STATE v. JONES (2025)

On July 20, 2021, Defendant, Jonathan Jones, was charged by bill of information with aggravated assault upon a peace officer, in violation of La.R.S. 14:37.2.¹ On November 6, 2024, Defendant was found guilty of aggravated assault upon a peace officer after a bench trial. Defendant was originally sentenced to six years at hard labor on January 7, 2025. Defendant then filed a motion to reconsider sentence. A hearing was set for February 18, 2025, and the trial court granted Defendant's motion and resentenced Defendant to five years at hard labor, due to his status as a first offender. Defendant appeals his conviction and sentence.

On appeal Defendant asserts two assignments of error. First, Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to convict him of aggravated assault upon a peace officer. Second, Defendant contends that his five-year sentence is unconstitutionally excessive.

FACTS

The facts will be addressed in the first assigned error section of this opinion.

ERRORS PATENT

In accordance with La.Code Crim.P. art. 920, all appeals are reviewed for errors patent on the face of the record. After reviewing the record, we find the minutes of the motion to reconsider sentencing hearing and the Uniform Sentencing Commitment Order (USCO) are in need of correction.

The minutes of the motion to reconsider sentencing hearing indicate the trial court ordered the sentence to run concurrently with “ANY OTHER SENTENCE PREVIOUSLY IMPOSED AGAINST THE DEFENDANT AS THE DEFENDANT IS A FIRST FELONY OFFENDER.” In one section of the USCO, there is an indication that Defendant's sentence “shall be concurrent with any or every sentence the offender is now serving.” In another section, the USCO indicates the sentence is “TO RUN CONCURRENT WITH ANY OTHER SENTENCE PREVIOUSLY IMPOSED.” However, neither the transcript of the original sentencing, nor the transcript of the motion to reconsider sentencing, indicate the trial court stated whether the sentence should run concurrently with any other sentence. “[W]hen the minutes and the transcript conflict, the transcript prevails.” State v. Wommack, 00-137, p. 4 (La.App. 3 Cir. 6/7/00), 770 So.2d 365, 369, writ denied, 00-2051 (La. 9/21/01), 797 So.2d 62. Thus, we order the trial court to correct the motion to reconsider sentencing minutes and the USCO to delete the language regarding the Defendant's sentence running concurrently with any other sentence.

Additionally, we find the USCO should be corrected to reflect the reduced sentence imposed at the motion to reconsider sentencing. At the hearing on the motion to reconsider, the trial court lowered Defendant's sentence to “a five-year DOC sentence.” However, the USCO reflects the original six-year sentence. Thus, we order the trial court to amend the USCO to correctly reflect the five-year sentence imposed by the trial court at the motion to reconsider hearing.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 1

For his first assignment of error, Defendant asserts that there was insufficient evidence to justify his conviction for aggravated assault upon a peace officer.

Law

The analysis for sufficiency of the evidence claims is well settled:

When the issue of sufficiency of evidence is raised on appeal, the critical inquiry of the reviewing court is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560, rehearing denied, 444 U.S. 890, 100 S.Ct. 195, 62 L.Ed.2d 126 (1979), State ex rel. Graffagnino v. King, 436 So.2d 559 (La.1983); State v. Duncan, 420 So.2d 1105 (La.1982); State v. Moody, 393 So.2d 1212 (La.1981). It is the role of the fact finder to weigh the respective credibility of the witnesses, and therefore, the appellate court should not second guess [sic] the credibility determinations of the triers of fact beyond the sufficiency evaluations under the Jackson standard of review. See State ex rel. Graffagnino, 436 So.2d 559 (citing State v. Richardson, 425 So.2d 1228 (La.1983)). In order for this Court to affirm a conviction, however, the record must reflect that the state has satisfied its burden of proving the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.

State v. Kennerson, 96-1518, p. 5 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/7/97), 695 So.2d 1367, 1371.

Louisiana Revised Statutes 14:37.2 provides that an aggravated assault upon a peace officer is an assault committed upon a peace officer who is acting in the course and scope of his duties.² Louisiana Revised Statutes 14:36 defines assault as the attempt to commit a battery or the intentional placing of another in reasonable apprehension of receiving a battery. Assault is a general intent offense, which pursuant to La. R.S. 14:10(2) is present “when the circumstances indicate that the offender, in the ordinary course of human experience, must have adverted to the prescribed criminal consequences as reasonably certain to result from his act or failure to act.” State v. Suydam, 23-475 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/28/24), 381 So.3d 867, writ denied, 24-441 (La. 11/20/24), 396 So.3d 69.

In this case, the State was required to prove: (1) a general intent to scare; (2) conduct generating a reasonable apprehension of bodily harm; (3) a resulting apprehension on the part of the victim; (4) the victim was a peace officer; and (5) the peace officer was acting in the course and scope of his duties. See State ex rel. J.M., 99-136 (La.App. 3 Cir. 6/2/99), 742 So.2d 6. See also State v. De Gruy, 16-891 (La.App. 4 Cir. 4/5/17), 215 So.3d 723, writ denied, 17-752 (La. 1/9/18), 231 So.3d 652.

Facts and Evidence Submitted at Trial

Officer Alvey Jones, III, (Officer Jones) previously with the Simmesport Police Department, testified regarding the incident. Officer Jones testified that during the late afternoon of June 4, 2021, he was driving his patrol car while wearing his police uniform in Simmesport when he observed a vehicle turning while failing to signal properly and playing loud music out of open windows. Officer Jones testified he observed two persons in the vehicle, with the passenger “frantically” looking at something in his waist after Officer Jones turned on his emergency lights, and that the vehicle traveled approximately another two hundred yards to stop despite going only fifteen miles per hour.

Officer Jones testified that as both vehicles came to a stop, about five feet apart from each other, the driver of the other vehicle opened his door, stepped out of the vehicle, stood within the enclave of the door up against the body of the vehicle, and faced Officer Jones. Officer Jones got out of his vehicle at the same time. The passenger meanwhile started to crawl towards the driver's side and proceeded to exit between the open door and the driver. Officer Jones then described the moment of the alleged assault as follows:

After that[,] I noticed that as the passenger started to exit the vehicle[,] he was doing so in a crawling position and his right hand, I noticed he had a small black semiautomatic firearm in his right hand and as he came out of the vehicle I guess something must have caught his feet and he stumbled and he hit the ground and then he started to come up with the firearm, pointing it directly at me.

Officer Jones testified that he told the passenger to “drop the fucking gun.” Instead, the passenger “continued stumbling, he had to drop his hand for support on the ground and he got up, gained his footing, rounded the open driver's door and took off running[.]” Officer Jones testified that he already had his weapon in hand before he saw the weapon in Defendant's hand. Officer Jones further testified that he feared for his safety and would have opened fire had it not been for the driver standing directly in the line of fire. Officer Jones testified he was unsuccessful in his subsequent attempt to chase down the passenger. After his failed pursuit, Officer Jones then allowed the driver to leave without writing a citation. In court, Officer Jones identified Defendant as the passenger.

The record shows Officer Jones's patrol car did not have a dash camera. While Officer Jones had a body camera, he did not recall if he had his body camera on at the time of the incident or if he remembered to turn it on. He testified that, insofar as if he did not have his body camera on him, it was due to him recently returning to the Simmesport Police Department.

Defendant testified in his own defense. According to his testimony, Officer Jones did not turn on his lights prior to stopping them and pulled his patrol car behind Defendant after they stopped at a residence. Defendant testified that as he was opening the passenger door, Officer Jones exited his patrol car, drew his weapon, and yelled, “close the fucking door, stop moving, stop whatever y'all doing in there, stop moving, shut the fucking door.” Defendant gave different accounts as to whom Officer Jones pointed his weapon. Defendant testified that Officer Jones pointed his weapon at the driver, then that Officer Jones initially pointed his weapon at Defendant before switching over to the driver, and then that Officer Jones pointed his weapon at both of them. Defendant further testified that he made “a break for it” using the driver's side door when he noticed that Officer Jones was distracted by his radio. Defendant claims that the driver was outside the doorway and thus not in his way, which he claims that Officer Jones could have gotten a clear shot at Defendant if he had wanted to shoot him.

Defendant also denied that he had a weapon or tossed one while running away. He also denied that he hit the ground and instead claimed that he grabbed the door to maintain stability and swing around it. Defendant testified that he ran because he was scared of Officer Jones due to the general circumstances of the stop and some alleged posting, having gone viral on social media in the weeks prior, as to Officer Jones allegedly antagonizing citizens in Simmesport. Defendant also testified as to an alleged incident where Officer Jones supposedly “maced some guy in his ditch[.]” However, Defendant also acknowledged that he did not know Officer Jones, and he did not have any prior interactions with Officer Jones.

Devonte Stevenson, the driver of the vehicle, also testified at the trial. According to Mr. Stevenson's testimony, he was driving to his aunt's house when Officer Jones pulled him over without turning on his lights, and after the vehicles stopped, the officer shouted over his microphone for Mr. Stevenson to get out of the car. Mr. Stevenson testified that Officer Jones already had his gun out when Mr. Stevenson got out of his car. Mr. Stevenson, who claimed he was standing within the frame of the doorway, testified that he did not see a gun on Defendant as Defendant ran out of the car. However, Mr. Stevenson conceded that he was looking in the officer's direction at the time Defendant ran from the scene. Mr. Stevenson also testified he did not recall seeing a weapon in the vehicle prior to this incident. Mr. Stevenson testified that he was not a close friend of Defendant, claimed he had no reason to cover for him, and did not remember why he was giving Defendant a ride that date. Mr. Stevenson further testified that he was not even aware in advance of why he was being called in to testify, as his mother was the one who read the subpoena and told him to show up for Defendant's trial. While Mr. Stevenson was aware that Defendant was subsequently arrested, Defendant's arrest was apparently a common enough occurrence that Mr. Stevenson did not make the connection.

At the conclusion of the trial, the trial court's ruling was as follows:

The Court has heard the testimony here today and the statute Aggravated Assault upon a Peace Officer is committed, it's an assault committed upon a peace officer who is acting in the course and scope of his duties. On the day in question, which is June 4, 2021, in Simmesport, Louisiana[,] the events that unfolded occurred while the officer in this case was in the performance of his duties as a Simmesport Police Department officer, he's acting in the course of his duties and his testimony stands uncontradicted with any kind of credible evidence that he [sic] a gun was pulled on him by the defendant, Jonathan Jones while exiting the vehicle and Mr. Jones fled and quite naturally there is no gun to be produced today because he fled the scene of the accident with the gun that the officer saw him with. There's no previous history between these two individuals, no evidence to support any period [sic] that Officer Jones had any acts [sic] to grind with Jonathan Jones. Every element of the charge has been proved with credible evidence from the officer. I find the defendant guilty as charged.

Arguments

Defendant asserts that the testimony of Officer Alvey Jones, which forms the entirety of the State's case, is unreliable and not corroborated by any other evidence. Defendant alleges the trial court relied on State v. Stephens, 09-631 (La.App. 4 Cir. 11/24/09), 27 So.3d 987, to uphold the verdict, as set forth in the trial court's “Reasons for Ruling.” Defendant suggests the facts in Stephens are materially distinguishable, noting Stephens was convicted of aggravated assault upon a peace officer, two officers testified at trial as to the defendant's actions, and their testimony was corroborating and supported by a 911 call and radio traffic. Defendant further notes the fourth circuit affirmed the conviction, finding the officers’ testimony alone was sufficient.

Defendant then addresses the differences between the facts in Stephens and those presented at his trial. Defendant suggests the trial court's reliance on Stephens is misplaced due to the absence of a recovered weapon, the testimony of Defendant and Mr. Stevenson denying the existence of a gun, and the “internal improbability of the State's version[.]” Defendant also raises concerns regarding whether Officer Jones was acting within the course and scope of his duties at the time of the incident. Defendant's argument is based on the testimony of Mr. Stephenson who stated that Officer Jones merely pulled up behind them, after they arrived at a house, without his lights engaged.

The State argues that the testimony of Officer Jones was credible and the State presented sufficient evidence to support all the elements of the offense and Defendant's conviction.

Analysis

First, we note that even though the trial court referenced Stephens in its “Written Reasons for Sentencing” filed on January 7, 2025, these written reasons were issued two months after the trial court found Defendant guilty. Thus, there is no indication the trial court relied on Stephens when the verdict was rendered.

According to Officer Jones's testimony, the incident occurred while he was effectuating a traffic stop after having engaged his emergency lights, and he was wearing his police uniform and driving a patrol car while making a lawful traffic stop. After review, we find this evidence satisfies the course and scope elements.

As to the next element of the offense, Officer Jones testified that Defendant pointed a firearm at him while Defendant was attempting to clumsily exit the stopped vehicle. Courts in this state have found that intentionally pointing a firearm in someone's direction, brandishing a weapon, intentionally raising a firearm “as if to aim it,” and possession of a gun combined with threats satisfy the general intent element of aggravated assault and constitute conduct generating a reasonable apprehension of bodily harm. State in Interest of L.C., 56,325 (La.App. 2 Cir. 7/16/25), writ denied, 25-1039 (La. 10/14/25), 418 So.3d 905; State v. Julien, 09-1242 (La.App. 3 Cir. 4/7/10), 34 So.3d 494; Suydam, 381 So.3d at 879; State v. Blaise, 504 So.2d 1092 (La.App. 5. Cir. 1987); State v. Connors, 432 So.2d 308, 311 (La.App 5 Cir. 1983).

In State v. Connor, 431 So.2d 801 (La.App. 4. Cir.), writ denied, 435 So.2d 435 (La.1983), the state attempted to introduce evidence of a defendant's prior “alleged assault” of a victim to show that the defendant's subsequent killing of that same victim was not accidental and that he was not averse to drawing his weapon at her. During the alleged assault, the defendant was arguing with the victim when a bar patron threw him against a wall, “whereupon defendant drew a gun and focused it on [the patron] after instantaneously pointing it at [the victim].” Id. at 801–02. The state asserted that this action constituted an aggravated assault on the victim. The court reasoned however that this “momentary pointing of the gun” at the victim while he moved the gun towards the patron did not demonstrate any intent specific to the victim because his “apparent intent was not to use the gun” on the victim. Id. at 802. The court thus upheld the lower court's refusal to admit the evidence of this “alleged” assault. Id. The court was not, however, conducting a sufficiency review and was applying a manifest error standard.

Here, although Officer Jones stated that Defendant was pointing the weapon directly at him, he described the events as occurring while Defendant was getting back up from a fall. Nevertheless, Officer Jones's testimony specifically showed that Defendant demonstrated apparent intent by either making an overt motion to train his weapon on Officer Jones or kept it aimed at Officer Jones for more than a mere moment. Furthermore, the trial court found, as a matter of fact, that Defendant pointed the gun at Officer Jones and this evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution.

Additionally, Officer Jones also testified regarding his resulting apprehension due to Defendant's actions and how he would have opened fire at Defendant had it not been for the position of the driver, thus satisfying that element of the offense.

After a review of the evidence and record, we find Defendant's objections, largely based on the reliability of Officer Jones's testimony, are unfounded. The fact finder in this case, the trial judge, was entitled to make his own credibility determinations regarding witnesses. Additionally, and insofar as Officer Jones's testimony was internally consistent, accepting the entirety of his testimony as credible was totally within the judge's prerogative, as the trier of fact. Finally, we are aware that credibility determinations should not be second-guessed by this court, and that “the testimony of a single witness, absent internal contradictions or irreconcilable conflicts with physical evidence, is sufficient to support a conviction.” State v. Jeter, 09-1004, p. 3 (La.App. 3 Cir. 4/7/10, 33 So.3d 1041, 1043. Thus, we find the State presented sufficient evidence to prove the elements of the offense.

Considering the foregoing, we find that there was sufficient evidence to support Defendant's conviction for aggravated assault upon a peace officer, and this assignment of error is without merit. Therefore, we affirm Defendant's conviction.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 2

For his second assignment of error, Defendant asserts that his five-year sentence is unconstitutionally excessive because he is a young first offender. As stated above, Defendant was originally sentenced to six years at hard labor. Defendant then filed a motion to reconsider sentence, and the trial court granted Defendant's motion and resentenced Defendant to five years imprisonment, due to his status as a first offender.

Louisiana courts have laid out the following guidelines with regard to constitutionally excessive sentence review:

Sentences within the statutory sentencing range can be reviewed for constitutional excessiveness. State v. Sepulvado, 367 So.2d 762 (La.1979). In State v. Barling, 00-1241, 00-1591, p. 12 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1/31/01), 779 So.2d 1035, 1042-43, writ denied, 01-838 (La. 2/1/02), 808 So.2d 331, a panel of this court discussed the review of excessive sentence claims, stating:

La. Const. art. I, § 20 guarantees that, “[n]o law shall subject any person to cruel or unusual punishment.” To constitute an excessive sentence, the reviewing court must find the penalty so grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime as to shock our sense of justice or that the sentence makes no measurable contribution to acceptable penal goals and is, therefore, nothing more than a needless imposition of pain and suffering. State v. Campbell, 404 So.2d 1205 (La.1981). The trial court has wide discretion in the imposition of sentence within the statutory limits and such sentence shall not be set aside as excessive absent a manifest abuse of discretion. State v. Etienne, 99-192 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/13/99); 746 So.2d 124, writ denied, 00-0165 (La. 6/30/00); 765 So.2d 1067. The relevant question is whether the trial court abused its broad sentencing discretion, not whether another sentence might have been more appropriate. State v. Cook, 95-2784 (La. 5/31/96); 674 So.2d 957, cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1043, 117 S.Ct. 615, 136 L.Ed.2d 539 (1996).

Further, in reviewing the defendant's sentences, the appellate court should consider the nature of the crime, the nature and background of the offender, and the sentences imposed for similar crimes. State v. Lisotta, 98-648 (La.App. 5 Cir. 12/16/98), 726 So.2d 57 (citing State v. Telsee, 425 So.2d 1251 (La.1983)), writ denied, 99-433 (La. 6/25/99), 745 So.2d 1183. In State v. Smith, 02-719, p. 4 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/12/03), 846 So.2d 786, 789, writ denied, 03-562 (La. 5/30/03), 845 So.2d 1061, a panel of this court observed that:

While a comparison of sentences imposed for similar crimes may provide some insight, “it is well settled that sentences must be individualized to the particular offender and to the particular offense committed.” State v. Batiste, 594 So.2d 1 (La.App. 1 Cir.1991). Additionally, it is within the purview of the trial court to particularize the sentence because the trial judge “remains in the best position to assess the aggravating and mitigating circumstances presented by each case.” State v. Cook, 95-2784 (La. 5/31/96); 674 So.2d 957, 958.

State v. Soileau, 13-770, pp. 4–5 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/12/14), 153 So.3d 1002, 1005–06 (alteration in original), writ denied, 14-452 (La. 9/26/14), 149 So.3d 261.

First, this court must look to the nature of the offense. Here, aggravated assault upon a peace officer is defined as a crime of violence as delineated in La.R.S. 14:37.2. As the trial court observed, Defendant used threats of actual violence in the commission of this offense, and the very nature of the offense involves a substantial risk that physical force may be used. Furthermore, Defendant committed the offense in furtherance of his willful refusal to obey Officer Jones's lawful instructions, after a lawful traffic stop. As the trial court observed, this entire incident could have been avoided had Defendant merely abided by Officer Jones's instructions.

Second, this court must look to the nature and background of the Defendant. The trial court determined that Defendant was a first felony offender, although the testimony of Devonte Stevenson indicates that Defendant nonetheless has frequent run-ins with police. Defendant was born on January 9, 2003, and thus he was eighteen at the time of his offense. Additionally, we find that the record reflects that the trial court properly articulated the relevant sentencing factors listed in La.Code Crim.P. art. 894.1 and thoroughly considered the particulars of Defendant's crime, the facts of this case, his youth, and his life circumstances, along with Defendant's status as a first offender.

Next, this court compares relevant cases and sentences imposed for similar offenses. At the time of his offense, La.R.S. 14:37.2 provided a sentence range of between one and ten years imprisonment, with or without hard labor, and a fine of not more than five thousand dollars. Here, Defendant's five-year sentence falls exactly within the middle of this range.

In our review and due to the dearth of relevant cases involving a first-offense defendant challenging the excessiveness of his sentence under La.R.S. 14:37.2, we reviewed such cases involving La.R.S. 14:37.4, aggravated assault with a firearm, which has the same maximum sentence. In State v. Shepherd, 56,075 (La.App. 2 Cir. 2/26/25), 408 So.3d 375, the second circuit upheld a five-year sentence at hard labor for aggravated assault with a firearm for a first time offender with no criminal history who did not discharge his weapon. In State v. Davis, 22-548 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/1/23), 355 So.3d 742, this court upheld a four-year sentence for aggravated assault with a firearm for a young first-felony offender with prior arrests who did not personally discharge his weapon. In State v. Brown, 17-124 (La.App. 4 Cir. 12/12/17), 234 So.3d 978, writ denied, 18-10 (La. 6/15/18), 257 So.3d 678, that court upheld a five-year sentence at hard labor for aggravated assault with a firearm for a first offender with children who did not discharge his weapon. After a review of these relevant cases, we find Defendant's sentence of five years appears to be entirely consistent with the sentences of other courts.

Finally, in addition to the other factors already discussed, the trial court determined that there would be an undue risk that Defendant would commit another crime if he were given a suspended sentence and specifically found that Defendant was in need of a custodial environment. After review, we find the trial court's findings and resulting sentence are fully supported by the record and are also reasonable and consistent with sentences given to similarly situated defendants. Thus, this assignment of error is without merit.

DECREE

We affirm the conviction and sentence of the Defendant, Jonathan Jones. Furthermore, we order the trial court to correct the minutes of the resentencing hearing and to correct the USCO to delete the language regarding the sentence running concurrently with any other sentence. We further order the trial court to correct the USCO to reflect the five-year sentence imposed at the motion to reconsider hearing.

AFFIRMED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The original bill of information charged Defendant with “aggravated assault against a police officer” and described Officer Jones as acting “without” the course of his duties. The bill was subsequently amended on June 11, 2024.

2.   This offense was previously titled “Aggravated assault upon a peace officer with a firearm” and required that the defendant use a firearm in the commission of the assault. The firearm language was removed by 2016 La. Acts. No. 225, § 1.

ORTEGO, Judge.