrator. Moreover, two eyewitnesses (Ms. Garcia and Ms. Davis) identified the defendant in photographic lineups after the incident and three eyewitnesses (Ms. Garcia, Ms. Davis and Mr. Dominick) identified the defendant in court as the man they witnessed shoot Ms. Gex on the porch of her mother's house. Thus, for the defendant to have been misidentified, the jury would have to have concluded that all three eyewitnesses were mistaken as to the same individual. In addition, although the defendant offered witness testimony and documentation of work applications, none of the testimony or the documentation was specifically linked to the time of the murders. Therefore, the jury could have reasonably concluded that the defendant killed the victims before or after filling out the applications.Henry I, 2013-0059, p. 16, 147 So.3d at 1153.

2.   This Court in State v. Henry, 2020-041, pp. 10-11 (La. App. 4 Cir. 10/29/20), 307 So.3d 249, 255 (“Henry II”) summarized the trial court's reasoning as follows:The district court noted that under La. C.Cr.P. art. 851(B)(3), a new trial shall [be] granted based on new and material evidence “if the evidence had been introduced at the trial it would probably have changed the verdict or judgment of guilty.” The district court wrote that evidence at trial indicated there was a struggle between Ms. Watts and her assailant, and that a detective who testified at trial opined that a possible motive for the murders was robbery, meaning that the perpetrator may have handled Ms. Watts's wallet. The district court recounted that the DNA testing excluded Respondent as a contributor to any DNA recovered from the crime scene. Noting the evidentiary value of DNA evidence in general, especially in light of a case built on eyewitness testimony, the district court ultimately concluded that the “interest[s] of justice and the concept of fundamental fairness” required that a new trial be granted because it was “highly probable that the newly discovered [DNA] evidence would have produced a difference result” at Respondent's trial.

3.   This Court in Henry II, 2020-0412, pp. 11-12, 307 So.3d at 256, summarized the trial court's reasoning as follows:The district court stated:I believe that the clear and convincing evidence standard outlined in Article 930.3, Paragraph 7, clearly mandates that this Defendant be granted a new trial. In all the years that I have and all of the decisions I've made, I've never been as confident in a decision as the decision I've been called upon to make ․ once again this morning. I am aware of the heinous nature of this crime. I'm aware of these two killings, how they occurred. I'm aware of the three eyewitnesses who testified. Clearly[,] the jury that heard this case initially never had the benefit, though no one's fault ․ but nonetheless, they never had the opportunity to review this additional evidence that is quite [sic] compelling in my opinion.The district court further explained: “I believe that it's highly probable, based on the evidence that has been newly discovered and presented before this Court, that the defendant is factually innocent of the crime for which he was convicted without his testimony and without this evidence being presented.” The district court noted that he observed the experts as they testified and weighed their testimony in finding that Respondent had met his burden under La. C.C.P. art. 930.3(7).

4.   As will be discussed in the assignments of error, the record shows that the State had intended to call Ms. Linda Davis and Ms. Cecilia Garcia (now Brown) to testify and requested that the hearing be “held open” for them. The trial court continued the matter to another day but the State could not produce the witnesses. The trial court refused to continue the matter any further.

5.   The transcript of the ruling contained in the record is erroneously dated August 20, 2024.

6.   In Jones v. State, 2022-01455, pp. 6-7 (La. 5/5/23), 362 So.3d 341, 346, the Louisiana Supreme Court found that the petitioner met his burden of “proving it is highly probable or much more probable than not that he did not commit the aggravated rape” of the victim where: the victim's description of her assailant did not match petitioner and instead matched perpetrator; there was no forensic or physical evidence linking petitioner to the rape; and expert testimony as to various factors that indicated potential for inaccuracies in identifications undermined the evidentiary value of victim's identification.

7.   In State v. Ruano, 2019-0709, p. 10 (La. App. 4 Cir. 3/4/19), 294 So.3d 44, 49, this Court reversed the trial court and found that the petitioner proved he was factually innocent of the crimes of which was previously convicted where: the forensic odontologist testified the petitioner's teeth could not have inflicted bite marks suffered by victim of physical attack; the petitioner did not have physical injuries assailant likely would have suffered as result of attack on victim; and the petitioner did not own a vehicle like the one assailant drove.

8.   The record reveals, however, that the issue of factual innocence was not before the Louisiana Supreme Court as the State did not seek writs on this Court's decision in Henry II, 2020-0412, 307 So.3d 249. This will be discussed later herein.

9.   The written judgment issued the same date contains similar language to the oral reasons provided by the trial court.

10.   In June 2019, La. C.E. art. 702 was amended to allow expert witnesses on the issue of memory and eyewitness identification in a criminal trial when there is no physical or scientific evidence linking the defendant to the crime. La. C.E. art. 702(B) provides:This Article shall also govern expert witnesses on the issue of memory and eyewitness identification. In a criminal case, if a party seeks to offer the testimony of a memory and eyewitness identification expert under this Article, such expert testimony may be considered for admission only if all provisions of Paragraph A of this Article are satisfied. A memory and eyewitness identification expert's testimony may not be admitted under this Article if there is physical or scientific evidence that corroborates the eyewitness identification of the defendant. An expert's testimony admitted under this Paragraph shall not offer an opinion as to whether a witness's memory or eyewitness identification is accurate.

11.   The trial court noted that Dr. Franklin could not render an opinion regarding whether a witnesses’ memory or eye witness indemnification is accurate.

12.   The report contains information similar to what Dr. Franklin testified to at the hearing. As with Dr. Franklin's testimony, the trial court only accepted the information in the report with regard to the general principles of identification of a suspect and not regarding any opinions provided as it applied to the case.

13.   As noted later herein, the State attempted to question Henry regarding his prior convictions and arrests. However, the trial court sustained defense counsel's objections regarding such testimony.

14.   The Louisiana Supreme Court in Jones also held that in a wrongful conviction compensation case, the petitioner need not introduce “new, material, noncumulative, and conclusive evidence” to establish he is factually innocent. Jones, 2022-01455, p. 4 362 So.3d at 344. The Jones Court stated in part:The State argues that existing jurisprudence interpreting La. R.S. 15:572.8 requires a heightened evidentiary burden. See Burrell v. State, 50,157, pp. 11-12 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1/13/16), 184 So.3d 246, 252-53; Jones v. State, 19-1570, p. 4 (La. App. 1st Cir. 9/18/20), 313 So.3d 997, 1000.[ ]Specifically, the State asserts that a petitioner must present new, material, noncumulative, and conclusive evidence [based on the new article, La. C.Cr.P. art. 926.2 on post-conviction claim of factual innocence] that meets an extraordinarily high standard and undermines the prosecution's entire case. See Burrell, supra (citing State v. Conway, [20]01-2808 (La. 4/12/02), 816 So.2d 290 and State v. Pierre, 13-0873 (La. 10/15/13), 125 So.3d 403). Mr. Jones counters that the plain language of La. R.S. 15:572.8 contains no such heightened evidentiary burden and that the court of appeal properly conducted a de novo review of the record. We agree.Jones, 2022-01455, p. 4, 362 So.3d at 344.

15.   We recognize that appellate courts review judgments, not reasons for judgment. However, an appellate court “may review the trial court's reasons for judgment to ‘gain insight’ into the trial court's judgment.” See TKTMJ, Inc. v. Sewerage and Water Board of New Orleans, 2020-0154, p. 3, n. 4 (La. App. 4 Cir. 12/16/20), 366 So.3d 276, 282 (citation omitted).

16.   See Ruano, 2019-0709, p. 5, 294 So.3d 44, 47 (citation omitted) (stating that La. R.S. 15:572.8 “implicitly [ ] reflects the intent that compensation will not be awardable in every matter in which post-conviction relief has been granted”).

17.   As noted above, the post-conviction transcripts and exhibits were before the trial court at the compensation hearing.

18.   Blood samples were collected and submitted for testing. The results of the testing produced “DNA profiles belonging to one or the other of the victims.” See Henry I, 2013-0059, p. 14 147 So.3d at 1152.

19.   Although not specifically addressed by the State in its brief, the State also attempted to elicit testimony of an arrest related to a domestic violence charge. The trial court sustained an objection from the defense.

20.   See n. 4.

21.   This Court denied writs on this issue on September 26, 2024. See Henry v. State, unpub., 2024-607 (La App. 4 Cir. 9/26/24). The Louisiana Supreme Court also denied writs. Henry v. State, unpub., 2024-01230 (La. 10/17/24) 394 So.3d 1287.

Judge Karen K. Herman