STATE OF LOUISIANA v. JOSHUA JAMES WILLIS (2025)

Defendant, Joshua James Willis, appeals his convictions for first degree and second degree murder. For the reasons that follow, we affirm Defendant's convictions.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL POSTURE

On June 21, 2016, the bodies of Brouklynn Hill and his girlfriend, Ashley Metz, were discovered in two different burning vehicles in two different areas of Lafayette Parish. Hill's body was found in a Nissan Altima. Later that day, Detective John Shea of the Lafayette Parish Sheriff's Office (LPSO) received a call from Hill's stepfather regarding an Instagram post on Hill's page that depicted a man on a beach pouring out a beer, which often signifies the passing of a friend or relative. This video was posted before news of Hill's death had been widely disseminated. Former-LPSO Detective Justin Doucet reviewed the Instagram post and identified the man on the beach as Hill's friend, Joseph Sylvester.

Sylvester was questioned by Detective Shea on June 23, 2016. Hill and Sylvester had been friends years earlier and had reconnected in early 2016. The two of them began burglarizing and stealing cars together. Hill also sold marijuana and Sylvester sold pills. They were captured by video surveillance at an Academy Sport & Outdoors using a credit card taken from a stolen Nissan Altima. According to Sylvester, Hill owed several thousand dollars of “plug money,” which indicates that a supplier had provided drugs to Hill on credit. Sylvester was arrested for stealing the credit card.

In a second round of questioning, Sylvester implicated Defendant, his uncle, as the murderer of Hill and Metz. Nonetheless, Sylvester was arrested for the murders of Hill and Metz. Sylvester and the State reached a plea bargain under which Sylvester agreed to plead guilty to obstruction of justice and aggravated burglary, for which he was sentenced to forty and ten years, respectively, with the assurance that his sentences would be reduced if he testified against Defendant.

On July 20, 2016, a Lafayette Parish Grand Jury indicted Defendant Joshua James Willis, and a co-defendant, Joseph Sylvester, with two counts each of first degree murder, in violation of La.R.S. 14:30. On July 29, 2022, the State amended the indictment to second degree murder of Hill, in violation of La.R.S. 14:30.1, regarding count two. On February 15, 2024, the State filed a notice that it would not seek the death penalty.

After several pretrial motions, hearings, and delays in jury selection, said selection began on April 17, 2024, and proceeded through April 19. The jury began hearing evidence on April 22. On May 2, it unanimously found Defendant guilty as charged on both counts.

During trial, Defendant brought an emergency writ to this court, asserting the district court erred by denying him the opportunity to fully cross-examine Sylvester, the State's main witness. The court declined to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction. State v. Willis, 24-209 (La.App. 3 Cir. 4/25/04) (unpublished opinion). However, the supreme court ruled that Defendant was entitled to cross-examine Sylvester using extrinsic evidence that contradicted his sworn testimony. State v. Willis, 24-533 (La. 4/28/24), 383 So.3d 910. This sequence of proceedings forms the basis of Defendant's second assignment of error and will be discussed accordingly.

The district court conducted a sentencing hearing on July 3; it ordered Defendant to serve life in prison for each conviction, without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence, to run consecutively. This appeal followed.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

Defendant asserts that the following constituted errors requiring reversal of his convictions:

I. The State failed to prove Joshua Willis committed first or second-degree murder beyond a reasonable doubt.

II. The trial court erred in preventing Joshua Willis from impeaching Joseph Sylvester by allowing Sylvester to invoke the Fifth Amendment.

III. The trial court erred in admitting excessive and gruesome crime scene/autopsy photographs that were not relevant for the State to prove their case.

IV. The trial court erred in admitting portions of a jail house recording where Willis tells Iesha Sam to get the [sic] that (rifle) from under the bed and hide it, and in allowing photographs of the rifle to be admitted at trial.

V. The trial court erred in not allowing Joshua Willis to introduce portions of a jail house recording between Willis and Rachael Sylvester in order to give context to a previously admitted statement.

VI. The trial court erred in preventing Willis from introducing Joseph Sylvester's song lyrics in evidence when they were written near the time of the murders.

ANALYSIS

Assignment of Error I:

Defendant urges that the evidence did not support his convictions. The review of such claims was enunciated in State v. Kennerson, 96-1518, p. 5 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/7/97), 695 So.2d 1367, 1371:

When the issue of sufficiency of evidence is raised on appeal, the critical inquiry of the reviewing court is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560, rehearing denied, 444 U.S. 890, 100 S.Ct. 195, 62 L.Ed.2d 126 (1979); State ex rel. Graffagnino v. King, 436 So.2d 559 (La.1983); State v. Duncan, 420 So.2d 1105 (La.1982); State v. Moody, 393 So.2d 1212 (La.1981). It is the role of the fact finder to weigh the respective credibility of the witnesses, and therefore, the appellate court should not second guess the credibility determinations of the triers of fact beyond the sufficiency evaluations under the Jackson standard of review. See State ex rel. Graffagnino, 436 So.2d 559 (citing State v. Richardson, 425 So.2d 1228 (La.1983)). In order for this Court to affirm a conviction, however, the record must reflect that the state has satisfied its burden of proving the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.

We review the matter cognizant that “the testimony of a single witness, absent internal contradictions or irreconcilable conflicts with physical evidence, is sufficient to support a conviction.” State v. Jeter, 09-1004, p. 3 (La.App. 3 Cir. 4/7/10), 33 So.3d 1041, 1043.

The elements of first degree murder are set forth in La.R.S. 14:30. At the time of the offense in June 2016, the statute stated:

A. First degree murder is the killing of a human being:

(1) When the offender has specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm and is engaged in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of aggravated kidnapping, second degree kidnapping, aggravated escape, aggravated arson, aggravated or first degree rape, forcible or second degree rape, aggravated burglary, armed robbery, assault by drive-by shooting, first degree robbery, second degree robbery, simple robbery, terrorism, cruelty to juveniles, or second degree cruelty to juveniles.

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(3) When the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm upon more than one person.

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(11) When the offender has a specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm and the offender has previously acted with a specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm that resulted in the killing of one or more persons.

Second degree murder is defined by La.R.S. 14:30.1, which in June 2016 stated in pertinent part:

A. Second degree murder is the killing of a human being:

(1) When the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm; or

(2) When the offender is engaged in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of aggravated rape, forcible rape, aggravated arson, aggravated burglary, aggravated kidnapping, second degree kidnapping, aggravated escape, assault by drive-by shooting, armed robbery, first degree robbery, second degree robbery, simple robbery, cruelty to juveniles, second degree cruelty to juveniles, or terrorism, even though he has no intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm.

As noted, the principal witness against Defendant was his nephew, Sylvester. At trial, Sylvester testified as follows:

On June 19, 2016, a Sunday, he attended a Father's Day party at the home of his mother Christy Sylvester, who is also Defendant's half-sister. Defendant, Hill, and Metz also attended. Hill became too drunk to drive, so he left a stolen red Dodge Ram pickup he had been driving and rode home with Metz.

The next day, Sylvester and Hill were riding together in the Ram when Defendant called and wanted to meet them in a park in Carencro. Defendant, who was driving a red Altima that Sylvester and Hill had stolen, wanted to look for another vehicle they might steal. The trio met in the park, left the Ram, and proceeded together in the Altima with Sylvester driving. Defendant sat in the front passenger seat, and Hill sat behind Sylvester. Suddenly, Defendant turned and shot Hill. Defendant and Sylvester then drove back to get the Ram. Defendant then drove the Altima away, and Sylvester followed him in the Ram. They drove to a location on Disett Road in Carencro, where Defendant produced a water bottle containing gasoline. He set fire to the Altima with Hill still inside. Sylvester and Defendant then drove to Sylvester's residence and parted ways.

That evening, Sylvester was walking and, as he approached his mother's house, saw Defendant sitting outside cleaning the gun. Defendant was concerned because Metz knew that Hill had been with Sylvester. Defendant determined that he would go to Metz's residence.

When the pair arrived at Metz's, the door was unlocked, and she was asleep. Defendant told Sylvester to look for a bag of money. Defendant woke Metz, bound her with some sort of fabric, and instructed Sylvester to make several calls to Hill's phone.

Defendant forced the still-bound Metz into her car and further restrained her with the seat belt. He told Sylvester to follow them; they stopped at a filling station and put gasoline in a water bottle. They stopped again on Old Spanish Trail in Scott, where Defendant got out of Metz's vehicle and shot her. He then poured the gasoline and set the car ablaze. Defendant and Sylvester then drove back to Acadiana Park so Defendant could pick up the truck.

Sylvester testified that the next day he accompanied his aunt and uncle to Lake Charles. During this trip, Sylvester uploaded a video of himself on a beach pouring out a beer as a tribute to Hill. According to Detective Shea, a member of Hill's family saw that this video was posted to Hill's Instagram page by Sylvester.

While he was jailed, Sylvester penned lyrics to a song that referenced the use of a .380 weapon. This was the same caliber weapon used in the murders. Defendant attempted to introduce the lyrics of this song as a means of casting suspicion on Sylvester. The trial court refused to admit the lyrics pursuant to La.Code Evid. 404(B)(2), which excludes evidence of creative or artistic expression to prove a witness's character.

Dr. Yen Van Vo, an East Baton Rouge Parish Assistant Coroner and forensic pathologist, performed the autopsies on Hill and Metz. Dr. Vo found a through-and-through gunshot wound to Hill's back that passed through his spleen and heart and exited his chest. His skin was charred, and soot was present in his airways, which indicated that he was still alive after the car had been set ablaze.

The wound path Metz's body exhibited showed that she had been shot in the left side of her back. The bullet traveled through both her lungs and her spine and was lodged in her right shoulder. Dr. Vo retrieved the bullet and delivered it to law enforcement. Dr. Vo testified that a relatively high level of carbon monoxide in her blood indicated that Metz was alive longer than Hill after the respective cars had begun burning.

The State sought to introduce photographs of the autopsies. Defendant objected on the grounds that their probative value was outweighed by undue prejudice that would result from allowing the jury to see such gruesome depictions. Those photographs were shown to the jury as Dr. Vo explained what was depicted in each during her testimony.

Mark Kurowski of the Acadiana Crime Lab testified that he test-fired a bullet from a Sig Sauer P238 .380ACP firearm. The test-fired bullet markings matched those of the projectile recovered from Metz's body. The test-fired cartridge case was fired from the same firearm as that of a cartridge case found at the scene of Metz's murder. The handgun had been recovered from Defendant's house, and DNA recovered from the gun was likely Defendant's.

Captain Sonny Stutes of the Lafayette Parish Sheriff's Office testified as an expert in cell phone mapping. Captain Stutes’ review of cell phone records corroborated Sylvester's testimony regarding his, Defendant's, and the victims’ movements during the relevant time periods.

Defendant acknowledges that his DNA was found on the murder weapon but argues that other evidence showed he moved the pistol from Sylvester's residence, implying that his DNA was transferred at that time. He observes there were twelve DNA swabs of the weapon, two of which matched him, while others indicated unidentified individuals. In addition to the gun, Metz's keys and phone were also found at Defendant's residence.

Regarding the gun itself, Defendant observes that a month before trial, Sylvester told the State that he did not know how Defendant came to have the weapon at his house. However, Sylvester acknowledged that, while in jail, he had a video visit with his girlfriend Shakayla Bruno. During that visit, he told her to move the gun, which he called “Blackie.” It appears that at the time of the visit, he thought the gun was in his closet. Bruno then told him that Defendant had already taken the weapon. During cross-examination, defense counsel mentioned the discrepancy. Sylvester indicated it was simply a matter of faulty memory. In brief, Defendant claims that Sylvester attempted to distance himself from the use of guns; however, at trial, Sylvester acknowledged having threatened to shoot people in the past. Also, he had a tattoo of a firearm, specifically an AK. He also admitted to being stopped and arrested for possession of a handgun about three months before the instant offense. Defendant also emphasizes that Sylvester did not report the murders to the police. Sylvester explained that he did not want to implicate a member of his family or violate street code by being a “rat.” Further, Sylvester feared Defendant.

Defendant also urges that his participation in the crimes made no sense. However, Sylvester testified that Defendant wanted a share in the car theft enterprise Sylvester and Hill were engaged in.

Defendant's true issue with the sufficiency of the evidence is reduced to Sylvester's credibility. Under Kennerson, 695 So.2d 1367, determinations of credibility are solely the province of the factfinder. “This court will overturn a jury's credibility assessment only when a witness's own testimony demonstrates that the witness's ability to perceive events was impaired in some way.” State v. Hypolite, 04-1658, p. 5 (La.App. 3 Cir. 6/1/05), 903 So.2d 1275, 1279, writ denied, 06-618 (La. 9/22/06), 937 So.2d 381. We find no such impairment in Sylvester's perceptions, and his testimony was corroborated by other evidence. This assignment of error lacks merit.

Assignment of Error II:

During cross examination, Defendant was asked about whether he had sold drugs since his plea bargain. Sylvester denied having sold drugs since the plea. Defendant then sought to introduce evidence of calls Sylvester made from Rayburn Correctional Center that indicated that Sylvester was receiving and selling contraband drugs inside the facility. The State objected that uncharged offenses are not admissible. The trial court agreed, and Defendant then proffered the recorded calls and filed an application for supervisory review, which this court declined.

However, the supreme court disagreed with the district court's ruling, stating:

Writ granted. The trial court erred in sustaining the state's objection to the defendant's question about whether the witness has been involved in drug dealing from prison after the witness initially denied such activities and the defendant was in possession of jail communications that might be used to impeach the witness. Confrontation is a fundamental right. U.S. Const. amendment VII; La. Const. Art. I, section 16. Applicant has shown specific extrinsic evidence that contradicts the sworn testimony at trial of witness Sylvester. Applicant is entitled to cross-examine with this evidence to attack the credibility of the witness. La. C.E. art. 607(D)(2). Unduly repetitive or cumulative evidence may be regulated by the trial court in its discretion to conduct an orderly proceeding.

Willis, 383 So.3d at 910.

When Sylvester took the stand again, Defendant offered a letter written by Sylvester to LaTonia LaDelle in which he urged her not to smoke too much marijuana. He reminded her, “We sell that [$#!+], don't smoke it.” Sylvester then invoked his right against self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Defendant then asserted that after he denied selling drugs, Sylvester was barred from invoking his right against self-incrimination:

At that point in time, that subject matter becomes open and he cannot now, when confronted with the graphic evidence, hide from the fact that he clearly lied to the jury and that he was trying to deceive them.

He does not have an absolute right to a privilege against self-incrimination when, as we said, without objection from the State or any suggestion that he would invoke his right when asked whether he was dealing drugs during this time period from Rayburn, and he said he wanted the protection of the Fifth Amendment.

He cannot play a game and try and use -- deny and then, when confronted with the truth, try to run and hide behind the Fifth Amendment. That is not what for [sic] the purpose is.

In addition, we believe that his drug dealing is a theme that runs throughout this case, not only while he was in Rayburn that is most acute at this moment but from the very inception of this case and perhaps the reason why both Brouklynn Hill and Ashley Metz were killed on a drug deal. The State brought his drug dealing up, in direct testimony. So we think that that theme persists throughout.

Sylvester's attorney, who attended the trial, argued that on the one hand, the letter to LaDelle represented “more like a joke than actual evidence of a drug deal.” However, he added:

But if they are asking of a bad act in prison and they're going to confront him with these calls which might be used again by someone to find illegal activities down the road, okay, other than actual drug dealing. We discussed this outside.

But potentially if he's discussing drugs, they could hit him on conspiracy, introducing things into a penal institution, just based on the discussion or attempt with things like that on crimes other than actual drug dealing inside the prison.

The trial court ruled in favor of Sylvester and allowed him to invoke his right against self-incrimination. Defendant was allowed to introduce extrinsic evidence attacking Sylvester's credibility. A series of calls from prison between Sylvester and others were played to the jury. Transcripts of the calls were not published to the jury, though, nor was he allowed to introduce a Drug Enforcement Agency publication outlining drug slang.

The trial court was faced with the tension that often arises in criminal proceedings between a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to confront his accusers and an accuser's Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. The trial court in this matter chose to favor the accuser's right. We find that the trial court chose wrongly.

The supreme court ruled that Defendant was entitled to conduct his cross examination of Sylvester, subject to the limits on evidence normally afforded the trial court. Willis, 383 So.3d 910. When trial resumed, Sylvester invoked his right against self-incrimination regarding a subject on which he had previously testified.

It is well established that a witness, in a single proceeding, may not testify voluntarily about a subject and then invoke the privilege against self-incrimination when questioned about the details. See Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 373, 71 S.Ct. 438, 95 L.Ed. 344 (1951). The privilege is waived for the matters to which the witness testifies, and the scope of the “waiver is determined by the scope of relevant cross-examination,” Brown v. United States, 356 U.S. 148, 154–155, 78 S.Ct. 622, 2 L.Ed.2d 589 (1958). “The witness himself, certainly if he is a party, determines the area of disclosure and therefore of inquiry,” id., at 155, 78 S.Ct. 622. Nice questions will arise, of course, about the extent of the initial testimony and whether the ensuing questions are comprehended within its scope, but for now it suffices to note the general rule.

The justifications for the rule of waiver in the testimonial context are evident: A witness may not pick and choose what aspects of a particular subject to discuss without casting doubt on the trustworthiness of the statements and diminishing the integrity of the factual inquiry. As noted in Rogers, a contrary rule “would open the way to distortion of facts by permitting a witness to select any stopping place in the testimony,” 340 U.S., at 371, 71 S.Ct. 438. It would, as we said in Brown, “make of the Fifth Amendment not only a humane safeguard against judicially coerced self-disclosure but a positive invitation to mutilate the truth a party offers to tell,” 356 U.S., at 156, 78 S.Ct. 622. The illogic of allowing a witness to offer only self-selected testimony should be obvious even to the witness, so there is no unfairness in allowing cross-examination when testimony is given without invoking the privilege.

Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 321–22, 119 S.Ct. 1307, 1311–12, (1999).

The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment guarantees the right of an accused in a criminal prosecution “to be confronted with the witnesses against him.” The right of confrontation, which is secured for defendants in state as well as federal criminal proceedings, Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 85 S.Ct. 1065, 13 L.Ed.2d 923 (1965), “means more than being allowed to confront the witness physically.” Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S., at 315, 94 S.Ct., at 1110. Indeed, “ ‘[t]he main and essential purpose of confrontation is to secure for the opponent the opportunity of cross-examination.’ ” Id., at 315–316, 94 S.Ct., at 1110 (quoting 5 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 1395, p. 123 (3d ed. 1940)) (emphasis in original). Of particular relevance here, “[w]e have recognized that the exposure of a witness’ motivation in testifying is a proper and important function of the constitutionally protected right of cross-examination.” Davis, supra, at 316–317, 94 S.Ct., at 1110 (citing Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 496 79 S.Ct. 1400, 1413, 3 L.Ed.2d 1377 (1959)). It does not follow, of course, that the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment prevents a trial judge from imposing any limits on defense counsel's inquiry into the potential bias of a prosecution witness. On the contrary, trial judges retain wide latitude insofar as the Confrontation Clause is concerned to impose reasonable limits on such cross-examination based on concerns about, among other things, harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness’ safety, or interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant. And as we observed earlier this Term, “the Confrontation Clause guarantees an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish.” Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 20, 106 S.Ct. 292, 295, 88 L.Ed.2d 15 (1985) (per curiam ) (emphasis in original).

Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 678–79, 106 S. Ct. 1431, 1435 (1986) (emphasis in original).

From Mitchell and Van Arsdall, we can glean the following pronouncement: it is error to allow a witness to invoke his Fifth Amendment protections on a matter about which he has already testified, but the trial court's decision to allow the witness to do so is reviewed for harmless error.

Factors to be considered by the reviewing court include “the importance of the witness’ testimony in the prosecution's case, whether the testimony was cumulative, the presence or absence of evidence corroborating or contradicting the testimony of the witness on material points, the extent of cross-examination otherwise permitted, and, of course, the overall strength of the prosecution's case.” Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 684, 106 S.Ct. at 1438; State v. Wille, 559 So.2d 1321, 1332 (La.1990).

State v. Burbank, 01-831, pp. 3–4 (La.App. 4 Cir. 12/29/04), 893 So.2d 109, 112, writ denied, 05-325 (La. 12/16/05), 917 So.2d 1082. Even though the State's case rested completely on the testimony of the witness at issue, the fourth circuit found the error harmless because the jury was otherwise made aware of the witness's bias. Id.

Defendant introduced other evidence to make the jury aware of Sylvester's potential post-plea drug-related activities. The trial court's error was harmless. This assignment of error lacks merit.

Assignment of Error III:

Defendant objected to the introduction of photos taken at the scenes of the crimes and during the autopsies of Hill and Metz. On appeal, he argues that the probative value of the photos was substantially outweighed by the danger of undue prejudice. Specifically, Defendant objected to photos of the interior of the vehicles in which the victim's bodies were discovered. The bodies depicted in the photos are almost unrecognizable due to the extent of the burning. Metz's head was wrapped in some fabric, which the trial court specifically referenced in admitting the photos. One photograph was excluded as unduly gruesome and another as repetitive.

The autopsy photos were admitted in conjunction with and during Dr. Vo's testimony. These photos demonstrate the paths of the bullets that were fired at Hill and Metz. While those photos show internal organs, their highly probative nature cannot be denied.

The state is entitled to the moral force of its evidence, and postmortem photographs of murder victims are admissible to prove corpus delicti, to corroborate other evidence establishing cause of death, as well as location and placement of wounds and to provide positive identification of the victim. State v. Koon, 96–1208, p. 34 (La.5/20/97), 704 So.2d 756, 776; State v. Martin, 93–0285, p. 14 (La.10/17/94), 645 So.2d 190, 198. Photographic evidence will be admitted unless it is so gruesome as to overwhelm jurors’ reason and lead them to convict without sufficient other evidence. Koon, 96–1208 at p. 34, 704 So.2d at 776, citing State v. Perry, 502 So.2d 543, 558–59 (La.1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 872, 108 S.Ct. 205, 98 L.Ed.2d 156 (1987).

We agree that the photographs are indeed gruesome. This court regularly sees claims of ‘gruesome’ photographs in capital cases, but has reversed only once on these grounds in any case. State v. Morris, 245 La. 175, 157 So.2d 728 (1963) (gratuitous introduction of “gruesome and ghastly” photographs depicting the progress of an autopsy in an ‘increasing grotesque and revolting’ manner constituted reversible error when the defendant admitted that he killed the victim and contested only his state of mind). Admission of “gruesome photographs is not reversible error unless it is clear that their probative value is substantially outweighed by their prejudicial effect.” Martin, 93–0285 at pp. 14–15, 645 So.2d at 198. Cf., State v. Wessinger, 98–1234, pp 16–17 (La.5/28/99), 736 So.2d 162, 179 (photographic evidence “will be admitted unless it is so gruesome as to overwhelm the jurors’ reason and lead them to convict defendant absent other sufficient evidence.”)

State v. Broaden, 99-2124, pp. 22–23 (La. 2/21/01), 780 So.2d 349, 364. cert. denied, 534 U.S. 884, 122 S.Ct. 192 (2002). In Broaden, the court viewed the photos at issue as superfluous to the State's case but still upheld the conviction. Id. In the present case, not all the photos were genuinely gruesome, and those that were had genuine probative value. For these reasons, this assignment of error lacks merit.

Assignment of Error IV:

In his fourth assignment of error, Defendant argues that the district court erred by admitting a jail recording in which he asked a woman to hide a rifle. Further, he complains that the court erred by allowing photographs of the rifle to be admitted.

During the investigation of the offenses in this case, Detective Alicia Tenney of the Lafayette Police Department monitored jail telephone calls. On June 28, 2016, she heard a conversation between Defendant and Ieisha Sam. Defendant instructed Sam to hide various items, including something that was under the bed, which other evidence indicated was a rifle. The district court ruled that the conversation was admissible because Defendant had told a detective that he did not own a gun. Thus, the court decided that the jail call was pertinent to Defendant's credibility.

On appeal, Defendant argues the rifle was not relevant, as there was no allegation that it was the murder weapon. However, while he mentions the court's ruling, he does not address its basis, i.e., that it was pertinent to his credibility. The trial court's ruling is correct, as lying to police may be viewed as indicative of a guilty mind. See, e.g., State v. Quinn, 18-664, pp. 15–16 (La.App. 1 Cir. 3/27/19), 275 So.3d 360, 371, aff'd, 19-647 (La. 9/9/20), 340 So.3d 829, cert denied, ___U.S. ___, 141, S.Ct. 1406 (2021), State v. Allen, 11-610, p.13 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/7/11), 79 So.3d 1220, 1231, writ denied, 12-413 (La. 9/12/12), 99 So.3d 32, aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 12-412 (La. 10/26/12), 101 So.3d 41 (reinstated a conviction based on guilty knowledge), and State v. Henry, 46,406, p. 13 (La.App. 2 Cir. 8/10/11), 73 So.3d 958, 966.

This assignment of error lacks merit.

Assignment of Error V:

Defendant's fifth assignment of error argues that the district court erred by refusing to admit a recorded jail telephone call between him and Rachel Sylvester. The core of his argument is that the call was admissible as a business record and thus excepted from the hearsay rule. He made the same assertion at trial, after the State raised a hearsay-based objection. Business records are defined by La.Code Evid. art. 803(8):

The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is available as a witness:

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(6) Records of regularly conducted business activity. A memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, in any form, including but not limited to that which is stored by the use of an optical disk imaging system, of acts, events, conditions, opinions, or diagnoses, made at or near the time by, or from information transmitted by, a person with knowledge, if made and kept in the course of a regularly conducted business activity, and if it was the regular practice of that business activity to make and to keep the memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, all as shown by the testimony of the custodian or other qualified witness, unless the source of information or the method or circumstances of preparation indicate lack of trustworthiness. This exception is inapplicable unless the recorded information was furnished to the business either by a person who was routinely acting for the business in reporting the information or in circumstances under which the statement would not be excluded by the hearsay rule. The term ‘business’ as used in this Paragraph includes business, institution, association, profession, occupation, and calling of every kind, whether or not conducted for profit. Public records and reports which are specifically excluded from the public records exception by Article 803(8)(b) shall not qualify as an exception to the hearsay rule under this Paragraph.

We find no case on point, and neither party's brief offers one. The telephone recording at issue does not meet the requirements of article 808. The information was not supplied by “a person who was routinely acting for the [institution] in reporting the information.” And neither Defendant nor Ms. Sylvester were ‘reporting’ information to the jail.

Thus, the recording of the jail call did not qualify as a business record for purposes of the hearsay rule. This assignment of error lacks merit.

Assignment of Error VI:

Defendant argues the district court erred by not allowing state witness Sylvester's song lyrics to be admitted at trial. The controlling law on this issue is in La.Code Evid. art. 404(B)(b)(ii), which states:

Except as provided in Article 412 or as otherwise provided by law, creative or artistic expression is not admissible in a criminal case to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith, provided that the accused provides reasonable notice to the prosecution in advance of trial asserting that the evidence is creative or artistic expression. Evidence of creative or artistic expression may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake or accident, provided that upon request by the accused, the prosecution in a criminal case shall provide reasonable notice in advance of trial, of the nature of any such evidence it intends to introduce at trial for such purposes, or when it relates to conduct that constitutes an integral part of the act or transaction that is the subject of the present proceeding.

When he sought to introduce the song lyrics, which speak of shooting and killing and reference a .380 handgun, counsel for Defendant indicated that the purpose of the offering was to show that Sylvester acted in conformity with the lyrics, “And also that he had knowledge of the murders and that the songs reflect that as well.” This is clearly contrary to the dictates of Article 404(B)(b)(ii). Accordingly, the trial court properly excluded the song lyrics. This assignment of error lacks merit.

DECREE

Defendant's convictions and sentences are affirmed.

CONVICTIONS AND SENTENCES AFFFIRMED.

SHANNON J. GREMILLION JUDGE