LORI FINTA VOLPATI v. WALTER AMEDEO VOLPATI (2025)

This appeal concerns a judgment modifying a consent judgment that partitioned community property between plaintiff/appellant, Lori Finta-Volpati (“Ms. Finta”), and defendant/appellee, Walter A. Volpati, former spouses. For the following reasons, we reverse the judgment of the trial court, in part, finding that Mr. Volpati had no cause of action to amend the consent partition judgment based upon a change of circumstances. Thus, we reverse the part of the judgment that held Ms. Finta liable to Mr. Volpati regarding maintenance, upkeep, expense, and utilities for the former marital home. We further find that the trial court erred in denying Ms. Finta's exception of res judicata as to apportionment of the mortgage on the home in the consent partition judgment. However, we uphold certain reimbursement claims made by Mr. Volpati against Ms. Finta, as described in detail below, thus affirming in part.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The record and briefs reflect that the parties were married in 2015. During the marriage, they purchased a home at 212 Tullulah Drive in River Ridge, Louisiana. At the time of divorce, the home was subject to a mortgage in favor of PNC Bank as security for a community obligation. On July 15, 2019, Ms. Finta filed a petition for divorce under La. C.C. art. 102. On September 13, 2019, the domestic hearing officer recommended, among other things, an award of interim spousal support to Ms. Finta, that Mr. Volpati be granted interim use and occupancy of the former family home at 212 Tullulah Drive, and that he should pay the monthly mortgage payments and waive his claim against Ms. Finta for reimbursement of the mortgage payments. He also recommended that Ms. Finta waive rental reimbursement for Mr. Volpati's use and occupancy of the home. The record shows that the parties had been engaged in efforts to elevate the home because it had a propensity to flood, and even though they were divorcing, they desired to perform the elevation and then sell the home.

Both parties filed objections to the recommendations regarding interim spousal support. Neither party objected to Mr. Volpati being awarded use and occupancy of the former matrimonial domicile, nor the recommendations regarding payment of the mortgage, reimbursement claims regarding payment of the mortgage, or the waiver of rental reimbursement. On October 30, 2019, Mr. Volpati dismissed his objections.¹ The hearing officer's recommendations became a judgment of the court, which was ultimately memorialized by a written “Interim and Consent Judgment” signed by the trial court on March 23, 2020. The judgment memorialized Mr. Volpati's interim use and occupancy of 212 Tullulah Drive, waived Ms. Finta's claim for rental reimbursement, ordered Mr. Volpati to pay the monthly mortgage, and waived Mr. Volpati's reimbursement for the monthly mortgage payments. Meanwhile, Mr. Volpati moved for a final divorce on February 11, 2020, which was ultimately granted in July of 2020.

The parties compiled their respective descriptive lists of assets and liabilities in order to set the community property partition for trial and resolution. In the first updated proposed joint descriptive list, submitted on January 8, 2021, Mr. Volpati is listed as the “possessor” of the family home. On January 21, 2021, the hearing officer made recommendations regarding the partition. In particular, recommendation 22, first paragraph, stated that “Mr. Volpati shall make every effort to reinstate the elevation grant offered to the parties by Jefferson parish through the FEMA Hazard Mitigation Grant Program. If the grant cannot be reinstated, Mr. Volpati shall immediately apply for a grant.” The recommendations were signed by the trial judge in a judgment dated January 27, 2021.

The next item in the record is the Consent Judgment of Partition of Community Property (“Consent Judgment of Partition”), dated November 11, 2021. Among other items, each party was awarded one-half of the “net proceeds” from the sale of the former marital home, which was to be listed for sale as soon as the elevation was complete. Pertinent other provisions are as follows:

• the community terminated on July 15, 2019;

• the divorce was granted on July 14, 2020;

• each party would pay half of the elevation costs, with equalizing payments from the net proceeds of the home sale if needed;

• expenses regarding raising the home over $500 required Ms. Finta's approval;

• unapproved non-required expenses over $500 would be borne solely by Mr. Volpati;

• each party would pay half of non-elevation repair expenses of the home subject to the $500 approval;

• reimbursement for non-approved expenses over $500 would be denied;

• both parties warranted community debts not allocated were paid, waived all reimbursement claims concerning community debts, and agreed the judgment was a transaction and compromise under La. C.C. art. 3071;2

• the prevailing party in an action to enforce or defend the agreement, after written demand and reasonable time to comply, would be awarded reasonable attorney's fees and costs; and

• disputes regarding listing or sale of the home would proceed by rule before the hearing officer.

The record reflects that Mr. Volpati enjoyed exclusive use and occupancy of the home and paid all expenses for repairs and maintenance, upkeep, and utilities of the home and the mortgage expenses of the home, as contemplated in the March 23, 2020 Interim and Consent Judgment and the November 11, 2021 Consent Judgment of Partition.

In the meantime, Ms. Finta moved out of state, but the parties continued to exchange emails regarding the elevation project. Two years after the Consent Judgment of Partition, on November 1, 2023, Mr. Volpati filed a Petition for Supplemental Partition and Request for Reimbursement or, in the Alternative, Rule to Show Cause. Therein, alleging that codal articles on co-ownership (rather than community property provisions) now applied to the parties’ shared ownership of the home, he sought reimbursement of all the expenses he had paid regarding the home since the date of the Consent Judgment of Partition (November 11, 2021) to the present, which included the mortgage, utilities, and various repairs and maintenance. He further requested division of the home expenses until it was sold. He also requested that the Consent Judgment of Partition be supplemented or amended to include the “unpartitioned” mortgage on the home.

Alternatively, Mr. Volpati claimed that error vitiated his consent to the Consent Judgment of Partition, namely that it had been represented to the parties that the home's elevation would take approximately five months to complete and that he could reside there while the work was being done. However, he alleged that this information had been incorrect (though not attributable to either party) and the work was still not completed. He alleged that he had to live elsewhere and thus the expenses of 212 Tullulah should be shared equally by the parties after he moved out.

Ms. Finta responded with exceptions of improper use of summary procedure, res judicata, and no cause of action. Therein, she argued that the Consent Judgment of Partition was res judicata regarding the reimbursement of any and all expenses of the home. Ms. Finta additionally argued that the agreement fully contemplated that Mr. Volpati would pay the mortgage and monthly expenses of the home after being awarded exclusive use and occupancy in September of 2019 (as confirmed in the March 23, 2020 “Interim and Consent Judgment), which was not in any way revoked or amended by the Consent Judgment of Partition, and thus Mr. Volpati's pleading stated no cause of action. She further pointed out that Mr. Volpati had failed to appeal the Consent Judgment of Partition. She asked for reasonable attorney's fees, pursuant to the Consent Judgment of Partition's provision allowing attorney's fees to a prevailing party who successfully enforced or defended the Consent Judgment from an attack by the other party.

After a hearing on the exceptions, the trial court ruled that the exception of improper use of summary procedure was moot. She denied the exception of no cause of action, and deferred ruling on the exception of res judicata to the trial on the merits of Mr. Volpati's supplemental petition.

Following a July 9, 2024 trial, the court's July 31, 2024 judgment:

• denied the exception of res judicata, granted a supplemental partition, found the PNC mortgage had not been partitioned, and allocated the PNC mortgage 50/50;

• granted reimbursement to Mr. Volpati, finding the Consent Judgment of Partition was silent as to upkeep, maintenance, expenses, and utilities of the home after November 11, 2021;

• found that Mr. Volpati's use and occupancy of the home terminated on November 11, 2021 under La. R.S. 9:374(B)3 and applied co-ownership law including La. C.C. art. 806;4

• ordered equal responsibility (50/50) for payment of all of the home expenses from June 1, 2022 until the sale of the home, with Mr. Volpati responsible for 100% of the home expenses from November 11, 2021 to May 31, 2022; and

• ordered equal division of specified pool, flooring, painting, and shower glass expenses, with Ms. Finta's half thereof to be deducted from her net proceeds of the sale of the home.

Ms. Finta appealed. Mr. Volpati answered the appeal, seeking trial and appellate attorney's fees.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

On appeal, Ms. Finta assigns the following errors: (1) the trial court erred in finding the mortgage was not partitioned in the Consent Judgment of Partition; (2) the court erred in awarding Mr. Volpati reimbursement for upkeep, maintenance, expenses, and utilities after November 11, 2021; (3) the court erred in ordering her to pay Mr. Volpati's separate obligations; and (4) the court erred in ordering her to pay for pool repairs inconsistent with the Consent Judgment of Partition and allegedly due to his neglect.

FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

Apportionment of the mortgage

Ms. Finta first argues that the Consent Judgment of Partition did in fact partition the mortgage between the parties, and thus the trial court erred in ruling otherwise, denying her exception of res judicata.

We recently summarized the law governing consent judgments in Cohen v. Cohen, 24-584 (La. App. 5 Cir. 5/14/25), 415 So.3d 374, 381:

A consent judgment is a bilateral contract in which parties adjust their differences by mutual consent, thereby putting an end to a lawsuit with each party balancing hope of gain against fear of loss. La. C.C. art. 3071; Lawrence v. Ashton Plantation Home Owners Ass'n, Inc., 22-122 (La. App. 5 Cir. 6/28/22), 344 So.3d 232, 239, writ denied, 22-1157 (La. 11/1/22), 349 So.3d 5. It has attributes both of contracts and of a judicial decree. D'Amico v. Burnthorne, 23-80 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/6/23), 378 So.3d 174, 183, writ denied, 24-34 (La. 2/27/24), 379 So.3d 1268. Consent judgments are governed by the same rules of construction that apply to contracts. Randazza v. Giacona, 20-439 (La. App. 5 Cir. 3/24/21), 316 So.3d 564, 569; Rousset v. Rousset, 14-663 (La. App. 5 Cir. 4/15/15), 170 So.3d 253, 256.

A compromise agreement which forms the basis for a consent judgment gets its binding force and effect from the consent of the parties. Rousset, supra. The interpretation of the consent judgment is the determination of the common intent of the parties. La. C.C. art. 2045. The meaning and intent of the parties is ordinarily determined from the four corners of the instrument. Millet v. Millet, 04-406 (La. App. 5 Cir. 10/26/04), 888 So.2d 291, 293. Each provision in the consent judgment is interpreted in light of the other provisions so that each is given the meaning suggested by the consent judgment as a whole. Bacchus v. Bacchus, 22-170 (La. App. 4 Cir. 5/4/22), 340 So.3d 148, 151. When the words of a contract are clear and explicit and lead to no absurd consequences, the intent of the parties is to be determined by the words of the contract. La. C.C. art. 2046; Jones v. City of New Orleans, 20-0247 (La. App. 4 Cir. 4/14/21), 315 So.3d 963, 967.

Res judicata principles apply to consent judgments. Elliott v. Elliott, 22-789 (La. App. 3 Cir. 10/18/23), 372 So.3d 447, 451.

Consent judgments are contracts subject to contract interpretation principles; res judicata applies under La. R.S. 13:4231 ⁵ and its exceptions in La. R.S. 13:4232,⁶ with limited res judicata effect in community property partitions only as to causes actually adjudicated.

Mr. Volpati argues the mortgage was not specifically partitioned in the Consent Judgment of Partition. Ms. Finta argues the “net proceeds” allocation contained in the Consent Judgment of Partition necessarily contemplated satisfaction of the mortgage from the gross proceeds of the sale of the home.

The Consent Judgment of Partition specifically provides, in pertinent part: “The net proceeds [from the sale of the home] shall be split pursuant to this Consent Judgment,” and each party “shall receive one-half (1/2) of the net proceeds from the sale of the home located at 212 Tullulah Avenue, River Ridge, Louisiana.” (Emphasis added.) Upon review, considering the statutory and jurisprudential authority set forth above, we conclude that a plain reading of the provisions of the Consent Judgment of Partition clearly reflects the parties’ intent for “net proceeds” to be the amount received from the sale of the home after liquidating the balance due on the secured community obligation in favor of PNC Bank. This supports Ms. Finta's arguments. We accordingly conclude that the trial court's specific finding of fact that the community liability to PNC Bank (the mortgage encumbering the 212 Tullulah property) was not partitioned in the Consent Judgment of Partition was manifestly erroneous and clearly wrong. The court thus erred in denying Ms. Finta's exception of res judicata. We accordingly reverse the trial court's ruling in this regard.

SECOND AND THIRD ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

Reimbursement for upkeep, expenses, and utilities

In her second assignment of error, Ms. Finta argues that the trial court erred in awarding Mr. Volpati reimbursement for paying the upkeep, maintenance, expenses, and utilities on the home after November 11, 2021, after finding that the Consent Judgment of Partition was silent as to the parties’ responsibilities after that date. Ms. Finta argues that by the explicit terms of the Consent Judgment of Partition, the parties waived any and all reimbursement claims that they may have against each other regarding the community property. In her third and related assignment of error, she argues that the trial court erred in ordering her to pay ongoing expenses on the home after May 31, 2022 that are separate obligations of Mr. Volpati, such as utilities, because they are solely in his name; and he chose not to terminate them when he voluntarily vacated the home at the end of May 2022.⁷

Mr. Volpati asserted at trial that he desired to amend these provisions in the Consent Judgment of Partition after realizing that the home elevation was taking much longer than he anticipated, and that the work had also rendered the home uninhabitable. He testified that the parties had been advised that the work would take only around “five months” and that he could live in the home while it was being done.

A consent judgment regarding partition of community property, unlike a consent judgment for support, is not subject to modification due to a change in circumstances. Cohen v. Cohen, supra, 415 So.3d at 381. As noted above, “[a] consent judgment is a bilateral contract in which parties adjust their differences by mutual consent, thereby putting an end to a lawsuit with each party balancing hope of gain against fear of loss.” Id. Mr. Volpati claims that he only agreed to the terms in the Consent Judgment of Partition regarding his responsibility for monthly expenses at the home (of which he had exclusive use) because the parties had been advised that the elevation would be completed in approximately five months and he could live in the house while the work was being done. However, neither the March 23, 2020 Interim and Consent Judgment, nor the November 11, 2021 Consent Judgment of Partition contain any such information or condition, or a time limit upon Mr. Volpati's expense obligations other than sale of the home. The fact that the elevation time frame proved to be longer than the parties originally contemplated is not attributable to either party and certainly not to Ms. Finta, who had moved out of state and who was relying on Mr. Volpati, as per the March 23, 2020 “Interim and Consent Judgment,” to manage the elevation project. Mr. Volpati's “balancing hope of gain against fear of loss” does not provide a cause of action to amend the Consent Judgment of Partition.

Consent judgments have attributes both of contracts and of a judicial decree. D'Amico v. Burnthorne, 23-80 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/6/23), 378 So.3d 174, 183, writ denied, 24-34 (La. 2/27/24), 379 So.3d 1268. In this respect, we note that Mr. Volpati did not appeal the Consent Judgment of Partition, nor did he file an action for nullity, which are two ways the law allows a party to attack a judgment.

Consent to a contract may be vitiated by error, fraud, or duress. La. C.C. art. 1948. Error vitiates consent only when it concerns a cause without which the obligation would not have been incurred and that cause was known or should have been known to the other party. La. C.C. art. 1949. Error may concern a cause when it bears on the thing that is the contractual object or a substantial quality of that thing. La. C.C. art. 1950. A court cannot relieve an able party of an obligation into which he freely and voluntarily entered absent evidence of a vice of consent. Horrigan v. Horrigan, 10-1377 (La. App. 1 Cir. 6/14/11), 70 So.3d 111, 115, writ denied, 11-1596 (La. 10/7/11), 71 So.3d 325.

Upon review, we find that there is no evidence other than Mr. Volpati's self-serving testimony that he would not have agreed to this term of the Consent Judgment of Partition had he known that the work would have taken longer than “five months” to complete. As previously stated, the Consent Judgment of Partition contains no condition or time frame on Mr. Volpati's obligations to pay the mortgage and monthly expenses on the home until it was sold. The record shows that post-separation, the parties had been attempting to elevate the house by at least January of 2021, as evidenced by the hearing officer's recommendations regarding Mr. Volpati's obligation to reinstate or seek an elevation grant. Further, it was not until two years after the Consent Judgment of Partition of November 11, 2021 that Mr. Volpati filed his supplemental petition. Mr. Volpati knew well in advance of his filing that the elevation had not been completed within five months of the date of the Consent Judgment of Partition. Thus, there was no error that vitiated Mr. Volpati's consent to these terms of the Consent Judgment of Partition.

The trial court made the factual findings that the Consent Judgment of Partition was silent as to the responsibility for payment of upkeep, maintenance, expenses, and utilities after November 11, 2021, the date of the Consent Judgment of Partition, and also that pursuant to La. R.S. 9:374(B), Mr. Volpati's previous award of use and occupancy had also terminated on that date.

The Consent Judgment of Partition contemplates that the home would remain unpartitioned until it was sold, with Mr. Volpati having exclusive use and occupancy of the home, and managing and paying for the mortgage expenses and regular maintenance, repairs, upkeep, and utilities of the home, with the explicit provision that he would manage the elevation project, subject to the requirement that Ms. Finta approve expenditures over $500. Without provisions to end Mr. Volpati's payment obligations with some event other than sale of the home, as well as the multiple pronouncements in the Consent Judgment of Partition that the parties had waived any and all reimbursement claims that they may have against each other regarding the community property, we conclude that the trial judge manifestly erred and was clearly wrong in determining that Mr. Volpati was entitled to new terms of reimbursement.

A consent judgment may allow the parties to reopen certain matters by provisions to that effect. The Consent Judgment here contained a provision allowing the parties to bring an action concerning the sale or listing of the home:

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that after the home at 212 Tullulah Ave, River Ridge, LA is elevated as set forth in the FEMA Mitigation Grant Program, the house shall immediately be listed for sale by a mutually agreed upon real estate agent at a mutually agreed upon price. The net proceeds shall be split pursuant to this Consent Judgment. Any unresolved issues regarding the listing or sale of the home may be brought before this court by rule and shall be heard by the Hearing Officer before bringing to the District Court Judge. (Emphasis added).

The Consent Judgment also provided that a party who filed and prevailed in an action to “defend” or “enforce” the provisions of the Consent Judgment of Partition would be entitled to reasonable attorney's fees from the other party. Clearly, Mr. Volpati's action to amend the Consent Judgment of Partition to change how the parties split the various expenses of the home is neither an action related to the sale or listing of the home, nor is it an action to enforce or defend the provisions of the Consent Judgment of Partition. Thus, we conclude that Mr. Volpati's supplemental petition to amend the Consent Judgment of Partition regarding the expenses failed to state a cause of action. We accordingly reverse the trial court's ruling in this regard.

FOURTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

Pool-related expenses

In her final assignment of error, Ms. Finta appeals the portion of the trial court judgment casting her with a half share of the $5,000 Mr. Volpati requested to fill in the in-ground pool, which was necessitated by damage caused to the pool by the contractor raising the home. She argues that Mr. Volpati did not seek her approval for this expense as per the terms of the Consent Judgment of Partition.

The record shows, however, that the parties exchanged various emails when the issue of the pool damage arose, and discussed the options that had been given Mr. Volpati. The first option was to repair the pool, at a significant cost to the parties, and the second option was to remove the pool and fill in the yard, which was estimated at a cost of $5,000. Ms. Finta, in an email, asked Mr. Volpati to let her know how he had decided to proceed. We find that under the circumstances, considering the evidence, this response constituted an assent to the expense of $5,000 to remove the pool. We thus affirm the award of half that amount to Mr. Volpati.⁸

ANSWER TO THE APPEAL

Attorney's fees

Mr. Volpati has answered the appeal, seeking attorney's fees for prevailing in the trial court, as well as attorney's fees on appeal.

Notwithstanding that Mr. Volpati has not fully prevailed in this Court, the Consent Judgment of Partition contained the following provision:

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AN DECREED that should a legal proceeding be instituted by a party to enforce or defend the provisions of this agreement, the prevailing party shall be awarded actual reasonable attorney's fees plus all costs. In order to be entitled to an award of attorney's fees, a party must make written demand for performance on the other party and allow a reasonable time for compliance prior to filing a legal action. The action may be brought as a summary proceeding.

Mr. Volpati sought to amend the Consent Judgment of Partition and/or partition a community debt (the mortgage) allegedly not partitioned therein. He did not seek to enforce or defend a provision of the Consent Judgment of Partition, which is a condition of the judgment itself for an award of attorney's fees. For that reason, as well as the fact that we have herein partly reversed the trial court's judgment that was in his favor, we deny Mr. Volpati's request for attorney's fees in total.

DECREE

For the foregoing reasons, the trial court's July 31, 2024 judgment is reversed in part. The part of the judgment allocating the mortgage payments between the parties is hereby reversed, the mortgage liability having been previously allocated by the Consent Judgment of Partition of November 11, 2021. The portion of the judgment which granted Mr. Volpati's request for reimbursement and held “that the parties shall be equally responsible (50/50) for payment of all expenses, including but not limited to upkeep, maintenance, repairs, utilities, mortgage, taxes, homeowner's insurance, and flood insurance for the 212 Tullulah property from June 1, 2022 until the property is sold,” is reversed. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed, including the award of $2,500 to Mr. Volpati from Ms. Finta for repairs to the pool.

REVERSED IN PART; AFFIRMED IN PART

FIFTH CIRCUIT

101 DERBIGNY STREET (70053)

POST OFFICE BOX 489

GRETNA, LOUISIANA 70054

www.fifthcircuit.org

SUSAN M. CHEHARDY CHIEF JUDGE

FREDERICKA H. WICKER

JUDE G. GRAVOIS

MARC E. JOHNSON

STEPHEN J. WINDHORST

JOHN J. MOLAISON, JR.

SCOTT U. SCHLEGEL

TIMOTHY S. MARCEL

JUDGES

CURTIS B. PURSELL CLERK OF COURT

SUSAN S. BUCHHOLZ CHIEF DEPUTY CLERK

LINDA M. TRAN FIRST DEPUTY CLERK

MELISSA C. LEDET DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL STAFF

(504) 376-1400

(504) 376-1498 FAX

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I CERTIFY THAT A COPY OF THE OPINION IN THE BELOW-NUMBERED MATTER HAS BEEN DELIVERED IN ACCORDANCE WITH UNIFORM RULES - COURT OF APPEAL, RULE 2-16.4 AND 2-16.5 THIS DAY DECEMBER 10, 2025 TO THE TRIAL JUDGE, CLERK OF COURT, COUNSEL OF RECORD AND ALL PARTIES NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL, AS LISTED BELOW:

CURTIS B. PURSELL CLERK OF COURT

24-CA-624

E-NOTIFIED

24TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT (CLERK)

HONORABLE DANYELLE M. TAYLOR (DISTRICT JUDGE)

BERNADETTE R. LEE (APPELLANT)

SHEILA H. WILLIS (APPELLANT)

REBECCA A. GILSON (APPELLEE)

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FOOTNOTES

1.   The record does not appear to contain a similar dismissal of Ms. Finta's objections, but the objections do not appear to have been heard and there is no transcript in the record from November 6, 2019, the date the objections were set to be heard in the district court.

2.   La. C.C. art. 3071 provides: “A compromise is a contract whereby the parties, through concessions made by one or more of them, settle a dispute or an uncertainty concerning an obligation or other legal relationship.”

3.   La. R.S. 9:374(B) provides, in pertinent part:When the family residence is community property or is owned by the spouses in indivision, or the spouses own community immovables ․, either spouse may petition for, and a court may award to one of the spouses, after a contradictory hearing, the use and occupancy of the family residence and use of community immovables ․ pending partition of the property or further order of the court, whichever occurs first.

4.   La. C.C. art. 806 provides:A co-owner who on account of the thing held in indivision has incurred necessary expenses, expenses for ordinary maintenance and repairs, or necessary management expenses paid to a third person, is entitled to reimbursement from the other co-owners in proportion to their shares.If the co-owner who incurred the expenses had the enjoyment of the thing held in indivision, his reimbursement shall be reduced in proportion to the value of the enjoyment.

5.   La. R.S. 13:4231 establishes the general principles of res judicata and provides as follows:Except as otherwise provided by law, a valid and final judgment is conclusive between the same parties, except on appeal or other direct review, to the following extent:(1) If the judgment is in favor of the plaintiff, all causes of action existing at the time of final judgment arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the litigation are extinguished and merged in the judgment.(2) If the judgment is in favor of the defendant, all causes of action existing at the time of final judgment arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the litigation are extinguished and the judgment bars a subsequent action on those causes of action.(3) A judgment in favor of either the plaintiff or the defendant is conclusive, in any subsequent action between them, with respect to any issue actually litigated and determined if its determination was essential to that judgment.

6.   La. R.S. 13:4232 provides exceptions to the general rule of res judicata:A. A judgment does not bar another action by the plaintiff:(1) When exceptional circumstances justify relief from the res judicata effect of the judgment;(2) When the judgment dismissed the first action without prejudice; or,(3) When the judgment reserved the right of the plaintiff to bring another action.B. In an action for divorce under Civil Code Article 102 or 103, in an action for determination of incidental matters under Civil Code Article 105, in an action for contributions to a spouse's education or training under Civil Code Article 121, and in an action for partition of community property and settlement of claims between spouses under R.S. 9:2801, the judgment has the effect of res judicata only as to causes of action actually adjudicated.(Emphasis added.)

7.   The record shows that Mr. Volpati purchased a separate home on June 1, 2022, at which point he moved out of the former marital home.

8.   The trial court's July 31, 2024 judgment also ordered equal division of specified flooring, painting, and shower glass expenses, with Ms. Finta's half thereof to be deducted from her share of the net proceeds from the sale of the home. Ms. Finta did not appeal these rulings, and thus, the judgment is affirmed with respect to these rulings.

JUDE G. GRAVOIS JUDGE